John
Mason: As this is the first time that I have spoken on a
matter of religion in this Committee and as I suspect that we will have
a lot of discussion on religion in the sittings ahead of us, I want to
make it clear that I speak personally and not as a spokesperson for my
party. Among
the wider public there is a lot of concern about some of these issues,
but I accept that those of us who are seriously involved in religion
are probably a minority in society. I guess that the committed
Christian population is around 5 per cent. I know that there are people
in my party and I guess in other parties here who would question
whether we should even be discussing some of these issues, as we try to
tie together sexual orientation, sexual behaviour, religious belief and
religious behaviour and practice. This can be a difficult area, but the
Committee should have the opportunity to discuss the place of religion
in our
society. Some
people feel that religion is the poor relation of the protected
characteristics, and there is some evidence that employers and others
will tend to decide against religion if there is a clash of rights. If
it is the considered opinion of the Committee and of Parliament as a
whole that religion should come last, let us make that clear and accept
it. However, the matter should be discussed. I accept that the wider
Church has been very intolerant of minorities in the past, and perhaps
the rest of society now feels that it is time for the Church to take a
bit of a kicking for the next few years. If that is what society feels,
it has some right to do it.
I might
disagree with the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon on a few
things, but I respect his consistency and the fact that we know where
he is coming from. I hope that the Committee will not accept the two
amendments, which are not necessary and would damage religious freedom.
One purpose of the Bill is meant to be protection against
anti-religious discrimination, not enshrining it. The explanatory
statement accompanying amendment 215
says: “This
is to make sure that organisations or individuals cannot use exemptions
based on religion or belief to discriminate on another ground for
example against persons whose lifestyle, because they are gay or
unmarried, is not consistent with orthodox practice of that religion or
belief.” That
recognises that the orthodox teaching of most of the main world
religions—Christianity, Islam and Judaism, although there are
others—is that sexual activity outside marriage is morally
wrong, yet the amendment seeks to dictate to adherents of those
religions that they could not apply such teachings in their own
affairs. It would tell them that they could not live those teachings
out and ensure that certain manifestations of orthodox religious faith
were
illegal. I
used the words “seeks to” because, as we heard last week
in the evidence session relating to schedule 9, there are large
question marks over whether the Bill narrows the already fairly limited
protections for employment in Churches. All such religious
organisations want is to be able to insist on staff whose lifestyle
does not contradict the teaching of their religion. It might be that
the effect desired under amendment 215 is already achieved under the
Bill, but we shall return to that another
day. The
views on sexual ethics that amendment 215 targets are mainstream views
that religious groups generally hold and have held. Along with views on
many other ethical issues untouched by the Bill, those views are very
dear to them. They have upheld such beliefs in their churches and
places of worship, in their own internal affairs, with little
complaint, and it is what they teach from the pulpits and what they try
to practise in their own
lives. Whether
we agree with those religious groups is not the real issue, and as
parliamentarians surely we do not exist to legislate on the beliefs of
adherents to any religion. It is hard to see why there should be
opposition to the idea that religious groups should regard living in
accordance with their teachings on sexual ethics as a necessary part of
observance of their faith. There are two sets of employment protections
for religious groups—that has already been referred to. One set
allows for discrimination based on religion or belief, while another
allows discrimination on other grounds, such as sexual orientation.
They are referred to under paragraphs 3 and 2 respectively of schedule
9. Amendment
215 would impose further limits and protections, which already require
religious groups to jump through hoops just to maintain their basic
freedom of association. It would provide more opportunity for people
hostile to the views of religious organisations to try to haul them
before employment tribunals in an effort to make them change their
beliefs. We have already seen that in cases brought against Christian
organisations by the British Humanist Association and by
Stonewall. Churches
and other religious organisations—and, I would suggest,
non-religious organisations—should have the right not to employ
someone with views seriously at
variance with their basic teaching. Surely we should leave such cases
well alone and promote diversity and understanding, rather than a
uniform greyness in our
society. It
is my desire not that the Churches impose their will on everyone else,
but that we, as minority groups, should be able to live with each other
in society. Do we really want to make it easier for people to sue
Churches?
Dr.
Harris: Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that it would be
illegal, and rightly so, for a gay organisation or a gay bar to sack
someone on the basis of their religious belief? Are not the amendment
and the Bill, with which he disagrees, just asking for reciprocity and
recognising that there are narrow exemptions that get religious
organisations and employers out of that duty of reciprocity? Does he
accept that religious people benefit from anti-discrimination
legislation because they are protected from being dismissed on account
of their religious
views?
John
Mason: I am totally committed to reciprocity, if that
means that we treat each other equally and respect each other’s
differences even when we disagree. I am not looking for special
protection for religious groups. However, I suggest that a gay
organisation should expect, when recruiting, that someone working for
it should be committed to its ethos, as I would expect in the Churches.
If someone is working for a gay organisation and changes their views to
the extent of being opposed to that organisation, the long-term
employment relationship would be extremely
difficult. 12.45
pm
Mr.
Boswell: Further to the intervention that the hon.
Gentleman is dealing with, before the memory of it fades, would he not
agree that one of the concerns for people with religious faith is that
some of the protections already in place may not be as strong as
previously thought, or may be faltering? I am thinking, for example, of
persons of faith and their attitude to Sunday
employment.
John
Mason: A number of religious groups—I am not saying
that it is all of them—would perceive that there is a move in
society broadly against religion. Things that were assumed in the past,
such as no ferries in the Western Isles on Sundays and such like, are
being challenged or questioned, whereas in the past people accepted
them without really thinking about the
matter.
Dr.
Harris: I want to bring the hon. Gentleman back to his
remarks on ethos—I know he has his notes to hand. Is he saying
that one can be correctly perceived as opposing the ethos of an
organisation merely on the basis of one’s sexual
orientation?
John
Mason: Earlier, the hon. Gentleman was saying that we
cannot distinguish between sexual orientation and sexual practice. I am
now wondering whether he is suggesting that we are separating the two.
I must admit that I am somewhat confused by his
position.
Dr.
Harris: I shall ask the question in two parts. Regardless
of whether the hon. Gentleman believes that sexual orientation and the
manifestation of that sexual orientation in a lawful way are one and
the same, does he believe that simply by being of a certain sexual
orientation one can be against an ethos of an organisation? Or does he
believe that, by practising the manifestation of that sexual
orientation within the law, one can be against the ethos of that
organisation? Is that his
contention?
John
Mason: What I am trying to say is that a religious
organisation might perceive its ethos and standards as tighter than,
and being of a different level from, what is allowed in society
generally. Going back to the example of a youth worker, which is
specifically mentioned as an example on page 181 of the explanatory
notes, someone who is working for a Church as a youth worker,
effectively in a pastoral role with young people and teaching them that
the only place that they should have sex is within a committed
marriage, it is difficult to consider how that person could themselves
believe the exact opposite, whether it be sex outside marriage with the
opposite gender or with the same gender. I find it hard in that
situation to split between sexual orientation and sexual
practice. Going
back to my speech, these are religious matters that are internal to
religious organisations. We should tread carefully before legislating
on such sensitive issues. People who disagree with the beliefs of
religious organisations have the freedom to seek employment elsewhere,
but religious organisations have nowhere else to go to exercise their
freedom of association if the law forces them to employ people who
reject the tenets of their faith. I am happy to accept that it is more
difficult once someone is in employment and changes their position.
However, the large majority of cases that we are thinking about arise
when recruiting staff. Strangely enough, although the explanatory
statement mentions the unmarried, it is perfectly legal to dismiss a
church youth worker who moves in with a partner of the opposite sex.
Nothing in the Bill would change that—it would still be lawful.
The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon explained a little more
about what he meant by amendment 216. I have been left guessing as to
what kind of organisation he was referring
to.
Dr.
Harris: I am not sure that that is right. I would be
grateful if the Minister clarified the situation in her remarks. I am
not sure that a heterosexual, having lawful heterosexual sex, is not a
manifestation of their sexual orientation. I agree that the issue is
trickier, because they are not usually a discriminated-against group. I
caution the hon. Gentleman against asserting so solidly that someone
can be dismissed on the basis of a lawful relationship in their private
life unless they are covered by the narrow provision that deals with
those in a proselytising role—if I may describe paragraph 2(8)
of schedule 9 in that way—especially under the European
convention on human
rights.
John
Mason: I stand to be corrected by those with greater legal
knowledge, but as a general principle, many associations that have
nothing to do with religion have sets of rules that it is possible to
break while remaining within the law. An example is having to wear a
tie in Committee. There is therefore a distinction.
We received
clarification earlier on the kind of organisations at which amendment
216. For example, political parties with a religious bent should not
receive special treatment. I am happy to agree with the hon. Member for
Oxford, West and Abingdon on that point. I am probably less sympathetic
to religious parties than him because I would rather see people of
religion in all parties. However, the proposal could damage religious
organisations whose beliefs overlap incidentally with certain public
policy positions. For example, a requirement that an employee believes
in good stewardship of the environment would be a natural outworking of
the faith of many religious bodies. However, it appears that amendment
216 would allow somebody who rejects that belief to claim that they are
being unlawfully discriminated against if they are turned down for a
job. Similarly, religious groups that believe that marriage should be
promoted in public policy could be sued, even though a belief in that
view is an obvious requirement for them to make of a new
employee. Many
religious bodies are also registered charities. They cannot advocate
support for political parties, but the Charity Commission recognises
their freedom to advocate positions that overlap with those of
political parties. The commission’s guidance document, CC9,
“Speaking out: Guidance on Campaigning and Political Activity by
Charities”, states under the heading, “Support for
policies”: “It
is acceptable for a charity to advocate support for a particular policy
advocated by a political party or candidate, provided that the policy
supports the charity’s purposes. However a charity must not
support a political party or
candidate.” Clearly,
if a charity advocates a policy and is recruiting a worker to promote
it, the charity must be able to insist that he or she supports that
policy. The fact that the charity is religious should not deprive it of
that
freedom. If
amendment 216 achieved its goal, it would create an obvious injustice,
because we as political parties can impose requirements about
supporting policy positions on our staff, yet religious groups would be
deprived of that freedom. As it happens, some politics is not protected
ground. Any employer, religious or not, could require support for a
political party as a pre-condition of employment and nobody could sue
them. I do not advocate that, but I simply point out that one cannot
sue for political discrimination—and rightly so, because that
would create a
minefield. Finally,
it is ironic that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon tabled
amendments 215 and 216, as well as amendment 217 in the next group. I
do not intend to speak to it, but it is worth pointing out that
although amendments 215 and 216 would impose new limits on the
manifestation of religion, amendment 217 would widen the legal right to
manifest sexual orientation. That would mean religion being further
relegated within equality law and more narrowly defined than other
strands. I hope that the Minister and the Committee will not give
religious bodies further cause for concern about the impact of the new
legislation and will oppose the two
amendments.
The
Solicitor-General: The intention behind amendment 215 is
to ensure that organisations or individuals do not misuse the various
exceptions available to religious organisations to discriminate against
people unlawfully because aspects of their lifestyle, such as sexual
orientation,
are not in keeping with the tenets of the religion or belief in
question. My note says that that fails entirely to understand the
construction of the Bill, but I will not read it
out. The
Bill identifies each of the nine characteristics that we are seeking to
protect and gives precise definitions of what constitutes each of them.
As such, it is clear what each characteristic is and what level of
protection is afforded to it. Although I appreciate that a
person’s religious belief should not be used to justify unlawful
discrimination, I consider that the Bill makes it entirely clear that
that is not
permitted. Where
discrimination takes place, the protected characteristic is the ground
on which the discrimination takes place. Any protected characteristic
that the perpetrator of the discrimination may possess is not relevant.
For instance, the exception available to religious organisations in
schedule 23 sets out exactly what such organisations can and cannot do
in relation to other protected
characteristics. Where
a person is discriminated against because of his or her sexual
orientation, the reason for that discrimination is because of their
sexual orientation, irrespective of the motive of the person actually
causing the discrimination. It would not matter that a person claimed
that they were acting in a particular way because of their religions
beliefs. The discrimination would still be because of the
characteristic of sexual orientation, so any exception that could be
considered applicable because of religion or belief would not come into
play. I
pause just to appreciate and acknowledge the concerns of the hon.
Member for Glasgow, East, were the Government to accept the
amendments—which they will not do. He knows that there are some
religious exceptions. Indeed, Committee members have debated those a
little bit this afternoon, even though we have yet to reach them
because they are in schedule 9. However, we do not think that those
exceptions have narrowed. We have no intentions of facilitating a
kicking for religion in any way at all. The religious exceptions have
been carried forward in the way that they were before.
The hon. Gentleman made a number of significant
points, but, with respect to him, I will not rehearse them in detail,
because we will not accept the amendments. Therefore his worries can, I
hope, be set
aside. On
amendment 216, the same answer that I have given on the question of
sexual orientation applies to public policy. Adhering to a particular
aspect of public policy is not a protected strand, but if there were
some way in which it was discriminatory to deal with somebody for
holding a particular belief, somehow, within one of the protected
characteristics, then the reasoning why it was done and the religious
position that gave rise to that discrimination would not facilitate the
actions of the person who, none the less, discriminated, because, as I
have already said, the discrimination would be because of the
characteristic protected. Despite there being a religious motivation,
that does not save anyone from being guilty of
discrimination. The
Bill makes it clear—I am not sure whether the hon. Member for
Oxford, West and Abingdon thought it did not—that a
person’s political beliefs are not captured by any of the
provisions that apply to religion or belief. There is abundant case law
showing that political beliefs are not covered by the current
legislation, which the Bill mirrors, pretty well precisely, and that
case law will still apply. The explanatory notes reiterate that point. I
am sure that the hon. Gentleman has read those notes and seen that that
is
so. It
is pretty clear already that a person’s political
beliefs would not be captured in the way that amendment 216 seeks to
prevent. I hope that I have dealt with the point regarding public
policy and I have said all that the Government wish to say about
amendment 215. I respectfully urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw
amendment 215. It has been a most interesting
debate.
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