Clause
49Meaning
of references to being in breach of immigration
laws Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Woolas: Very briefly, this clause is also part of the
jigsaw puzzle. The clause title is a phrase that occurs in various
parts of nationality legislation and, like the good character
requirement in clause 48, is not a new requirement, as is explained in
the explanatory notes. We are moving it into the 1981 British
Nationality Act so that it sits alongside the provisions to which it
relates. It does not change policy or the law in its
application; it moves the piece of legislation from nationality law to
immigration law. As such, it is part of the simplification process to
achieve greater consistency within our
legislation. Question
put and agreed
to. Clause
49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the
Bill. Clause
50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
51Entry
otherwise than by sea or air: immigration
control Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: Government amendments 34 and
37. Government
new clause 3—Common Travel
Area. I
think that the Minister should rise to his
feet.
Mr.
Woolas: Thank you, Sir Nicholas, for that ruling, which I
believe is helpful to our understanding of this
clause. Let
me explain what we are doing here. As it stands, clause 51 concerns the
common travel area of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and
the smaller islands—the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands and so
on. We have moved new clause 3 to replace clause 51; I will be asking
the Committee to reject the stand part motion. The common travel area
derives from section 1(3) of the Immigration Act 1971, which relates to
a person arriving in the United Kingdom from any of the islands or the
Republic of Ireland. That has governed travel between these two
countries since that time and, indeed, before it. Amendments 34 and 37
are consequential on new clause 3. I should also draw attention to the
fact that amendment 31 would be opposed, although I think that has not
actually been selected.
11.15
am
The
Chairman: No, it has not.
Mr.
Woolas: Thank you, Sir Nicholas. I would have opposed it,
had it been, for consistency reasons.
The world is
very different from the place it was when the common travel area came
into existence. There is much more travel, and it is faster and
relatively cheaper for those who make journeys. Because that is the
case for legal journeys, it is also true for illegal journeys, whether
they involve illegal migrants and/or those who are engaged in criminal
activity. The common travel area that defines the border controls or
lack thereof, is by its nature presenting a risk to border control. It
is being exploited by illegal immigrants and serious organised crime to
assist their criminal activity. We saw that in the press very recently,
when an investigation by the French immigration forces exposed a
criminal gang that was bringing people in club class from Paris to the
United Kingdom, via Ireland. That took advantage of the common travel
area. Our evidence is that there are some 8,000 immigration offenders
travelling each year between the Republic of Ireland and the UK on air
and sea routes alone.
Mr.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con): Could the Minister explain
to the Committee how many immigration offenders are in the United
Kingdom? We have to put that 8,000 in
context.
Mr.
Woolas: We apprehended 28,000 clandestine entries last
year. That is not visa abuse but, in layperson’s terms, people
who have got in on the back of a lorry.
Overall, in terms of people here illegally—I am picking this
phrase very carefully—I think the hon. Gentleman knows that
nobody knows. By definition, one does not
know.
Mr.
Blunt: The point I wanted to make is that when the
Minister says 8,000 immigration offenders, it could be drawn from a
category of over 1 million people resident in the United
Kingdom.
Mr.
Woolas: The figure of 8,000 is our estimate of the
clandestine and organised illegal routes. To compare like with like,
you would have to look at the following. Basically, we believe the
criminal gangs try to organise routes through our ports, particularly
through Calais to Dover, through the tunnel and on the ferries. The
more effective we have been at closing those routes off, the more
alternative routes have come into play—particularly
Ireland.
Let me answer
the hon. Gentleman’s question more specifically. To give a like
for like comparison, the number of illegal immigrants detected in Kent
was 14,600 in 2001, and it was 1,800 last year. My hon. Friend the
Member for Dover has raised this issue in the House on many occasions
and I would argue that this figure shows the success of the border
controls there. The number of detections through visa fingerprinting in
2008 was around 4,000. That refers to cases identified for the whole of
the system where the detection has been based exclusively on
fingerprints. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman some comparison for
the scale of the problem we are dealing
with. Paul
Rowen (Rochdale) (LD): On the Minister’s figure of
8,000, the Republic of Ireland operates a border system, so if someone
is going from Calais to Dublin, are they not apprehended by the Irish
authorities, or are they not operating a border
system?
Mr.
Woolas: That is a very good point. The Republic of Ireland
has indeed introduced an electronic borders system similar to ours. We
are responsible for the United Kingdom, however, and of course the
Republic of Ireland’s visa arrangements are up to them. It is
also true, of course, that the European Union non-Schengen countries
include the Republic of Ireland as well as the UK, so we do have common
cause with Ireland, but the problem goes both ways. The argument that
the hon. Gentleman has put is put very forcibly the other way round in
Dublin, because of the number of transits and because the Republic of
Ireland is an EU country. The powers that we are asking for in the new
clause and the amendments, in rejecting the proposed clause as it
stands, do exist in similar terms in Ireland, including at the land
border, as I will go on to
argue. The
hon. Member for Reigate, in asking about the 8,000, raises an important
point. Our particular concern is about organised crime. The claim has
been made that our proposed clause abolishes the common travel area. It
is not our policy, nor our intent, nor the practical impact of our
proposals to abolish the common travel area. We have reconfirmed our
commitment to that, because of the social and economic benefits that it
brings. It is the third-country nationals who are illegal who are of
concern to us. Our changes will not prevent British citizens or Irish
nationals entering freely, as they do now, and we do not anticipate
that there will be a
noticeable impact on the journey for the vast
majority of passengers. The CTA is based on the principle that, once a
person has been granted leave to enter one part of the CTA, they will
not normally require leave to enter the UK. That point does not change.
Those who enter the UK from another part of the CTA will be able to
enter freely, unless they fall within an excepted category—for
example, those who are subject to an outstanding deportation
order. In
order to preserve its benefits, we need a proportionate response to the
risks we now face. We remain committed to working with Ireland to
further secure the external CTA border—the point the hon. Member
for Rochdale makes—but we must also act to protect our borders
by allowing for immigration controls on those travelling on intra-CTA
routes. The concept of immigration control within the CTA is not new.
The Irish Government do not believe such controls are inimical to the
CTA; as I have said, they have applied an immigration control on
third-country nationals arriving directly from the UK for more than a
decade. The
UK does not currently have the clear legislative power to control
non-European economic area/third-country nationals entering the UK from
elsewhere in the CTA. The Government believe that that is simply not
acceptable, especially as we need to tighten our borders in order to
face up to the risks that the modern world faces and the increase in
global movement of people. That is why we are seeking to reinstate the
Government's original clause, which is new clause 3, which was taken
out in the other place, to enable controls on air and sea routes for
people travelling within the common travel area and an ability by Order
in Council to control the land border, subject to parliamentary
approval, under section 10.
We believe
that the power will be used proportionately on all routes. Those
travelling by air and sea between the Republic of Ireland and the UK
will be required to carry a passport or national identity card. We will
also use the e-Borders system to increase our ability to respond
proportionately to threat. We propose a very modest use of the power in
relation to journeys from the Crown dependencies, the islands, because
we know that the risk is much lower, although I must guard against
displacement—the possibility that the tougher a control is made,
the more displacement can occur to other areas. There are examples of
small air and sea craft being used to get round our border controls,
for purposes of illegal migration and illegal entry of goods.
Damian
Green: The logic of the Minister’s argument is that
there are weaknesses in the Irish Government’s border controls.
Does he think that Irish border controls are better or worse than UK
border
controls?
Mr.
Woolas: The hon. Gentleman’s policy of opposing
e-Borders, or the bits of them with relevance to the question, would,
if applied to the Republic of Ireland, create an open back door into
the United Kingdom. That is the practical answer, and the hon.
Gentleman’s policy needs to change. As he knows, and as I said
on Second Reading, I am not responsible for border control in the
Republic of Ireland, and I imagine that if I suggested I were there
would be severe political implications, for which I should not want to
be held responsible.
The hon.
Gentleman makes a good point, however, in that there is a challenge for
us all—I think that the question was raised on Second
Reading—with respect to the benefits of travel by Irish
nationals and UK citizens between our two countries; the island
dependencies are relevant as well. How do we keep the advantage and not
disrupt the travel experience, and yet have effective control of the
border? The powers that we are taking are powers to require the
carrying of identification. They are not powers—except with
respect to third-country nationals, for whom we would want to take
those powers—to stop travel. We cannot, under the powers,
restrict freedom of movement for Irish nationals and UK citizens; this
is about the third-country
nationals. Clause
51 as it stands prevents any form of immigration control on those who
have arrived in the UK over the land border between the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland. I want to make it clear that both
political and practical considerations mean that fixed or routine
controls on the land border are not a viable option; but that does not
mean that we, or the Republic of Ireland, should do nothing. Tightening
controls on air and sea routes without making provision for any
activity on the land border would increase the risk of displacement and
at the same time reduce our ability to tackle it. We would push the
criminal gangs on to the land route—those that are not already
using it. That would clearly undermine our intention of strengthening
the border and, indeed, reforming the
CTA. We
propose, on the land border, the capacity to mount targeted,
intelligence-led operations in response to the level of threat. There
will be no routine presence at the border. We will not require persons
crossing the land border to carry a passport or national identity
document.
Paul
Rowen: Given the past history of the troubles in Northern
Ireland, surely we already have powers to stop anyone moving between
the borders, without the need for the present imposition. If not, what
did we do during the
troubles? 11.30
am
Mr.
Woolas: The hon. Gentleman asks the question that I asked
when being briefed on the debate in the other place. We do not
currently have the clear power to control persons entering the UK by
that route. As it stands, clause 51 would prevent us from having it. In
relation to immigration—not in relation to other powers for
which the Bill is not responsible—if we have reason to believe
that illegal migration is taking place across that border, we do not
have the power to deal with it. I ask the Committee to give us that
power.
Paul
Rowen: I hear what the Minister says but he talked about
criminal activity. There seems to be a great deal of confusion in the
Home Office about the use of the powers.
Mr.
Woolas: There is no confusion in the Home Office. There is
an urgent request to Parliament to grant us the power that we need. I
agree that there has been confusion over the interpretation of what is
being proposed, for good and perhaps not such good reasons. The hon.
Gentleman will be aware of the potential misrepresentation
of the policy in parts of the United Kingdom and in Ireland. Again we
come to the crux of the powers we are seeking. To stop immigration and
customs abuse, we believe that our officials need those powers.
Currently, we have to deal with those activities that may be related to
criminal activity after they have taken place. With the powers, we will
be able to deal with them at that border, as we do at airports and
other
borders.
Paul
Rowen: I am listening very carefully to the
Minister’s explanation. He quoted a figure of 8,000 illegal
immigrants. Page 8 of the summary table in the impact assessment, which
refers to the 10-year cost or benefit, includes the reduction in
imported asylum cases, and abuse of the
immigration system, as not quantified; increased border security as not
quantified; the reduction in the number of illegal migrants and
potential reduction in illegal working as not quantified; and the
reduction in cross-border crime, including serious organised crime, as
not quantified. If the Minister is seriously asking us to accept his
amendment, he needs to do a lot better than the other place and what he
has provided in the information before
us.
Mr.
Woolas: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his perceptive
comments and for reading the impact assessment. The matter he raises
relates to displacement. In border control, one continually deals with
displacement: displacement of routes through Europe and from other
parts of the world into Europe, and displacement of criminal activity
in relation to drug smuggling. For example, because of the success of
our forces in the Caribbean, cocaine smuggling from South America is
now often displaced to western Africa. He will have seen reports of the
operations to stop cocaine smuggling via the Republic of Ireland. I
refer him to the case last year where we tracked across the Atlantic a
yacht bound for Ireland. In terms of the overall impact, there is no
figure, as he rightly points out. There are other factors to bear on
that. Estimates and impact assessments have to be justifiable. They are
not based on the whim of the Minister. My figure of 8,000 relates to
the number of people who we estimate, through our intelligence and
security forces, have been able to abuse that border—not just
the land border, but the air and sea routes as well.
No one knows
exactly how much abuse there has been. We use intelligence from, for
example, country of origin, those who have been involved in
people-trafficking routes and the underground. It is not a scientific
process, therefore. I can assert, however, with absolute certainty that
there is an Achilles heel in our border control. The measures on the
common travel area are designed to address
that.
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