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Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many applications for extension of service from members of the armed forces approaching retirement have been declined in each year since 2000. 
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average percentage shortfall against requirement for the infantry rank of (a) private and (b) lieutenant colonel was in each year since 2003. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The available data on average percentage surplus or shortfall of privates and lieutenant colonels for the infantry are provided in the following table. Consistent infantry requirement data for 2003 and 2004 are not available at the level of detail requested.
|Financial year||Lieutenant Colonel (surplus)||Private (shortfall)|
|(1) Based on first 11 months of the financial year.|
1. The figures are for trained Regular Army only and therefore exclude Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service, Mobilised Reserves, TA and all other Reserves, but includes those personnel that have transferred from GURTAM to UKTAP.
2. The information is based on paid rank.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the estimated cost of the Astute-class submarine from the (a) direct resource departmental expenditure limit (DEL), (b) indirect resource DEL and (c) capital DEL was at 31 March (i) 2001, (ii) 2002, (iii) 2003, (iv) 2004, (v) 2005, (vi) 2006, (vii) 2007, (viii) 2008 and (ix) 2009. 
|As at 31 March each year|
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the expenditure incurred at the Atomic Weapons Establishment of £800 million in 2008-09, £900 million in 2009-10 and £950 million in 2010-11 is additional to (a) the capital cost of warheads included in the Defence White Paper, (b) the £5.3 billion 25 year AWEML and management contract, (c) the running costs of the current Trident programme and (d) settlements made under the Comprehensive Spending Review. 
Mr. Hutton: The figure of £5.3 billion was the estimated 25-year management and operation costs produced when the AWE Management and Operation contract was extended to a 25 year term. This was published on 22 January 2003, Official Report, column 14WS. Since 1 April 2008 the financial planning for AWE has made no distinction between these costs and additional investment associated with the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP), which was announced on 19 July 2005, Official Report, column 59WS. The figures of £800, £900 and £950 million quoted therefore comprise both additional NWCSP investment and the underlying management and operation costs for the years in question.
£2-3 billion for the possible future refurbishment or replacement of the warhead.
The decision on whether to refurbish or replace the warhead has yet to be made and will likely be necessary in the next Parliament. This cost is not reflected in any of the figures quoted in the question.
In service costs of the current Trident programme were provided in a response to the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker), on 13 November 2008, Official Report, column 1302W. These did not include the cost of AWE.
Finally, the 2007 pre-Budget report and comprehensive spending review White Paper (Cm 7227), made clear in paragraph D8.7 that additional NWCSP funding, (which is incorporated within the £800, £900 and £950 million figures) was provided to continue the programme of investment in sustaining key skills and facilities at AWE,
both to ensure we can maintain our existing nuclear warhead for as long as necessary and to enable development of a replacement warhead should that be necessary.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: I will place a copy of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept in the Library of the House. I am withholding the document requested on the Concept for Special Operations as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice international relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) military and (b) civilian staff of his Department carried out work on the 1998 Strategic Defence Review; which other Departments provided staff to carry out such work; what discussions his Department had with the governments of other countries during that review; how many days were taken to complete it; and how much was spent on it. 
Mr. Hutton: A very wide range of civilian and military staff carried out work on the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. The Department also received over one hundred inputs from staff as part of the consultation process. An exact record of the number of staff who contributed work is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
The first stage of the review was conducted jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in consultation with the Cabinet Office. The Treasury were informed at all stages. The Department of Trade and Industry were involved in all work with industrial ramifications. The views of all Departments on the options arising from the review work were gauged within a Cabinet Office inter-departmental committee.
Our NATO allies and other partners were kept fully informed of the process during the period of the review. The NATO and WEU Secretary Generals, Defence Ministers of NATO allies and Five Power Defence Arrangements and Gulf Co-operations Councils were kept informed in letters and at a broad range of NATO and bilateral meetings.
The exact cost of the review is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. However, we assess the cost to be in the region of £2.3 million. This does not include normal staff costs, as all MOD staff involved in the work completed it as part of their day to day activities.
Willie Rennie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the surplus of income over expenditure was at the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency base at Crombie in each of the last five years. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: Due to changes in the MODs maritime business there was a need to conduct further analysis into the future requirement for the provision of support services by DSDA Crombie and it was decided it would be unwise to transfer the ownership of the site before this work was completed.
Willie Rennie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent representations he has received from Commander-in-Chief Fleet on the minimum number of posts required to ensure the safe conduct of operations at the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency, Crombie. 
Willie Rennie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Defence Equipment and Support risk register for the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency base at Crombie includes a minimum staff requirement. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: The minimum staff requirement does not appear on the DE&S risk register but is recorded on the technical site risk register. Also, DSDA is undertaking a study looking at DSDA Crombie's future tasking. In common with all similar projects, a risk register is being produced that will include staffing matters and articulate any perceived risks.
Willie Rennie: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the recommendation of the Investments Approval Board was on the minimum number of posts for the safe conduct of operations at the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency base at Crombie. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: In February 2006, The Future Role of Crombie Study made recommendations as to the future role and manpower requirements at DSDA Crombie. These recommendations were approved by the then Minister of State for Armed Forces. At the time it was determined that 26 posts would enable the safe and effective running of DSDA Crombie, as the site was to reduce to that of a jetty/waterfront support operation upon the intended drawdown of explosive storage and processing activity by 31 March 2010. Prior to the full implementation of the recommendations, additional work was transferred to Crombie from other DSDA sites, which brought with it an increase in manpower of 14 posts, although future manpower requirements at the site are still being considered. I will write when this work is finalised.
Information on the MOD's PFI commitments is published in our Annual Report and Accounts, copies of which have been placed in the Library of the House and are available online under the MOD's Freedom of Information Publication Scheme, found at the following link:
Mr. Kevan Jones: Following a change in naming convention, the position of Director Business Resilience replaced that of Director General Security and Safety; it is a full-time post. In keeping with civil service policy on promoting work force diversity and alternative working patterns, full-time positions can be filled by one or more individuals with flexible-working contracts, provided the Department is satisfied that the key outputs of the post can be maintained. The Director Business Resilience post is currently filled on this basis.
Mr. Kevan Jones: The Department is unable to provide this information as it is not held in the format requested. However, I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on recruitment advertising on 23 February 2009, Official Report, columns 23-24W, to the hon. Member for North Devon (Nick Harvey).
Bob Spink: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 27 January 2009, Official Report, columns 311-12W, on official cars, how many of the cars leased by (a) his Department and (b) its agencies are over six years old. 
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