NETWORK CAPACITY
22. The
Government's approach to increasing capacity on the rail network
through investment in infrastructure is over-cautious. While we
welcome the small-scale measures such as platform lengthening
and station re-modelling included in the High Level Output Statement,
we are convinced that significant investment in new rail lines
will be essential, and the Government must join Network Rail to
plan for significant expansion of the network sooner rather than
later. An investment plan to remove those among the 15 pinch points,
identified in the 1998 White Paper, which have not already been
remedied, should be produced urgently. (Paragraph 98)
23. We welcome the
Government's commitment not to close railway lines. However, we
find the Minister's argument against the possibility of re-opening
disused lines less than convincing. The notion that the immediate
availability of rolling stock should dictate whether a rail line
is reopened puts the cart before the horse. If there is sound
justification for reopening a line, either because extra capacity
or a diversionary route is required, then rolling stock will simply
have to be acquired for it. (Paragraph 99)
24. The time and cost
involved in developing new railway lines from scratch is vast,
compared to the cost of preserving and maintaining the large network
of disused lines for possible future use. The Government must
make a commitment that all disused lines with any potential for
future rail use, be it as part of the strategic rail network or
as diversionary routes, should be preserved. Where such lines
are put to other uses, this must be reversible so that they can
be re-commissioned, should the reopening of the railway become
an option. (Paragraph 101)
25. The 1,300 new
carriages pledged in the High Level Output Statement are much
needed and very welcome. But it is clear that, due to the growth
in rail patronage, the new stock is unlikely to relieve overcrowding
significantly. (Paragraph 107)
26. We note how little
new rolling stock is going to be available to areas outside London
and the South East. We expect the Government to address this imbalance
through the cascading of rolling stock throughout the system.
It is essential that all rolling stock is well matched to the
circumstances and requirements of individual lines and that old
rolling stock is not replaced by newer, but less suitable cars.
(Paragraph 108)
27. It is entirely
appropriate that strategic decisions about rolling stock procurement
and specification should be taken centrally. Given the level of
fragmentation of the industry, there is no other way to ensure
sensible use of tax-payers' money for long-term investments such
as rolling stock. However, we are concerned that the Department
may not have adequate and appropriate expertise to handle such
vital strategic decisions in-house, and to do so efficiently.
Matters of such importance should not be left to expensive external
consultants. (Paragraph 111)
28. We look forward
to the Competition Commission's report on the rolling stock market
in the UK, due in 2009. In the meantime, the Department must improve
its rolling stock procurement strategy so as to create a stable
and consistent pattern of procurement. By doing so, it will achieve
the best value for money for tax payers, and it will ensure that
Britain can continue to have a rolling stock industry. (Paragraph
113)
29. We welcome the
Government's commitment to re-modelling stations that are significant
pinch points on the strategic rail network. We acknowledge the
importance of improving the serious passenger overcrowding at
Birmingham New Street Station, but we are not convinced that the
current project is adequate. The Government must address the issue
of whether Birmingham New Street is ever going to be able to accommodate
the throughput of trains required in two or three decades, when
the number of services might have doubled. If the station cannot
be adapted to such throughputs, then the Government must look
for alternative solutions now. (Paragraph 117)
30. We welcome the
Minister's assertion that the Government is looking at other major
pinch points on the network such as Manchester, and that investments
to remodel such stations might be forthcoming. We remind the Government
that the elimination of such pinch points on the rail network
in the north of England is vital to achieve the rail capacity
improvements, which in turn will underpin efforts to drive up
economic growth and prosperity in the region. We do not expect
to wait till the next HLOS before action is taken. (Paragraph
118)
31. We welcome the
HLOS commitment to modernise and upgrade 150 stations. We expect
the Government to ensure that the process of selecting stations
is fully transparent, and we encourage Network Rail's drive to
secure additional funding from other sources for the station refurbishment
programme. (Paragraph 119)
ENCOURAGING MODAL SHIFT
32. The
Government should encourage modal shift. Amongst arguments for
embracing a policy to promote a modal shift away from roads and
air and towards the railways, environmental impacts along with
congestion management are the most compelling. We expect the next
High Level Output Statement to include detailed plans and targets
for significant increases in the share of journeys made using
the railways. (Paragraph 124)
Financial sustainability
33. We
have little doubt that cost control has been weak across the industry,
and we believe controlling costs needs to be the Government's
top priority in terms of funding for the railways. The current
funding discussions between the ORR and Network Rail may go some
way towards controlling costs at Network Rail, but as we have
said in the past, the Government needs to do more to ensure that
franchises also control their costs tightly. As we have shown
on several occasions past, the sheer complexity of the industry
has made it prone to unnecessary cost escalation and waste. (Paragraph
132)
34. We are deeply
concerned that the rapid shift away from taxpayer contributions
and towards passengers paying a significantly larger share of
the cost of running the railways will be detrimental to passengers
and the future of the railways alike. We accept that the level
of subsidy now paid by taxpayers is probably too large for the
longer term, but a rapid shift in this balance will counteract
any efforts to encourage modal shift. Furthermore, if a full-scale
economic downturn were to develop, passenger numbers are unlikely
to grow as fast as projected in the High Level Output Statement.
This situation could jeopardise the current hard-won level of
financial stability. We therefore recommend that the Government
review the planned shift between tax payers' subsidy and the fare
box with a view to pacing this transition over a significantly
longer period of time. (Paragraph 138)
Conclusion
35. The
White Paper, setting out the Government's objectives for the railways
over the next 30 years, and the HLOS, providing a detailed five-year
plan, were published as one integrated document. Our analysis
of this document has demonstrated that the White Paper has very
little to add to the five-year plan set out in the HLOS. If the
two had been entirely separate documents, there would have been
very little to publish as a White Paper, and the Department would
have been forced to come up with a much stronger and bolder vision
for the long-term future of the railways. The Government should
now seek to develop a genuine 30-year strategy. (Paragraph 141)
