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Written Evidence Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry, Global Security: Iran
Understanding IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND the Possible Consequences of Military ACTION
Dr. Frank Barnaby Nuclear Issues Consultant, Oxford Research Group
7 June 2007
INTRODUCTION
1. Dr. Barnaby is Nuclear Issues Consultant to Oxford Research Group (ORG). He is a nuclear physicist by training and worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston in the 1950s. He was also on the senior scientific staff of the Medical Research Council; Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995); Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); a Professor at the Free University in Amsterdam; and a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota. In addition to his work for ORG, he is now a freelance defence analyst and a prolific author on military technology.
2. Oxford Research Group is an independent non-governmental organisation and registered charity which seeks to bring about positive change on issues of national and international security. Established in 1982, it is now considered to be one of the UK's leading global security think tanks. ORG is a registered charity and uses a combination of innovative publications, expert roundtables, residential consultations, and engagement with opinion-formers and government, to develop and promote sustainable global security strategies. In 2003, Oxford Research Group was awarded the Niwano Peace Prize, and in 2005 The Independent newspaper named ORG as one of the top twenty think tanks in the UK.
3. Since mid-2005, ORG has been working both publicly and behind-the-scenes to highlight the potentially disastrous consequences of military action against Iran and its nuclear programme, arguing that diplomacy must be made to work. This written evidence explains that, far from setting back Iran's nuclear programme, a military attack might create the political conditions in which Iran could accelerate a nuclear weapons programme. It supplements oral evidence on this issue given to the Foreign Affairs Committee by Dr. Barnaby on 23 May 2007.
IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
4. In spite of a flurry of recent meetings - between, for example, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and between Larijani and the European Union's foreign policy chief Javier Solana - there has been no breakthrough on Iran's main dispute with the West - its refusal to suspend nuclear enrichment as a precondition for negotiations on trade benefits and other issues.
5. The West continues to accuse Iran of developing nuclear weapons in a programme disguised as a civil nuclear-energy programme. Specifically, Iran is accused of intending to use its gas centrifuge enrichment facility at Natanz to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Tehran continues to insist that its nuclear programme is aimed solely at the peaceful generation of electricity and refuses to stop the enrichment of uranium, an activity that it says it has an inalienable right to conduct under the NPT.
6. IAEA inspectors believe that Iran has now solved most of the technological problems associated with its uranium enrichment programme and is enriching uranium on a far larger scale than before. The rate of progress they have made in recent months on enrichment has surprised IAEA officials. Iran appears to be on course to enrich uranium to the level of about 90% in uranium-235 required to fabricate nuclear weapons, if they take the political decision to do so.
7. In a recent IAEA inspection of Iran's enrichment facility at Natanz the inspectors found that Iranian engineers were already running about 1,300 gas centrifuges to produce fuel, enriched to about 4.5% in uranium-235, suitable for use as fuel in a nuclear reactor. In addition, 300 centrifuges were being tested and 300 more were reportedly under construction. The Iranians are now able to spin the centrifuges at the high speeds necessary to make nuclear fuel, and to run them smoothly. According to Iranian officials, the Natanz facility has 1,600 active centrifuges, and will soon have 3,000 operating.
8. Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, stated that: "The Iranians pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich. From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that's a fact." What is not clear is whether or not Iran can keep up the rate of its recent progress and be able in the foreseeable future to produce a civil nuclear-power reactor on an 'industrial scale' as Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran plans to do.
9. It must be assumed, however, that the Iranians will continue to increase the number of centrifuges installed at Natanz. They have announced the intention to operate about 50,000 centrifuges at the plant to produce fuel for a number of nuclear-power reactors they intend to construct in the future and possibly to export nuclear fuel.
10. Having reached an enrichment of about 4.5% in uranium-235, Iran could circulate enriched uranium hexafluouride gas repeatedly through the centrifuge plant to increase the enrichment to about 90% for use in nuclear weapons. If they take the political decision to do this, the Iranians would presumably withdraw from the NPT and not allow IAEA inspectors into the country (as did the North Koreans).
11. According to a recent estimate by El Baradei, Iran is likely to take between 3 and 8 years to acquire enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, if it encounters no further serious technical problems in their programme. Three thousand centrifuges of the type Iran has (called P-1 centrifuges) could, if they are operating smoothly and continuously, produce about 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium per year, enough to fabricate two nuclear weapons. However, the components for a nuclear weapon will have to be manufactured and tested and nuclear warheads will have to be miniaturized for delivery by Iranian surface-to-surface missiles - these steps will take a significant time to achieve. There is, therefore, still time for diplomacy to work.
Questioning the case for military action
12. Despite the above conclusion, there are some in the US and Israeli administrations, in particular, who argue that military action must be taken before it is too late. Advocates of early military action argue that the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran are such that military strikes are justified, whether a smoking gun is found or not.
13. It is true that, alongside other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it is reasonable to assume that Iran has conducted research and development into the fabrication of nuclear weapons. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Iran has embarked on production engineering - putting in place the technical facilities needed to build a bomb - and, as already stated, it is known that it is some way off being able to produce the amount of fissile material needed to produce a nuclear weapon.
14. The contention that military action will set back Iran's nuclear programme significantly can and should be questioned. Iran's nuclear programme is extensive and dispersed; a military strike would have to contend with:
a. A large number of targets b. Well-protected and hidden facilities c. Inadequate intelligence d. The likely survival of key scientists and technicians
15. If the aim of military strikes is to destroy key nuclear facilities, they would have to target:
a. The Kalaye Electric Company that produces components for gas centrifuges b. The nuclear power reactor at Bushehr c. The heavy-water reactor and the heavy water production plant at Arak d. The uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz e. The uranium mines and mills at Saghand f. The research reactors at Isfahan
16. There is therefore an inherent contradiction in arguments that a military strike could both encompass all key facilities and be surgical and brief. A compromise would have to be made on either the scale of military action or the certainty of success. In either case, the numbers of innocent civilian casualties would probably be high because a surprise attack would catch many people unawares and unprotected.
17. There also is a real possibility that Iran has constructed secret facilities in the anticipation of a military strike. It is also conceivable that Iran has built false targets, installations that appear to hold nuclear facilities but in fact act as decoys. With inadequate intelligence, it is unlikely that it would be possible to identify and subsequently destroy the number of targets needed to set back Iran's nuclear programme for a significant period. Furthermore, with the probable survival of key scientific personnel, it would only be a matter of time before Iran could rebuild its nuclear programme. The question is, how much time?
Crash reconstruction
18. If Iran's nuclear facilities were severely damaged during an attack, it is possible that Iran could embark on a crash programme to make one nuclear weapon. In the aftermath of an attack, it is likely that popular support for an Iranian nuclear weapon capability would increase; bolstering the position of hardliners and strengthening arguments that Iran must possess a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, Iran has threatened to withdraw from the NPT and, should it do so post-attack, would build a clandestine programme free of international inspection and control.
19. In the aftermath of an attack, following a political decision to change the nature of the nuclear programme to construct a bomb as quickly as possible, Iran could:
a. Used stored, fresh nuclear fuel to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) in a small centrifuge facility to fabricate a weapon. b. Chemically remove plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel elements - from the Bushehr or Arak reactors, if either were operational - and use it to fabricate a nuclear weapon. c. Assemble new centrifuges and produce HEU. Some centrifuges might survive a military attack, but it is conceivable that Iran has stored additional centrifuges in secure locations.
20. This process would be hastened if Iran had a secret supply of uranium hexafluoride or if it had constructed a small primitive reactor, fuelled with natural uranium, to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. It is also possible that, post-attack, Iran could purchase additional needed materials from sympathetic states or on the black-market.
21. In the aftermath of a military strike, if Iran devoted maximum effort and resources to building one nuclear bomb, it could achieve this in a relatively short amount of time: some months rather than years.
CONCLUSION
22. The argument that military strikes would buy time is flawed. It does not take into account the time already available to pursue diplomacy; it inflates the likelihood of military success and underplays the possibility of hardened Iranian determination leading to a crash nuclear programme.
23. Post military attacks, it is possible that Iran would be able to rapidly build a nuclear weapon as part of a crash programme, and would then wield one in an environment of incalculably greater hostility.
24. It is, therefore, a mistake to believe that Iran can be deterred from attaining a nuclear weapons capability by bombing its facilities. Diplomacy is the only realistic course of action.
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