House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Dr John Russell (University of Bradford)

1. AUTHOR'S EXPERTISE

1.1 My field of expertise covers the former Soviet Union, terrorism and, specifically, the Russo-Chechen Wars (1994-96 and 1999-2006).

1.2 I have published widely on the above topics. I have also presented a number of papers on these topics in the UK, USA, Finland, Germany, Poland and Russia as well as having led seminars designed for the MOD (Bradford and St Andrews) and for government and research institutions (FCO, IISS, RIIA etc).

1.3 In 2003 I was called as an expert witness by the defence in the Akhmed Zakayev extradition case at Bow Street Magistrates' Court in London, which I have characterised as representing the classical "terrorist versus freedom fighter" dilemma. [67]

2. SCOPE OF REPORT

2.1 This report focuses on "insurgent", rather than "state" terrorism. [68]

2.2 However, it is worth pointing out that (a) the absence of accountable good governance in Russia currently not only facilitates acts of violence that, outside of parameters established by the "war on terror" might well be considered acts of "state" terrorism (eg the assassination of Chechen separatist leaders Maskhadov[69] and Zanderbiyev) [70]and (b) the prevalence throughout Russian society of "might" over "right" creates a disturbing identity of interests between Russian political, economic and criminal worlds that obscures both the perpetrators and commissioners of such acts of violence, at home and abroad, as those against such outspoken opponents of the regime as Anna Politkovskaya and Aleksandr Litvinenko.

2.2 Theorists of terrorism and counter-terrorism would tend to identify in Russia today elements of a state of "violent" politics. [71]Historically, such a state tends to give rise to forms of "violent" opposition that include terrorism.

2.3 It is axiomatic, therefore, that any move within Russia towards the establishment of "normal" politics would reduce significantly the internal terrorist threat, confining it, in effect, to the radical margins of society, as is the case in such democratic countries as the United Kingdom. All available evidence would point to the Russian Federation, under Putin, heading in the opposite direction.

2.4 The report considers the "Chechen" factor (3), the threat of terrorism beyond Chechnya (4), Russian counter-terrorist policies (5) and contains a Conclusion (6).

3. THE "CHECHEN" FACTOR

3.1 Until the death on 9-10 July 2006 of Shamil Basayev, acknowledged mastermind of the Budennovsk (June 1995), Dubrovka (October 2002) and Beslan (September 2004) hostage-taking crises, terrorism in Russia was widely interpreted as being linked to the coalition-led "war on terror" announced by President Bush following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. After the theatre siege in Moscow (Dubrovka), the US State Department, in February 2003, added three of Basayev's units to the list of proscribed terrorist organisations. [72]

3.2. Since the death of Basayev, ostensibly at the hands of Russian special forces, there have been no major terrorist incidents emanating from Chechnya. Indeed, with the exception of the mass attack on Nalchik (capital of Kabardino-Balkaria) in October 2005, the lifting of the Beslan siege marks the effective end of Chechen-inspired "international" terror. Acts of violence perpetrated since by Chechen separatist forces, led currently by Doku Umarov, appear to be targeting military and so-called `collaborationist' elements rather than civilians.

3.3 The death of Basayev and of the Jordanian-born Abu Hafs al-Urdani in November 2006[73] appears to have reduced significantly the influence and threat of the so-called Wahhabist "Arab" mercenaries in Chechnya, as had the amnesty granted to former Chechen boyeviki (fighters) by Ramzan Kadyrov (see 3.10). However, outside funding, training and insurgent activity from this source continue to be a factor. [74]

3.4 It is generally agreed that President Vladimir Putin exploited the "war on terror" to eliminate all shades of Chechen separatist opposition. Indeed, he referred to the second conflict as a "Counter-terrorist operation". This was used to justify the physical elimination of such Chechen separatist leaders as former president of Chechnya-Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, in March 2005 and his successor Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev in June 2006. Any overlap in the activities of such "legitimate" opponents with Basayev and his followers was presented as proof positive that all separatists in the North Caucasus were "terrorists"; a view hotly disputed in the West.

3.5 This deliberate attempt to solve the political question of self-determination in the North Caucasus by military means led to a spread of resistance to Russian rule throughout the North Caucasus and a concomitant spread of Wahhabist ideology, organised mainly through djamaats (originally communal, now religion-based, military organisations). [75]

3.6 From mid-2000, Putin has sought to present the world with a "political" solution to the conflict in Chechnya with his policy of "Chechenisation".[76] This involved supporting the ex-rebel Mufti of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, in the latter's efforts to eradicate Wahhabist influence in Chechnya.

3.7 In exchange for undertakings to keep Chechnya within the Russian Federation, Kadyrov was given a fairly free hand to deal with the Chechen opposition as he saw fit. That this included the severe abuse of human rights by forces led by his son Ramzan, has been well documented by Russian and Western NGOs. A three-stage process was launched in March 2003 of a referendum on Chechnya's status, election of a Chechen president (Akhmad Kadyrov in October 2003) and elections to a Chechen parliament (November 2005).

3.8 No supporters of Chechen independence were allowed to participate in any of the three stages, none of which were recognised as "free and fair" by Western observers. [77]These Chechen factions were also excluded from the Strasbourg Round Table, organised by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in 2005. [78]Although most Chechens are pragmatic enough to accept a fair degree of autonomy instead of outright independence, the effective outlawing of such a legitimate aspiration inevitably gives rise to charges of hypocrisy and double standards being levelled at Western governments.

3.9 On 9 May 2004, Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated, ostensibly by Basayev's men, while attending a Victory Day parade at the main stadium in Grozny, capital of Chechnya. [79]He was subsequently replaced (in August 2004) by Alu Alkhanov, although de facto power devolved to Ramzan, his son, who not yet having attained the age of 30, could not constitutionally be president. Ramzan Kadyrov has since acquired a status not unlike that of the former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, being recognised simultaneously as a figure of fun, worthy of media attention, and as a ruthless dictator who, while very popular amongst his own supporters, uses extreme violence against his opponents. [80]

3.10 In February 2007, Putin replaced Alkhanov, initially in an acting capacity, but from 2 March on a permanent basis, with Ramzan Kadyrov (who attained the age of 30 on 5 October 2006). Since then Kadyrov Jr has imposed a one-man rule in Chechnya, through his armed detachments—the kadyrovtsy. The fact that over half of these troops, estimated to number 15,000, are former Chechen resistance fighters[81] (ie "terrorists" under Putin's terminology) has led to considerable disquiet in Russia as to the loyalty and degree of autonomy given to such units.

3.11 It has been claimed that the considerable number of Russian federal troops still stationed in Chechnya are still there due both to this distrust of Kadyrov and to the fact that Russian military officers are making significant profits through illegal activities in Chechnya, sometimes allegedly, in collaboration with their Chechen opponents. [82]

3.12 Although officially the situation in Chechnya is said to have been "normalised", military skirmishes continue (a military helicopter downed in April 2007 with 18 dead, [83]unconfirmed reports of up to 20 federal dead in violent clashes in Khattuni in May 2007). [84]This scenario would appear to confirm that "violent politics"' persist in Chechnya, leading to an expectation that insurgents would resort to, among other tactics, "terrorism" in their continuing struggle with the authorities.

4. THE THREAT OF TERRORISM BEYOND CHECHNYA

4.1 The major fears arising from what has been termed the "Kadyrovisation"[85] of Chechnya is that this brutally effective, in the short term, method could be used to suppress opposition not only throughout the North Caucasus, thus igniting longstanding tribal and ethnic enmities, but also throughout the Russian Federation, stoking up further the well-documented "Caucasophobia",[86] prevalent amongst ethnic Russians. The recent events in Kondopoga[87] (Karelia), after which Kadyrov threatened to intervene if the local authorities stood idly by, might serve as a preview as to how this scenario might develop.

4.2 The focus of insurgent activity appears to have shifted from Chechnya to, in particular, neighbouring Dagestan and Ingushetia. As Kadyrov has expressed territorial ambitions in both regions, the prospect of his forces being used against insurgents, with or without the approval of the Kremlin, cannot be ruled out.

4.3 As noted, the organising force for insurgent terrorism throughout the North Caucasus is the djamaat or jamaat (see 3.5). The most notable are the Sharia djamaat in both Dagestan and Ingushetia and the Yarmuk in Kabardino-Balkaria. [88]Other djamaats are operative in Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia as well as in the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories of Russia. [89]Djamaats continue to operate within Chechnya: Maskhadov's successor as leader of the Chechen resistance, Sadulayev, was leader of the Argun djamaat. [90]One American academic expert on the region has concluded: "The emergence of the `military jamaat' threatens to stretch Russian resources to the limit and turn the North Caucasus into a minefield of anti-Russian resistance".[91]

4.4 Extreme dissatisfaction with Russian rule that has the potential to be articulated through violence has spread to areas of the North Caucasus previously considered the most pro-Russian. This is particularly evident in Kabardino-Balkaria, since the mass armed assault on its capital, Nalchik, by insurgents in October 2005, [92]and in North Ossetia, following the opaque and unsatisfactory handling by the authorities of the investigations into the Beslan tragedy. [93]

4.5 This form of organisational violence has the potential to spread not only to other traditionally Muslim areas of Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan on the Volga, but also throughout the considerable Muslim diaspora in every large Russian city. To the extent that "Muslims" are conflated with "Caucasians" as constituting a "terrorist threat" in the perception of ethnic Russians, the potential for violent conflict will rise.

4.6 Given the threat of violence, the comparatively low level of socio-economic development and uncertain prospects throughout the North Caucasus, there has been a significant migration flow from the region amongst both ethnic Russians and Caucasians. [94]Both groups take with them to their new areas of settlements all over Russia their own cultural narrative. This potential for social conflict is exacerbated by the fact that upwards of one and a half million Russians have experienced the "meat grinder" of Chechnya, resulting in the so-called "Chechen syndrome", which manifests itself in alcohol and drug abuse, criminality, violence, depression and suicide. [95]

4.7 Perceptive Russian observers have drawn attention to the fact that more and more of Russia is becoming like the "black hole" of lawlessness in Chechnya. Given the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the aforementioned overlap of interests between political, economic and criminal circles, the terrorist threat that this poses within Russia and beyond is apparent.

5. RUSSIAN COUNTER-TERRORIST POLICIES

5.1 In order to understand the current Russian administration's attitude to counter-terrorism it is important to take into account that the President, Vladimir Putin, is a former KGB officer as well as a former head of its successor organisation, the FSB. Many observers have noted the prominence in his administration of the siloviki—representatives from the ministries responsible for law and order. [96]In the Soviet period the KGB was the epitome of the pre-eminence in Russian thinking of the "ends" over the "means".

5.2 The mindset of the siloviki would appear to favour uncompromising, hard-line approaches to countering terror, including the policies of "eradication" and employing "terror" against terror, while at the same time, be less predisposed to policies that might be termed "hearts and minds" (containment and addressing the root causes). This mindset was horrifyingly evident not only in the bloody resolutions of the Dubrovka and Beslan hostage-taking crises, but also in the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of firepower in both Chechen wars.

5.3 Russia was amongst the first to sign up for the "war on terror" after 9/11, having already warned of an Islamic "arc of instability from Kosovo to the Philippines" since 2000. [97]Its counter-terrorist policies have always been closer to those of Israel and the current US administration than those advocated by members of the European Union.

5.3 In February 2006, in response to the unsatisfactory handling of the Beslan siege, a National Counterterrorism Committee was established to establish a single, centralised chain of command, under the FSB, to co-ordinate counterterrorism. [98]

5.4 In March 2006, the Russian legislature approved the law "On Counteracting Terrorism". This listed the criteria for designating organisations as "terrorist":[99]

(i) Engaging in activities aimed at changing Russia's constitutional system through violence, including terrorism;

(ii) Maintaining links to illegal armed groups and other extremist organisations operating in the North Caucasus; and

(iii) Having association with, or links to, groups regarded as terrorists by the international community.

On this basis 17 groups were designated as "terrorist".

5.5 Russia continues to share information and cooperate in a number of international counter-terrorist initiatives, including the US-Russian Counterterrorism Working Group, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. [100]

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Although the immediate threat of terrorism in Russia has receded in recent years, the medium and long-term prospects remain a source of concern. The policies of the current administration, far from resolving issues likely to spawn violence, appear to be spreading the potential for insurgent violence in the form of what the administration, although not necessarily outsiders, would identify as terrorism.

6.2 A lid has been placed, temporarily perhaps, on the Chechen conflict. The maintenance of "violent" rather than "normal" politics in that region, however, would appear to ensure future manifestations of insurgent violence, including terrorism.

6.3. The "success" of "Chechenisation" appears to have encouraged Putin to employ similarly hardline strategies in tackling opposition throughout Russia, thus increasing "violent" politics at the expense of "normal".

6.4 Although the influence and presence of Wahhabist outsiders has been significantly reduced, the spread of jihadist ideas through the North Caucasian djamaats appears to pose as great a terrorist threat as that previously posed by the Wahhabites.

6.5 Although a signatory to many international counter-terrorist initiatives, Russia appears to retain an idiosyncratic understanding as what represents a "terrorist" threat. The lessons learned, for example, in Northern Ireland, do not appear to be regarded as applicable to the Russian situation.

6.6 The lack of any meaningful criticism of Russia's approach to terrorism from the West dismays not only those non-ethnic Russians striving for some form of self-determination and those Russians that might be termed liberal or human rights activists but also those within Western society that perceive the injustice of such an approach. The danger inherent in this is apparent if one bears in mind that two of the four London suicide bombers mentioned Chechnya in their farewell messages. [101]

6.7 While Russia might well be regarded as our "partner" in combating terrorism, the unfortunate impression appears to have been given by Western leaders in recent years, notably Bush, Blair, Berlusconi and Schroeder, [102]that Putin is our "friend". Such a lack of discrimination is hardly likely to win the hearts and minds of those in both Russia and the United Kingdom who would prefer to see matters settled by "right" rather than "might".

Dr John Russell

Senior Lecturer in Russian & Peace Studies, Department of Languages and European Studies and Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

12 May 2007