House of Commons - Standards and Privileges

Select Committee on Standards and Privileges Sixth Report

Conduct of Mr George Galloway

1. We have received a memorandum from the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards on the outcome of his investigation of complaints made in April 2003 against Mr George Galloway, then the Member for Glasgow, Kelvin and now the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow. The Commissioner's memorandum is reproduced at Appendix 1.

2. Our duty is to consider the conclusions of the Commissioner and to report to the House, with recommendations if appropriate.

3. In accordance with our usual practice, we showed Mr Galloway a copy of the Commissioner's memorandum before we started considering it. Mr Galloway's written comments are reproduced at Appendix 2. We asked Mr Galloway to give oral evidence, and he did so on 26 June.[1] . He has subsequently submitted further written evidence. This is reproduced as an appendix to his oral evidence and the Commissioner's comments on this are reproduced at Appendix 6.[2]

4. As the Commissioner explains,[3] at the heart of his investigation lies a series of articles in the Daily Telegraph in April 2003.[4][5] He received two formal complaints. The first, from Mr Andrew Robathan, Member for Blaby, asked the Commissioner to investigate "the extremely serious allegations made by the Telegraph against George Galloway MP".[6] He added "you will understand that none of the money that was allegedly paid to Mr Galloway was declared in the Register of Members' Interests." The second, from Mr Andrew Yale, commented that "recent media reports have raised concerns that Mr Galloway MP has not been open about travel/hotel expenses and put up blocks in the way of Parliament. Parliament's reputation is now being hurt and the truth is needed one way or the other."[7]

5. The central allegation against Mr Galloway made in the Telegraph article was that he had been receiving substantial undeclared personal financial benefit from Saddam Hussein's regime by way of the Oil for Food Programme. This is an extremely serious allegation, and one which Mr Galloway has consistently denied throughout the Commissioner's inquiry and in oral evidence to us.[8] The Commissioner's inquiry has raised questions not only in relation to Mr Galloway's compliance with the rules of the House on registration and declaration of interests, and in relation to advocacy, under the rules in force at the time, but also as to whether his conduct has damaged the reputation of the House.

6. The Telegraph articles related to documents alleged to have been found by one of its journalists in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs building shortly after the fall of Baghdad to Coalition forces in April 2003. Mr Galloway has never accepted that these documents are what they purport to be or that they were found in the circumstances claimed by the journalist concerned.[9] As part of his investigation of the complaint, the Commissioner arranged, with the consent of the Telegraph, for them to be forensically examined.[10] As part of our consideration of this matter, we have ourselves seen the documents. On June 19^th we took oral evidence from the forensic scientist who examined them on behalf of the Commissioner, along with a translator of Arabic.[11]

7. Mr Galloway strongly disputes some of the evidence received by the Commissioner and has challenged the bona fides of a number of witnesses, both in exchanges with the Commissioner and in evidence to us, and also in the House.[12] He has also challenged our own bona fides and those of the Commissioner.[13] We comment later in this report on all these aspects of Mr Galloway's conduct.

8. The Commissioner's inquiry has been one of the most complex ever undertaken, and has been of unparalleled duration. Its purpose was to investigate the complaint and establish whether Mr Galloway had breached the House's Code of Conduct. Legal proceedings delayed completion of the Commissioner's investigation of the complaints for nearly three years.[14] The inquiry has also been complicated by the fact that some key potential contributors, notably Mr Fawaz Zureikat, Mr Galloway's appointed representative in Baghdad in relation to the Mariam Appeal,[15] and Dr Amineh Abu-Zayyad, Mr Galloway's former wife, have not responded to the Commissioner's repeated invitations to contribute to his investigation. In the course of his investigation, the Commissioner found evidence that led him to conclude that Mr Galloway had indeed breached the Code in a number of respects.

9. We pay tribute to the Commissioner for the fairness, thoroughness and sensitivity with which he has conducted this difficult inquiry.

The Mariam Appeal

10. A key element in the Commissioner's inquiry has been the Mariam Appeal, and Mr Galloway's involvement with it. As the Commissioner points out, the Mariam Appeal was established in 1998.[16] Mariam Hamza, from whom the Appeal took its name, was brought to the United Kingdom by Mr Galloway in April 1998 for treatment for leukaemia, which Mr Galloway believed to have been caused by depleted uranium from weapons used in the 1991 Gulf War. In May 1998, Mr Galloway circulated a letter on House of Commons notepaper, with an appeal for financial contributions towards the cost of her treatment, which the Appeal was guaranteeing. The stated target of the Appeal was £100,000—half to cover the estimated cost of Mariam's treatment and the balance "being sent back to Iraq in medicines and medical supplies for the children she has had to leave behind."[17]

11. In its early stages, the Appeal was run from Mr Galloway's office in the House, and throughout it had a bank account with Lloyds Bank. In a mandate to the bank continuing that account in February 1999, Mr Stuart Halford was recorded as Chairman of the Appeal, and Mr Galloway as its newly-appointed Secretary, and both were appointed as its signatories. The appeal subsequently moved to its own offices, first in Northumberland Avenue and later in Borough High Street. An additional bank account, at the National Bank of Abu Dhabi branch in Knightsbridge, was opened in 1999. We have seen no evidence that Mr Galloway was ever a signatory to this account.

12. At some later date, Mr Galloway became Chairman of the Appeal, as evidenced by the copy of its constitution reproduced by the Commissioner at WE34.[18] Mr Fawaz Zureikat became Chairman in 2000, and the Appeal's London office subsequently closed.[19]

13. What were the aims and objectives of the Mariam Appeal? The May 1998 letter referred to above strongly suggests that its principal initial objective was humanitarian, being aimed at covering the cost of Mariam Hamza's medical treatment, without any surplus to be used for providing medical supplies for children in Iraq, although as the Commissioner points out, there was evidence of a political element from the outset.[20] Mariam Hamza's primary cycle of treatment in the United Kingdom was completed before the end of 1998.[21] Subsequently the Appeal adopted[22] a constitution with three objectives, which included highlighting "the causes and results of the cancer epidemic in Iraq". These would be achieved through three principal activities: providing medicines and medical equipment to Iraq; increasing awareness of the plight of Iraqi children; and fundraising to support the objectives.[23] The constitution also provided that, on dissolution "any remaining funds would be given to a designated charity that has similar objectives or is specifically established for helping the children of Iraq."[24] The bulk of the Appeal's resources were received after Mariam Hamza's initial treatment in the United Kingdom had been completed.

14. Mr Galloway agreed with the Commissioner that, throughout the life of the Mariam Appeal, he had personally been responsible for its overall direction.[25]

15. As the Commissioner points out,[26] the overall funding of the Mariam Appeal eventually exceeded by an order of magnitude the relatively modest sums referred to in the May 1998 letter from Mr Galloway. The overall income of the Appeal over its lifetime was in excess of £1.4 million, the majority of it coming from three donors: the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Abu Dhabi, both of whom made substantial donations following approaches by Mr Galloway, and Mr Fawaz Zureikat.[27] Mr Galloway confirmed in evidence to us that more than 90% of its funding came from foreign sources, the Abu Dhabi contribution amounting to £508,735 and Mr Zureikat's to £448,248.[28] The principal donations were sequential; the bulk of the Saudi Arabian contributions were followed in the spring of 1999 by the Abu Dhabi contribution.[29] Mr Fawaz Zureikat's contributions came in the period August 2000 to December 2002.[30] Mr Galloway agreed that, after Mr Zureikat became Chairman of the Mariam Appeal, he was the source of its only big donations.[31]

16. Mr Fawaz Zureikat became known to Mr Galloway either the late summer of 1998,[32] or in the summer of 1999,[33] and he became Chairman of the Mariam Appeal in the course of 2000.[34] He was also appointed at some point in either 1999 or 2000 by Mr Galloway as "my representative in Baghdad on all matters concerning my work with the "Mariam Appeal" or the Emergency Committee in Iraq".[35] The letter appointing him is undated, and Mr Galloway cannot recall with certainty when it was written.[36] Mr Galloway described the letter as "plenipotentiary powers to act in the name of a campaign of which he was the chairman".[37] Asked whether Mr Zureikat was appointed as representative before he made his initial donation to the Appeal, Mr Galloway replied:

17. Mr Galloway told us that Mr Zureikat's financial support for the Mariam Appeal came from a personal approach he made to him.[39] He described him as "a highly political man", who was also a major funder of the anti-sanctions campaign in Canada, Jordan and Egypt,[40] and was a leading campaigner in Gulf countries against the sanctions. He had not asked him the source of his donations, and did not consider it appropriate to do so.[41]

18. As the Commissioner points out,[42] the preponderant emphasis of the Appeal was on its campaigning expenditure. Mr Galloway estimated the overall costs to the Appeal of Mariam Hamza's treatment, and the cost of medicines and medical supplies taken to Iraq at "of the order of £200,000"[43] and agreed that the vast majority of its expenditure was spent on campaigning. He commented that:

The basis for this, according to Mr Galloway in his oral evidence to us, was that in the view of the Appeal, sanctions were the cause of the cancer epidemic in Iraq, and that campaigning to lift the embargo on Iraq was therefore consistent with the Appeal's objective[45] of highlighting its causes and results.[46] In registering a visit to Iraq in November 2001, Mr Galloway described the Mariam Appeal as "an organisation working for the lifting of the embargo on Iraq".[47]

The Telegraph documents

Introduction

19. The Telegraph documents are important because, if what is in them is true, certain of them provide strong circumstantial evidence that Mr Galloway had solicited financial support from the Iraqi government for the Mariam Appeal, that this support was being delivered through commissions on oil sales under the United Nations Oil for Food Programme and on food contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of Trade, and that Mr Galloway was aware of this and had sought such indirect funding to avoid political difficulties inherent in overt funding of a campaign to lift sanctions against Iraq receiving funding from the government of that country.

20. The most important of the Telegraph documents for the purposes of our inquiry are:

the Intelligence Chief's memorandum of 3 January 2000, reproduced at WE 4;

Mr Tariq Aziz's memorandum of 5 February 2000, reproduced at WE 5;

the Presidential response to the Intelligence Chief's memorandum, reproduced at WE 7;

the Foreign Minister's letter on the outcome of consideration of the Intelligence Chief's memorandum, reproduced at WE 8; and

the Iraqi Interests Section letter of 8 July 2000 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the proposal for an International Work Camp, reproduced at WE 23.

21. There is, of course, no reason of principle why Mr Galloway should not have sought funding from the Iraqi government for the Mariam Appeal, just as he had done from the governments of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. However, Mr Galloway maintained that, despite his general support for the proposition that it was difficult for those seeking funds for political purposes to be selective as to the background of potential donors, he would not himself have accepted Iraqi support for the Mariam Appeal.[48]

22. It is important to note at this point that neither the authenticity nor the veracity of the documents was an issue in Mr Galloway's successful libel action against the Telegraph, so the outcome of this action has no bearing on the point. Mr Galloway told the Commissioner that it was open to the paper to produce evidence about the veracity of the material in the documents and they did not do so. He continued:[49]

"If they had been able to do, believe me, they would have done so."

The Deputy Editor of the Telegraph informed the Commissioner[50] that the paper had at one stage indicated to the court its wish to prove the authenticity of the documents to the court's satisfaction. Mr Galloway's lawyers had resisted this on legal grounds, and the judge ruled against the paper on the grounds that the authenticity of the documents was in his view not relevant to the qualified privilege and fair comment defences raised by the paper in the proceedings.

23. As the Commissioner points out,[51] the judge observed:

24. As the Commissioner's memorandum demonstrates[53] there are major differences of view over how the documents came into the possession of the Telegraph reporter, whether the documents are authentic, and if they are authentic, whether what they say is true.

How the documents came into the possession of the Telegraph reporter

25. The essence of the evidence of Mr David Blair, the journalist who found the Telegraph documents, is that he found them in a room in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the course of a single visit by him on 19 April 2003.[54] Mr Galloway maintains[55] that he had been told by a senior British journalist who was a foreign correspondent on a national daily paper, that Mr Blair had in fact been given, rather than had found, some or all of the documents, that Mr Blair had himself had some anxieties about the way the Telegraph had handled the story, and that the files had in fact been given to Mr Blair by MI6. Mr Galloway also maintained that he had been told by the journalist that another journalist, Mr Philip Sherwell, claimed that he had previously examined the same room as Mr Blair, and had seen no such documents.

26. The Commissioner's memorandum clearly sets out both the accounts of Mr Blair and Mr Galloway as to how the documents were found, Mr Blair's comments on Mr Galloway's version of events and in particular his confirmation that all the published documents came from the same folder,[56] and Mr Sherwell's denial of Mr Galloway's claim that he had searched the same room as Mr Blair.[57]

27. Our first task was to decide which version of events to believe.

28. Mr Galloway told the Commissioner[58] that some of the documents were not found as Mr Blair said they were, but were given to him "and I can prove that". He has consistently refused to disclose the identity of the journalist who told him Mr Blair's account of how the documents were found was untrue. We asked him to provide proof, and he referred us to an e-mail he had sent to his lawyer immediately following the alleged conversation with the journalist.[59]

29. Pressed as to why he would not disclose the identity of the journalist (in a private evidence session from which, if necessary, the name could have been excised from the record before the evidence was reported to the House) Mr Galloway explained that this would compromise both the journalist's personal security and his professional standing.[60] He was nonetheless willing to show the Chairman personally his diary entry for the day in question, which included the person's name, but he would not be willing for that person to be contacted to confirm the story.[61] We have not asked the Chairman to take up Mr Galloway's confidential offer as it would not lead to any new information emerging as to the provenance of his version of events.[62]

30. In effect, Mr Galloway asks us to take on trust his explanation of the discovery of the documents which is not only entirely uncorroborated, but in certain respects disputed by a journalist (Mr Sherwell) not directly involved in their discovery. Mr Galloway accepts that he can give us no reason why we should prefer his version of events.[63] Mr Galloway's evidence provides no confirmation that the information he was given, and thus the content of the e-mail, was factually accurate. On the other hand, we have the evidence of Mr David Blair which if he had knowingly falsified it would expose him to the risk of prosecution for perjury, action against him by the House, and the destruction of his professional reputation as a journalist. The Committee has no doubt that Mr Blair's account is to be preferred to Mr Galloway's.

Are the documents authentic?

31. The authenticity of the Telegraph documents has been the subject of forensic examination both in relation to Mr Galloway's libel action and at the request of the Commissioner.[64] The examination in relation to the libel action was of a preliminary nature, and not taken further when it became clear that the authenticity of the documents was not to be an issue considered in the legal proceedings. The Commissioner also sought evidence from a number of other sources as to their authenticity.[65]

32. As the Commissioner points out,[66] Mr Galloway has consistently argued that these documents are not authentic, although he has accepted that in a limited number of specific cases original documents are genuine and copies are copies of authentic originals. A particular case in point in the latter category is his letter of authority to Mr Fawaz Zureikat to act as his representative in relation to the Mariam Appeal in Baghdad. Mr Galloway also disputes any authentication of the documents by the current Iragi regime.[67]

33. A number of other documents linking Mr Galloway with activities in Baghdad, which emerged around the same time as the Telegraph documents, have been conclusively established to be forged. Mr Galloway argues[68] that the existence of these documents may be evidence of a campaign to discredit him, and that the existence of contemporary documents proven to have been forged in itself casts doubt upon the authenticity of the Telegraph documents.

34. In his oral evidence to us,[69] Mr Galloway modified his position on the authenticity of the Telegraph documents. He said:[70]

"It is not my case that the documents are forged. I say that they might be forged or some of them might be forged, that they might be the product of some corruption within the Iraqi regime or some of them might be, or I think I added in the document that they might be the product of someone making money in my name, behind my back and without my knowledge. Some of them could be that or they could be a mixture of all three of these things."

35. The Commissioner has summarised[71] the outcome of the forensic analysis of the documents both by Dr Giles, who conducted the preliminary analysis for the Telegraph in connection with the libel action, and by Mr Thorne, who conducted a preliminary analysis on behalf of Mr Galloway in connection with the libel action, and a more substantial examination for the Commissioner, and who gave evidence to us on the documents.

36. In evidence to us Mr Thorne listed[72] the reasons which had led him to his overall conclusion that the Telegraph documents were highly likely to be authentic. While commenting that "nothing in forgery is technically impossible"[73], he noted[74] some of the specific factors that he considered pointed towards authenticity. He added:[75]

"Any one thing on its own is probably not massively significant, but it is adding them altogether that makes it more and more difficult and less and less likely to produce a forgery."

He also rejected Mr Galloway's suggestion[76] that the documents could have been produced by a 'ghost office'.[77]

37. Unlike Mr Galloway (who was offered the opportunity to examine[78] the Telegraph documents), we have ourselves seen them in their totality and with the files in which they were found. We have little doubt, based on the evidence we have received, including the forensic evidence, that those documents which are relevant to our inquiry are authentic. We note that, in his evidence to us, Mr Galloway did not explicitly rule out this possibility either.[79]

Is what they say true?

38. Given our conclusion that the Telegraph documents appear, on the evidence available to us, to be authentic, and Mr Thorne's evidence of the effort required to create such a substantial mass of falsified material, there must in our view be some degree of presumption in favour of what they say being true.

39. Mr Galloway's evidence about the extent to which he kept the Iraqi authorities informed about his actions in support of the anti-sanctions campaign may be relevant. He told the Commissioner that he regularly met the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in London to keep him informed of his proposed plans and accepted that these might be described as a working programme.[80] That would appear to corroborate this particular element in the text of the letter from the Foreign Minister of 22 January 2000 to the Presidential Chancellery,[81] one of the Telegraph documents, although Mr Galloway had initially offered the Commissioner a different explanation[82] involving the proposal for work brigades which in evidence to us, he returned to, maintaining that it was "equally possible".[83]

40. The work brigades proposal was the subject of a letter from the Iraqi Interests Section to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 8 July 2000, a copy of which is included in the Telegraph documents.[84] The terms of this letter reflect closely the terms of the relevant announcement by the Mariam Appeal,[85] and a contemporary press report.[86] We regard this as circumstantial evidence that the letter was indeed based on the Mariam Appeal announcements, and that the reference in earlier correspondence was thus not to the work brigades proposal.

41. We were struck by the way a coherent and credible story emerges from the key documents, whose authenticity we accept, and conclude that they accurately describe aspects of Mr Galloway's involvement in securing Iraqi funding for the Mariam Appeal. This reinforces our view, in the light of our conclusions on authenticity, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to presume that what the documents say is true.

Mr Galloway's relationship with Mr Fawaz Zureikat

42. Mr Fawaz Zureikat's relationship with Mr Galloway is important because the Volcker inquiry[87] established conclusively that Mr Zureikat had received allocations of oil under the Oil for Food Programme which had subsequently been lifted and sold.[88] Mr Galloway's name is also mentioned in relation to some of these. As we have already pointed out, Mr Fawaz Zureikat became Chairman of the Mariam Appeal in the course of 2000, and Mr Galloway appointed him as his representative in Baghdad on all matters concerning his work with the Appeal. Mr Zureikat was the Appeal's largest regular donor in its latter stages.

43. As Chairman of the Appeal, and as Mr Galloway's personal representative in Baghdad in relation to it, Mr Zureikat was well placed to promote its interests there. Mr Galloway described him as 'a very successful businessman….very committeed to the cause of ending the suffering through sanctions in Iraq',[89] although he conceded that he had no detailed knowledge of his business activities.[90]

44. Mr Galloway accepts that Mr Zureikat was trading in both oil and other goods under the Oil for Food Programme, and that he would have been doing so on a commission basis.[91] He accepted that Mr Zureikat had made the payments to the Mariam Appeal that are listed in the Commissioner's memorandum,[92] but disputed any suggestion that they could be linked directly to receipts of commissions for sales under the Oil for Food Programme.[93] He was adamant that Mr Zureikat was funding his donations out of his own pocket.[94] He continued:[95]

"I believe he was sincerely—and I still believe he was sincerely—an Arab nationalist trying to get the embargo on Iraq lifted……"

45. Mr Zureikat has responded to neither the Commissioner's nor Mr Galloway's[96] requests to offer evidence to the Commissioner's inquiry.

The record of the meeting between Mr Galloway and Saddam Hussein in August 2002

46. On 8 August 2002, Mr Galloway had a meeting with Saddam Hussein, and a document which purports to be a record of this meeting was obtained by the Commissioner.[97] According to this record, Mr Galloway made remarks which implied that some of his activities in support of the Iraqi regime may have been financed through an oil-related mechanism. If the record were to be substantiated, it would represent further circumstantial evidence that the activities of the Mariam Appeal had been funded through the Oil for Food Programme, and that Mr Galloway was aware of this.

47. Mr Galloway maintains that there was nobody present at the meeting (or at any rate the smaller, private part) who could have taken a record, and concludes that it is therefore not authentic. He considers it to be a bowdlerised version, inaccurate in a number of respects, of accounts he has himself given.

48. In his evidence to us, Mr Galloway was dismissive of of the alleged record of the meeting on a number of grounds, notably that it had emanated from the intelligence services and "which they say was recovered from a department who was not involved in the circulation list of the so-called "minute"".[98] We note that the document states that the minute was to be distributed to "the comrades in the Iraqi State Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party and to the Ministers" and that 30 copies were made.[99] However, neither the Commissioner nor we have any information on the precise circulation; the document itself is silent on this point.

49. Mr Galloway was adamant that his meeting had not been taped.[100] He maintained[101] that "this is not a minute of my meeting with Saddam Hussein…….if there were a tape the inaccuracies in this minute would not be there and the fabrications would not be there either…..if there was a tape it would be much more interesting than the document we have got in front of us." He maintained that Saddam Hussein had spoken about "exactly what would happen if Britain and America invaded Iraq, in blood curdling detail", and drew attention to what he maintained were obvious errors in the record.[102]

50. Since submitting his memorandum to us, the Commissioner has received through the Ministry of Defence a paper setting out the background to the copy of the alleged meeting record,[103] and we gave Mr Galloway a copy before he gave evidence to us. This was prepared by the Combined Media Processing Centre—Qatar. It provides information on where the document was found, its source, and practice in relation to making records of the President's meetings. The document appears to provide strong circumstantial evidence that Saddam Hussein had many meetings recorded, and that the Press Secretary was required to transcribe them. The inference is that the record of the meeting between Mr Galloway and Saddam Hussein could well have been produced in this manner.

51. We note that Mr Galloway rejects any suggestion that his meeting with Saddam Hussein could have been covertly recorded and subsequently transcribed by the Press Secretary. Equally, the paper received by the Commissioner reflects a credible explanation of its provenance, and how it came into the hands of Coalition forces.

52. We take the view that the alleged record of the meeting between Mr Galloway and Saddam Hussein in August 2002 is authentic.

1 See Oral Evidence, pages 3-25. Back

2 p. 177. Back

3 Appendix 1, paras 16 to 21. Back

4 Referred to subsequently in the report as the Telegraph. Back

5 The principal article is reproduced at WE1, p. 6. Back

6 WE2, p. 7. Back

7 WE3, p. 7. Back

8 Q267. Back

9 Appendix 1, para 71. Back

10 See WE 32, p. 31. Back

11 See Oral Evidence, pages 1-2. Back