Appendix: Government Response
Strategic sea-lift enables large volumes of defence
equipment and stores to be transported to operational theatres
in the most cost-effective way, but early political and military
decision-making is needed if sea-lift is to be possible. We recommend
that the MoD identify how the speed of its decision-making could
be improved further in order to maximise the use of sea-lift.
(Paragraph 15)
1. The Department notes the Committee's comments.
We recognise that the use of sea-lift represents a cost-effective
method of moving assets to theatre and this is reflected in the
MoD's current Ro-Ro contract. Seeking to make maximum use of sea-lift
where operationally appropriate is a standard operating procedure
for the Department. Strategic movements planning is fully integrated
into the wider MoD operational planning process and we continually
seek to optimise the use of the most appropriate form of strategic
lift consistent with meeting both planning opportunities and operational
timelines.
Strategic air-lift is an expensive option for
transporting equipment and stores when compared with strategic
sea-lift, but is the fastest option for transporting equipment
and stores needed urgently in theatre. When using strategic air-lift,
the MoD must ensure that the lift capacity of aircraft is fully
utilised, giving priority to the equipment and stores urgently
needed in theatre. However, where spare capacity is available,
it makes sense to transport other items which are not needed as
urgently, rather than "fly fresh air". (Paragraph 17)
2. The Department notes the Committee's comments
on maximising the use of airlift capacity. The air bridges used
for the support of overseas theatres are sized to match the capacity
needed by commanders to prosecute their mission effectively and
are kept under continual review. Movement of equipment is closely
managed and flowed into theatre in accordance with theatre priorities.
Utilisation of aircraft is very high and makes optimum use of
the payload and physical space available.
3. We note that the transportation of equipment
through third countries to support current operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan has generally not caused any problems. (Paragraph
19)
3. The Department notes the Committee's comment on
transportation through third countries in support of operations.
We continue to receive good support from the countries in question.
We are pleased to learn that the Ro-Ro container
ships have performed very effectively in both supporting current
operations and undertaking other tasks, and note that the MoD
considers that the six ships are sufficient to meet its current
needs. (Paragraph 22)
4. The Department welcomes the Committee's comments
on the Ro-Ro container ships. The Ro-Ros continue to support a
mix of operational and exercise tasks, along with support to overseas
garrisons and allied nations. The vessels meet the bulk of MoD's
needs with a limited number of additional requirements being met
by use of the Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary), through reciprocal
arrangements with allies, or by the chartering of small numbers
of commercial vessels.
We note that in addition to the six Ro-Ro container
ships, the MoD's four Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) vessels can
also be used in a strategic sea-lift role, although they have
only been used once to date in such a role. (Paragraph 25)
5. The Department notes the Committee's comments.
Three Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) vessels are now in service
and the fourth, LYME BAY, will be available for tasking in November
2007 following operational sea training. The vessels have now
undertaken three sealift tasks with a fourth to take place shortly.
The MoD has good arrangements to access commercial
shipping and has, to date, secured the commercial shipping it
required to supplement its own sea-lift capability. However, the
commercial shipping market is reducing. We recommend that the
MoD undertake a detailed analysis of the commercial shipping market
with the aim of assessing whether it will be able to secure access
to commercial shipping in the quantities and timeframes necessary
to meet its future needs. (Paragraph 32)
6. The Department notes the Committee's recommendation.
The MoD receives annual assessments of British-registered militarily
useful shipping from the Department for Transport, the next of
which is due in late September 2007. In addition, detailed assessments
and analysis of commercial ship availability are undertaken by
NATO's Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council Planning Board for Ocean
Shipping. Work is currently underway to produce a new version
of this assessment which, along with the Department for Transport
data, will enable MoD to take an informed view of the commercial
market.
We are very concerned that a high proportion of
the current transport and tanker aircraft are not available for
immediate deployment to undertake the required tasks. While modifications
are often the reason for aircraft not being available, maintenance
is also a key factor, and reflects the fact that the MoD has an
ageing transport and tanker aircraft fleet which is being flown
at an unexpectedly high level in very punishing conditions. While
new transport and tanker aircraft are in the pipeline, it will
be some years before they enter service. We have real doubts as
to whether the current transport and tanker fleet can provide
the level of availability required between now and when these
new aircraft come into service. (Paragraph 38)
7. The availability of our air transport and tanker
aircraft is carefully managed to ensure that there are sufficient
available to undertake planned tasks, while managing the routine
maintenance programme and any additional modification programmes.
Those aircraft undergoing maintenance and/or modification can
usually be returned to the front line should they be required
for tasking. The response time to recover aircraft from deep maintenance
depends upon what is being done to the aircraft, how stripped
down the aircraft are and what resources can be diverted to the
task by industry. However, there is routine close co-ordination
between the MoD and industry to ensure recovery times are as short
as possible if this contingency is required. The periodicity of
routine maintenance can be calendar-based, landings-based and/or
flying hour-based on a particular aircraft.
8. The Department agrees with the Committee that
some aircraft are incurring additional maintenance and repair
activity as a result of the conditions in which they are employed.
For example, the use of the C-130 Hercules onto natural surfaces
rather than paved runways results in some unavoidable damage to
the under-belly surface of the aircraft. This was recognised early
during the aircraft's employment in such conditions and an under-belly
protection programme was rapidly implemented to reduce the requirement
to carry out extensive repair and recovery activity. However,
the various operational and engineering demands placed on our
aircraft are very carefully managed and coordinated to ensure
that we have sufficient aircraft to meet the task.
The MoD makes extensive use of commercial air-lift
for transporting freight and personnel to supplement its own air-lift
assets, and is reviewing whether the current Strategic Lift balance
between the air-lift capacity provided by its own air-lift assets
and the air-lift capacity it requires from the marketplace is
right. The MoD should complete its review as quickly as possible
and ensure that the recommendations are implemented fully. (Paragraph
46)
9. The MoD monitors carefully the balance between
its own strategic airlift assets and the use of charter. As a
result of its most recent detailed analysis the Department has
concluded that the purchase of a further C-17 Globemaster III
aircraft will reduce the risk inherent in our use of the charter
passenger air transport market. This was announced in a written
statement by the Secretary of State for Defence on 26 July 2007.
The aircraft, which will bring the UK C-17 fleet to six in total,
is expected to be delivered in 2008.
We welcome the action that has been taken to improve
the reliability of the airbridge and to improve the experience
of service personnel being transported to and from the UK and
operational theatres. The MoD should not underestimate the impact
on the morale of Service personnel of delays returning to the
UK, particularly if the delays cut into a short period of leave.
The MoD must monitor closely issues relating to the airbridge
and ensure that the improvements in hand are fully implemented.
(Paragraph 53)
10. The Department notes the Committee's comments
on the airbridge and we continue to take measures to refine the
service provided. The morale of deployed personnel is an extremely
high priority. It has a comprehensive action plan of short, medium
and long term measures, with clear responsibilities assigned,
accountable to a recently-appointed Defence Air Movements Process
Coordinator (ACDS Log Ops). We have instigated a system of formal
passenger feedback and have a further formal review planned for
later this year which will both enable progress to be benchmarked
and identify further potential improvement measures. It should
be noted that airbridge reliability has improved, with over 92%
of airbridge flights since April 2007 arriving within three hours
of forecast timings.
The leasing of four C-17 large transport aircraft,
which are to be purchased when the lease ends, has greatly increased
the MoD's strategic airlift capability and performed extremely
well. We welcome the fact that these four aircraft will be purchased
once the lease ends and that the MoD is to purchase a fifth C-17
aircraft. We recommend that the MoD should commission a detailed
analysis of the medium and longer term consequences of the high
level of use of the C-17 and C-130 Hercules fleets, and should
publish the results of that analysis as soon as possible. (Paragraph
62)
11. The Department welcomes the Committee's comments
on C-17 and C-130 aircraft. We share the Committee's concerns
regarding the medium and longer term consequences of the current
high levels of use of the C-17 and C-130 fleets. We wish to reassure
the Committee that we already monitor very closely the impact
that flying rates have upon the expected life of our aircraft.
We constantly monitor the fatigue that our aircraft are subject
to in order to reassess our ability to maintain military capability
in the future and enable early action to be taken where necessary.
In the long term, the MoD is taking account of the reduced life-expectancy
of its aircraft as a result of increased flying hours and in the
short term, where appropriate and justifiable, any additional
costs of increased hours are charged to the Reserve whenever directly
attributable to Operations.
MoD officials are producing advice to ministers
setting out options for addressing possible risks relating to
the MoD's future air-lift requirements. Given the performance
of its C-17 large transport aircraft, the MoD must give consideration
to the acquisition of additional C-17 aircraft. Such a decision
needs to be taken quickly given that the C-17 production line
may be closing in the near future. (Paragraph 67)
12. The Department agrees the recommendation. The
C-17 has proved a great success on operations and we keep our
C-17 requirements under continual review. As highlighted in the
Department's response to recommendation eight, on 26 July 2007
the MoD announced its intention to purchase a sixth Boeing C-17
Globemaster III, as part of a number of measures to enhance operational
effectiveness. This is indicative of the importance the Department
places on Air Transport and will further boost the UK's strategic
airlift capability.
13. The requirement for strategic airlift will be
reviewed as part of the Department's Planning Round 2008 process
in the context of other Defence equipment requirements.
We note that the In-Service Date slippage on the
A400M programme remains at 15 months, as reported in the Major
Projects Report 2006, and that Airbus has devoted more resources
to the programme to keep it on track. (Paragraph 74)
14. The Department notes the Committee's comments.
We continue to oversee and support (wherever appropriate) industry's
effort to keep the A400M programme on track. Since the release
of the HCDC report on Strategic Lift, there has been slippage
to the start of aircraft final assembly in Seville, which has
now commenced (August 2007, five months later than the contract
schedule), and Airbus Military have announced delay to the aircraft's
first flight, which is now planned for Summer 2008.
15. Industry are implementing a series of schedule
recovery plans and, based on the company's latest forecasts for
initial aircraft deliveries, we consider the impact to our In
Service Date of March 2011 to be manageable. We are seeking further
information from Airbus Military so that we can build increased
confidence in the robustness of their estimates.
The delay to the A400M programme has required
the lives of ageing C-130K aircraft to be extended. If there are
any further delays on the A400M programme, the scope for further
extending the lives of C-130K aircraft may be limited, and expensive,
leaving a potential capability gap. We recommend that the MoD
undertakes a full analysis of the options for bridging a potential
capability gap if the A400 programme experiences any further delays.
(Paragraph 77)
16. The MoD accepts this recommendation. The Strategic
Mobility Capability Planning Group has already identified the
need to carry out such an analysis and working closely with the
A400M Integrated Project Team will consider the likelihood and
scope of any A400M delays, as well as mitigation strategies to
deal with the consequences thereof. The potential costs and limitations
of extending the C-130K in service are recognised and critical
investment decision points have been identified. We will remain
adaptive to emerging information on the A400M programme.
The MoD has assured us that A400M aircraft will
be fitted with a Defensive Aid System and a Fuel Tank Inertion
system for protection. We assume these systems will be fitted
to all A400M aircraft and call on the MoD to confirm, in its response
to our report, that this will be the case. It would be a false
economy not to fit these systems to all A400M aircraft during
manufacture, only then to retro-fit the systems later at great
expense. (Paragraph 79)
17. The Department notes the Committee's comments
on fitting a Defensive Aids System and a Fuel Tank Inertion system
to all A400M aircraft. Procurement and fitting of Defensive systems,
including that for the A400M, is kept under constant review. We
constantly monitor and take judgements on a range of factors including
threats, technology available and industrial capacity to provide
the capabilities we need within the timescales we require. In
balancing its priorities, the MoD has already ensured that all
but one of our A400M aircraft will, during manufacture, be fitted
with the necessary equipment to enable full Defensive systems
to be installed at a later date; this includes Fuel Tank Inertion
and a Defensive Aids System. Thus the higher costs of modifying
the aircraft to retrofit these systems will be avoided. The one
exception to this is an early development aircraft which is already
under construction and cannot be fitted with the enabling pipework
for Fuel Tank Inertion during the current production run. However,
the MoD is currently looking at ways to address this shortfall.
The fitment of defensive aids equipment for the full A400M fleet
will be considered in the current Planning Round 2008.
The MoD is acquiring 25 A400M aircraft to replace
its C-130K Hercules aircraft fleet. Several C-130 Hercules aircraft
have been lost during current operations and the MoD is undertaking
work to identify likely future attrition rates. We recommend that
the MoD consider acquiring additional A400M aircraft to ensure
that the pool of 25 available aircraft is maintained. (Paragraph
81)
18. The Department notes the Committee's concerns
about the available numbers of A400M aircraft. The UK has committed
to purchase 25 aircraft but in line with current planning assumptions
has no plans to purchase more at this time. Unlike Fast Jet aircraft,
the MoD does not buy an attrition reserve of transport aircraft
but has call on the Treasury Reserve to replace aircraft lost
during operations. In determining total A400M fleet size the MoD
has considered both the total number of aircraft required to support
discrete and concurrent operations, as well as the overall volume
of freight to be moved over time required by policy planning assumptions.
While the replacement of C-130K with 25 A400M will, overall, result
in a one-for-one replacement, the increased payload and range
of A400M roughly doubles the relative airlift capability offered
by C-130K.
It is intended that the MoD's Future Rapid Effect
System (FRES), a family of medium-weight armoured vehicles, are
to be transportable to operational theatres by A400M aircraft.
However, the increased weight of FRES could lead to it becoming
too heavy to be transported by A400M or could substantially reduce
the distance that the vehicles could be transported. The weight
of FRES must be carefully monitored and managed, both during development
and when in-service, to avoid a situation where the UK Armed Forces
will have a new generation of armoured fighting vehicles which
cannot be deployed rapidly overseas. (Paragraph 90)
19. The Department accepts this conclusion which
is consistent with the approach already being adopted by the Department
for the FRES programme. In responding to the Committee's report
on FRES[1] we
explained that transportability by A400M is recognised as a risk
to the programme and that this risk is being carefully managed
with appropriate mitigation strategies. We also asked the Committee
to note[2] that the question
of the relative priority of force protection in theatre and air
deployability had been resolved. Whilst both are important, protection
in theatre is a higher priority than air deployability by A400M.
Decisions on FRES will continue to reflect this priority.
The MoD is undertaking work to identify a support
and maintenance arrangement for the A400M aircraft when it enters
service. The MoD needs to ensure that the arrangement identified
provides the UK with operational sovereignty. (Paragraph 92)
20. The MoD notes the Committee's comments. We are
currently undertaking an Assessment Phase, which covers all aspects
of support to deliver a through-life value for money support solution
that provides the required level of operational sovereignty. The
Defence Industrial Strategy (December 2005) identifies no specific
sovereign requirement to sustain an indigenous industrial capability
for large fixed wing aircraft, but recognises the ongoing need
for the systems engineering/design skills and access to Intellectual
Property Rights for the integration of mission systems, including
defensive aids. The MoD will take account of these needs in its
assessment of the range of support options.
The A400M programme is a European collaborative
programme, but has been structured in a way to avoid some of the
problems experienced on past collaborative programmes, such as
Eurofighter. We recommend that the MoD evaluate those aspects
of the A400M programme which have gone well, and those aspects
which have gone less well, such as the very long development phase,
and ensure that the lessons are applied to future collaborative
programmes. (Paragraph 96)
21. The Department accepts the Committee's recommendation.
Formal Key Stage Peer Reviews (KSPR) are mandated across DE&S
at different stages of a project's life. These reviews draw useful
lessons and provide examples of good practice for migration through
the Organisation. The next A400M KSPR will be undertaken, as required,
at the end of the Programme's Development Phase. Its remit will
include an assessment of the effectiveness of collaborative aspects
of the programme including (but not limited to) the placement
and management of the Development and Production Phase Contract
through OCCAR.
The MoD's current tanker aircraft fleet consists
of elderly TriStar and VC-10 aircraft which are becoming increasingly
expensive to keep in service. We note that MoD considers that
these aircraft can be maintained in service until the Future Strategic
Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) is available, although it acknowledges
that there would come a point where the cost of maintaining the
aircraft would become prohibitive. (Paragraph 105)
22. The Department notes the Committee's comments.
DE&S has put measures in place to ensure that the TriStar
and VC-10 fleets can be sustained until FSTA has been introduced
to Service. The costs of maintaining these legacy fleets are constantly
monitored to ensure they provide value for money for Defence.
We note that the MoD considers that a Private
Finance Initiative (PFI) deal for the Future Strategic Tanker
Aircraft (FSTA) programme offers better value for money than acquiring
the aircraft under a conventional procurement approach. (Paragraph
111)
23. FSTA will provide our Armed Forces with a modern,
efficient, Air To Air Refuelling and passenger Air Transport capability.
The PFI service will provide Through Life capability through a
contract that covers provision of aircraft, infrastructure, training
and support, and which includes incentives on industry to deliver
available capability to contractually agreed standards.
The FSTA programme was nominated as a potential
PFI project in 1997, but some ten years later a deal has yet to
be finalised. We expect the MoD to identify the reasons why this
project has taken so long, and the lessons for future projects
where the MoD is considering a PFI approach. (Paragraph 112)
24. FSTA entered its formal Assessment Phase in December
2000 when an Invitation To Negotiate was issued to industry. FSTA
is a large and uniquely complex PFI programme and the commercial
arrangements have inevitably taken time to conclude. In keeping
with normal practice, the Department will undertake a Post Project
Evaluation and will draw on any lessons learned.
We welcome the news that MoD has decided to proceed
towards financial and contractual close of the FSTA PFI deal.
However, challenges still remain on the project as the funding
has still to be raised. It is important that the MoD works closely
with the contractor, AirTanker Ltd, so that the PFI deal can be
finalised quickly. We consider it vital that the FSTA aircraft
enter service as soon as possible, given the need for improved
air transport for Service personnel. (Paragraph 115)
25. The Department notes the Committee's support
for the PFI contract. We are working closely with AirTanker and
its advisors to ensure the PFI funding process is completed as
quickly and effectively as possible. We share the Committee's
desire for the FSTA capability to enter service as soon as possible.
We note that other countries also have a requirement
for new tanker aircraft. The MoD should consider whether there
is scope for another country to become a partner on the FSTA given
the financial and inter-operability benefits that this might offer.
(Paragraph 116)
26. The Department notes the Committee's comment.
We will continue to maintain dialogue with other nations about
the scope for cooperation on Air To Air Refuelling capability.
1 Defence Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session
2006-07, Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report
of Session 2006-07: The Army's requirement for armoured
vehicles: the FRES programme, HC 511, response to conclusion
8 Back
2
Ibid., response to conclusion 9
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