Clause
6
Type
of provision that may be made by
orders
Mr.
Hogg:
I beg to move amendment No. 96, in
clause 6, page 5, leave out lines 22 to 24
and insert—
‘(1) The Court
may make orders specified in subsections (3), (4) and (5)
below.’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to
discuss the following amendments: No. 97, in clause
6, page 5, line 29, leave out ‘Examples
of’.
No. 98, in
clause 6, page 5, line 31, after
‘orders’, insert
‘may’.
No.
99, in
clause 6, page 5, line 40, leave
out ‘Examples
of’.
No. 100,
in
clause 6, page 5, line 42, after
‘orders’, insert
‘may’.
No.
101, in
clause 6, page 6, line 4, leave
out ‘Examples
of’.
No. 102,
in
clause 6, page 6, line 5, after
‘orders’, insert ‘may’.
No. 103, in
clause 6, page 6, line 25, leave
out from ‘orders’ to ‘prohibitions’ in line
27 and insert ‘may not
include’.
Mr.
Hogg:
The purpose of these amendments is effectively
twofold. It is to strike out subsection (1) and to modify subsection
(3).
May I remind the
Committee that—[
Interruption
.
] Was
it my handkerchief or am I
perambulating?
The
Chairman:
Order. It was the handkerchief that caught my
eye. [
Laughte
r
.] The right hon. and learned
Gentleman was not out of order but he was not perhaps quite as
sartorially elegant as he ordinarily is.
[
Laughter
.]
Mr.
Hogg:
I was wondering whether I was strolling around the
place. [
Laughter
.]
Anyway, the purpose of this
group is twofold: to strike out subsection (1) and to modify subsection
(3).
I remind the
Committee that the definition of serious crime includes anything that
the court wishes to treat as a serious crime. We have already had that
debate. The language will be found in clause 2(2)(b).
We need to keep it in mind that
the background is not just the defined offences but any other offence
that the court thinks appropriate. Then one goes to clause 6(6) and we
find something rather similar, because the various specific powers that
are referred to in clause 6(3)—which are draconian, and have
already been referred to by various hon. Members—are only
examples. We are not confining the power of the court to the categories
that are set out. The court can, in fact, make any order that it thinks
appropriate; we go back to the language of clause 6(1). The various
examples are but examples and they extend right across the spectrum of
human activity: who the person meets; where they go; the type of
business that they undertake; what they do with their financial
arrangements, and this and that. It extends to the power to prevent a
person from living in a particular place, or requiring a person to live
in a particular place. I think that it would enable the court to impose
curfew orders, which, as we know, are a form of house arrest.
There is no limitation to these
powers, which is, of course, one of the reasons why in previous
debatesI have tried to introduce the criteria of justness,
proportionality and reasonableness, but I failed. This is an important
clause, because it gives the power to the court to do anything that the
court thinks appropriate. I cannot, cannot, cannot believe that that is
right, and I really think that if this House understood what was being
said and done in this Committee it would be deeply shocked.
The truth is, Mr.
Bercow—you and I know this, as we have been in the House a very
long time—that most Members do not read Bills, and they do not
read Committee proceedings either. Most Members do not know what is
happening and the Executive can do pretty well what it pleases, because
of the rubber stamp procedures that, I am afraid to say, we have
created in this place. I happen to believe that this Bill is a scandal
and I really believe that a House of Commons that was unfettered and
voting freely, probably secretly, would never pass this sort of thing.
I very much hope that the
Minister will reflect on whether it is right to give the court the power
to make any order, of which this measure is but an
illustration.
Nick
Herbert:
I rise once again to support my right hon. and
learned Friend’s amendments. We, too, have concerns about the
broad scope of the provisions in clause 6(3) and the extent to which
the prohibitions that are set out are only examples of conduct and
activity that may be prohibited or restricted or the requirements that
may be imposed under the serious crime prevention order. It is a
non-exhaustive list and the purpose of the amendments, as my right hon.
and learned Friend explained, is to make it an exhaustive
list.
The
restrictions in the making of control orders are similar to those set
out in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. There are close analogies
between control orders and the serious crime prevention orders proposed
in the Bill. In considering whether the restrictions are reasonable, it
is important to look at
how control orders have been interpreted by the courts, how they have
fared and, in particular, their use in relation to detaining people in
their homes, which is the subject of huge controversy and is permitted
in relation to serious crime prevention orders in the
Bill. There is an
important difference, to which the hon. Member for Wrexham drew
attention, in that the serious crime prevention orders are made by the
courts and not by the Executive, although my right hon. and learned
Friend explained the extent to which the Executive has an important
role in all this. By contrast, control orders are made by the
Executive.
It is also
important to note the absence of a safeguard in making these very
onerous restrictions in clause 6(3): under the control order
legislation in section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the
prosecution—
It
being twenty-five minutes past Ten o’clock,
The
Chairman
adjourned the Committee without Question put,
pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned till this day at
Two
o’clock.
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