Clause
6
Annual
report by the
Assembly
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Jim
Fitzpatrick:
Clause 6 provides for the assembly to prepare
an annual report on its work and achievements during the year. The
report will be prepared at the end of each financial year and must be
sent to the Mayor before it is published. For a period of six years,
the report submitted to the Mayor should be kept available both for
viewing at the offices of the authority and, for a nominal fee, for
sending to any person on
request.
Requiring
the assembly to produce an annual report will increase its public
accountability and raise its profile among Londoners. The report will
enable the assembly to set out its work and achievements over the
previous 12 months. It will also complement the Mayor’s report
on the exercise of his statutory functions.
Question put and agreed
to.
Clause 6
ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
7
Staff
appointed under section 67(2) of the GLA Act
1999
Tom
Brake:
I beg to move amendment No. 56, in
clause 7, page 5, leave out lines 3 and 4
and insert
‘may,
following consultation with the Mayor and Assembly, determine any
matter affecting the establishment of the
Authority.’.
The
Chairman:
With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following:
Amendment
No. 57, in
clause 7, page 5, line 4, at
end insert—
‘(2A) The head
of the Authority’s paid service shall give not less than 28
days’ notice in writing to the Assembly, together with reasons,
before determining any matter affecting the establishment of the
Authority.
(2B) The head of the
Authority’s paid service shall have regard to any comment
expressed by the Mayor and the Assembly within the period of 28 days of
the giving of that notice.
(2C)
On making a determination affecting any matter affecting the
establishment of the Authority, the head of the Authority’s paid
service shall, if he has received comments under subsection (2B) above,
make a statement in writing setting out the reasons why any comments so
submitted are not accepted.
(2D) For the purposes of this section, the
expression “any matters affecting the establishment of the
Authority” shall in relating to a post or posts appointed under
subsection (2),
mean—
(a) the total
number of any such posts;
(b)
the grading of any such
posts;
(c) the functions of any
such posts; and
(d) such of the
terms and conditions of employment that relate to the functions of any
such
post.’.
Clause
stand part.
Amendment
No. 40, in
clause 8, page 6, line 15, leave
out subsection
(6).
Amendment No. 58,
in
clause 8, page 6, line 19, at
end insert
‘except any
function of the Authority’s paid service to which sections
67(2A) to (2D)
apply’.
Clause
8 stand
part.
Tom
Brake:
The Great London Authority Act 1999 provides that
the assembly is responsible for appointing staff to the authority,
including those responsible for the three distinct roles of setting the
establishment, agreeing staffing-related policies and procedures and
appointing staff. In practice, assembly members are not involved
directly in the appointment of staff other than to senior posts within
the secretariat, the statutory officers, and director-level
appointments across the rest of the authority. This highlights an
important distinction in respect of the staffing
establishment—the creation and deletion of positions—and
the appointment of staff, filling the posts that have already been
created on the staff establishment. The Bill would transfer
responsibility for creating and deleting posts and appointing staff to
those posts—apart from the head of paid service, the statutory
finance officer and the monitoring officer who would be appointed
jointly by the Mayor and assembly—from the London Assembly to
the Greater London Authority’s head of paid
service.
Amendments
Nos. 56 and 57 would, if amendments Nos. 39 or 40 were not accepted,
amend the Bill to put in place safeguards requiring the head of paid
service to consult the Mayor and assembly before taking decisions
relating to the establishment of the authority, and prevent the head of
paid service from delegating his functions in relation to the creation
and deletion of posts to any other officer of the authority. The
assembly unanimously supports the introduction of these safeguards, so
again the Minister is in a position where amendments are being put
forward with the full support of all parties on the assembly. Clearly,
GLA members will look carefully at this debate to see why, if the
Minister chooses to refuse these amendments, he has taken that
position.
The head of
paid service must be placed under a statutory duty to consult the
London assembly and the Mayor in advance of any decision on the
creation and deletion of posts within the authority's staffing
establishment. That would ensure that the head of paid service has
regard to the views of the Mayor and assembly, and is accountable to
them for his decisions. It would also ensure that the current degree of
transparency in decision making about staffing policies and procedures,
and the size and functions of the establishment, is retained.
The head of paid service should
not be allowed to delegate his powers relating to the creation and
deletion of posts in the authority. The power so to delegate could
result in a diffusion of responsibility and accountability, as well as
potentially making the decision-making process less transparent. If the
Government choose not to accept amendments Nos. 56 and 57, amendment
No. 40 would maintain the status quo so that the assembly remained
responsible for staffing matters within the authority—with the
exception of the head of paid service, the statutory finance officer
and monitoring officer, who would be jointly appointed by the Mayor and
assembly.
When the
Minister responds, he thus has two options. He, or the Minister for
Housing and Planning, whom I welcome to the Front Bench, could opt to
explain why the status quo is not favoured when it provides certain
safeguards but does not stop the Mayor and the authority functioning
effectively. The Minister for Housing and Planning could say why she is
unhappy with those present arrangements; she also has the opportunity
to explain why she is not supporting safeguards that could be put in
place when this change, if it occurs, will see the head of paid service
take responsibility for staff. I will listen carefully to the
Minister’s reply, and hold fire until I have heard that, before
seeing how I want to proceed with these particular
amendments.
Michael
Gove: I support the principle and detail of the amendments
standing in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington.
After the briefest of estrangements over this debate, I am happy that
we are once more reunited. It is wonderful to have the warm embrace of
the Liberal Democrats once more restored. I will make no comment about
the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik), or about the
Liberal Democrats leaving and then re-embracing other
individuals.
As to
the matter under debate, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington
pointed out that the current arrangement works well. It has the merit
of ensuring that the assembly has an important role to play in staff
appointments. It is important to clear up any concerns that some may
have. It is not the case that the assembly is responsible for the
meanest and lowliest staff appointment, as some may think. The assembly
is not responsible for every discharge of executive function but,
crucially, it determines the overall staff complement and has a key
role in certain important staff appointments. It is important to
appreciate why this system, which I accept is distinctive and not
replicated in any other part of local government, has worked well so
far. That is because it ensures that debates about staffing can occur
transparently and openly, by operating across parties.
One concern
that many people had about the mayoral system, and the idea of an
executive Mayor, was its departure from existing local government
practice in England and Wales. There was concern that we would see
municipal Bonapartism—that rather than a Napoleon of Notting
Hill, there would be a Napoleon for the whole of London—and that
questions of staffing, the discharge of executive functions and policy
would be
decided by the Mayor and his kitchen cabinet without appropriate
openness or transparency.
The
Liberal Democrats and I, and my Back-Bench colleagues, have been
trying—and will try during the progress on the Bill—to
bring those decisions into the light wherever possible, whether on
planning, housing or any other area, to ensure that there is maximum
transparency and accountability. One good thing about this legislation
which the Government originally brought forward in their first term was
that there was already greater transparency and accountability about
the creation of the staff complement. Because it was the assembly that
debated and fixed those matters, it was not simply the case that the
Mayor, in the privacy of his own kitchen cabinet, could take his
decisions; we could have extensive public scrutiny of them. As a result
of that, there is general agreement that the system has worked well.
What we are likely to see here is a departure from a system that is
transparent and open and works well to a system that will favour the
Mayor and limit the degree of transparency and openness.
It might be
argued that the new system is closer to local government practice and
to the principle that a chief executive should be responsible for
appointing staff. In fact, it marks a departure away from a welcome
precedent that the Government established in the original legislation.
One of the things that it is important to recognise is that the Mayor
of London occupies a distinctive position in the whole system of
governance that we have in the UK. We do not have any other analogous
individual who exercises such a degree of power. To try to say that the
Mayor should have all the benefits but none of the constraints that
apply in local government elsewhere is to shift the balance in a way
that we consider to be unfortunate.
I know that some
people will say that all that is proposed is that a
bureaucrat—an enlightened bureaucrat at that, a head of paid
service—is responsible for discharging those functions. However,
that individual will find that he or she comes more under the sway of
the Mayor and the Mayor’s private office, and is less directly
accountable to the assembly than is the case at the moment. Given the
way that the Government seek to try to remove transparency and
accountability from the current process of setting the staff
complement, we believe that the Liberal Democrat amendments, by seeking
to preserve the existing system, strike a blow for greater
accountability, which should be at the heart of every measure within
the Bill. We are therefore more than happy to support the amendments
that stand in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and
Wallington.
Robert
Neill:
May I support the principle of what has been said
by my hon. Friend? I will trespass on the Committee’s time for a
short period to reinforce that in practice. It will be a shame if, for
what I accept are genuinely good intentions, the Government disturb a
system that has worked well, and is regarded by those people who are
members of the assembly and by those who work for the GLA as having
worked well. The assembly has never sought to use its current power to
interfere in the vast majority of appointments. I have referred on
other occasions to one or two rather controversial appointments that
the Mayor has made within the staff of the GLA. There was some
political
controversy about that, and some controversy in the press, but at the
end of the day, those of us who thought that they were mistaken
appointments, having made our point, did not seek to obstruct them
through the mechanism of the assembly.
It was also
important that the Mayor had to seek an accommodation with the parties
in the assembly to make sure that what he did was acceptable, in broad
terms, to public policy. It is worth paying tribute to the current
leader of the Labour group on the London assembly, Len Duval, who,
during those early periods, was chairman of the business management and
appointments committee of the assembly, and who worked in co-operation
with Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders—I was one of
them—to ensure that we did not get involved in confrontation.
The assembly has not abused its current powers. On the contrary, it has
used them in a measured way. So why move away from them? “If
it’s not broke, don’t fix it” is a pretty good
maxim. I know that the Minister regards Mr. Duval’s
judgment highly, in these and all matters, including that most
important, which has been alluded to—the fortunes of the great
West Ham United. I hope that he will think again about his judgment
there.
May I make two
other short points? This is not a criticism of the chief executive, the
current head of paid service, who is recognised on all sides as a
public servant of most outstanding calibre who has worked well with all
parties in the assembly and with the Mayor. However, such a post holder
is put in a difficult situation. The assembly has taken decisions on
staffing at a high level, in public, through its business management
and appointments committee, and reports have been made in public to the
full assembly. That transparency is hugely important and should not be
compromised, which is a concern that we have for the integrity of the
working of the
organisation.
12.15
pm
Tom
Brake:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he
agree that the changes go against the trend? Confirmation hearings are
about providing more checks and balances, whereas the provision goes in
the opposite direction. Does he also agree that it would be pertinent
for members to know what the current head of paid service thinks about
the changes? He will be required to implement them and he might have
views on how that could be done and how effective they will be. I hope
that when the Minister responds she will be able to confirm what
consultation with him was carried out and what his view
is.
Robert
Neill:
As far as I am aware, the head of paid service has
operated with the level of discretion that I would have expected had he
been, for example, the permanent secretary of a Department of State,
which he might well have been had his career taken a different path. No
officers of the GLA have sought the power in question, and it is
difficult to see where it has come from. I do not wish to strike an
uncharitable note, but I hope that it is not the result of a trade-off
to make up for disappointment about other powers being given to the
Mayor. There has been no suggestion from any professional body that the
change is needed. That was the important point that the hon. Gentleman
made.
I shall not
trespass on to municipal Bonapartism, beyond observing that between
1870 and 1873 Chislehurst was the world centre of Bonapartism—it
was the residence-in-exile of the emperor Napoleon III, who promptly
died and so never had to be put to an electoral test. I note that for
the history buffs among us. The principal point has been well made by
the Front-Bench spokesmen of both Opposition
parties.
Robert
Neill:
I hope that this is not about Napoleon
III.
Mr.
Slaughter:
No, it certainly is not, although I am sure
that the hon. Gentleman is a worthy successor to
him.
The hon.
Gentleman will forgive me if I am wrong, but in his comments on the
Labour members of the assembly, is he implying that they support the
line that Opposition members of the Committee are taking and that they
are happy with the current situation? That is not my understanding from
speaking to them. I wonder whether he is over-egging his argument by
saying that there is wholehearted opposition to the proposal within the
GLA.
Robert
Neill:
I am sorry, Mr. O’Hara, but it
seems, with respect, that the hon. Gentleman may not have been
listening to me. I was saying that all parties in the assembly have
worked together to make the system work well in practice. That is why
it is not broke and does not need fixing. I was certainly not
misrepresenting what Labour assembly members say. They certainly agreed
that if there were to be any changes, safeguards needed to be put in
place to ensure transparency and probity. I believe that they abstained
on the matters passed by other parties, and they were put in a
difficult
position.
Tom
Brake:
The hon. Gentleman has made a point that I was
going to make: all parties agreed that if staffing transfers were to
take place, the safeguards referred to in the amendments would need to
be put in place. Is he as confused as I am about the weight that is
being given to the views of assembly members, including Labour members,
and those of another party that we cannot quite identify? That validity
of that party’s concerns is clearly being given more weight than
those of London assembly members of all
parties.
Robert
Neill:
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Given the
history, it is difficult to discern where the drive for the idea has
come from. The assumption will be that it came from the Mayor or from
his office, but it is worth remembering that the assembly has as good a
mandate as the Mayor—it is elected at the same time by the same
people. It would be interesting to know why the Government feel obliged
to adopt one particular course when there is a clear and coherent
consensus against it and when, as the hon. Gentleman observed, the
proposal flies against the general intellectual thrust of the Bill.
That troubles me.
I
think that that makes my point, though I shall just mention to the hon.
Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush that Napoleon III was
elected President of the French republic by an overwhelming majority.
So I am happy to follow him in some regards.
The
Chairman:
Order. I think that we have heard enough of
Napoleon
III.
The
Minister for Housing and Planning (Yvette Cooper):
I
apologise for having missed the opening hour of the sitting owing to a
long-standing engagement. It is a pleasure to serve under your
Chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara. I am sure that the debate
will be cheerful throughout our proceedings on the Bill, even when we
disagree.
This part
of the debate covers both a number of amendments that have been tabled
and the matter of clause stand part. In my response I shall therefore
first cover the purpose of the proposed provisions and then the
amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and
Wallington.
Section 67
of the Greater London Assembly Act 1999 provides for the
appointment of three categories of authority staff. First, the Mayor
can appoint two political advisers. Those are personal appointments
made by the Mayor alone. Secondly, the Mayor can appoint not more than
10 other members of staff whose posts are open to competition, with
appointment on merit. Finally, the assembly appoints all other
authority staff after consultation with the
Mayor.
Clause 7
provides for the staff who are currently appointed by the Assembly to
be appointed in future by the authority’s head of paid service,
who is the most senior GLA official. He will be obliged to
consult the Mayor and the assembly before making an appointment, and he
will need to have regard to available resources and to the priorities
of the authority. Clause 7 also amends section 70(2) of 1999
Act to allow the head of paid service to set the terms and conditions
of the staff whom he appoints, again after consultation with the Mayor
and assembly. The appointment terms and conditions of current staff
will have effect as if they were appointed by
him.
Clause 8 amends
section 72 of the 1999 Act to enable the Mayor and assembly, acting
jointly—which is important, to appoint the authority’s
head of paid service and set his terms and conditions. It also allows
the head of paid service to delegate any of his staffing functions to a
member of staff of the authority, other than to staff appointed by the
Mayor. Finally, it provides that the head of paid service cannot also
be a member of the authority staff appointed by the Mayor under section
67(1).
So
a series of safeguards is built into the clauses. The hon. Member for
Surrey Heath was concerned that the Mayor would be given unrestricted
power to appoint a kitchen cabinet, but the reverse is true—we
are establishing a head of paid service whose appointment will be a
joint one, and we are allowing that jointly appointed official to
appoint the remaining GLA staff.
Michael
Gove:
Will the Minister say precisely what is wrong with
the current
system?
Yvette
Cooper:
I shall come to that. The purpose of making the
changes is relatively limited, but the clauses provide some benefits
over the current system. The current system is slightly anomalous in
that, although the GLA’s staff are largely engaged in carrying
out the Mayor’s programme, they depend on the assembly for
their terms and conditions; they are, effectively, appointed by the
assembly. The GLA has two branches, one of which largely decides the
work programme, while the other is responsible for staffing,
appointments and terms and conditions. There are certain anomalies and
potential unhealthy tensions in that arrangement. Clearly, it is
important for there to be a certain amount of tension between the Mayor
and the assembly. That is the purpose of scrutiny; it is a healthy
tension to create within a
democracy.
We should
consider with caution whether it is wise for the terms and conditions
of the non-political appointees who carry out the work of the GLA to be
part of the political tension between the Mayor and the assembly, and
so to be potentially subject to the disagreements, rows, trade-offs and
arguments that inevitably take place between them. That is why we
thought that it would be a better arrangement for such staff to have a
jointly appointed head of paid service who, after consulting both
branches of the GLA, could make appointments and staffing decisions in
the interests of the whole
GLA.
Tom
Brake:
The Minister referred to “potential”
unhealthy tensions. Can she list any actual unhealthy tensions that
have prompted the
change?
Yvette
Cooper:
There are accounts of discussions between the
Mayor and the assembly having involved decisions about staffing. The
Bill aims to ensure that there are sensible constitutional arrangements
for the GLA, and to do so in a way that anticipates potential tensions
rather than simply responding to existing arrangements. The hon. Member
for Surrey Heath is very concerned to ensure that we anticipate the
decision making of future Mayors and assemblies. Given his fear that
future Mayors might not be as responsible as the current one, I would
say to him that the way to ensure that that is not the case is to join
us in backing the current Mayor for a further term of office, rather
than engaging, in the style of “The X Factor”, in a
search for an alternative, who would, I am sure, be far more
irresponsible in the execution of all his powers.
This is simply about trying to
ensure that the GLA’s staffing arrangements are
sensible.
Stephen
Pound:
Ah, a candidate for
Mayor.
Michael
Gove:
In the Minister’s last sentence, even though
there were a number of subordinate clauses, there were more
contradictions than is normally the case in her arguments. Let me
briefly refer to two of them. The first is her invitation for us to
back the current Mayor on the basis that any other alternative would be
less conscientious or less responsible. My argument is that most
alternatives, particularly the Conservative alternative, would be
significantly more conscientious and more responsible.
However, it is conceivable that
a future Labour politician will, by some fluke, find himself in that
position and be less conscientious and less responsible. That goes to
the heart of the logical flaw in the Minister’s argument. She
said that she wanted to
ensure that in future there could be no irresponsible exercise of power.
However, at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and
Chislehurst pointed out, because decisions are taken in the open,
through the process of negotiation in the assembly, we have a highly
effective check against the abuse of powers. If the Government get
their way, the head of paid service will find himself or herself
susceptible to greater influence from the Mayor acting alone than is
the case at the moment. A deliberative assembly with 25 members
discussing something in the open is clearly less susceptible to covert
pressure than is an individual.
12.30
pm
The
Chairman:
Order. The Minister has the Floor. That was
supposed to be an intervention.
Yvette
Cooper:
The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is confident that
any Conservative candidate would be more responsible than the current
Mayor. That point is unfortunately undermined by the lack of a
Conservative candidate who is prepared to stand against the current
Mayor. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath has such a strong and growing
personal interest in London that perhaps he could be prevailed upon to
be a candidate himself, should all else
fail.
The hon.
Gentleman was trying to make a point about the need for negotiation and
open debate, which is extremely important. It is part of the
assembly’s role to hold the Mayor to account, to promote
openness, transparency and debate and to have a healthy tension with
the Mayor about particular issues of disagreement. However, we should
be cautious about making the terms and conditions of non-political GLA
staff part of the territory for political argument, debate and
negotiation. Is that the kind of thing on which we want the assembly to
focus its attention, when it should be concentrating on scrutinising
policies and
delivery?
Why not
leave matters such as staff terms and conditions to the head of paid
service according to long-standing parliamentary and ministerial
tradition? Ministers play one role and are accountable to Parliament,
but we allow Departments and the civil service to take decisions about
staffing and terms and conditions. We are trying to focus the assembly
and the Mayor on what is important to them, rather than allowing them
to get into inappropriate rows, trade-offs and negotiations about
practical matters such as terms and conditions and staffing
arrangements, which might properly be done by the head of paid service.
It is important to note that the head of paid service will be jointly
appointed by the Mayor and the assembly and will be accountable to both
for decisions on
staffing.
Michael
Gove:
The Minister has said that the GLA should have a
scrutiny role, but whenever we introduce a proposal to strengthen GLA
scrutiny, the Government reject it, which they show every sign of
continuing to do. In the one area in which the GLA’s powers are
strong, the Government propose to weaken them.
Why?
Yvette
Cooper:
The hon. Gentleman obviously wants debates about
other aspects of scrutiny, and it would be inappropriate for us to be
diverted from the particular
measures—
The
Chairman:
Order. I thank the Minister for that comment. I
remind members of the Committee of the terms of debate on these two
clauses.
Yvette
Cooper:
Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. We are
making important changes to the scrutiny of confirmation hearings,
which we have discussed, and to other matters, which the Committee will
have the opportunity to discuss in detail. The issue that we are
discussing now is a practical measure to ensure that attention is
focused on matters that should rightly be the subject of open,
transparent disagreement between the different branches of the GLA,
while allowing the organisation to function as effectively as possible
in managing and organising its staff, terms and conditions and so
on.
The amendments
tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington are unnecessary
and would be too bureaucratic in practice. There is already a
requirement on the head of paid service to consult the Mayor and the
assembly and to have regard to their views when determining the number,
grading and function of GLA staff. However, it would be inappropriate
to prevent the head of paid service from delegating those appointment
functions. The head of paid service continues to have responsibility
and accountability for those functions, but it is not right that that
officer should have to take every decision about every appointment or
staffing issue, as those matters can sensibly be delegated to other
officers as long as the line of accountability is very
clear.
A consultation
period of 28 days before the head of paid service can make decisions
would introduce delays and bureaucracy into a system that should be
able to respond flexibly. In particular circumstances, the head of paid
service may want a 28-day consultation period and a series of
engagements and consultations, but specifying a 28-day consultation
period, written representations and written statements and responses
would make it harder for the head of paid service to do a practical
management job in the interests of the GLA as a
whole.
Mr.
Andrew Pelling (Croydon, Central) (Con): I apologise for
not being here earlier. I was at a joint press conference with the
Mayor about the operation of Croydon Tramlink. It is a great privilege
to serve under your chairmanship, Mr.
O’Hara.
Bearing
in mind that this is one of two key areas of scrutiny provided to the
assembly under the original 1999 Act, does the Minister feel that the
assembly has been ineffective in using that ability? She has prayed in
aid efficiency, but is that important enough to warrant taking this
element of scrutiny away from the
assembly?
Yvette
Cooper:
I think that I have addressed the hon.
Gentleman’s points already. The amendments tabled by the hon.
Member for Carshalton and Wallington would introduce inefficiencies. I
am concerned about those amendments, because they are not the most
effective way of ensuring effective management. I am concerned about
the current arrangements on appointments between the Mayor and the
assembly, because it is anomalous for the work programme to be
decided by one branch and staffing arrangements by another. That may
lead to staffing terms and conditions for non-political appointments
becoming part of the territory of trade-offs, negotiations, rows and
debates between the assembly and the Mayor, which is not the best way
to get effective staff arrangements for the GLA in the long
term.
This
is a relatively limited, practical measure that will not have a
substantial effect on the scrutiny of the assembly—in fact; it
will allow it to concentrate on serious scrutiny—and it will not
give any other branch of the GLA any more or different powers. This is
purely about practical arrangements to support the
staff.
Robert
Neill:
I am trying to follow the Minister’s
argument. Can she provide an example of the current powers being used
to politicise the terms and conditions of appointment of non-political
members of staff? Is there a current example of the process working
badly? Surely that would have been foreseen by the Government when the
Bill was introduced six years ago. Where is the evidence to suggest
that there is anything other than a peripheral, potential risk? Where
is the problem in
practice?
Yvette
Cooper:
Hon. Members have said throughout that the Bill is
about making sensible changes that do not simply respond to the
existing arrangements, but also anticipate potential arrangements, such
as the future disposition of the Mayor and the assembly. Concerns have
been raised in some quarters about staffing issues being discussed by
the Mayor and the assembly, but those are not the reason for making the
changes. The reason is that the changes seem pretty sensible and allow
us to make long-term arrangements to prevent staffing arrangements
being used as a political football in discussions between the Mayor and
the assembly.
This is
not a major change, and it will not cause problems and substantial
difficulties in any quarter. It is a relatively sensible, not hugely
interesting change that will improve support for the GLA
staff.
Mr.
Pelling:
Is the Minister saying not that the assembly has
abused this power, but that it was just an error to include it in the
original 1999
Act?
Yvette
Cooper:
We have watched the operation of the Mayor and the
assembly and have learned about the importance of focusing on scrutiny,
which needs to take place, and about the need for the Mayor and the
assembly to focus on things that matter. There has been a process
examining whether the original 1999 Act best serves that end or whether
sensible amendments can be made. We have concluded that amending the
system is sensible and will improve how the GLA functions in a
relatively limited way. Opposition Members cannot sensibly object to
those amendments.
Mr.
Greg Hands (Hammersmith and Fulham) (Con): I wonder
whether the Minister has read the London assembly briefing on that
specific point? She thinks that the proposed changes are not
particularly
significant or controversial, but the assembly itself has told us that
the Bill provides for changes relating to the appointment of
staff
“which will
constitute a significant shift in power away from the assembly at a
time when existing arrangements function
well.”
Yvette
Cooper:
There are two questions for the assembly. First,
why does it think that its involvement in staff terms and conditions is
so significant? Secondly, should it be the assembly’s function
to be involved in and responsible for the terms and conditions of
junior GLA staff? Should the assembly see that as an important part of
its debate and political tensions with and scrutiny of the Mayor?
Should it not simply concentrate on overall delivery and policy and
allow non-political appointments to the GLA to be conducted by a head
of paid service, who is accountable to the assembly and the Mayor
jointly?
If the
Government were proposing a head of paid service accountable only to
the Mayor, I could understand why the assembly might raise concerns,
but we are not. We are saying that the head of paid service should be
responsible to both the Mayor and the assembly. The measure is a
practical one that will allow a sensible, functional arrangement for
GLA work
patterns.
Tom
Brake:
The Minister has referred to potentially unhealthy
tensions. Will she accept that the head of paid service might well sit
in the middle of such tensions, with the Mayor and assembly requiring
him to do different things? How about that for potentially unhealthy
tensions?
Yvette
Cooper:
In those circumstances, the head of paid service
should listen to both, decide the right thing to do and take
responsible decisions on the required staffing arrangements. The
alternative is for the issues to be part of the public territory and of
rows between the Mayor and the assembly.
Both the Mayor and the assembly
need to understand that the staffing arrangements and the terms and
conditions concern the employment of people who do significant jobs for
the assembly but who are not part of the main mayoral appointments or
the three key executive appointments, which are made jointly. Neither
the Mayor nor the assembly should use the more junior appointments that
are part of the GLA as political territory in the debates and rows
between them. All that the measures will do is put such appointments on
a sensible footing. I am not sure whether hon. Members are desperate to
keep this debate going in order to prevent us from reaching other
clauses, but I feel that I have made my points as often as it is
possible to make
them.
Several
hon. Members
rose—
Yvette
Cooper:
I shall take one last intervention from the hon.
Member for Surrey Heath, or allow the hon. Gentlemen to choose among
themselves who will speak, but there is a limit to what more can be
said.
Michael
Gove:
The Minister has only herself to blame on this
occasion. The more she explains, the more obscure the justification
becomes. She has talked about the GLA’s vital role in
scrutinising executive
responsibilities. The GLA has exercised its scrutiny function, and it
has said that such an accretion of executive responsibilities to the
head of paid service is wrong. She cannot say that the GLA should
restrict itself to scrutiny, and then say when it expresses an opinion,
“These people are wrong, I personally find the matter not
particularly interesting and, as ever, executive convenience should
come before scrutiny.” That is no way to deal with the
governance of
London.
Yvette
Cooper:
Opposition Members protest too much. They do not
honestly believe that the terms and conditions of junior staff of the
GLA should be a critical matter of scrutiny for assembly members. They
clearly want to make a political point, and they have had plenty of
opportunity to do so. If they are really thinking sensibly about
practical arrangements for the management of GLA staff, they will
recognise that the provisions are perfectly sensible and respectable
and will have benefits by preventing the staff from becoming political
footballs to be used by various branches of the GLA. The clauses
certainly do not do any of the terrible things that Opposition Members
have suggested, and they should be supported for practical
reasons.
12.45
pm
Tom
Brake:
In her opening sentence, the Minister said that she
wanted a cheerful debate. It is a pity that she was not here when the
Under-Secretary gave Opposition Members something to cheer
about—the indication that he would introduce an amendment on the
subject covered by amendment No. 38, which we welcome. It is a pity
that she did not continue in the same vein and maintain the general
sense of bonhomie and festive afterglow.
We listened carefully to the
reasons she gave for the “sensible changes”, as the
Minister called them, but I am afraid that we heard no good reasons. We
heard a series of allegations—the phrases used included
“concerns expressed in some quarters”, “heard of
some tensions” and “potential rows between assembly
members and the Mayor”—but she could not provide any
examples. We have in Committee two assembly members who would no doubt
have contributed examples of those rows, tensions and concerns, if
there had been any. The Minister gave no hard facts to justify the
changes.
Mr.
Slaughter:
I am reluctant to prolong the debate because,
like my hon. Friend the Minister, I suspect that this is a phantom
attack. The more I hear from the Opposition parties, the more I believe
that they are trying to make something out of not very much. As I
understand it, the proposal is that the senior non-political officer of
the authority, with joint responsibility for the assembly and the
Mayor, will deal
with staffing matters. To my mind, that is exactly what happens in most
other local
authorities.
My hon.
Friend the Minister will not say this, but I shall: there is an anomaly
in the 1999 Act that needs correction. It is surely far more sensible
for non-political officers to have the responsibility in question. The
possibility that the shrinking violet, the head of paid service, might
not be able to arbitrate between political parties was considered in
the regulatory impact assessment, but the argument is clearly nonsense
and was dismissed. The hon. Gentleman is clearly making too much of
it.
Tom
Brake:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention,
but it does not divert me from my course. If the Minister is proposing
a change to an Act that has been in place for more than six years and
is, by all accounts, operating effectively, she should present to
members of the Committee hard reasons why she is not happy with the
present arrangements and wants to change them. She has not done so. She
has simply referred to allocations made and concerns expressed by a
source whose identity she has not clarified for the benefit of
Opposition Members—I do not know whether she has clarified the
matter for Government Members. She has not confirmed the source of the
alleged tensions and concerns, and she has done nothing to dispel the
concern, which is shared by me and Conservative Members, that the
change is being driven by the Mayor and flies in the face of a system
that appears to be operating effectively and has the support of
Assembly members. I shall not therefore withdraw the amendment but will
press it to a
Division.
Question
put, That the amendment be
made:—
The
Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes
10.
Division
No.
4
]
Smith,
Ms Angela C.
(Sheffield,
Hillsborough)
Question
accordingly negatived.
Further consideration
adjourned.—[Jonathan
Shaw.]
Adjourned
accordingly at nine minutes to One o’clock till this day at Four
o’clock.
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