Police and Justice Bill |
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Fiona Mactaggart: Let us review what the clause is trying to do. I will deal with the hon. Lady’s points. The clause establishes the position of a new chief inspector for justice, community safety and custody, who will take over from the existing justice system inspectorates—the inspectorates of: constabulary; the Crown Prosecution Service; court administration; prisons; and the national probation service for England and Wales. Our ambition is to create a chief inspector who will look at the whole system, have a direct relationship with Ministers, be appointed by the Queen, and give independent guidance and challenge to our services. That is why we want clause 21 to stand part of the Bill. The hon. Lady seeks to substitute for the creation of a new chief inspector a joint secretariat and planning unit that would co-ordinate those five inspectorates. We considered such a model and consulted on it as part of our consultation on the reform of the inspectorate, but we rejected it because it would encounter the same limitations experienced by the existing inspectorates, which already have the use of a joint inspectorate for such purposes, albeit not on a statutory footing. I am certain that such a model would suffer from a lack of strong, overriding leadership on inspection priorities, setting a strategic course on the balance between single agency and joint inspections, and the ability to commit resources accordingly. I think that nowadays everybody recognises that with modern inspection it is necessary to focus attention where it is most needed and have a relatively light touch when services are doing an excellent job to enable them to get on with it. Individually, inspectorates reflect that approach in their inspection programmes, but it is more difficult in a patchwork system in which there is merely co-ordination between existing inspectorates which focus on places and things, rather than issues. The hon. Lady read out the inspection principles of a certain organisation—I did not hear which organisation—and those principles sounded very good. However, I would add one: the user, who in this case would be the defendant, victim or witness—the user of the services—should be a focus of the inspectorate. Generally, the kinds of qualities that she described are important to the inspectorate, which is one of the reasons why, for example, we have ensured that the inspectorate can set its own criteria. We have ensured also that expertise can be retained, which was one of her anxieties, and that is provided for in paragraph (5)(3) of schedule 8. That will ensure that the expertise that exists in all of the inspectorates—we have talked a lot about the expertise in the prisons inspectorate—can be retained. The hon. Lady made the point, which was well-made, that her anxiety about the criminal justice inspectorate is not that it is in principle a bad idea, but that in practice there are risks. I admit that there are risks, but we have put a lot of energy into the design of the inspectorate in order to minimise those risks. The
That is one of the reasons why, where custody is concerned, we need to be extremely careful to ensure that that quality of focus is retained, which is why the inspectorate will be structured as set out in the Bill. The model that the hon. Lady offers—I understand why she has done so—is a weaker one, and does not provide the opportunities to look at the spaces in between systems, the places through which people fall, and the end-to-end experiences. We found that the inefficiencies, for example, in bringing offenders to justice, often happened in between different parts of the system. The police would say, “Oh, we arrest them fast”, but then there would be a block in the magistrates court because of the way in which the police perform their functions. If we aligned those services more intelligently, and got them to understand where the barriers were in the next service, we could improve the quality of the whole service. At the moment, we do not have an inspection regime that can automatically focus on that. Of course, we have joint inspections, which are conducted in the way that clause 21 allows for—a kind of negotiated deal in between individual inspectorate’s fiefdoms. That has produced some excellent inspections such as one on the transport of people between courts and prisons. That good inspection highlighted a number of things that had been ignored. Often, however, those inspections do not produce good results because it is not necessarily anyone’s priority, and it is agreed between silo inspectors. They do not work well automatically or have a drive to get through it. We believe that we need to try to ensure that inspection remains relevant to service users and providers. The reforms of policing, prosecution, court administration and the management of court offenders that have we have already conducted have been fundamental and wide-ranging. They have been supported by better joined-up strategies led by the National Criminal Justice Board, and at local level by the development of joint working arrangements with local criminal justice boards. We do not have an independent inspection regime to match those reforms, and to match the achievements that service providers are seeking to develop to provide a unified public response to crime and disorder. A statutory joint secretariat could help with such objectives, and that is why we had the non-statutory one to which I referred. There has been some good progress with joint inspection works, but we want something more ambitious—something that reports powerfully and credibly on the criminal justice system as a whole. We want something that can easily follow the experience of users as they pass through the
We have not discussed that part of the requirement very much, but I think that we all agree that inspection should try to be an aid to improvement rather than a burden on services. It should be a burden on services when they fail to perform, and it should be unashamed about that, but it should also try to operate in a way that helps services, taking a strategic view of where it can make most difference, and thus provide best value for money. It needs to maximise opportunities for efficiency and for pooling funds, skills, knowledge and support services. If those are our objectives, I do not think that anyone who was given a remit to design a new inspection regime would actually propose five separate inspectorates and a co-ordinating secretariat. Why persevere with the awkwardness of a fractured regime when a unified one could preserve all its strengths and improve its most obvious weaknesses? The hon. Lady remains to be convinced as to whether we can preserve all the present strengths. She has quoted, in aid, the chief inspector of prisons, but she will notice that the chief inspector retains—in a very inspectorial way—a note more of scepticism than criticism about whether what we have sought to do will in practice retain the excellence of inspection for which she is responsible, without—in her words—diluting it. She refers to the importance of the special duty for which we have provided, and she asks whether we can bottle it, and what will be the risk associated with change. I think that they are two of the most important things. We have recognised that there is a risk at the moment of change—the risk of taking the eye off the ball—on custodial inspection, which is an area in which services can change quickly without any public awareness. That is particularly the case when there is a large prison population, and it is precisely why we have both kept the special duty, and have allowed ourselves to commence different parts of the new inspectorate responsibilities at different times. In that way, we can ensure that the ability and expertise that exists in the prisons inspectorate can be retained and can operate side by side with the new inspectorate, as it grows. We think that that will diminish the risk—though it will not eliminate it 100 per cent. Nevertheless, the reform could make things much better. Though I cannot promise it to the hon. Lady—one never can when one is making a change—I genuinely think that by embedding those qualities in the legislation we have very substantially reduced the risk, and at the same time created the opportunity to retain spikiness. 11.15 amI do not think that legislation can guarantee that we will always have chief inspectors who are sufficiently spiky and able to do the best kind of job, but creating a big strategic inspectorate, which has a duty not only to inspect the system end to end but to set its own inspection criteria and retain expertise, with a special
It is very probable that we can not only continue the excellence of the prisons inspectorate. My ambition is much more than that: to ensure that we create a quality of independence and spikiness in the inspectorates of all relevant services, which in some cases have not been as powerful for the public and the user as we all feel they have been in the prison service. The prize is an inspectorate system that is at least as good as Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons and has all of its good qualities in all areas of criminal justice, community safety and custody. That is what we are seeking, and the way in which we have constructed part 4 of the Bill should reassure hon. Members that we have a real chance of producing something much better than what has gone before. Nick Herbert: The rationale for the creation of the combined inspectorate puzzles me. As I understood it, it was originally to save money. Back in 2003 the Prime Minister’s Office of Public Service Reform produced a report entitled “Inspecting for Improvement.” It noted that the increase in the cost of public sector inspection had more than doubled from £250 million in 1997 to more than £550 million in 2002-03. Further impetus towards the rationalisation of the way in which inspections were conducted was provided by the Gershon efficiency review. We should note that the combined inspectorate, the reduction of the number of inspection bodies relating to business from 35 to nine and the reduction in public sector inspectorates from 11 to four were announced by the Chancellor in the Budget last year. The implication was that there would be savings, which was why it formed a part of the Budget discussions, or at least a reduction in unnecessary regulation. That appeared to be the rationale. However on Second Reading the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety confirmed that the establishment of the inspectorate
We therefore have the curious suggestion that simply combining the inspectorates will somehow result in a more efficient inspection regime. How will it do so? It is not going to involve any savings, for a start. The regulatory impact assessment states at paragraph 3.2:
Well, we have agreed about the necessity for independent scrutiny. It adds that it is needed
we agree about that too—
Column Number: 256 We agree with those objectives, but it is not clear why a combined inspectorate should meet the objectives better than the existing inspectorates. It is, however, clear that there is a potential loss, in relation to the independence of the prisons inspectorate. The balance sheet shows on the one hand an uncertain reorganisation, which will not save any money, and, on the other, great concern, expressed by the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) and others, including others outside the House, about the potential detrimental impact on the prisons inspectorate, which we have already debated. That is not a very convincing balance sheet. We are relying on a lot of assertion that somehow combining the bodies will automatically improve the inspection regime. I do not see evidence that that will happen, so we are taking it on trust that the regimes will be improved. The regulatory impact assessment itself conceded that the improvement could, to varying degrees, be made by joint working—further, deeper co-operation between the existing five inspectorates. However, it argues that
Radical reform simply consists of merging the inspectorate bodies. That is the extent to which it is radical. I remain unpersuaded of the merits of the measure and concerned about the implications for the prisons inspectorate. I do not think that there is much more that we can say on the matter now, because we do not have a great deal of information about how the new inspectorate will operate. Much, as the Minister suggests, will rely on the quality of the appointees. Although the regulatory impact assessment suggested that a chief inspector would be appointed ahead of the enactment of the Bill, I do not think that it has happened yet. It is incredibly important that the individual in question should be able to epitomise the independence and leadership that any of the individual inspectorates, and certainly the combined inspectorate, need. Lynne Featherstone: I appreciate the Minister’s response which showed a passionate conviction that the proposals will bring about a better system. The difference is that Liberal Democrat Members are not convinced that the provisions embody any guarantee. Supposing it all goes horribly wrong? How responsive could we be after the fact? As the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs has said, we are asked to take a leap of faith, and at this point I am sure that I cannot do that without being negligent in my duty to those who rely on the quality of prisons inspection. The Chairman: The Minister does not have to answer, but I am happy to call her if she wishes. Fiona Mactaggart: I was asked some specific questions by the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs about what would improve. I shall give him three instances. It would be much easier to track the experience of service users. It is important to focus on that: providing a clear emphasis on the end user’s perspective. A service user does not know whether the
We will be able to promote improvement across agency boundaries—that is a real challenge for the criminal justice system—by exploring themes and making recommendations that span agencies, encouraging innovation, diversity and the spread of good practice, and discouraging silo working. This is not a cost-saving exercise, but there will be effectiveness and efficiency gains from pooling funds, skills, knowledge and support services and from the ability to assimilate and continually learn from a wide range of experience. We have consulted on the measure, although one would not have thought so from the debates here, and a number of bodies—local criminal justice boards are foremost among them—are confident that it will produce a better system than the present one. As I said to the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green, we have put in place a number of mechanisms to protect us from the risks of everything going horribly wrong. An example is the timing of commencement of different aspects of the measure. That will protect us if there is a risk that we have not predicted. Nick Herbert: I want to respond on one point. Paragraph 3.3 of the regulatory impact assessment states:
It is alleged that a police force, for example, would lose confidence in the inspectorate of constabulary because that inspectorate had the single remit of inspecting constabulary. Why on earth should a police force lose confidence in an inspection body that is dedicated to and knowledgeable about the performance of the police service? On the contrary, a police force may well lose confidence in an inspection regime that is undertaken by a combined inspectorate that the force does not consider has expertise in the matters affecting that force. I return to my previous point. Many assertions are made about the benefits of a joint inspection regime, but I am not sure that there is much underlying that to give us confidence that the joint regime will necessarily deliver the higher standards of inspection that we seek. Question put and agreed to. Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Column Number: 258 Clause 23 Duties of Chief Inspector with regard to prisons etc Fiona Mactaggart: I beg to move amendment No. 86, in clause 23, page 25, line 15, leave out ‘holding centre’ and insert ‘holding facility’. This technical amendment corrects a mismatch in wording between subsections (4) and (10) of clause 23. Amendment agreed to. Clause 23, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Power to confer additional functions on Chief Inspector 11.30 amFiona Mactaggart: I beg to move amendment No. 87, in clause 24, page 25, line 22, leave out ‘additional functions’ and insert
This technical amendment puts beyond doubt the purpose for which clause 24 is to be used—that is, to confer non-inspection functions relating to the existing inspection remit on the chief inspector if that is desired, not to add areas of inspection to the remit. A hypothetical example, in case hon. Members require it, of such a non-inspection function would be a role in making senior appointments to an inspected organisation. Amendment agreed to. Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 25 to 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 8 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector for Justice, Community Safety and Custody Fiona Mactaggart: I beg to move amendment No. 88, in schedule 8, page 87, line 32, at end insert—
This is a technical amendment to clarify the pension status of members of the new inspectorate with police backgrounds and to regularise the pension status of members of the inspectorate of constabulary from non-police backgrounds. Amendment agreed to. Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to. Clauses 29 and 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Column Number: 259 Schedule 9 Transfer of staff and property etc to the Chief Inspector Fiona Mactaggart: I beg to move amendment No. 89, in schedule 9, page 93, line 24, leave out paragraph 5 and insert—
This is another technical amendment, in order to give you another break, Mr. Conway. It brings paragraph 5 to schedule 9, which provides for a scheme for the transfer of property from the existing inspectorates to the chief inspector, into line with the approach adopted in an equivalent provision, paragraph (40)(1) to schedule 1, which relates to the transfer of property to the national policing improvement agency. Amendment agreed to. Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to. Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 10 agreed to. Clauses 32 to 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 35 Making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences Amendment proposed: No. 148, in clause 35, page 30, line 17, leave out lines 17 to 20 and insert—
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 60, in clause 35, page 30, line 18, leave out ‘or’ and insert ‘and’. Lynne Featherstone: I do not profess to be a computer expert or a computer hacking expert. I was contacted about the Bill by a constituent who is a computer security consultant, a visiting research fellow at the London School of Economics and an established expert on computer security. His remarks about the Bill have a serious bearing. He pointed out that the drafting is sloppy because it means that legitimate computer consultants could be breaking the law by using tools that are used for hacking, even if there are legitimate security reasons for using those same tools. Obviously, many tools that are traditionally used by hackers are used by security consultants when checking a system to make it safe from hacking. For example, remote administration is used in many offices by IT staff to help with a malfunctioning computer. I
The current wording states that the law will be broken by anyone who makes, supplies or offers a program that is designed for use for an offence under section 1 or 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, or intends to use those programs to commit any of the same offences. Our amendment would change the “or” to “and” to ensure that an offence is committed only when there is possession and intent to use the programs for the purposes of hacking, and so a security consultant using them legitimately to check that a system is secure would not be caught by the drafting. Out of interest, I was moving around the internet, so to speak, and we stand condemned as a Committee on both sides by computer experts. They describe our handling of the subject as substandard. They particularly find fault with the Government’s approach, and Government amendment No. 148 has the distinction of making that substantially worse. Under the previous wording, a software developer had to know that their software was designed as a hacking tool or that it was intended for that purpose. Under the amendment, they will need only to intend it to be used or believe that it is likely to be used for that purpose. It is down to their belief. Those in software development are fully aware of the capabilities of software. We do not know what we are talking about. Although Liberal Democrat were admonished—albeit only slightly—we received the endorsement that our suggestion to change “or” for “and” at the end of paragraph (a) would at least link what a developer believes their software may be used for with intent, but make the other bit about belief redundant. Although the Government have tabled their amendment as a late entry to try to get it right, it would seem that the computer industry is still criticising their amendment. I would prefer them to stick to our amendment, which has at least a slight endorsement from the computer experts, who have clearly been chattering long and hard. Their view is that the Government should have made more of an effort to get it right in the first place. The Government have had a long time to think about the provision. They have received reports from the all-party group on the internet and from the internet crime forum, which is a Home Office consultative body. I understand that the original wording was not set out in consultation with anyone, expert or otherwise. I do not think that either side comes out particularly brilliantly, but I am trying to amend our lack of knowledge. |
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