Identity Cards Bill


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Mr. Garnier: The Under-Secretary said that a framework is set out in clause 23, and that it is clear. I accept that, in his eyes, the vagueness of clause 23 provides a framework. It certainly is not clear, but we will discuss that in due course. I am not in the least
 
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satisfied with how this part of the Bill is constructed and we may return to the matter, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Carmichael: Subsection (4)(b) deals with the authorisation of provision of information if it is provided

    “for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime.”

I am curious to know why the word “serious” is included when it is not included in any other definition in the Bill.

Andy Burnham: I shall consider that point. The clause deals with the relationship between the Bill and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which, by definition, deals with serious crime. I think that is the reason for the drafting, but if it is not I will write to the hon. Gentleman. The clause relates to a measure that deals specifically with serious crime, which is why the provision is drafted in that way. However, I assure him that I will come back to him on the point.

The audit trail of paragraph 9 information may be sensitive and we have ensured throughout the Bill that there is a higher test for access to such information. Only when serious crime is involved will police forces be able to access that information, which is probably why the provision is drafted in that way. If I need to clarify any of that in writing, I shall do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Use for correcting inaccurate or incomplete information

Mr. Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in clause 21, page 19, line 23, at end insert—

    ‘(2A)   Where subsection (2) applies, the Secretary of State shall notify the individual in writing that he has taken action under that subsection within 30 days of doing so.’.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 183, in clause 23, page 20, line 26, at end insert

    ‘and,

      (c)   notifying the individual of the fact that information has been provided.’.

Mr. Garnier: Amendment No. 183 would have a similar effect on clause 23, which we touched on briefly a moment ago, to that which amendment No. 73 would have on this clause. I want to ensure that there is no unnecessary, uncalled for or unjustified growth in secret government.

The clause is entitled “Use for correcting inaccurate or incomplete information” and it will allow the Secretary of State to tell someone who is not the subject of the information that something recorded
 
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about an individual is inaccurate or incomplete, and allow him to tell that unspecified third party that the information on the register is inaccurate or incomplete without letting the subject of the information know either that the information is inaccurate or incomplete or that he has told someone it is inaccurate or incomplete.

Unless the Government can persuade us otherwise, the Secretary of State should notify the subject of the information in writing that he has taken action under the provision within 30 days of doing so. There is no magic about the figure of 30 days, and if the Government want to specify another period I shall be happy to go along with it if it is reasonable.

I have a philosophical objection to things going on about me out of my sight unless there is a good and justifiable public policy reason for them to do so. I understand that there will be occasions when the register might say, for example, that I am a suspected drug dealer, people trafficker or money launderer. The third party—let us assume that it is the police, and perhaps the chief constable of a particular area—may wish to gain access to the information about me on the register, on which those data have been recorded.

I appreciate that, on other occasions, one of the Ministers has said that opinion evidence or opinion shall not be recorded in the register. However, I drew their attention to the definition of personal information in the Data Protection Act 1998, under which opinion evidence or opinion seem to be recordable.

I appreciate also that there shall be occasions when it might be in the interest of the detection or the prevention of crime for that third party, if it is a police authority or officer, to know that the information designating me as a suspected people trafficker or a money or drug criminal is inaccurate. It might be in my interests for that to be corrected. I also have a right to know the information about me on the register that is wrong.

This short debate has briefly exposed the dangers inherent in the ID register system as well as the use that can be made of it by the state either for or against my interests and, more particularly, without my knowledge. The more we computerise and dehumanise government, the more important it is for the individual citizen to be treated as a human being rather than as a digit and as a collection of inanimate information.

The Bill is all about giving the Secretary of State undefined powers to do undefined things, nominally in the interests of the state and in the interests of ourselves as a collective of individuals. However, we are becoming pieces of information to be processed, rather than human beings. If we are to move down this road for reasons of administrative and governmental efficiency, it is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that the Government exist to benefit the individual and to benefit society, which is a collection of human beings, not just numbers.

I urge the Government when addressing amendment No. 73 and amendment No. 183, which relates to clause 23, to explain how they can justify the
 
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movement of information about me, whether accurate or inaccurate, in circumstances in which I am wholly ignorant of that traffic.

Mr. Carmichael: I have added my name to amendment No. 73. Amendment No. 183, which stands in my name, relates to clause 23, but it deals with much the same point.

Returning to an earlier debate about the ownership of the information and the basis on which it is provided, I share philosophical difficulties of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and it remains my strong view that the information should remain in the ownership of the individual to whom it relates. That being the case, it makes sense that when the information has been wrongly recorded or corrected, as outlined in the clause, the person to whom the information relates should be made aware of that fact. The one obvious rider relates to national security and the prevention and the detection of crime. With that, I shall be interested to hear what the Under-Secretary has to say.

Andy Burnham: Amendment No. 73 would make it a requirement to notify an individual in writing within 30 days if information had been requested about him under clause 21 by another person. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland would expand the power under clause 23 to make regulations, so that they could include provision about notifying an individual that information had been provided without his consent under clauses 19 to 22.

I want to make the important point that we have constantly gone over such ground during our proceedings and we are now having to do so yet again. However, it is crucial that that happens because, although we have discussed these matters, the same myths are being propagated about what the Bill will and will not do.

11.45 am

For the avoidance of doubt, I say to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that, if he were a suspected criminal or drug dealer, such information could not be held on the register because it would not be a registrable fact. He need have no fear that such a position is possible. As he knows, the registrable facts are set out clearly under schedule 1. It is for the organisation requesting the information to examine its own records. Obviously, other organisations could hold information that he might be a suspected drug dealer, but not the national identity register. It is an identity verification system and it will not hold all types of information about criminal or medical records.

We have been over such matters before and we must do so again because we cannot allow such arguments to stand unchallenged. It is important to take such action because it affects the whole basis on which the amendments were introduced. There is no fear that such information can be held, so a lot of the arguments fall because of that statement.


 
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It is important to note in respect of both amendments that, to comply with the first data protection principle, which requires that the information be processed fairly, the Secretary of State will have to give notification to data subjects of, among other things, the purposes for which data will be processed. In practice, in respect of the national identity register, it will probably be the case that on the application form an explanation will be given of the power to carry out cross-checks under clause 21 and the power to provide information without consent under clauses 19, 20 and 22. In all likelihood, such matters will be explained on the application form for people registering with the scheme.

However, unlike the two amendments, the Data Protection Act does not oblige the Secretary of State to give notification of each occasion on which the powers are used. There are good reasons why we consider it not appropriate to place the Secretary of State under such an obligation. As for amendment No. 183, it is obvious that there will be many circumstances in which it would be completely inappropriate to inform a data subject that information about him had been provided. Such notifications could, for example, undermine criminal investigations, matters of national security and Customs-related investigations.

The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will know that one reason for introducing the Bill is to weed out and close down people’s ability to acquire documents fraudulently in false names. If people were notified of discrepancies, they would also be notified of the fact that an investigation was under way into why they had applied for documents in two different names. There might be good reasons for not having a requirement in the Bill whereby each time a cross-check is undertaken, the individual is notified.

On amendment No. 73, clause 21 was drafted specifically to allow the Secretary of State to notify people or organisations that provide information as part of the identify checking process if subsequent inaccuracies or omissions are discovered in the information they supplied. That will enable us, when an organisation has provided information that we believe is inaccurate or incomplete, to alert that organisation to that fact.

As a result of that power, the administrators of the national identity register will be able to help to ensure that data held in other places by Departments and public bodies are accurate. In turn, that will help us in a general fight against identity fraud. It will ensure that those who try to avoid identification by using slightly different details will find it harder to do so.

Members of the Committee may have heard about the publication yesterday of a UK Passport Service report on its personal identity project. It covers the processes whereby the UK Passport Service is increasingly cross-referencing data received with those held by other Departments. That has proved to be successful and, as hon. Members can see from the report, the project is to be extended. The measure simply gives the same powers in relation to the national identity register as exist with regard to the UK Passport Service.


 
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In most cases, when processing an application form, the Secretary of State is likely to have the most recent and accurate information about an individual. Where a discrepancy arises between that information and the information held on another database, that other database may well be out of date. It will then be a matter for the organisation holding those data to consider amending its records or make further inquiries of the individual. At that point, there is a strong likelihood that the organisation concerned will contact the individual to alert him or her that a discrepancy has arisen and to ask for clarification. In most cases, people will experience the effect that the amendment seeks to achieve: there will be notification when such a check has been carried out.

It is possible that the Secretary of State may have reason to believe that the information on the application form is inaccurate and that the data held by other organisations are correct. In those circumstances, as the UK Passport Service is already doing, it is right that the Secretary of State has the power to try to clear up the discrepancy. It is open to the Secretary of State to contact the individual should he wish to do so.

A legal obligation to notify the data subject every time a cross-check is carried out, even where no discrepancy is revealed—that is an important point—would involve a disproportionate investment of time and resources. It would be bureaucratic and unnecessary. As I have outlined, in practice, where discrepancies arise, the data subject is likely to be contacted by one or other data controller. Furthermore, the power is limited to the validation of information that is or could be held on the register. There is no scope for it to be used in a way that would be surprising or that would involve anything other than the usual identity information.

I give that cast-iron assurance to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and, for those reasons, ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Garnier: Let me put the Under-Secretary out of his misery: I will ask the Committee’s leave to withdraw the amendment, but I want him and the Government to understand that in a democracy public trust in the institutions of government is vital. I am afraid that public trust in the Government—I do not mean this Government; I mean Governments generally—is declining as we become more and more a computerised society and less and less a society in which people interact with each other as individuals.

I am sure that we have all received any number of complaints about the operations of the Child Support Agency. That is a classic example of a situation in which the individual feels wholly disempowered as a consequence of having to deal, as a number, with a computer, which simply will not sympathise with his personal problems.

I know precisely what schedule 1 of the Bill says, but I am not so naive as to believe that a massive exchange of information is not already taking place between Departments, even before the Bill becomes an Act. Nor am I so naive as to think that, just because we have the Bill as drafted, all sorts of things will not go on that
 
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are not specified in the Bill and still less in the regulations. I flag up yet again a concern that needs to be addressed, if not by this Committee then by some other part of Parliament at a later stage. In the meanwhile, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patrick Mercer (Newark) (Con): I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 21, page 19, line 32, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 75, in clause 21, page 19, line 33, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

No. 76, in clause 21, page 19, line 36, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

Patrick Mercer: These three amendments are simple. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (4) include rather imprecise references to

    “something recorded in that individual’s entry”,

    “something provided to the Secretary of State”,

and

    “something otherwise available to the Secretary of State”.

The amendments would simply replace the three references to “something” with “a specified statement”. I hope that will tie down subsection (4) and make it a little clearer.

No doubt the Under-Secretary will tell us that this clause should be read in conjunction with clause 11 and that he will resist the change to the wording, because changing the wording here would mean that the wording in clause 11 ought to be changed. However, I would still appreciate his explanation.

Andy Burnham: The hon. Gentleman anticipates my notes on clause 21 and this amendment. The clause must be seen in the light of clause 11, which contains the power to require information for validating the register in the first place. Clause 21 comes into play when it appears that that information is incorrect and it needs to be cross-checked or verified with another Department. He is right that the clause is complementary to and consistent with clause 11—perhaps that should have been clause 12, but that is a different argument.

Clauses 11 and 21 use the word “something” to refer to the information that can be required for the purposes of verification. As we have discussed, “something” covers any information that can be recorded in the register. Beyond that, the Bill does not limit the information to which clauses 11 and 21 can relate. However, the persons from whom information might be required under clause 11—and thus provided to, under clause 21—must be specified in an order, which will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

While the hon. Gentleman was speaking, I was reminded of the phrase “something of the night” and the fact that, although it is vague and imprecise, we all knew what she meant by it. In this legislation, “something” refers to things such as a photograph and fingerprints. The term is deliberately wide, because we
 
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are talking about not only facts, data and words, but other information that could be held on the register, such as a biometric reading or a photograph. However, I assure the hon. Gentleman again that it does not extend to anything other than the information held on the register. Schedule 1 guarantees that. The term “something” refers to paragraph 2 of schedule 1, which lists

      “(a)   a photograph of his head and shoulders;

      (b)   his signature;

      (c)   his fingerprints;

      (d)   other biometric information about him.”

The term is used so that all the registrable facts can be encompassed.

I have explained why the amendment is neither sensible nor necessary, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

Patrick Mercer: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for that explanation. I should apologise for my earlier absence; I trust the reason was explained and the apology accepted.

Mr. Garnier: I did not explain.

Patrick Mercer: Forgive me, Mr. Hood. I attended the evacuation exercise in the Chamber. I hope you will indulge me for having done so.

The phrase “déjà vu” has come to mind many times in respect of the Bill. I remember putting precisely the same arguments as those I have put with regard to this amendment to a different Minister in a previous debate, and I received almost the same arguments in response. I take on board the points that have been made about clause 11 and paragraph 2 of schedule 1, although I still have reservations and remain less than content. However, as the Under-Secretary gave a lucid explanation, as did his ministerial colleague, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Power to authorise other uses of information

12 noon

Mr. Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 77, in clause 22, page 20, line 3, at end insert—

      ‘(da)   any disclosure of information which results or would result in interference with an individual’s private and family life is proportionate, and is for the purpose of—

      (i)   the protection of public safety or public health, or

      (ii)   the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;’.

The amendment would add to clause 22 a reference to the requirements of the European convention, by implication if not expressly. No doubt the Government will say that such a reference is implied anyhow. The amendment also refers, again by implication, to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the Regulation of Investigative Powers Act 2000.


 
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I will set the amendment in context. We are dealing with the passing of information to a public authority without the consent of the individual. “Public authority” is, for the purposes of the Bill, defined by clause 43, on general interpretation, as having

    “the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998”.

I was going to take the Committee directly to the Human Rights Act 1998, but, as we discussed a couple of weeks ago, a public authority comes to be defined not so much by its name as by what it does. For example, while the BBC is not, for some purposes, a public authority, for other purposes it is.

One can think of any number of examples in which, when making a private contract, a body is not a public authority, but, when it is doing something that affects the individual citizen, it is a public authority. We need to be careful about accepting at face value the definition in the general interpretation clause about what a public authority is.

I also have a complaint that, as before, the Government are requiring Parliament to give them unspecified and vague powers. To see that, one has to look only at clause 22(1)(b), which says that

    “the information is of a description specified or described in an order made by the Secretary of State”.

We have not seen those orders. I do not suppose that we will get see them in time for consideration on Report. I doubt that we will see a definition on Third Reading. I doubt that even the other place will receive a definition that would satisfy a reasonable reader when they discuss the Bill later in the year or early next year.

Although “public authority” is defined by section 6 of the Human Rights Act, the definition is not specified or described here, nor is the information referred to in subsection (1)(d). Therefore, it seems to us important that the Government should explain themselves so that, to refer to amendment No. 77,

    “any disclosure of information which results or would result in interference with an individual’s private and family life is proportionate”.

That is the individual’s article 8 right under the European convention.

That disclosure of information must be

    “for the purpose of the protection of public safety or public health”.

That is my Civil Contingencies Act point. The definitions of public safety and public health in the Civil Contingencies Act are remarkably wide.

Disclosure of information could also be for

    “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Again, under a number of Acts of Parliament passed in the last half dozen years, all sorts of powers are given to all sorts of people, no doubt for good public policy reasons. However, when mixed into the bowl of the Identity Cards Bill, concerns of private rights against the state come to mind.

I want to be assured by the Government, not just by implication and not just because the Secretary of State has rubber-stamped the front of the Bill with his belief that it complies with the Human Rights Act 1998. I have seen that happen many times and I have seen it challenged. I have seen individual aspects of Bills, or of
 
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clauses of Bills, fall foul of the Human Rights Act. I want to be assured that the Government have in mind the rights of the individual and the interference that could be done to the rights of the individual, particularly in relation to his family life and his private life. That is described in our amendment.

Andy Burnham: I hope that I can deal quickly with the amendments. The hon. and learned Gentleman complained earlier that the Government were not listening to some of the concerns. He will know that when the Bill was last debated in Committee there was a fairly detailed discussion on the clause and the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Mr. Browne), gave a commitment to consider the concerns and to give further thought to the clause. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be reassured that the clause has been improved in that respect and that the Government have responded to some of the concerns put to the then Minister by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins).

The clause is more narrowly drawn than it was. I shall mention some of the ways in which it has been improved. As the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, although we expect most of the checks on the register to be done with the consent of the individual, there are circumstances where we will allow them to be done without consent—and we have been discussing those today. However, once the scheme is in operation, it is right to keep open the possibility that there may be other situations in which it becomes necessary, in the public interest, to provide information to other public bodies. It would be wrong to list those bodies in the Bill now and wrong to require further primary legislation as the logical extension of the measure, which is why the clause is drafted as it is.

It might help Committee members if I give a few examples of how we envisage the power being used. For instance, it might be sensible to allow local government to have access to the information. The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that local government administers the payment of housing benefit. In fraud investigations it would be sensible, from its point of view, for it to have access to the register. The fire and ambulance services could also be beneficiaries of access when verifying identity against the register following a major accident.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Betts) raised the possibility that the register may, at some point, be used for electoral registration. In future, particularly in respect of measures to combat electoral fraud, the national identity register could provide a sensible way to maintain the integrity of the electoral register and tackle, nay eliminate, electoral fraud.

There are circumstances in which it is sensible, for good public administration, for us to extend the bodies who could benefit through secondary legislation, with the key proviso that Parliament decides that it is necessary to do so.

The power in the clause is subject to the affirmative order-making procedure. An organisation could not be added without parliamentary approval. That was
 
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added after the previous discussion—it was to be done under the negative procedure before. The Government have listened to the concerns that were expressed previously and have strengthened the Bill in that way. The authorisation procedure provided for in clause 23 would be subject to applicable oversight arrangements under the national identity commissioner.

The power was significantly narrowed during the parliamentary progress of the Bill in the previous Session and further safeguards have been added. The information in paragraph 9 of schedule 1 is now excluded. Information can be provided only to bodies that are public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998. That is spelled out in the definitions contained in the back of the Bill. A further significant safeguard has been added to this version of the Bill: subsection (2) now provides that the order-making power can be used only when the provision of information is necessary in the public interest, as defined in clause 1(4).

Amendment No. 77 would insert a requirement for any provision under clause 22 to be proportionate in its interference with an individual’s private and family life and to be

    “for the purpose of . . . the protection of public safety or public health, or . . . the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Nobody in the Committee would have any objection to those reasons, and I understand the hon. and learned Gentleman’s concern. However, I reassure him that the amendment is unnecessary because of subsection (2) and the full application of the Human Rights Act to the Bill. Under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, a public authority must not interfere with a person’s right to a private or family life except in limited circumstances. Those include when such interference is

    “in accordance with the law . . . in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

That is a detailed list. However, we are confident and can give the hon. and learned Gentleman the assurance that the Bill fully complies with the Human Rights Act. His amendment, which lists the circumstances in which information may be provided, is more limited than the provisions of the ECHR. We believe that agreeing to it could mean that the scheme was not able to maximise its benefits.

The amendment would exclude the ability to provide information without consent to any additional organisations when that was in the interests of national security, economic well-being or the prevention or detection of crime. That would mean that we might not be able to provide information to local authorities for fraud-prevention purposes, for example.

I hope that Opposition Members will accept that we listened to the concerns that were expressed by their Front-Bench team in the previous Session. The safeguards provided under the subsection have been significantly strengthened and the subsection’s scope has been significantly narrowed. I do not think that Opposition Members need fear anything from the bodies that we have in mind. As I say, local
 
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government is an obvious example of such a body, but the information might also be useful to the fire or emergency services.

The possibility of using the register in respect of electoral registration should be considered by Members on both sides of the Committee, given the number of people who currently fall off the electoral register. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe made that important point.

For all those reasons and because of the final safeguard of the House deciding whether the power would ever be invoked, Opposition Members can feel reassured that they have been listened to and that the clause includes the necessary safeguards, given the Human Rights Act and the access to information provisions. I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

 
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