Violent Crime Reduction Bill


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Ms Abbott: We heard earlier speakers—experienced hunters and shooters—talk of the importance of seeking a balance between the activities of the law regarding a minority and the criminality that the clause is designed to address. It is right that we seek a balance, but I hope that my comments can pull the balance in a slightly different direction.

The important point to make to Opposition Members is that the type of gun crime that we see in the inner city is qualitatively different from that which we have seen in the British Isles since the second world war. People have always used guns to commit crime in this country, and there have always been professional armed robbers, but the gun crime that has emerged in inner London in the past 10 or 15 years is qualitatively different. It is gun crime as part of a lifestyle; it is about people who do not feel that they are dressed to go out for an evening at a nightclub if they do not have their weapon; it is about people who use guns in a way that professional criminals never did—to settle petty disputes that arise because someone has not let them into a nightclub, has been rude about their girlfriend or has brushed up against their new suit.

Members may think I exaggerate, but if Metropolitan police officers were here, they would describe shooting after shooting that was an example not simply of crime, but of so-called respect crimes, in which people were enforcing their status in their gang or community by using a gun. The tragic fact is that the majority of gun crime in London is not about crime at all, but about respect crimes. The gun culture, which glorifies the gun, is at the heart of such crimes. We are talking about something that is qualitatively different from what Britain has seen before.

When we talk about minding weapons, we are talking in many cases, as the Minister said, about people using children. In recent days, a big cache of
 
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weapons was found in a child’s bedroom in London. When someone uses a child to hide a weapon, it is not simply a question of their trying to conceal their criminal activity. What are they doing to that child? I represent a community in which young men see the man with the man with the gold chain and the gun, or the man with ready money, as far more of a role model than any Member of Parliament or lawyer.

3 pm

The clause is therefore important, not only because it aims to prevent people from concealing crime, but because it must be wrong that children are drawn into the gun culture at an early age by being used to mind guns so that people evade their sentences. The effect is greater than simply hiding crime: it draws children into a complicity with a culture that glorifies weapons. The amendments—probably tabled in good faith, as hon. Members do not understand my community any more than I understand theirs—would leave a gaping hole in the clause.

When we talk about intentionality, we have to remember that those gunmen, for reasons that I will touch on further as we progress, exercise tremendous fear over their communities. If the gunman says that he left the gun in the child’s bedroom unintentionally and the child says, “He left the gun in my bedroom unintentionally”, as does the mother, how will we prosecute?

Mr. Djanogly: I understand where the hon. Lady is coming from. I am certainly not speaking against the clause, and I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross is either. I think that she might like to reconsider her general approach to our comments. Yes, we have been talking about narrowing the clause, but she must appreciate that we are talking about a mandatory five-year sentence. Intention can come into it. Life is not a series of perfect situations.

Ms Abbott: We are indeed talking about a mandatory sentence. My hon. Friend the Minister explained how mandatory sentencing has had an effect on such crimes. I am afraid that if we bring intention into the clause, the people whom it is meant to target would evade prosecution by being able to frighten people into supporting them in saying, “It was all an accident; it was all a mistake. I did not know that it was in the kid’s bedroom. It was unintentional.”

Sammy Wilson: Does the hon. Lady accept that in the scene that she paints—with which I have total sympathy, especially as I have seen exactly the same excuse used in places in Northern Ireland—the gun is probably illegal anyhow and would therefore not be covered by the clause? Indeed, there would be other ways of dealing with that crime, because whether the gun was hidden intentionally or unintentionally, it should not have been in anyone’s possession since there was no firearms certificate for it.


 
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Ms Abbott: That is perfectly true. However, the fact remains that the clause is designed to address, in my view, the increasing practice in the city of using children and girlfriends to mind guns. The Opposition amendments would leave unacceptable loopholes in the legislation. It is hard enough to bring such people to book, and we do not need legislation with loopholes in it. I oppose the amendments.

Hazel Blears: I do not think that I have anything to add to what I have said, and I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington made an eloquent case.

The only point that I will make is in reply to the hon. Member for East Antrim. The weapons will be illegal, but the mischief that we want to address is people seeking to evade going to prison for five years for possessing a weapon by saying, “I am not in possession of a weapon, so I cannot be prosecuted and I will not go to jail.” That is exactly what the provisions are designed to act against. From what I have heard, that has broad support across the Committee, and so I ask hon. Members to withdraw the amendment so that we can get prosecutions, so that people cannot wriggle out of their responsibilities and so that we can continue the fight against gun crime, which is proving quite successful.

As I said, the latest crime statistics today show that the shotgun offences are down and the use of handguns is down; the use of imitations is up, but fatalities are also low. That is a matter of great encouragement, but we need to do more to ensure that people are not evading the law by saying that they have put the goods into other peoples’ hands, are not responsible and cannot be sentenced appropriately.

Mr. Djanogly: The amendments go some way to showing that more thought is needed. What came to mind when the hon. Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington was speaking was what would happen if a child went into a parent’s bedroom and stole the parent’s gun. The parent would have to prove that he or she had not given the gun to the child.

When discussing the five-year mandatory sentence, issues will arise that need full consideration. Although I will withdraw the amendment—

The Chairman: Order. It is not for the hon. Gentleman to decide whether to withdraw the amendment. That is a matter for the hon. Member who moved it.

Mr. Djanogly: On that basis, Mr. Forth, I have said my piece.

John Thurso: I reiterate what I said reasonably clearly: that the purpose of my amendment is to discover the Government’s intention. I apologise to the Committee for my slightly conversational exchanges with the Minister, but they were extremely useful because what she said in her response goes almost all the way in assuaging my great worry. The definition that she gave certainly sounded extremely useful. I am not a lawyer, I hasten to add, so I will read
 
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her response carefully and take advice on it. However, having listened to it, I am reasonably confident that it addressed my point. I entirely understand and have great respect for her and everything she has done to combat the sort of gun crime that exists in her constituency and other inner cities, which, happily, does not exist in my part of the world.

The hon. Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington referred to the culture of glorifying the gun and was absolutely right that people feel that they can go out and get an Uzi or a pistol to use as an Armani fashion accessory. The one point I want to make—I would like to sit down quietly with her one day and talk about it—is that I believe that responsible, legal, law-abiding, gun-owning people do not glorify guns. They use them for specific purposes, whether sporting, pest control, deer culling and so on. I have brought up my children, who are now mostly adults, to shoot. They know that guns are kept in cases, that they are not loaded until a person is in the right position and that they are treated as dangerous weapons only to be used in the circumstance for which they are intended. That goes for the vast majority of the legal, gun-owning community.

I think the hon. Lady and I are on the same side because I want the sort of crime and the attitude to which she referred squashed. I believe in this legislation and think that it will help. However, I want to ensure that there are no unintended consequences. We all know of legislation that has had unintended consequences.

Steve McCabe: The hon. Gentleman said that the respectable gun-owning community does not glorify guns, and I am sure that that is true in the majority of cases. However, has he ever seen a website known as “Young Shots”, which shows children in possession of guns, encourages parents to induce their children to have guns and details what they can shoot with those guns. In some cases, those children are younger than 12. Does he think that could be described as glorification? What word would he use to describe it?

John Thurso: I have not seen that website, but I have a suspicion that it is linked to the British Association for Shooting and Conservation or another such organisation. I started shooting with a .410 shotgun when I was nine and introduced my children to shooting at what I thought was the appropriate age, which was when they could sensibly handle a weapon and be instructed—around 11 for both my sons. One can impress on people of that age the need for safety and the requirements of game shooting much more easily than with older people. I have been in the field shooting with people in their 30s, and I would say that they are not as instinctively safe as either of my sons, who started at an earlier age. I do not hold with the argument that because 11-year-olds have a weapon they are glorifying the gun. They are enjoying a legitimate country pursuit and being taught to do it safely and properly; they are not being taught to glorify the gun. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.


 
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Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 150, in clause 24, page 26, line 27, leave out paragraph (a).

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 201, in clause 24, page 26, line 27, after ‘part’, insert ‘(being pressure bearing parts)’.

No. 202, in clause 24, page 26, line 27, after ‘part’, insert ‘of an air weapon’.

Lynne Featherstone: The amendment is short. I am not clear from reading subsection (3)(a)—I am not sure that I understand it—whether an air weapon is a “dangerous weapon”. The subject goes to the heart of our discussions on age and weapons, and it will come up repeatedly, so I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation of whether or not an air weapon is deemed to be dangerous.

Mr. Djanogly: As I read it, the amendment would result in the provision covering only blades and knives rather than firearms. I wonder what the Minister has to say about that. If I am right, we will not support it. The clause should apply to firearms.

On amendment No. 201, there is no legal definition of a component part of a firearm. The Home Office consultation paper of May 2004, “Controls on Firearms”, states:

    “we consider component parts are those elements necessary to the action of the gun, such as trigger mechanisms, barrels, frames etc. but not screws, springs, nuts, bolts, etc. which may be used for other purposes. We invite views on the value of producing a statutory definition”.

I would be grateful if the Minister would give us her views. After further consultation, it seems to be generally understood in the trade to mean any part that is pressure bearing. It is necessary and desirable to have a clear and unambiguous definition of component part.

Amendment No. 202 deals with another problem. The Bill is ambiguous on whether “component part” in subsection (3)(a) refers to the component part of an air weapon only or to any component part of any firearm. If it is intended to cover the component parts of air weapons only, a workable definition would be preferable. We suggest inserting “of an air weapon” after “component part”.

Hazel Blears: I agree with the hon. Member for Huntingdon that amendment No. 150 would remove firearms from the definition of dangerous weapons. That would destroy the major focus of an important measure that has been welcomed by members of the community. It closes a gap in legislation that has allowed firearm offenders to go free. I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green, and we oppose the amendment.

Amendments Nos. 201 and 202 deal with the definition of dangerous weapons, particularly with reference to air weapons. To avoid doubt, we are excluding air weapons from the scope of the provisions, and the reference to component parts relates to air weapons only.


 
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We have identified a drafting defect in the Bill and want to make a technical amendment. By inserting the word “of” after the word “parts” in subsection (3)(a), we will make it clear that the measure relates to a component part of an air weapon rather than of any other kind of weapon. I am not sure whether we can have an “of” without tabling a formal amendment. I remember once discussing whether “and” was a conjunctive or a disjunctive word. Perhaps “of” falls into a similar category. With your leave, Mr. Forth, we could have a technical amendment to that effect.

Lynne Featherstone: The amendment is not clear—I take the Minister’s view on it—but it resulted from confusion about the drafting. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Penalties etc. for offence under s.24

Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment No. 299, in clause 25, page 26, line 39, leave out ‘4’ and insert ‘10’.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 151, in clause 25, page 27, line 7, leave out subsections (4) to (8).

No. 204, in clause 25, page 27, line 7, leave out subsection (4).

No. 205, in clause 25, page 27, line 10, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

No. 206, in clause 25, page 27, line 11, leave out ‘exceptional’.

No. 207, in clause 25, page 27, line 17, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

No. 208, in clause 25, page 27, line 19, leave out ‘exceptional’.

No. 209, in clause 25, page 27, line 25, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

No. 210, in clause 25, page 27, line 26, leave out ‘exceptional’.

No. 211, in clause 25, page 27, line 33, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

No. 212, in clause 25, page 27, line 35, leave out ‘exceptional’.

No. 213, in clause 25, page 27, line 41, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

No. 214, in clause 25, page 27, line 43, leave out ‘exceptional’.

Government new clause 19—Minimum sentence for certain firearms offences.

3.15 pm

Lynne Featherstone: I rise to speak to amendments Nos. 299 and 151. Amendment No. 299 suggests in clause 25 on line 39 of page 26, changing,


 
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    “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years”

to “not exceeding 10 years”. The amendment tests the Government’s will involving the differential value that they place between murder by gun and murder by knife. There is more equality between those two dangerous weapons than the sentencing reflects. I wanted to highlight that point, because the subsection mentions knives and bladed weapons, and in my constituency knife crime is as much an issue as gun crime. We should like to see the sentencing for knife crimes increased.

I wonder sometimes whether knife crime carries less weight because we are familiar with knives and they seem to be less serious and dangerous. I am sure that that is not the case and we must be tougher. My hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), asking the Home Secretary an oral question the other day, said:

    “The Home Secretary knows that the current sentence for carrying a gun in public is seven years but the maximum sentence for doing the same with a knife is only two years. Given that both are weapons and can kill, will the Home Secretary consider increasing the maximum sentence for carrying a knife as part of his proposals?”

The Home Secretary, to his credit, answered that he would

    “be pleased to consider proposals to that effect when we debate the Bill that was mentioned in the Gracious Speech and examine specific measures.”

That is this Bill. The Home Secretary continued:

    “A knife is not the same as a gun but the hon. Gentleman is entirely correct to say that we need to compare the two and ascertain whether they should be brought more in line.”—[Official Report, 23 May 2005; Vol. 434, c. 400.]

I support my hon. Friend’s question and I hope that the Government will address it, because they do not address it fully in the Bill.

Ms Abbott: Is the hon. Lady aware that there is some evidence, in east London certainly, that knife crime is supplanting gun crime? There is evidence that as the Government bear down on gun crime, young people are turning to knives precisely because the penalties are lower.

Lynne Featherstone: I was not aware of that statistic, but it does not surprise me that that would be the case. In my constituency knife crime appears to be rising, and it is widespread, possibly because of the relative ease of getting hold of a knife compared with getting hold of a gun.

Amendment No. 151 is about mandatory minimum sentences. Subsections (4) to (8) should be omitted. Mandatory minimum sentences prevent a court from taking full account of the individual circumstances of a case, which can result in disproportionate sentences in contravention of article 49(3) of the European Union charter of fundamental rights, which provides:

    “The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.”

The ordinary principles of the sentencing regime can be distorted because five purposes are meant to be considered when sentences are laid down under section 142(2) of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003.


 
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Ms Dawn Butler (Brent, South) (Lab): The removal of subsections (4) to (8) would contradict the hon. Lady’s suggestion that the period should be increased from four to 10 years, making the sentence for carrying knives tougher. We should consider a tougher sentence for those carrying firearms. As the Minister previously explained, gun crime has reduced since the Government introduced a minimum five-year sentence. In my constituency there is a firearm incident on average every 17 days. We should look to strengthen the Bill; removing the mandatory minimum sentence of five years would not strengthen it.

Lynne Featherstone: I take the hon. Lady’s point, but I am arguing about the distribution of justice. Seriousness, according to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, is determined by two main parameters: the culpability of the offender and the harm caused by the offence. The mandatory minimum sentence is presumably designed to echo the provision in section 51A of the Firearms Act 1968, which was inserted by the 2003 Act. The courts said that the

    “purpose of the provision is to ensure that absent exceptional circumstances the courts will always impose deterrent sentences”

and that the discretion of the court would be removed by the mandatory minimum sentencing. We remain concerned that the proportionality of sentencing may be subverted by the mandatory situation in each of the cases. Courts may be obliged to pass a minimum sentence.

Ms Butler: Again, I must stress that that would make the Bill far more woolly, which I know that the Liberal Democrats are not used to being. The hon. Lady’s changes would make a gaping hole in the Bill, when we should be strengthening it.

The hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross stated previously that the five-year minimum sentence made him think twice about leaving a loaded gun in his car while his friend drove it away. By removing the mandatory minimum sentence, we will stop people thinking about the consequences of someone else carrying their firearm. We must strengthen the Bill, not weaken it, yet the hon. Lady is weakening the Bill.

The Chairman: Order. The hon. Lady should try to make her interventions brief. There is ample time in Committee for members who seek to catch my eye to make contributions. I would appreciate it if interventions were as brief as possible.

Lynne Featherstone: It is certainly not my intention to weaken the Bill, but I am concerned that a mandatory minimum sentence may deliver injustice. There is an attempt at equivalent seriousness, and as I understand it even a different firearms offence would not attract the same sentence. A very uneven playing field would be created while sending out an appropriate message to those who are the focus of the legislation.

Steve McCabe: I do not want the legislation to be at all woolly. Will the hon. Lady say clearly to the Committee that her intention is to oppose the mandatory sentence?


 
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Lynne Featherstone: No, that is not my intention. I am trying to understand whether the Government have thought through the distinctions that the provision might create. Even different firearms offences do not carry that mandatory minimum sentence, so the Bill would create an inequality in the law.

Mr. Jones: I am looking with some amusement at the face of the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross. He was obviously paying great attention to the hon. Lady’s contribution. Is what she is putting forward official Liberal party policy to weaken the Bill or is it a bit of freelance enterprise on her part?

Lynne Featherstone: I have made it perfectly clear that the intention is not to weaken the Bill. The intention is to sort out some of the inequalities or unevenness that might be created by the minimum mandatory sentence. Other firearms offences do not carry such a sentence.

Mr. Jones: Is this the Liberal party’s official position or is it a freelance move on the hon. Lady’s part? Judging from the hon. Gentleman’s face, her colleague clearly has some grave reservations.

Lynne Featherstone: I am aware of my colleague’s reservations, although the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones) can see his face, whereas I cannot. This is a probing amendment to ascertain the Government’s view.

Mr. Jones: Is this official party policy? I recognise that the hon. Lady’s colleague has reservations. It was also quite amusing to see her face when he described the small arsenal that he keeps at home.

Lynne Featherstone: My experience of firearms is not so much limited as non-existent. I share with the Minister an understanding of alcohol that I do not have of firearms. I ask her to respond to my points.

Mr. Djanogly: The clause relates to the imposition of new-length mandatory sentences that relate to the crime of using someone to mind a weapon. Although it is obvious that sentences should be severe and certain enough to act as a deterrent, we have several reservations about the clause. First, there is no evidence to support the increases and no evidence to justify the imposition of mandatory sentences. The second reservation relates to the imposition of mandatory sentences themselves from a conceptual point of a view.

On amendment No. 299, from the Liberals, we see no evidential justification for increasing the sentence to 10 years. If we were talking about judicial discretion coming into play, we might have some more sympathy, but, on the basis of mandatory sentences, I am afraid that we will not support that amendment.

However, the position changes with Liberal amendment No. 151 and our amendments Nos. 204 to 214. We have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady has just been saying. The purpose of our amendments and amendment No. 151, which basically
 
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has the same effect, is to remove mandatory sentencing and leave room for judicial discretion. Our amendments do that by removing the word “must” and replacing it with “may” and by removing the word “exceptional” in line 11. I note also that new clause 19, which the Government recently produced—I have not had the opportunity of reviewing all the implications, because it cuts across other pieces of legislation—seems to extend the minimum sentences to a whole range of offences under firearms legislation. Although I applaud the Government’s intention in moving towards some kind of consistency in the legislation, that should not be done at the expense of justice. I shall explain why.

First, where is the evidence to show that the imposition of long mandatory sentences will have an effect on violent crime reduction? That is one of our concerns. I will not outline to the Committee the well-established arguments relating to mandatory sentences and judicial discretion. However, we must remain vigilant about mandatory custodial sentences where it is preferable to allow judges discretion. In the Bill, it must be prudent, and infinitely more desirable, to allow judges discretion in order to avoid the unintended ramifications that may arise. Mandatory minimum sentences can result in disproportionate sentences, which could be in contravention of article 49(3) of the EU charter of fundamental rights. That provides that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence. For starters, surely it is not intended that the mandatory minimum sentences should apply to children. I should be grateful if the Minister would confirm that that is the case.

The mandatory minimum of five years’ imprisonment in clause 25(4) seems to echo the provision in section 51A of the Firearms Act 1968, which was inserted by section 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Both those sections make provision for exceptional circumstances. In the recent case of Rehman, which concerned section 51A, it was held that exceptional circumstances existed if

    “to impose five years’ imprisonment would result in an arbitrary and disproportionate sentence.”

The court said that the

    “purpose of the provision is to ensure that absent exceptional circumstances the courts will always impose deterrent sentences”.

3.30 pm

Despite that judgment, there remain concerns about the proportionality of sentencing under these provisions because the result might be, in cases where exceptional circumstances cannot be made out, sentences that would not otherwise be justified. It is notable that in the case of the second appellant in Rehman, whose mandatory minimum sentence was upheld, both the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal expressed regret or reluctance at coming to the conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances in his case. In the case of Jordan, Alleyne, and Redfern in 2004, the Court of Appeal said
 
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that cases of “exceptional circumstances” will be rare, and that they arise only where there are real exceptional circumstances.

That strict approach has been confirmed in a number of cases. In the case of Evans in 2005, the Court of Appeal decided that “real exceptional circumstances” had not arisen. The offender, a civilian station reception officer at Dagenham police station, had a considerable collection of guns and ammunition at his home and in the boot of his car. He was a gun enthusiast aged 55 who enjoyed shooting at a rifle range and had never been in trouble before. His gun club supplied a reference. Other referees spoke of him as a good neighbour, family man and citizen. There was also a psychological report that stated that the offender had a severe level of obsessive compulsive disorder and clinically significant levels of anxiety and depression. The Court of Appeal rejected the submission of “exceptional circumstances”. For those reasons, we propose to remove the word “exceptional” from clause 25.

The knock-on effects of this type of clause should also be borne in mind. Courts may be obliged to pass minimum sentences even though an offence of equivalent seriousness would not attract such a sentence. This clause imposes mandatory minimum sentences of five years and three years. In the case of Grainger in 1997—a manslaughter case, originally charged as murder—the victim started chanting football slogans of a team other than his, then obtained a knife and superficially stabbed himself in the chest. The offender then retrieved a kitchen knife and plunged it into the chest of the victim. The sentence given was three years’ imprisonment. Having killed someone with a knife, the offender received a sentence of only three years. How can it be fair, therefore, that for just giving someone the knife to carry he could get a mandatory minimum sentence of five years?

Again, in the case of Kitchener in 1999, the offender arrived home to discover a group of neighbours protesting about his dog and its continuous barking. The offender left his partner and children at a friend’s house, armed himself with a knife and returned home. A fight broke out in which the victim was stabbed and died. The sentence given in that case was five years’ imprisonment.

Another way of demonstrating that this clause could result in disproportionately long sentences is by comparing it to sentencing for death by dangerous driving. The guideline case—

 
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