Welfare Reform Bill


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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Mrs. Anne McGuire): I am delighted to see you back in your Chair, Mr. Hood. I have missed you.
I can allay the fears of the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey, who is in danger of confusing two issues. One is voluntary work, and we have said more than once that volunteering is a stepping stone along the pathway to work. There is a major difference if someone is working in a commercial environment and appears not to be declaring any income from that job. As a Member of Parliament I have known circumstances in which someone has worked full-time in a business and has been astonished to find out that the DWP thought they might be earning some money when they were also claiming benefit. That scenario will be covered rather than the type that the hon. Gentleman painted.
On capital, perhaps I can highlight another scenario. To circumvent the capital limits, a person might put all their capital in the name of a trusted friend—it would need to be a pretty trusted friend—or a family member. They might effectively dispose of capital so as to come under the threshold. The clause will deal with such scenarios.
Mr. Boswell: Is it fair to summarise the Under-Secretary’s comments as being that the clause is primarily dedicated to dealing with abuse and deliberate attempts to frustrate the system, rather than dealing with people with entirely legitimate activities who might get caught in the fire? Will she at least assure us that that is what she is trying to do in the regulations?
Mrs. McGuire: The hon. Gentleman puts his finger on the nub of the matter. We have increased the capital limits—we doubled them in April 2000—and there is now a limit of between £6,000 and £16,000. For older people in residential care the limit is around £10,000. The clause will essentially allow us to deal with those who seek to circumvent the rules. They are the same rules as currently exist for income support, and they should be translated into the new legislation.
Danny Alexander: It was the specific assurance on voluntary work that I wanted. Having received it, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Earnings disregard level—
‘(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations that the level of earnings disregard for claimants of Employment and Support Allowance shall be set at a level that he shall by determine.
(2) In determining the level of earnings disregard under subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall have regard to labour market conditions including the National Minimum Wageas defined under section 1 of the National Minimum WageAct 1998 (c. 39).’.
Mr. Hunt: I, too, welcome you back to the Chair, Mr. Hood. We are trying to make progress. We know that that must be the case because we have not heard the weather forecast for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey. I regret that slightly, because rather like “The Archers”, I am beginning to follow that forecast and I am a bit curious as to how it might be this afternoon.
I thank you for selecting new clause 13 with clause stand part, Mr. Hood, because it is only loosely related to the clause. It deals with the income of claimants, and there is not really anywhere else in the Bill that is suitable to discuss that. Before speaking to the new clause, I have a question for the Under-Secretary. Clause 16(3)(b) gives the Secretary of State the power to disregard the capital or income that a person possesses. Will she confirm that she might be prepared to do that if a disabled person is asked to take part in a consultation on Government policy and is given travel expenses? She and I both spoke at the annual general meeting of the British Council of Disabled People recently. One of that organisation’s great concerns is that it is often asked to participate in consultations about policy, but often gets little or no remuneration for it. It is particularly concerned that if its members receive any remuneration—even travel expenses—it could count as income towards their earnings disregard. Will that be one occasion on which the Secretary of State could show a bit of latitude?
5 pm
Mr. Boswell: Does my hon. Friend agree that this may apply to certain people who may receive expenses or honoraria, or may decline to claim them in relation to anything that they are required to do in connection with user consultations under social care legislation? Parliament encourages consultation with service users, so it would be unfortunate if it appeared to subvert the position of users through the earnings disregard.
Mr. Hunt: As ever, my hon. Friend makes an important point. A specific example of what he is talking about would be the pilots concerning individual budgets, where it is vital to get service users’ views if programmes are to be rolled out effectively and successfully. I am sure that the Government do not intend to put off disabled people from participating in such consultations, so it would be great if the Minister could reassure the Committee.
Moving on to new clause 13, I understand that the real intention of the Bill is to tackle the barriers to work faced by many people with a limited capability for work. It is encouraging that the Bill rolls out various proactive support measures that could help people make the difficult transition and engage in the world of work. However, I tabled the new clause because I am concerned that the Bill fails to deal with a structural problem that is a huge barrier to people re-engaging or engaging for the first time—[Interruption.]
The Chairman: Order. May I ask the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire (Natascha Engel) to resume her seat?
Mr. Hunt: I am grateful, Mr. Hood. I am hoping that the hon. Lady will intervene later, because she made some interesting interventions earlier when we were talking about Tunbridge Wells Tim and Derbyshire Dave.
I am concerned that built-in disincentives, including the strict rules about how much money can count towards the earnings disregard, strongly discourage people from engaging in the world of work. If we remove the structural problems with the earnings disregard, we will have far greater success with the proactive support measures advanced under the Bill as part of the pathways roll-out.
On the DWP website, which I viewed last night, under a heading of “Working while claiming benefit”—
Mr. Ruffley: You should get out more.
The Chairman: Order.
Mr. Hunt: We return to my activities last night, which included looking at the DWP website, which I am proud to have done because it was important for our debate today.
The Chairman: Order. The hon. Gentleman has only himself to blame.
Mr. Hunt: Thank you, Mr. Hood. As a new Member of Parliament, I shall take very seriously your advice about not getting things transcribed things on to the record that are best left untranscribed.
The DWP website says:
“You cannot usually work while you are getting Incapacity Benefit, Severe Disablement Allowance, National Insurance Credits or Income Support because of illness or disability. You may be able to do the following types of work but you should check with your local Jobcentre, Jobcentre Plus or social security office before you start.”
Then it talks about those types of work. Neither the Bill nor the explanatory notes make it clear howthe dual structure works in this regard. I hope that the Minister is able to enlighten the Committee about ESA and the dual structure that exists at the moment, where people on income support only have a £20 earnings disregard, but those on incapacity benefit have the permitted work higher limit of £81 a week. The Bill does not make it clear whether the Government intend that dual structure to continue.
I am sure that it will not have escaped the Minister’s notice that, curiously, there is a much lower earnings disregard for those likely to be the poorest people involved in the programme. Will the Minister clarify whether she thinks that it is appropriate to have two levels of earnings disregard given that part of the benefit of introducing new welfare reform legislation is a move towards simplicity and transparency, where possible? Having complicated rules dependent on the individual claimant for earnings disregard would not appear to do that.
The earnings disregard for people on income support has not changed since its introduction, but the labour market conditions have. Disability Alliance told the Select Committee on Work and Pensions that until October 2005 those on income support could work for up to four hours on the minimum wage, but since then increases to the minimum wage to £5.35 mean that they can work for just over three hours. It asked whether it was not incongruous that a person can work for a certain number of hours one year, but not the next. I put it to the Committee that that is against the spirit of the Bill—a spirit that the Opposition welcome.
The Select Committee recommended that the earnings disregard be set at four hours at minimum wage and uprated annually. New clause 13 is actually weaker than that and would allow, but not compel, the Secretary of State to uprate the earnings disregard in line with the minimum wage and require him or her to take account of other labour market conditions, not just the minimum wage—other conditions need to be factored in.
I put it to the Minister that it is not necessarily the case that increasing the disregard would amount to an increase in public spending. If people did not think that it was going to affect their benefits package, they would feel more encouraged to engage in the world of work—in many cases they are not because of the earnings disregard—and to take those first few halting steps. In that case, in the long run, the Bill would be more successful in getting people off employment and support allowance and back into work.
The Minister gave an interesting example from her constituency surgery when she met someone working for a commercial organisation who did not understand why that might be incompatible with claiming benefits. The concern is that if the earnings disregard rules are too generous, everybody doing a part-time job might think, “I will sign on and claim benefits at the same time as earning a wage from my part-time job”.
Actually, the Government could be a lot bolder with earnings disregard because of the structure of the pathways to work programme. In reality, people have to go through a process before being considered for ESA and talk to a personal adviser who has much more detailed knowledge of their personal situation than has been the case before. In that situation, with that knowledge of individual claimants, it ought to be possible to be a lot more generous with the earnings disregard.
I thank you again, Mr. Hood, for allowing this new clause to be debated. To wrap up, I remind the Minister that Capability Scotland said that 50 per cent. of working-age disabled people in Scotland did not want to engage in the world of work because they were worried that it would threaten their benefits package. Let me remind her also that the Secretary of State himself has talked frequently, in the House and the media, about the relationship between poverty and worklessness. Is it possible that by accepting the new clause we could turn the spotlight on the barriers created by permitted hours and the earnings disregard? Will she consider supporting the new clause as a step in the right direction to dealing with that issue?
Danny Alexander: I would like to add a few remarks to those of the hon. Member for South-West Surrey on earnings disregard. It is an important issue to raise at this stage. I shall not comment on his nocturnal activities, but I do think that his amendment has drawn attention to an important issue. The situation is worse than he described because he dwelt only on the permitted working rules in relation to incapacity benefit and earnings disregard in relation to income support. But of course there are also earnings disregard that apply to housing benefit. In relation to incentives to work and the agenda to make work pay, is it worth someone going to work, as the Bill tries to encourage people to do? Do people feel that when they go to work, they receive a reasonable amount of the money that they earn?
The question of earnings disregards is important. The earnings disregard is set at £20, which means that someone can carry out less than four hours work on the minimum wage before they start losing benefits. Depending on which benefit they receive, they may lose it quickly, too. Recent figures suggest that as a result of those tapers, people can then lose their benefit at the rate of 70p to 90p in the pound of new wages earned. If one were to suggest such rates for people at the top of the income scale, there would be squeals of pain from the City and elsewhere; however, the Government consider it acceptable for people at the lowest end of the scale.
The earnings disregard will allow a proportion of income to be earned before the clawback starts. It will be critical to people who want to try out not just work-related activity, but a few hours of work a week, or to people who have a fluctuating condition and are able to work less than 16 hours a week. Tax credits that help people make their work more worthwhile do not kick in until 16 hours have been worked.
It would be useful if the Under-Secretary were to address not only the earnings disregard for employment and support allowance, but the interaction between the different earnings disregards for different benefits. After all, someone in receipt of ESA is likely—although not certain—to be in receipt of housing and other benefits, as the hon. Member for South-West Surrey said. All earnings disregards will have a substantial impact on the financial incentives for people to return to work.
I would be grateful if the Minister were to explain both the Government’s thinking on earnings disregards, and her discussions and thoughts on the idea of higher earnings disregards to help get people off benefits and back to work and to help a range of other claimants who face substantial disincentives. That includes high marginal withdrawal rates of benefits. A higher earnings disregard could help someone move higher up the ladder towards work, before that person’s benefits started being taken away. What we do about marginal reduction rates of benefits is a matter for a separate debate, although it is important. We could start by establishing earnings disregards at a sufficiently generous rate that allowed people to try out work, and for work to be financially worthwhile.
 
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