Mr.
Turner: It would be unfair of me to ask the Minister a
question that I could not answer if he asked it of me, so I shall not
ask him, but I should like someone to tell me what is the supreme being
in which Jains believe if it is not a god, which qualifies Jain
organisations to be charities.
Edward
Miliband: The hon. Gentleman is completely right. I do not
know the answer to that
question.
Martin
Horwood: Having spent a year in India, I might be able to
assist the Minister. In several Indian religions, including Jainism,
great respect is paid to prophets and to those interpreters of the
world who are not divine, just as Buddha in Theravada Buddhism is
regarded as having achieved nirvana or enlightenment, not
divinity.
Edward
Miliband: That certainly satisfies me. I am grateful to
the hon. Gentleman for that
explanation.
Tom
Levitt: My hon. Friend will be aware from a previous
conversation that my concern about the clause was not philosophical,
but mathematical. Subsection (3)(a)(i) includes polytheism and
subsection (3)(a)(ii) includes atheistic religions; there is, however,
no specific mention of monotheistic religions. Am I right in thinking
therefore that, when the clause says that “religion”
includes those definitions, it does not exclude other
definitions?
Edward
Miliband: My hon. Friend is right. It important to say at
this early stage in proceedings that the Bill will be built upon the
common law definitions of a charity that have been built up over more
than 400 years or so. The confusion in Committee might
sometimes arise from the fact that we are building on that foundation.
In the case my hon. Friend raises, a belief in the supreme being or
beings and the expression of that belief through worship of a supreme
being or beings is part of the common law definition of religion in
terms of charitable
purposes.
Mr.
Bone: Is the Minister saying that nothing will really
change in relation to religion in the Charity Commission’s
administration? If so, why are we bothering to add the extra
definition?
Edward
Miliband: It would be wrong of me to say that that thought
has occurred to me at any point during the past eight weeks when I have
been learning the details of the Charities Bill. The answer to the hon.
Gentleman is that we are undertaking a Herculean task, which is to set
out a list of charitable purposes that can take forward the
implementation of charitable status in the coming decades. We need to
set them out as best we can in the Bill. His understanding is correct
in that the definition of religion for charitable purposes has been
established under law and it will not change
materially.
Helen
Goodman: One of my constituents, the former Bishop of
Durham, said famously that the resurrection is not simply a trick with
a bag of bones. My concern about the amendment tabled by the hon.
Member for Isle of Wight is that he is trying, by including a reference
to a supernatural principle, to come to a precise theological position
on religion. It is not appropriate for the Committee to do that.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Church of England is the established
national Church in England, does my hon. Friend the Parliamentary
Secretary agree that it is not appropriate for us to present
definitions of religion that are too
theological?
Edward
Miliband: I
agree.
Tom
Levitt: Surely, the purpose of the Bill—the
biggest review of charity legislation in the past 400
years—is seen in clause 2(2) and the other provisions are
subservient to it. Clause 2(2) contains a list, established through
case law and other sources, that will form the definition of a charity
for the Charity Commission and others to use. The value of clause 3 is
that it helps to define one of the words used in clause
2(2)—“religion”—the meaning of which has
changed fundamentally over the 400 years since the concept of charity
law was first produced. For the first 350 or so of those years, there
would have been a narrow definition of the use of the word
“religion” in the common law on charities: it would have
meant Christianity and nothing
else.
Edward
Miliband: My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are
trying to strike a balance between setting out principles that will
take us forward
and are flexible enough to accommodate changes in social circumstances
over time. I hope that we are striking the right
balance. A number of
concerns have been raised about the amendment tabled by the hon. Member
for Isle of Wight. We are concerned that it would significantly widen
the definition of “religion” when that is not necessary,
and there is a risk of including some beliefs that perhaps ought not to
be included. During a debate on a similar amendment in another place,
my noble Friend Lord Dubs referred to “‘nutty’
religions”. However, we are more worried about irrational,
bizarre beliefs of other sorts and about some perfectly respectable
beliefs that, nevertheless, ought to have no place in religion. For the
benefit of the Committee, the dictionary definition of
“supernatural”, is that which is attributed to or thought
to reveal some force above the laws of nature, or is magical, occult or
mystical. Any belief founded on a principle of that sort could
potentially qualify as a religion under the amendment. I am not
convinced that that would be a good way for us to go. Palmistry,
horoscopy and tree worship might qualify as religions under the
amendment, although I am sure that that is not the hon.
Gentleman’s intention. There is a danger that the breadth of the
amendment might allow all kinds of practices to claim religious status.
I hope that, on the basis of our full debate, including the exposure of
the Australian red herring, the hon. Gentleman will not press his
amendment. On
amendment No. 53, also tabled by the hon. Gentleman, I am sympathetic
to the idea that there are all kinds of sports and that people have
different predilections for sport and those should be accommodated in
the law. However, by defining sport in the terms that we have used, we
are retaining in essence an approach that has already been established
by the Charity Commission. Chess is not allowable under the
“other sport” category, but, having said that, chess
organisations can come into charitable status in all kinds of other
ways. More than a dozen chess charities are registered as charities,
mainly under the advancement of education heading. For the benefit of
the Committee, the other sports that are not considered to be covered
by the definition are angling, ballooning, billiards, crossbow and
rifle shooting, flying, gliding, motorsports and parachuting.
Given the debate, we should
reflect on the argument that has been advanced. I am not convinced that
simply taking out the relevant subsection is the right way forward, but
I do take seriously what hon. Members have said. As my right hon.
Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said, we must avoid
unintended consequences. We must not start a new argument about
hunting, for example, or anything like that. We will go away and, in
the spirit of charity, reflect on the matter and report back on
Report. The hon.
Member for Isle of Wight, a former teacher, set me an exam question on
amendment No. 3: he asked me explain the consistency between clause
1(2) and clause 2(7). The purpose of clause 2(7) is to ensure that
wherever there is reference to charitable purposes in primary or
secondary legislation or in any document, charitable purposes is to be
construed in accordance with clause 2(1). A document includes, most
importantly, the written constitution of every charity. Subsection (7)
makes that apply to legislation
and documents passed or created before the Bill, except where the
context requires
otherwise. The purpose
of the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, which is acknowledged is
probing, is to ensure that the Bill’s definition of charitable
purposes applies only in legislation and documents passed after the
Bill. Let me give a few examples to illustrate the way in which the
amendment would not be helpful. The first is to do with references to
charitable purposes in legislation. Many pieces of legislation refer to
charitable purposes, including the 1988 Act to which I referred
earlier, which gives exemptions to charities from income and
corporation tax on the income that they spend for charitable purposes.
The difference between clause 1(2) and clause 2(7) is that the
exception in clause 1(2) caters to, for example, tax laws applying to
charities throughout the UK, whereas clause 2(7) is about achieving a
common definition of charitable purposes. That is the distinction
between them. I hope that clears up the confusion.
We are seeking a common
definition of charitable purposes—as clause 2(7) ensures.
However, we also want to accommodate the situation in which a different
definition of charity applies in law and we might want to keep that
definition. We are concerned that the reference to charity in the 1988
Act applies across the United Kingdom, but the Bill applies only in
England and Wales. We do not want the charitable benefits to be removed
from charities in Scotland and Northern Ireland. I hope that clears
that point up for the hon. Gentleman and that I have successfully
answered his exam
question.
Mr.
Turner: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his
answer. We must assume from his answer that the words
“charitable purpose” do not appear in the 1988 Act and
the word “charity” does. Otherwise, I do not see how what
is appropriate for England in subsections (6) and (7) can be
appropriate for the whole United Kingdom under subsection (2). Is the
Minister saying that a charity whose charitable purposes are defined as
its objective in its constitution will have to change its constitution
to fit the definition in clause
2(1)? 12
noon
Edward
Miliband: Yes, but I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman was
not correct on his original point. As I said earlier, section 506(1) of
the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1998 says
that “‘charity’
means any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes
only”. It contains both
the word “charity” and the phrase “charitable
purposes”. I am
trying to explain, not very eloquently, that there will now be a common
definition of “charitable purposes”, as the Bill will
change the definition in the 1988 Act. The definition of
“charity” in the 1988 Act is a UK-wide
definition—importantly so, because taxes are a reserved and not
a devolved matter—and must remain so. It must not come into line
with the Bill’s definition of “charity”, because
if it did so, it would apply only to England and Wales, depriving
Scotland and Northern Ireland of the benefits of charitable
status.
Tom
Levitt: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the clarity
and consistency of his summary. He sets a high standard for the rest of
the Committee. I am particularly grateful that he has rejected what we
might call the Cheltenham principle throughout—the idea that a
harmless but not entirely necessary proposal should be included simply
on that basis. I hope for similar consistency throughout the
Committee.
Edward
Miliband: I thank my hon. Friend for his kind remarks, and
I hope that the hon. Member for Cheltenham is not too
wounded. To make it
clear why we hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press his amendment,
I shall give a second example involving charitable purposes and
documents, including charities’ constitutions. If an
organisation is an existing, grant-making charity, its constitution
might say that it can make grants to one or more charitable purposes as
the trustees may from time to time determine at their discretion. It is
important that that definition of “charitable
purposes”—I think that he referred to this—is
consistent with the Bill and not some other definition. That is the
purpose of the clause under scrutiny. I hope that I have satisfied him
on this rather difficult and arcane area, and that he will not press
his
amendment.
Martin
Horwood: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation
of the legal implications of amendment No. 70, and am therefore content
to withdraw it. However, I hope that he will take account of the spirit
of the amendment and the implication behind it, as well as the
explanation that he gave to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight about his
amendment. There is a risk that inconsistency will spread and
proliferate throughout the legislation, making life complicated for the
administrators and treasurers of
charities.
Edward
Miliband: I meant to cover the hon. Gentleman’s
point about the Inland Revenue and the way that it administers the
definition of “charitable purposes”. It is clear from my
explanation to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight that there will now be
a common definition of “charitable purposes”, which
should be consistent in its
administration.
Martin
Horwood: I am grateful for the Minister’s reply,
but I will be extremely surprised if that is the practical result,
because I suspect that the different definitions used by the different
wings of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will still exist.
However, I am content to let him investigate that in his own
time.
Mr.
Turner: From his intervention, the Minister seems to be
saying that the definition of a “charitable purpose” will
be the same in Scotland as in England and Wales, although perhaps I
shall be told that I have got that wrong. I certainly understood that
the purpose of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham
was to bring the definition into line with that in Scotland. I accept
that the Minister may be saying that the definitions are already in
line, but as the issue of fee-charging charities is clearer in Scotland
than in England, I do not see how they can be the same.
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