Finance (No.2) Bill


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Dawn Primarolo: The hon. Gentleman could, but it would be illegal. That is the point of some of the amendments. [Interruption.]
Mr. Goodman: I shall pass over that interjection, in case it finds its way into Hansard, which I fear it has. I do not know whether the Paymaster General was suggesting that the amendment would be illegal, but I can understand her impatience as I am about to tax her again with one of the examples that I have a way of raising. I hope that she will address it more directly than she did the previous example.
The clause will extend restrictions on gift aid payments by close companies to non-close companies. The argument has been put to me that it is likely to hurt charities that run substantial corporate benefactor schemes and that the maximum benefit of £250 is minimal and will discourage companies from entering into such schemes. An example was given to me by, needless to say, the Charities’ Tax Reform Group. Let us suppose that the National Trust were trying to raise £500,000 to repair a property and a corporate benefactor agreed to donate £250,000. The National Trust might begin to raise the rest by holding a fundraising dinner, selling tickets at £100 a head. The corporate benefactor might be given a free table in recognition of its generosity and to encourage other substantial contributions. If the benefit to the benefactor exceeded £250, the charity would lose gift aid on the whole £250,000 donation. The argument put to me was that if the Government are unwilling to delete clause 58, at the very least the upper limit should be raised from £250 to £2,500 to allow charities to devise effective corporate benefactor schemes and to encourage companies to be generous in entering them.
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Dawn Primarolo: Company gift aid is a tax relief specifically designed for gifts to charities, not for payments that convey potential, substantial benefits on the donor company and those running it. In the Government’s view, the existing benefit limits are sufficient for charities to express their gratitude for a donation. We are talking about the benefits conveyed to the donor company by the charity when it says thank you for a donation. I say to the hon. Gentleman that there is no evidence to suggest that ensuring that donations to charities benefit principally the charity and not the giver—that is precisely what the clauses before us will do—will harm corporate giving.
A balance needs to be struck to ensure that companies do not benefit if they make a payment to charity with the aim of benefiting principally themselves and not the charity. The limit is there to prevent the glorious events that are designed to benefit those attending, but have little charitable benefit. That goes to the heart of the purpose of gift aid. I hope therefore that, given the narrow focus of the limit, the hon. Gentleman will accept that it is appropriate.
I remind the Committee that this series of clauses will deal with the misuse of charitable status by those who would put pressure on charities, or use them in order to benefit themselves, but not the charity. I want to reinforce that point. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that explanation of why amendment No. 95 is unattractive and why I do not want the Committee to pursue it.
Mr. Goodman: In short, the Paymaster General argued that the Treasury accepts the principle of a limit because charities might benefit from the relief given to the donor, such as in the example that I gave. However, given that a higher limit might actually benefit the charities, she did not justify why the level should be £250 rather £2,500. I was not satisfied with her explanation so I am inclined to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 20.
Division No. 2]
AYES
Francois, Mr. Mark
Gauke, Mr. David
Goodman, Mr. Paul
Hoban, Mr. Mark
Hosie, Stewart
Newmark, Mr. Brooks
Villiers, Mrs. Theresa
Wright, Jeremy
NOES
Balls, Ed
Banks, Gordon
Barlow, Ms Celia
Breed, Mr. Colin
Goodman, Helen
Healey, John
Heppell, Mr. John
Hesford, Stephen
Hodgson, Mrs. Sharon
Keeley, Barbara
Khan, Mr. Sadiq
McCarthy, Kerry
MacDougall, Mr. John
Marris, Rob
Primarolo, rh Dawn
Reed, Mr. Andy
Reed, Mr. Jamie
Tami, Mark
Thurso, John
Wright, Mr. Iain
Question accordingly negatived.
Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Cars with a co2 emissions figure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Rob Marris (Wolverhampton, South-West) (Lab): The Government introduced the regime to change the way in which company cars are taxed several years ago. I think that I am right in saying that the majority of new cars bought in the United Kingdom are still company cars. The Government have had huge success with the regime. It has really changed the way in which company cars are bought, and the CO2 emissions of the company car fleet have been falling year on year in contrast to the CO2 emissions of private average cars, which have been increasing in the past couple of years.
My hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury would probably term what I am about to say as an early bid for next year. I welcome the proposals under clause 59 at the lower end of the scale so that, when the 3 per cent. diesel supplement is dropped, some cars will drop to a 10 per cent. valuation for company car tax purposes. However, having had such success with changing buying plans for company cars in recent years, the Government have missed a major opportunity by not greatly increasing the figure at the upper end of the scale. I urge my hon. Friend to take such action next year.
Mr. Goodman: The hon. Gentleman was certainly right about the lower end of the scale. Will the Financial Secretary comment on the remarks of Stewart Whyte, the director of the Association of Car Fleet Operators, about the clause? He said:
“Generally, it is a broadly neutral budget for the fleet industry with no major changes. However, the further tightening of company car tax in 2008-09 is a minor disappointment. It is clear that vehicle manufacturers are having some difficulty in driving through the technological changes that will see a significant rise in the number of very low CO2-emitting cars on sale.”
We certainly explored that issue in the debate on vehicle excise duty. He went on:
“We hope that all parties will work together to ensure that the typical car becomes much more fuel- and CO2-efficient—and therefore tax-efficient—so that the impact on drivers of the tax change is neutral. We cannot have a company car tax system which takes no account of the technical realities of the vehicles available and, as a result, penalises company car drivers through no fault of their own.”
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (John Healey): Clause 59 is a further step in the reforms that we put in place in 2002 to base the company car tax system on carbon dioxide emissions as a contribution to meeting the challenge of climate change. My hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) is right to say that it has been a success. Our first stage evaluation demonstrated that the average emissions of company cars in 2004 were some 15 g per kilometre lower than they would have been had we not put the reforms in place. On his point about top rates, he is nothing if not consistent. He made the same point in relation to top rates of vehicle excise duty in earlier discussions on the Bill. He is right that I will not accept the argument at this stage in the debate on this clause, but I will take it as an early Budget representation for 2007.
We are making two changes to reinforce the environmental effect of the company car tax regime. First, the clause reduces the level of carbon dioxide emission qualifying for the lower threshold by 5 g per kilometre to 135 g per kilometre from 6 April 2008. That will provide a continuing incentive for company car drivers and their employers to choose more fuel-efficient cars. It will also encourage manufacturers to produce cars with lower carbon dioxide emissions.
The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. Goodman), is right to quote Stewart Whyte, and Mr. Whyte was right to say that the measure is broadly neutral for the industry. It is also neutral for the Exchequer. We do not anticipate an impact on revenues from the company car tax regime when the changes come in in 2008-09. If the hon. Member for Wycombe has discussed it with him, Mr. Whyte will also have pointed out that the industry was expecting the Government to move in this direction. We have been discussing it for some time, and did so again in the run-up to the Budget. The point about setting the rates three years in advance is that that is not just advantageous for companies that make cars available to their employees for private use; it is also a useful long-term signal for car designers and manufacturers about the policy direction of the Government.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

Mobile telephones
Question proposed, That the clause stand part ofthe Bill.
Mr. Mark Francois (Rayleigh) (Con): May I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. O’Hara? The most controversial part of chapter 5 of the Bill, which deals with personal taxation, is undoubtedly clause 61, which paves the way for the abolition of the popular home computing initiative, a decision that is still very much to be regretted, but that we dealt with in some detail in the Committee of the whole House. Clause 60 is an associated though less immediately controversial issue. Essentially, it seeks to limit to one phone any tax reallocation of mobile phone use by an employer to an employee. It was covered by the same regulatory impact assessment as clause 61, to which I shall refer shortly.
11 am
There are two areas in which it would be helpful to have clarification from the Paymaster General on the intended operation of the clause.
To begin with, there appears to be a residual ambiguity as to the permitted degree of personal use—if any—of the one mobile phone to which the clause refers, and on the tax implications, because there are differences between what is said in the Bill and the explanatory notes on the one hand and in the subsequent regulatory impact assessment on the other.
On clause 61, the Government now say that people who are provided by their employer with a computer at home for business purposes will not be taxed on that computer as a benefit in kind, provided that any personal use of it is not significant. After debate, the Paymaster General offered to consult employers to define the term “not significant,” and I understand that that work is ongoing. However, I should like to know the parallel position under clause 60 in relation to mobile phones that are provided for business purposes.
The explanatory notes initially implied that there was to be no attempt to regulate the extent of such private use for the purposes of identifying a taxable benefit in kind. Paragraph 1 of the notes states, fairly clearly:
“This clause replaces the exemption for employer provided mobile telephones in section 319 Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003. It provides that no tax will be due when employers make only one mobile telephone available for private use and removes the availability to family or household tax-free.”
Paragraph 16 of the notes then says:
“The clause re-focuses the relief provided by the exemption, keeping administrative burdens for employers to a minimum where a mobile telephone is provided for business use and private use is also made.”
Furthermore, when one looks at the clause, one sees that new section 319(1) to be inserted in the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 says:
“No liability to income tax arises by virtue of section 62 (general definition of earnings) or Chapter 10 of Part 3 (taxable benefits: residual liability to charge) in respect of the provision of one mobile telephone for an employee without any transfer of property in it.”
So far, so good. However, the associated regulatory impact assessment, which was signed by the Paymaster General on 24 April—a fortnight or so after the changes made by clause 60 came into effect—observes that there are now some 50 million mobile phones in use in the United Kingdom. That is a very large number. The RIA does not attempt to break it down into phones provided primarily for business purposes and those that are for personal purposes, but at paragraph 41 it states:
“Employers will still be able to benefit from the deregulatory objectives behind the mobile phone exemption when only one mobile telephone is made available for private use or where a mobile phone is provided for business purposes and there is insignificant private use.”
However, paragraph 23 of the RIA, entitled “Implementation and Delivery Issues,” states more explicitly:
“Where additional mobile phones are made available for private use or where private use of a business mobile phone is significant it will be liable to a tax charge and Class 1A National Insurance in the same way as any other benefit in kind.”
So a literal reading of the RIA implies that there could be a benefit in kind in certain circumstances of provision of an individual mobile phone. If that were the case, employers might be expected to define for taxation purposes the amount of personal use of that mobile phone, even if they had provided only that one mobile phone to their employee. There might be a considerable compliance burden for companies that sought legitimately to remain on the right side of the line. The regulatory impact assessment acknowledges the potential compliance burden at paragraph 54:
“Compliance costs would arise from employers having to report to HMRC the benefits in kind that would be subject to tax and Class 1A NICs under these proposals, the potential need for records to be kept and the implementation of extra coding notices for employees.”
The length of that process might be considerable. For example, if a mobile phone were provided primarily for business use, employees and employers might have to spend hours trawling through mobile phone bills to identify incidental private use and establish whether it was significant. That decision would in itself be subjective, and it might lead to unnecessary disputes between employers and employees, and then, indeed, employers and HM Revenue and Customs.
If, as is often the case in this day and age, the employer paid a fixed monthly amount and call charges were free up to a certain limit, how would “significant” be determined? How should the employee quantify the additional cost to reimburse his or her employer in order to avoid a tax charge? Put another way, assuming that the employee does not or cannot identify the cost of private calls, how should the employer compute the taxable amount in order to remain on the right side of the line?
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales considered the issue, and it made the following point about this clause:
“If significant private use of mobile telephones is to be taxable once again, we suggest that there should be a flat rate charge, as was the case before it was abolished from 6 April 1999. This proposal will avoid the need for complex benefit calculations resulting from the availability of a wide variety of payment plans.”
For clarification, will the Paymaster General confirm exactly how the new regime is intended to operate? Specifically, will there be a tax charge for a benefit in kind even on one employer-provided mobile phone if the private use of such a phone is deemed significant? Can we expect new guidelines to define insignificant as opposed to significant personal use? We will be given guidelines in relation to home computers, for instance, and paragraph 73 of the regulatory impact assessment implies that guidelines will apply to both.
If we are going to receive guidelines relating to mobile phones, when are they likely to be made available, given that the measure is already supposed to be in force? Who will be involved in drawing up such guidelines, and what consultation, if any, will take place? There appears to be a dichotomy, so will the Paymaster General clarify the issue for the Committee before we allow the clause to stand part of the Bill?
There is an associated point that requires clarification. It concerns BlackBerrys. They are becoming increasingly common in business—and in this place, too. I thought that in making this point, I had best declare a personal interest, if only for safety’s sake. In a post-Budget note on employer-provided mobile telephones, Deloitte and Touche called for clarification of the status of BlackBerrys, as did KPMG. In addition, in a recent tax alert note on the subject, Ernst and Young pointed out the following:
“No guidance has been given from HM Revenue and Customs to employers about how to determine whether a device’s primary purpose is a mobile phone or whether the mobile phone capability should be considered a secondary feature.”
Subsection (4) of proposed new section 319 defines a mobile telephone as “telephone apparatus”, which means,
“wireless telegraphy apparatus designed or adapted for the primary purpose of transmitting and receiving spoken messages and used in connection with a public electronic communications service.”
The key phrase is “primary purpose”. BlackBerrys usually also encompass a mobile telephone capability. However, arguably, they are not designed primarily for that purpose. Therefore, they appear to be in a grey area as they can also be used for transmitting messages such as e-mail and for obtaining information from the internet. The more modern BlackBerrys allow us to surf the world wide web.
Mr. Brooks Newmark (Braintree) (Con): I must confess to having an interest. Although I do not own a BlackBerry, I own a Palm Treo, which has the same impact as a BlackBerry. My hon. Friend makes an excellent point about non-verbal communication. What may be helpful is the fact that all my bills, and I believe all of his, when they are telephonic are itemised. Therefore, any tax inspector of the Revenue can see clearly what is for business and what is for personal use. Perhaps we should be considering that as well, because those devices are for both written and verbal communication.
 
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