Animal Welfare Bill |
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Clause 60 Transition Amendment made: No. 140, in clause 60, page 30, line 35, leave out subsection (1).—[Mr. Bradshaw.] Clause 60, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 62 Commencement Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 45, in clause 62, page 32, line 5, after ‘appoint’, insert
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 46, in clause 62, page 32, line 8, at end insert
Norman Baker: This comes back to the issue that we have touched upon on some occasions and skirted around on others, namely the extent to which the Bill is an enabling Bill; indeed, the matter was referred to in the previous exchange. To what extent can we expect the Government’s promises to be delivered and within what time scale? I hope that the Minister will accept that Members in all parts of the Committee have taken him on trust when he has promised to do certain things that we all want. In exchange for that we have provided the Government with powers. However, as part of that exchange there has been no guarantee—nor perhaps could there be with an enabling Bill—that those powers will be introduced. Clause 62 states that only three clauses will come into effect on day one. They are clause 55, which just says that Ministers can do something, clause 61, which just specifies the extent of their powers, and clause 63, which gives the title—it is good to the know that the Bill has a title, but there nothing else in clause 63. Nothing in the rest of clause 62 specifies a date or a time scale for any of the secondary legislation by which we all set so much store and which might otherwise not be introduced. As hon. Members will know from previous legislation, there is a litany of cases down the ages in which promises about secondary legislation have been made as part of enabling legislation, but that secondary legislation has not appeared. The first Act that I remember working on as a researcher was the Environmental Protection Act 1990. There are
The Bill contains an enabling power, and the Minister is on record as saying that those powers will be introduced through secondary legislation, but that does not guarantee that those powers will be introduced. Suppose, for example, that the Government have a change of philosophy, that the Minister changes and the new Ministers takes a different view, or that there is a change of Government. All sort of things can happen to derail the process on which we have all agreed so far. As a quid pro quo, in exchange for our agreeing to significant enabling powers, the Minister ought to be prepared to specify something in the way of an enactment date for those powers. I fully accept that the regulatory impact assessment sets out a timetable for regulations and codes. It goes up to 2010, with performing animals as the last entry. Of course, the Minister will readily recognise that that is not legally binding and therefore, in a sense, is no more of a guarantee than his words. I do not wish to be pejorative or insulting. I am just saying that the timetable is not a legal guarantee, any more than what is said in this room. There is no guarantee that things will follow on. The Minister will know that the EFRA Committee and others have raised considerable concerns about the use of secondary powers. If we are to rely heavily on those secondary powers, at the very least we need some guarantee as to when they will come in. Amendments Nos. 45 and 46, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-West, would set a time scale by inserting the phrase
That would give us some guarantee of when the powers would come in. The Minister may say that that is unrealistic and it will take five years to deal with performing animals, or whatever amount of time he has set out in the regulatory impact assessment. That is fair enough. If he wants to say that it will take five years, or even eight years, that is fine, but we want an assurance that all the good work that we have done on the Bill—we are now coming to the end of it—will be put into practice and that all the things that we have agreed should happen will actually happen. One way of achieving that is to include in the Bill some sort of requirement that it occurs. If the Minister is committed to animal welfare, as I know he is, it is in his interests to ensure that that happens, rather than see the good work that he has done disappear off into the distance. Mr. Bradshaw: The hon. Gentleman has drawn the attention of Committee members to the tension that we have touched on throughout the proceedings between our desire to introduce the laws and our desire to ensure that there is proper scrutiny and consultation. Will he reflect on that? In a moment, I think that we will be pressurised to commit ourselves to deal with greyhounds earlier than we currently plan to do. Not only is there a capacity issue in terms of my
The hon. Gentleman has written to me about the regulatory impact assessment. I do not know whether he has a copy of my letter. Basically, I have replied in the affirmative and said that we still intend to stick to the timetable laid down in the RIA. The impact of his amendment would be that, if commencement orders had not been made within three years of Royal Assent, they could not be brought into force at all. I do not think that he would want that to happen. Perhaps I can give the hon. Gentleman some more assurances about our intentions. The clause follows standard practice. Only the barest provisions—those that enable us to bring the other provisions into force—will come into force on Royal Assent. All the others will come in by commencement orders. In England, the Government have committed themselves, as part of their better regulation agenda, to bring regulations and orders into force on common commencement dates. Those dates are 1 October and 6 April. Although much depends on the speed with which the Bill completes its parliamentary stages and is submitted for Royal Assent, it is my strong hope that we will be able to commence the main provisions of the Bill in England in October. In some cases, a slower timetable may be necessary. To cite one example, in clause 5 the provision to ban mutilations must clearly be brought into force at the same time as the regulation that specifies the exemptions to the ban. However, we have given various commitments—some in the Bill—not to introduce regulations without a full public consultation. Those consultations take time. A 12-week period is prescribed in the Government’s code of practice on consultations. There is a complex relationship between the date of Royal Assent and common commencement dates, and between the Bill’s statutory provisions and its regulation-making powers. We certainly intend to bring the Bill’s provisions into force within three years. We set out that timetable in the RIA that I sent to you, Mr. Gale, your co-Chair, Mrs. Humble, and all members of the Committee. As I say, it is our intention to stick to it. I hope that, in light of those assurances, the hon. Gentleman will seek to withdraw the amendment. 2 pmNorman Baker: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation and for confirming his intentions, which is useful. It is particularly useful to have him on record as remaining committed to the timetable of the regulatory impact assessment. I suspect that that is as much as we can get out of him, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Column Number: 313 Clause 63 Short title Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill. Norman Baker: I hate to be pedantic, but as we are in 2006, should it not be the Animal Welfare Act 2006? Mr. Bradshaw: Yes. In the published version of the Bill the year is given as 2005. That will be updated automatically in subsequent prints of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill. New Clause 3 Statutory improvement notices
Brought up, and read the First time. Bill Wiggin: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. It is part of the proceedings that you will want to know from me, Mr. Gale, whether we will vote on new clause 5. For a brief moment, before speaking to new clause 3, I want to remind the Committee that on the afternoon of Thursday 19 January the Minister said:
that is the recording of an animal fight in particular —
Column Number: 314 I will reconsider whether it would be possible to tie that possession to an event that had taken place in this country. The difficulty of proving that was why this provision was dropped from the draft Bill.” However, the Minister said that he would reflect
I hope that that is still the case. If he will just say yes, we can proceed, and we will not need to vote on new clause 5, which I think will be helpful to the Committee. I know that the Minister wanted to consider the possession of videos and films of fighting, and I am sure that he still does, as he mentioned it. I will happily give way to him if he wants to intervene. If he does not, let us give him a few more moments, Mr. Gale, and talk about new clause 3. The Chairman: Order. All that was strictly out of order. I was hoping that the Minister might be able to reply, but he was obviously caught on the hop and I do not think that it is fair to ask him to respond immediately. If he wishes to give an indication during his response to new clause 3, that will probably also be out of order, but I will accept it. Bill Wiggin: Thank you, Mr. Gale. Funnily enough, I suspect that new clause 3 is one of the most important parts of the Bill. I am sure that the Government would have wanted to introduce it, but as yet have not. We are dealing with a new offence—failure to fulfil the duty of care. The new clause would ensure that anybody who fails in the duty of care receives some sort of statutory warning before they are prosecuted. The amendment has two purposes. First, it would give those in violation of their animal welfare obligations the opportunity to improve the welfare conditions of animals in their care prior to any proceedings going through the courts. In many cases that might prevent lengthy and costly legal actions and enable persons who were unaware that they were committing a violation of the Bill to change their ways without being immediately criminalised. If someone had unintentionally failed fully to provide for their animal’s welfare needs, it would be far better to give them the opportunity to rectify the situation than to pursue them through the courts. Secondly, the amendment would ensure that only certain authorities could issue statutory improvement notices, and it would give them a responsibility to assist in fulfilling the requirements of an SIN. At present anyone can issue another person with a so-called improvement notice; for example, someone with no formal qualifications, knowledge or authority could do so. I could issue anyone with such a notice, telling them to change the way in which they treat their animal or risk being prosecuted. That is because I have a common-law right to prosecute others. The amendment would not change or restrict that common-law right, but it would enhance the credibility of the practice of issuing improvement notices by empowering certain bodies to issue them as a statutory requirement. It would give those governmental bodies responsibility to go along with
On Second Reading, I pressed the Minister on written warnings and he stated:
It is true that there is nothing to prevent anyone from issuing a written warning. However, there is nothing legally binding about such a warning and it could easily be ignored. As the RSPCA pointed out in a briefing note, in cases where its advice was ignored, most owners would have followed it if it had been backed up by the potential for legal proceedings. On Second Reading, the Minister raised the issue of the Bill being designed to avoid prosecutions, reduce costs, prevent cruelty and promote welfare and he argued that a statutory improvement notice would be contradictory to that aim. I beg to disagree. The new clause is written in the spirit of the Bill; it will save time and costs and help individuals to improve animal welfare. It would ensure that improvement notices were issued by an appropriate authority and that there was a statutory obligation to fulfil that their requirements. If there are arguments in favour of the RSPCA notices, they may be useful as rebuttals. At the moment, the RSPCA issues non-statutory improvement notices to animal keepers. Often these are issued in what might be perceived as a threatening or intimidating manner. Anyway, even if they are well-intentioned and justified, there is no requirement to comply. The statutory improvement notice proposed in the new clause would place a compliance obligation on the offender. It would be useful if the Government were to guarantee that the RSPCA or any other non-governmental organisation would not be empowered through future secondary legislation, especially under clause 10(2)(b), to issue improvement notices with statutory obligations. The RSPCA’s table of amendments and comments shows that it is in favour of the new clause in principle, but is concerned that it will create a two-tier system of RSPCA notices and statutory improvement notices. 2.7 pmSitting suspended for a Division in the House. 2.22 pmOn resuming— The Chairman: Order. Before we proceed, I gather that there is likely to be another vote within the next hour. I must remind the Committee that there is no injury time awarded for Divisions, because the end time of our proceedings is determined by the House. Bill Wiggin: We shall be much quicker if the Government confirm that they are doing the research, as I think they said they wanted to, then we shall not
Mr. Bradshaw: We are looking at videos. Bill Wiggin: I just hope that the Minister is looking at the right sort of videos. I can confirm that I shall not require a vote on new clause 5. New clause 3 is very important, however. In the briefing, “RSPCA and the Welfare Offence”, the RSPCA hints that if the advice were backed up with greater legal strength, it would be less likely to be ignored. Moreover, given the fact that RSPCA inspectors have no statutory powers—we are told that they do not want any—and cannot issue notices that impose a statutory requirement on people, it would be sensible that only Government bodies had such powers. In addition, we should remember that RSPCA inspectors are not Government inspectors, and considering the confusion that it can cause, the new clause would clarify the law so that the public were aware that statutory improvement notices could be issued only by certain Government bodies and not charities. There are concerns that the Minister is relying too much on the RSPCA to enforce the legislation, when Government bodies predominantly should prosecute under criminal law. The proposed statutory improvement notice in this new clause would enable the RSPCA and others, including individuals, to report suspected offenders to the appropriate authority, which with its expertise could check the allegations and, if they appeared to be true, issue the SIN. We have heard how RSPCA inspectors visit premises on numerous occasions and that they are powerless to act even after 25 visits. The new clause would enable them to report the case to the appropriate authority, which, if it was of the same opinion as the inspectors, could immediately issue an SIN. That would speed up the animal’s recovery, which is what we all want. On Second Reading the Minister said that if there was a serious welfare offence, the RSPCA might want to move straight to prosecution. If the amendment were accepted, nothing would stop them doing that, as that is its common-law right. A serious offence would fall under the cruelty offence in clause 4, not under the clause 8 welfare offence covered by the new clause. That is an important difference. It would be appropriate to give the power to the police, as they will be involved in the enforcement of the Bill, as well as to local authorities, the state veterinary service and the courts. Now that animal owners can be prosecuted under a far wider series of offences, we want to make sure that, in the first instance, they have the chance to improve the animal’s welfare. If I dare, Mr. Gale, may I talk about my own chickens? Two days ago it was very cold; the water that they drink will have frozen over. While I am here debating with the other members of the Committee, my neighbour is responsible for making sure that the chickens have their water. He will pop round, break
That is what is behind the new clause: if the warning order could be put in place, there would be no need to proceed to court. The evidence from the RSPCA is that issuing warning letters works: that is why it writes them and why I want to see the provision written into the Bill. I am more than happy to accept that the practicalities of the new clause and its drafting may not be perfect, but we have time between now and Report stage to hone it. I believe that such a move will also take place in Scotland, when it tackles the same problem. This is a well-meant new clause. I believe that it would make a vital improvement to the Bill, and I hope that, with all that in mind, the Government will consider it seriously and accept it. Mr. James Paice (South-East Cambridgeshire) (Con): I want to support my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster, who spoke so well to the new clause. I want first to emphasise what my hon. Friend said about Scotland. Just before the Division the Minister moved some amendments to bring the Bill into line with the Scottish legislation. It seems sensible that, in this context, this measure too should be put in place. The second point is the need to avoid unnecessary prosecution; my hon. Friend gave the example of his chickens. As I am sure all members of the Committee will be aware, many of the welfare offences that will arise under clause 8 are caused by ignorance and are by no means wilful. Sadly, many people who keep pet animals or birds do not know how to look after them properly. We hope that the codes of practice will reduce that problem, but ignorance is a fundamental issue. I am not sure that it is helpful to move to prosecution simply because of ignorance, when people will often be more than willing to put things right if they are required to do so. It is perfectly true, as my hon. Friend said, that an informal notice can be given, but that does not necessarily resolve all the problems. There should be an obligation to issue a statutory notice, and I endorse entirely his distinction between the welfare offence under clause 8 and the cruelty issue. If there is a serious, urgent issue that requires prosecution, I should think that it will fall under the cruelty offence, which should rightly move quickly to prosecution, because it will almost certainly be a matter not of ignorance but of wilfulness. 2.30 pmMy final point by way of example, in a slightly lighter-hearted vein, relates to two press articles that appeared this week in my local paper, the Cambridge Evening News. Other hon. Members may have received it; I know that it has been circulated to one or two of
An expert witness during the two-day trial suggested that the birds’ habit of plucking out their own feathers had been brought on by sexual frustration. He said that the hand-reared birds had probably become sexually attracted to humans—that might be a challenge even for the Liberal Democrats—after mistaking their owners for their parents, which led to extensive feather plucking. Magistrates cleared the pair of all charges and later the presiding magistrate made his decision, saying it was unreasonable to expect a second opinion when veterinary opinion had already been received. That is a clear example of an unnecessary prosecution and the magistrates clearly felt that that was the case. The person involved had sought veterinary advice on the matter and was told that there was no cure for the condition. It is the sort of situation where a statutory improvement notice would have been an obvious course of action, rather than action involving such cost and distress. Those birds were confiscated last May. The owners had been without them for nine months, and all that cost and stress could have been avoided if an improvement notice had been served. That is a good example that supports the case of my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster. Mr. Drew: I am not sure how the new clause will operate. A statutory improvement notice has to be served in some way and must have some legal importance. The Minister sounds as if he has misgivings, but the idea that there should be a yellow card, as well as a red one, has merit. However, it is a question of the grounds on which the statutory improvement notice would be served. To have any meaning, the notice would either have to be served through the courts or be subsequently available to the courts if a prosecution were to arise because someone took no notice of it. Those are my misgivings. |
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