Animal Welfare Bill |
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Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab): I support my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud in suggesting a specific prohibition on the keeping of primates as pets. We can easily understand that nobody in Britain can possibly provide an environment suitable for a polar bear in a private house, but there is still, unfortunately—although we no longer have the chimpanzees’ tea parties—a lot of misconceptions about the nature of primates. They are still seen as being very like humans, whereas in fact they have immensely complex social and physical needs which nobody can provide for. Unfortunately, there is still a lot of ignorance about
Mr. Bradshaw: We all agree that primates do not make suitable pets. They are not allowed in the general pet trade and imports are already limited to zoos, scientific institutions and specialist private keepers. I am sure that hon. Members will be familiar with the work of the International Fund for Animal Welfare on this issue. Some Members may have been lobbied by the fund. On Second Reading, I made it clear that we have sympathy with the aims of the amendments and the new clauses. The Government have acknowledged the problem. DEFRA’s global wildlife division is considering the feasibility of measures under article 3.2 of CITES to tackle the problem on the basis of conservation. I encourage hon. Members to remember that the Bill is primarily aimed not at banning any particular animal-keeping activities, but at ensuring that the welfare needs of animals are met and, through the introduction of the welfare offence, that someone is responsible for them. Legislation will be backed up by codes of practice and regulations that are appropriate to the types of animals concerned. I can tell the hon. Member for Lewes and my hon. Friends the Members for Stroud and for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) that, as a priority, the Government intend to develop a code for the keeping of primates. Its likely effect will be to restrict their keeping to zoos, scientific institutions and specialist keepers. Paddy Tipping: Is the Minister saying his officials have advised him that when the welfare tests are available, the keeping of primates as pets will in effect be banned, that this is enabling legislation and that after it is introduced with regulations, no primates will be kept as pets? Mr. Bradshaw: Yes, exactly so. I was going to assure the hon. Member for Lewes that the Bill allows us to introduce such secondary legislation. Bill Wiggin: Who does the Minister count as a specialist keeper? Mr. Bradshaw: We would have to consult on that and make the decision in relation to secondary legislation. There is an example in the constituency of the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Jim Knight), of somebody who has great experience of offering a good environment for the keeping of primates, some of which have been rescued from people who have been unable to keep them as pets. It is a sort of monkey sanctuary. I should not want to pre-empt the possibility of such facilities remaining open. We shall discuss that sort of thing when the secondary legislation is made. Column Number: 157 Norman Baker: I have been to that monkey sanctuary and I would not want to restrict the splendid work that it does. However, the Minister is relying on a code of practice. Clause 12(3) deals with codes of practice, stating:
If we are to rely on codes of practice, we must be sure that they are effective in securing the improvements that we want. Mr. Bradshaw: The same point could be made about anything under the welfare offence. I entirely agree. On the hon. Gentleman’s point about devolution, I wanted to reassure him that clause 10(2)(a) will allow the restriction or a ban on the keeping of a certain species of animal, including primates, under secondary legislation if such action is considered necessary to protect their welfare. We are mindful of concerns about that, but following discussions with our draftsmen, we think that the scope of existing delegated powers has already been confirmed. On that basis, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment. Norman Baker: I am grateful to the Minister for his response. He is sympathetic and recognises the reasons why it is inappropriate for primates to be kept as pets, as they have been in depressingly large numbers in this country. He knows that the public at large support that view. A MORI poll conducted in October 2005 showed that 79 per cent. of the public thought that the keeping of primates as pets should be made illegal, so there is clearly a head of steam among the public for a ban. 3.30 pmThe Minister is trying to avoid bans. At least I know the reasons for that approach. Without rehearsing the arguments of the last debate, I point out that he wants to rely instead on a code of practice. He seems to be saying that the code of practice will be written in such a way as to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for an ordinary member of the public to keep a primate as a pet. That is a convoluted and long-winded way of achieving a ban. If the code achieves one, fair enough, but it would be simpler to be straightforward about it. If the code of practice were to result in a ban, that would be welcome. The Minister said that he will introduce a code at an early stage—that is on the record—and that also is welcome. I reiterate my earlier point about the length of such documents. He will cause a great deal of work to be thrust upon his officials, who have to produce the code, despite a simpler solution being available through the amendment or new clause. However, that is his choice. It is important to flag up clause 12. If we are to rely on codes of practice, we must be sure that they are enforceable and that there are no get-out clauses. The fact that, in itself, there is not a prima facie case for a prosecution is a little worrying, but doubtless we shall come to that in clause 12. I do not intend to take the
I ask the Minister to give more details about clause 12, particularly clause 12(3), when we get to it. Under the circumstances, I reserve the right to move new clause 1 later in the proceedings, if I may do that, Mr. Gale. I believe that it is in order to do that. The Chairman: Strictly speaking, the hon. Gentleman ought to indicate now when he wants to move new clause 1. It could be moved formally later at the appropriate place in the proceedings, but he ought to indicate now if he wishes to do that. I shall let him ponder that, but perhaps he could let me know by the end of the afternoon. Norman Baker: I am grateful, Mr. Gale, for such unusual flexibility from the Chair, which is helpful. I am not trying to threaten the Minister with new clause 1, but nor do I want to close down my options later. I shall therefore reflect on the matter, as you suggest. Doubtless the hon. Member for Stroud will have a view on his amendment. Mr. Drew: I am looking for absolute clarity from my hon. Friend the Minister on how the process will operate. Let me take him through how I see events occurring, but he may wish to intervene on me. There has been a clear indication from the Committee of its views, so it does not seem to need to vote. On Second Reading, perhaps there was not such a clear indication. Bill Wiggin: I drew the Minister’s attention to what is meant by a proper keeper, or a person who would be fit to keep primates. For example, a zoo keeper who brings up young gorillas, chimps or any other primate that has been rejected by their mother may look after them at home. If the zoo were to go bust, the keeper would probably be first in line to try to take care of the monkey or primate afterwards, so I do not favour a total ban. The Minister probably has the degree of flexibility right. If the code of practice is sufficiently robust, I, like him, suspect that few primates, if any, would be kept. Mr. Drew: That intervention is very helpful. I would never want to fetter the Minister such that, in extremis, we caused additional cruelty rather than prevented it. We do not know what situations could arise. Let me take the Minister through what I envisage will happen. As a result of my choosing not to press the amendment, I presume that the Government will subsequently make clear, if not before Third Reading, the nature of the secondary legislation that they intend to introduce in several areas. That secondary legislation will set out, with clarity, what the code of practice will be and that code will be enacted as a matter of urgency. We have already discussed the secondary legislation for tail docking, which may follow later this year and that is good to hear. I know the Minister does not control the business programme, but the Department for Environment, Food and Rural
This issue is equally important, but perhaps not so pressing. I hope that the Government will see fit to find the necessary legislative slot for the code of practice in due course. If that is the case, I will withdraw the amendment with alacrity, because we would be making progress. I see this enabling Bill as being fit for purpose if it does the things that we want. Norman Baker rose— Mr. Bradshaw rose— Mr. Drew: I shall give way to my hon. Friend the Minister first. Mr. Bradshaw: I urge my hon. Friend to leave some us flexibility to achieve what he and other members of the Committee want through a code of practice, which would be quicker than secondary legislation. As I emphasised earlier, that would be perfectly possible. In the end, it may be quicker to have a legally enforceable code of practice under the welfare offence. I beg him not to tie my hands too much because insisting on secondary legislation might take longer than a code of practice. Mr. Drew: That is very useful. The hon. Member for Lewes may want to come in, but I will first respond to what the Minister said. I want to be clear about the matter, which I hope will provide greater clarity for the Committee. I do not mind whether we take the secondary legislative route per se or the code of practice route with statutory underpinning; I just want the issue to be progressed as a matter of urgency. Both secondary legislation and a code of practice would have to be undertaken following consultation, which brings me back to what the hon. Member for Leominster said. If there are exemptions that need to be spelt out in the code of practice or secondary legislation, that is the time to do it. I do not want to limit consultation, as we want to ensure that we get things absolutely right. We have made progress. I am now clear about the matter although I hoped that the Minister would say whether the Government preferred the code of practice or secondary legislation. I believe that it is the former, and the hon. Member for Lewes will now help me in that respect. Norman Baker: Having heard the exchanges, I am happy to give notice that I will not pursue new clause 1. I hope that helps you, Mr. Gale. Does the hon. Member for Stroud accept that if the Government decide on the code of practice, it is important to deal with animals that are already kept as pets in order to ensure that they are properly cared for in the new regime? I would not want anyone to feel that an animal for which they have responsibility does not meet the terms of the code of practice and thus it will suffer as a result, perhaps by being destroyed. We must
Mr. Drew: That is very helpful. I would not want to tie the Government’s hands. If they have good intentions, we must support them; it is about making the proposals as effective as possible. The code of practice should be introduced as a matter of urgency, as much as anything so that we can see what is in it and know whether further amendment is needed before it goes to consultation. If that process is as clear and transparent as possible, the measure will be as effective as it should be. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Bill Wiggin: I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 10, page 5, line 23, leave out paragraph (b). The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 195, in clause 10, page 5, line 26, leave out ‘establishment’ and insert ‘appointment’. No. 77, in clause 10, page 5, line 27, at end insert—
Bill Wiggin: Amendment No. 74 has been tabled because worries have been expressed to me about who will be affected by the power in the clause. The Bill does not suggest who may or who may not be affected by the provision nor does it suggest how co-ordination will take place. I am worried especially that the provision can hand over a vast range of unchecked powers to the Secretary of State. Indeed, paragraph 44 of the Bill’s explanatory notes states that subsection (2)
I am not sure that I can endorse that approach. For example, it is not clear whether it would mean that the appropriate national authority could use taxpayers’ money to subsidise the activities of charities or other organisations. It is not clear if it would mean that future regulations could be passed that would abrogate powers that are exercised exclusively by the police to non-governmental groups. It is with that in mind that I tabled the amendment. It would prevent regulations from getting out of control. Amendment No. 77 would ensure that established organisations and bodies not under the direct control of a local authority or the Government could not hold dual powers to promote animal welfare and bring forward prosecutions. Norman Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman give way? Bill Wiggin: No, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I shall not give way. The amendment is sensitive and complicated. It is not an attack on the RSPCA, and that will become clear. I shall be delighted to give way after I have finished what I have to say. Column Number: 161 In its present form, the Bill is both vague about the nature of the powers that can be granted under the regulations. The amendment would set boundaries on the powers that can be granted. It would also prevent the Government from regulating to give organisations such as the RSPCA powers that involve a conflict of interests between welfare promotion activities and welfare prosecution activities. That would clearly create a conflict of interests, whereby bodies such as the RSPCA may well pursue prosecutions against certain individuals that are based on their own ideas and interpretation of the law. Indeed, in order to prevent such conflicts of interest from happening, 20 years ago the then Conservative Government recognised that such matters may impact on the state’s ability to dispense justice, as a result of which they separated the majority of the police powers of prosecution and established the Crown Prosecution Service. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds recognised that conflict of interest and no longer pursues prosecutions, preferring to refer them to the Crown Prosecution Service. Moreover, the RSPCA’s counterpart in Scotland, the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, leaves prosecutions to the direction of the procurator fiscal. Clearly, it would be unacceptable for an unaccountable charity with its own agenda to be empowered by the Government through regulations. As it stands, the RSPCA pursues both welfare activities and prosecutions, but it is not empowered by the Government to do so. It is allowed to do that, as it so wishes. That is the fine line. Norman Baker: It seems that the hon. Gentleman is trying to change the present arrangements whereby the RSPCA promotes animal welfare and initiates prosecutions. I am not aware of particular problems with that. Can he give an example of a problem? Bill Wiggin: The hon. Gentleman has not read the amendment clearly. It states:
That is the fine line. Yes, the RSPCA undertakes such action at the moment. I should be happy to send him a file full of examples, but that is not what the matter is about. I am talking about controlling. An inherent part of the Bill would be clarified by the two amendments that suggest that the Government should not empower NGOs and what is done with taxpayers’ money. I hope that I have answered his question. 3.45 pmMr. Drew: Why is “establishment” is used instead of “appointment”? The bodies will, in effect, be appointed. I want to understand what the difference is in law and am sure that the Minister will be able to explain. Does the wording make any difference to the responsibilities of those who oversee the welfare of animals? Those will be important roles and subject to challenge, as will the individuals concerned. We need to get things right. Column Number: 162 Norman Baker: I rise to speak about amendment No. 77. Of course, I assume that the hon. Member for Leominster has good intentions, and his amendments so far have demonstrated that he has a strong commitment to animal welfare, as I hope do all people in the room. However, the way in which I read amendment No. 77, notwithstanding the explanation given, is that it would severely curtail the powers of bodies such as the RSPCA in a way that would be detrimental to the delivery of good animal welfare. Historically, the Government, intentionally or implicitly, have relied on the RSPCA to undertake prosecutions. The vast majority of the prosecutions work done on animal offences has been carried out by the RSPCA. We would be much worse off if it was limited in what it could do. Bill Wiggin: I am reminded that the hon. Gentleman intervened on me on Second Reading on this very point. Empowerment is the key. Yes, the Government do rely on the RSPCA to undertake the bulk of prosecutions. The amendment is designed to prevent the Government from empowering NGOs of any sort. The RSPCA is obviously the one doing the job, which is why we are discussing it. Norman Baker: Perhaps I will let the Minister deal with that point, but my initial reaction is that an organisation must be empowered to take action, otherwise it cannot take that action. It is not given a duty to take action, which is perhaps the point that the hon. Gentleman wants to make; it is given the power to do so. That power already exists, or else the action that has been taken could not have been taken. I am at something of a loss to know why this matter has been raised. I asked the hon. Gentleman to give me examples of where there has been a problem. If there is a problem, let us hear about it. No examples have been given so far. As far as I am concerned, the RSPCA has done a very good job of promoting animal welfare and undertaking prosecutions. I do not really see what the problem is. Mr. Bradshaw: One of the most important features of the Bill is the flexibility to respond to future circumstances. That will allow us to keep our animal welfare laws and enforcement practices up to date much more easily than previous legislation did. The published draft contained an extensive list of situations in which it would have been possible to exercise the power. In the interests of simplicity, we removed many of those from the final Bill as they are clearly included in the power in subsection (1) without the need to specify them individually. However, there are some important powers that it was felt might not otherwise be covered by subsection (1) and which should, therefore, still be listed as examples of how the overall power could be used. One of those is the power that the hon. Member for Leominster seeks to delete by means of amendment No. 74. Throughout the long gestation of the Bill, I have heard many times the concern that there is too much inconsistency in the way in which animal welfare is enforced across the country. This provision is included to give the appropriate national authority the ability to
As for amendment No. 77, I tend to agree with the hon. Member for Lewes. Although the hon. Member for Leominster said that the amendment was nothing to do with the RSPCA, it certainly has not been interpreted in that way by the RSPCA, as it has told me. I agree with the hon. Member for Lewes that the RSPCA does excellent work in enforcing animal welfare legislation, and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to it for that. It has played a crucial role in the enforcement of animal welfare since the middle of the 19th century, and it would be a huge blow for animal welfare if it were to cease to do that work. The RSPCA’s enforcement role stems from the fact that animal welfare legislation is—as is much other law in this country—common informers legislation, meaning that anyone can consider bringing a prosecution if they wish. The RSPCA currently investigates cases and brings prosecutions in a private capacity, and it will be in a private capacity that it will continue to do so. I have already emphasised on Second Reading that the RSPCA does not seek additional powers, and I hope that that is now finally understood. The first of the hon. Gentleman’s amendments on this subject, and indeed his winding-up speech on Second Reading, indicated that he is concerned about the potential conflict of interest around the RSPCA investigating and prosecuting animal welfare cases. His intention in proposing amendment No. 77 appears to be to prevent the Government from appointing the RSPCA, or any other non-governmental organisation, as enforcers under secondary legislation if they are also going to prosecute offences. I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s desire that enforcers be open, accountable and free from any conflict of interest, and we will certainly ensure when the regulations are put in place that every step is taken to ensure openness and accountability of our nominated enforcers. However, I have to disagree that this is the way to achieve it. Let us carry the implications of his amendment through using an example. Bill Wiggin: Does what the Minister just said mean that it is his intention to empower RSPCA inspectors as enforcers? Column Number: 164 Mr. Bradshaw: They are already empowered under current legislation. The hon. Gentleman does not seem quite to have grasped that. Bill Wiggin: My reading of the Bill is that it empowers local government inspectors, not the RSPCA, which acts as a charity and has asked for no more powers, wants no more powers and is prepared to initiate prosecutions privately. I read what the Minister has said as different from that, which is why I query it. Mr. Bradshaw: The hon. Gentleman seems to be confusing the issue of the role and definition of inspectors, which covers local government and SVS employers, and the power of the RSPCA to investigate and prosecute cases, which exists at present and will continue to exist under the Bill. Bill Wiggin: There is no power. Mr. Bradshaw: I think the hon. Gentleman has misunderstood the nature of what is being proposed. I was about to give another example to the Committee. Let us put the RSPCA to one side for a moment so that he can perhaps better understand the implication of amendment No. 77. If we were satisfied in future as to the capability of the National Greyhound Racing Club to see that regulations relating to the welfare of racing greyhounds were enforced, it would seem imperative that it should have the ability to bring prosecutions against those of its members who failed to comply with the requirements of the law. Likewise, turning to my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes, if we were satisfied that the Performing Animals Welfare Standards International could regulate the performing animals industry itself, it would surely be imperative that it had the ability to prosecute its members for welfare violations. The effect of the hon. Gentleman’s first amendment would be to bar completely any form of effective self-regulation, by preventing regulators from bringing prosecutions. It would also be contrary to better regulation to have to duplicate effective self regulation by local or central Government action. Often bodies such as industry associations, many of whom issue excellent codes of practice for their members, are best placed to identify problems and take corrective action. Normal duties of a prosecutor would apply. Were the amendment accepted, there would be total confusion when it came to enforcement of the law. The RSPCA would under Clause 8 be able to investigate and prosecute the welfare offence but would be barred from enforcing secondary legislation passed to support the requirements of clause 8. Its ability to enforce the law would be undermined. Animal welfare is, and always has been, common informers legislation, and to change that position would put an unreasonable burden on our police and Crown Prosecution Service, and it would not be in the interests of animal welfare. In reality, the extent to which those who breach animal welfare requirements could be brought to justice would be seriously diminished if the amendments were approved. Column Number: 165 I agree that it is right to look critically at the work of any enforcement body. We have done so with regard to the RSPCA, and we have considered carefully whether it is appropriate to continue the long-established common informers regime in the new legislation. We have concluded that it is clearly in the interests of animal welfare to do so. I consider that the RSPCA’s record is impressive, as are those of many other animal welfare organisations. To take away its ability to investigate and prosecute would be an unnecessary and retrograde step. Amendment No. 195 would provide that the appropriate national authority could establish bodies to have functions with regard to providing advice on animal welfare, should there be a need in future. The difference between “established” and “appointed” is that one appoints a person and one establishes a body. I hope that helps clear the matter up for my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud. On the basis of my remarks, I urge the hon. Member for Leominster to withdraw the amendment. |
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