Animal Welfare Bill |
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Shona McIsaac: Would my hon. Friend acknowledge that some people involved in the training of animals use what most of us regard as quite cruel practices, but justify them by saying that they are necessary for the activity that the animal is trained to undertake? Mr. Drew: I largely agree; that is the point I am trying to make, in a nutshell. My hon. Friend put it more concisely than I have. I would go slightly further inasmuch as whether the provisions have been worded properly relates to how the courts determine matters. The last thing I want is for there to be a whole rash of cases where an excuse is made that the subsection is a justification for not treating animals in the normal way. The provisions represent, in practice, the teeth of the Government’s argument concerning duty of care. If they are to bite—to continue that analogy—they must be made comprehensive, foolproof and fair. It will not be fair if the subsection makes possible an opportunity for those who treat animals in a certain way for a specific purpose to be subject to a different gradation of the law. No doubt the Minister will have something to say about that. Norman Baker: I have some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s point and hope that the Minister will reflect on it seriously. The clause is important—one of
There appears to be an inconsistency in the clause, which follows the inclusion of subsection (3) to which the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) referred. We passed clause 3, which deals with responsibility for animals. It said that a reference to someone “responsible for an animal” meant that they were responsible whether that responsibility was permanent or temporary. We agree with that. We then considered clause 4, which dealt with unnecessary suffering in order that those responsible, whether temporarily or otherwise—the Minister gave some good examples—could be guilty of causing unnecessary suffering. However, this clause contains a qualification that appears to limit those to whom the duty of care applies—at least that is how I read it. It should apply to everyone whether or not they hold an animal for a lawful purpose, but it muddies the waters and provides an inconsistency. It raises the possibility of an unwelcome and successful defence, which no one would want. The Bill would be better if subsection (3) were deleted. I am keen to understand why the Minister feels it should be included. Mr. Bradshaw: This is slightly reminiscent of our debate on Tuesday about the cruelty offence, particularly the issues concerning police horses and guard dogs. The Government are trying to make it clear that it would not be proportionate or reasonable to have an absolute welfare offence that did not take into account the circumstances of both the animal and the person responsible. That is the same whether one is talking about the welfare or the cruelty offence. Let me give a concrete example of why that is case in relation to welfare: farmed animals are kept to produce food. As a society, we believe that they should be kept in a manner that provides for their essential welfare needs, and codes of practice and secondary legislation cover most farm animals. However, I am not sure that members of the Committee would say that the welfare standards of farmed animals needed to be the same in all circumstances as those of pets, although some would say that they should be. We take into account the purpose for which an animal is kept when we decide the appropriate legal standards, which is why it is absolutely right that their welfare should be assessed in that context. However, like the cruelty offence, that is not, to quote my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, an excuse or get-out but something that a court may want to take into consideration. Greg Mulholland: That is a fair point, so why not specify farm animals, rather than having a clause that we fear would lead to a serious watering-down of the welfare offence, which the Committee agrees is the best part of the Bill? Mr. Bradshaw: Because to do so would still create an absolute measurement of the welfare offence, which would trap us into not being able to apply considerations of circumstance and proportionality. Column Number: 129 Norman Baker: The Minister referred to the qualification in clause 4—he does not like the phrase “get-out clause”—which in a sense is a defence for those in the circumstances that the Minister is trying to deal with. Would not that give the necessary defence without further qualification in clause 8 of the type he referred to? In what circumstances would it be possible not to deliver the five freedoms in clause 8(2)? In what circumstances are they necessary? How can they possibly be deemed to be unnecessary? Mr. Bradshaw: I was coming to that. The hon. Gentleman is making my point, perhaps better than I have done, which is that for the purposes of the Act the person would still have to meet the needs of the animal, which are outlined in subsection (2). It allows the courts to take account of circumstances and proportionality when deciding whether an offence has been committed, rather than there being an absolute standard. Shona McIsaac: My hon. Friend keeps going on about the circumstances, and I admit that they are mentioned in subsection (1). Why, then, is he so resistant to amendment No. 204? Mr. Bradshaw: If I understand my hon. Friend rightly, she is urging us to adopt a welfare offence that is absolute, regardless of circumstances. Shona McIsaac: Regardless of the circumstances in which the animal is found. Mr. Bradshaw: I am arguing against that. It is not a sensible way forward, for the reasons I described. Shona McIsaac: May I give my hon. Friend an example? An elephant is the same whether it is kept in a circus, a zoo or a sanctuary. That is why we must make it clear that the welfare standards should be absolute for that animal, or else different welfare standards will apply to one species. Mr. Bradshaw: My hon. Friend misses the point. This not a get-out or an excuse, it is about the circumstances and conditions that a court may take into account when considering whether the welfare needs of an animal have been met. Shona McIsaac: So, if we take the example of a circus elephant or a large cat such as a tiger or a lion, subsection (3) would not provide a get-out for using sticks on those animals to train them to perform. Mr. Bradshaw: I am saying that, yes. My hon. Friend is wrong if she implies that arguing that what one is doing is lawful is consistent with the welfare offence. That is not the case. I suspect that we will debate circuses at some length later in our proceedings. I am not sure that I agree with her that every different species of animal needs the same sort of welfare in all circumstances. We would expect different sorts of welfare for a farmed llama from those for a llama in a zoo or a llama in a circus. She is urging an absolute welfare standard that takes no account of the circumstances, either of the animal or the person concerned. Column Number: 130 Justine Greening: I am concerned that that seems entirely to contradict our previous discussion on good practice. The discussion seems to be validating exactly the position that many Members took which is that appropriateness would be far more flexible and give the Minister the flexibility that he says we require. Mr. Bradshaw: What we are talking about throughout the whole of the Bill is securing minimum welfare standards for our animals. We can continue to have an argument about whether we think “good practice” or “appropriate circumstances” is stronger. I happen to believe that “good practice” is stronger. But we are trying not to set an absolute welfare limit, regardless of the circumstances, either in which the animal is kept or of the human beings dealing with it. Shona McIsaac: If the circumstances in which the animal is kept are such that the welfare standard cannot be met, surely the circumstances of that animal should be changed rather than our having a lower welfare standard. That is what the clause could end up doing. Mr. Bradshaw: No, I do not accept that at all. I could not have been clearer on this Bill. Both in pre-legislative scrutiny and on Second Reading, it was made clear that if the welfare standards of an animal cannot be met in a particular environment, that practice is banned. It will not happen. It will be challenged in court and it will stop. I do not think that I can be clearer. Bill Wiggin: I may be able to help the Minister. The hon. Member for Cleethorpes wanted to identify whether the treatment of the elephant should be the same wherever it was. The Minister was saying that that is not what the Government want at all. The only reason I can think of why the Government should possibly not want that is that because at some stage it may be necessary to take the llama or the elephant to the vet. While it was travelling to the vet it could not have the same environment as where it lived permanently. Is that really what the Minister is saying, or have I misunderstood? Mr. Bradshaw: I beg his pardon, but the hon. Gentleman will have to make the point again. Bill Wiggin: When the hon. Lady said that a llama or an elephant should live in the same situation irrespective of who owned it and what type of business they were running, or if the elephant or llama was travelling to the vet— Norman Baker: The vet? Bill Wiggin: Normally I would expect the vet to visit the elephant, but for the purposes of the example if the elephant was travelling, it would not be in the same circumstances and environment as it would be when it was home. I suspect that that is where the Minister wants some flexibility, which amendment No. 129 gives him. Column Number: 131 1.45 pmMr. Bradshaw: If, like me, the hon. Gentleman is trying to make the point that we want good practice, not an absolute standard regardless of the circumstances, yes I agree. Amendment No. 90 would limit the scope of the welfare offence. The court would not have to consider whether an owner or keeper had provided an animal with a suitable environment, but only whether he had provided the animal, as the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) said, with adequate and comfortable living space. Apart from adding the term “comfortable”, which is difficult to define, the amendment would exclude a court’s taking into account the absence of other aspects that had a significant impact on the animal’s welfare. For example, a dog kept in a backyard may have adequate and comfortable living space, but it would be exposed to the worst of the elements during summer and winter if the yard had no shelter. The Bill would thus fail to ensure that the welfare needs of the dog were fully met. On amendments Nos. 192 and 129, I know that there are concerns that subsection (3) of clause 8 could give a person an absolute defence against the welfare offence, and that if someone could show that what they were doing was a lawful activity, or for a lawful purpose, they could not be found to have committed the welfare offence. That is not how subsection (3), in tandem with subsection (1), will function. As I said earlier, lawful purpose and lawful activity are circumstances to which it is relevant to have regard when applying subsection (1). Subsection (1) states that the person must
and subsection (3) clarifies that the lawful purpose or activity should be taken into account, but that does not mean that they are an absolute defence, a get-out or an excuse. Shona McIsaac: Will my hon. Friend give us some examples of circumstances that would constitute lawful purpose and lawful activity? Mr. Bradshaw: I find it difficult to do that off the top of my head. One example that my hon. Friend may like to consider is how the way that a pet horse is kept differs from the way in which horses for commercial purposes are kept. Horses like to be kept together in groups. [Interruption.] No, I am suggesting that as an example that my hon. Friend may like to consider. Would she want somebody prosecuted because they kept a pet horse on its own, which is not generally how horses like to live? I am not sure that she would. I am simply trying to get across the fact that there may be different welfare considerations in different circumstances, whether one is talking about pets, farmed animals, circus animals or zoo animals, and that we should not have an absolute welfare standard. Mr. Drew: I apologise for interrupting the Minister on this complicated issue. I accept entirely what he says about the situation of the animal, but I am more concerned about what is done to an animal because of the reason that it is kept or owned. That is the
Mr. Bradshaw: I think that I understand my hon. Friend. Some of his concerns will be met by a code of practice, or resolved by the common sense of the courts in considering whether behaviour was reasonable and proportionate, whether a lawful purpose needs to be taken into account and whether the treatment of the animal was excessive. If the treatment was excessive, the person would be likely to fall foul of the cruelty offence anyway. Amendment No. 204 attempts to ensure that the circumstances in which an animal is found would not be relevant in deciding what its needs are. As I said, we believe that is unnecessary. As the Bill is drafted, an animal’s circumstances are not considered in such decisions. Subsection (2) explains what the needs might include. Once the needs are established, it is necessary to consider whether the person took reasonable steps to meet them to the extent required by good practice, and that will be done taking into account all the circumstances. On that basis, I urge hon. Members not to press their amendments. Bill Wiggin: The Minister has been battling away on the difference between absolute and flexible standards, and I have enjoyed watching him wriggle. For my purposes, I am content that we may be all right. However, the arguments seemed to fly very much in the face of the Bill’s purpose, which is to increase responsibility for animal welfare. To some extent, choosing flexibility means that the absolute duty for animal welfare is diminished. If the Minister can live with that, it is a shame, but I understand why. The drafting of this part of the Bill is extremely difficult, and Conservative Members have done our best to give him a great deal of help. He probably ought to go away and think about the matter; when he reads what he has said today, he may want to do that anyway. Should he wish to amend the Bill at a later date, we will all be sympathetic. Shona McIsaac: The Minister has done a wonderful job in thoroughly confusing me as to what he is going on about, so I think that I will withdraw the amendment and go away and read what he said. I know what I am trying to get at with my amendment. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said, we do not want lower standards to be applied. There is worry about training, too. In addition, the provision in subsection (3) looks like a defence and a get-out, and the Minister could give me no concrete examples in relation to that situation. I will reflect on the wording of my amendment, but I would like the Minister to reflect on what he has said today. Let us hope that we can come up with something, in this most important part of the Bill, that will not create a lower welfare standard for some animals; I feel that the subsection could inadvertently
Hon. Members: Nod! Mr. Bradshaw indicated assent. Shona McIsaac: It has been a long day, I know. I just said that if the Minister agrees to meet me to talk about the clause, so that we do not inadvertently create a lower standard for some animals, I will withdraw the amendment. Mr. Bradshaw: I am always happy to meet my hon. Friend. Shona McIsaac: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 9 Transfer of animals by way of sale or prize to persons under 16 Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 9, page 4, line 38, leave out subsections (3) to (6) and insert—
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 169, in clause 9, page 4, line 38, leave out subsection (3). Amendment No. 170, in clause 9, page 5, line 1, leave out subsection (4). Amendment No. 16, in clause 9, page 5, line 6, at end insert
Amendment No. 171, in clause 9, page 5, line 7, leave out subsection (5). Amendment No. 17, in clause 9, page 5, line 13, leave out subsection (6). New clause 11—Transfer of animal by way of prize to any person—
Norman Baker: This is another attempt to resurrect the draft Bill and reject the version before us. The amendments deal with the issue of pets as prizes. I do not pretend that the clause is the most important part of the Bill, although it is significant, but the subject has been covered, on and off, in the newspapers for a considerable time. If the papers are to be believed, views on the matter have been expressed by both the
To leave that to one side and look at the merits of the case for amendment No. 15, which I tabled with my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-West (Greg Mulholland), the Minister will know that there are no laws at present to prevent animals from being given as prizes. When we think of animals being given as prizes, we think of goldfish at fairs, but the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has on record cases of animals such as ponies and pigs being given as prizes. Obviously, there are significant welfare implications for such animals—as, indeed, there are for fish. Bill Wiggin: The purpose of prizes is to encourage people to want to win them, so the case of pigs and ponies is very specific; many people would not want to enter a competition in which they would be lumbered with an animal that they did not want at the end, so I think that goldfish are the main concern. Norman Baker: Goldfish are certainly the main animals given as prizes, but theoretically it is possible that a person who entered a raffle might end up being given some sort of animal. I imagine that in those circumstances the animal would not come with detailed guidance about how to look after it. Indeed, any attempt to impose such guidance on someone who had won a prize might be doomed to fail. It is hardly likely that someone will be told, “Congratulations, you have won a prize, now you must sign this code of conduct and agree to undertake these conditions before you can accept your prize.” I have never seen that occur. When animals are given as prizes—particularly goldfish, as the hon. Gentleman said—they are often not treated seriously. There have been horrific examples of animals simply being discarded when they are not wanted. If someone wins an animal as a prize, it is at least possible that they had not anticipated getting that animal, had no wish to have it and have no knowledge of how to treat it. They might then discard it without a second thought for the consequences for the creature. The Bill makes it an offence for a person to give away an animal as a prize to a child under 16 unless that child is accompanied by someone over 16. That offence is a new introduction since the draft Bill. There should be an absolute ban on the giving of pets as prizes, for the reasons that I have given. There can be no guarantee that even somebody over the age of 16 would deal responsibly with such a prize. Without prejudice to amendment No. 15, amendment No. 16 would qualify the position set out in subsection (4)(b), which states that a person is permitted to give prizes to someone accompanied by a person over 16. There is no indication in that subsection of what the relationship might be between the person under 16 who is being given the prize and somebody over 16 who may happen to be with them.
Amendment No. 17 is intended to seek clarification from the Minister on the phrase “in a family context”. I notice that the amendment is supported by the hon. Members for Leominster and for Stroud, who may also want to speak to it. I am concerned about what the phrase means, and would welcome clarification on that point. Although the phrase may be useful, it is nevertheless helpful to explore in Committee what the Minister understands by it. It may mean that it would be normal behaviour, for example, for a parent to give a child a dog or cat for Christmas. They may do so responsibly, giving the child good guidance and ensuring that the animal is properly cared for. Nobody wants to eliminate such activity, and we are making no attempt to do so. The phrase “in a family context”, however, could be deemed to mean something less satisfactory. It could mean, for example, that a distant aunt, uncle or cousin could give a dog or cat to someone who was not expecting it and had no wish to have it, which would mean that the consequences of giving an animal as a prize would apply. There would be no follow-through or guidance, and the person who gave the animal might simply disappear after Christmas lunch and never reappear on the scene. The phrase “in a family context” needs more exploration to ensure that it relates to a continuing relationship allowing continuous care for the animal, not to the temporary context of someone not in the immediate family who will not necessarily have any interest in the animal or even in the person under 16 to whom they have given it. 2 pmBill Wiggin: Amendments Nos. 169, 170 and 171 are probing amendments that have been suggested by the Kennel Club. Along with the British Veterinary Association, the club was concerned that the Bill would leave under-16s still able to win prizes. It pointed out that, although the sale of animals to under-16s is banned, it is contradictory to have a situation in which, when accompanied by an adult, under-16s can win an animal as a prize. Column Number: 136 To resolve that situation, the club wants to ban the giving away of any animal as a prize, which is why it has asked for subsections (3), (4) and (5) to be removed. Alternatively, it would like clarification, which I hope that the Minister can provide. My understanding is that the intention of the Bill is that there always be an adult over 16 responsible for any animal. I hope that the Minister can confirm, despite the unclear wording of the clause, that its intention is not that under-16s be obstructed from looking after an animal, but that the ultimate responsibility should be with an adult. We want to encourage young people to take responsibility for animals, but we want adults to take responsibility for those young people’s activities. I once won a goldfish at a fair, and that is what triggered my fascination with fish that ended up with my being a volunteer keeper at London zoo aquarium. Unfortunately, at a similar fair, I noticed young people dropping bags of goldfish from the big wheel and, at that point, I recognised that the number of enthusiasts created by winning a goldfish as a prize is far lower than the number of acts of cruelty that may follow from such prizes. That is why I support the Bill on that point. There seems to be a loophole in the Bill that would enable people classed as family to transfer ownership of an animal to a person under the age of 16. As drafted, the Bill would leave the courts with a problem as to the definition of a family. Would it include non-blood relatives or situations in which a child lives in foster care? There are wide-ranging and diverse definitions of family, so it may be unwise to include such a subsection. As the hon. Member for Lewes said, people may appear on the scene, accompany a child, and then disappear. Without the subsection, children would still be able to care for pets, but responsibility would remain with an appropriate adult. Why should one rule apply to one set of people and not to another? Amendment No. 17, which I believe that we proposed in parallel, would ensure legal consistency and prevent any confusion around the child ownership of animals. |
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