Dr. Harris: Surely that is the way for decisions not to be challenged on the ground of discrimination. I am not a lawyer or draftsman, but it seems to provide a specific exemption. There is a debate to be had about whether the human rights of someone outside the country in respect of exclusion can be heard by the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, that was one of the issues in the Moon case and the court found that they were not. I would have thought that the provision dealt with the question of whether there has been unlawful discrimination—because it will not be unlawful.
Mr. Grieve: I do not share the hon. Gentleman's confidence. I would love to see the advice that the Government received, but I appreciate that I shall not. He advances a good argument, and it is possible that the Government will be successful, but I feel that they will be successful only if they are able to show that a public order issue warrants the discrimination that subsection (4)(f) allows them to practise.
Having conceded the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the Bill, the Government may find themselves on more difficult ground in arguing to keep people out whose presence they think is not conducive to the public good. That is not to say that they will not succeed, but there are perfectly clear grounds on which an applicant could frame an argument. He could say, ''You are discriminating against me for coming into the United Kingdom and the only basis of that discrimination is in relation to religion.'' In view of the evolving nature of the law in that area, such an application might succeed. I hope that that does not happen, because I can think of a large number of people who ought to be kept out of the country whose views are particularly pernicious. I exaggerate when I say a large number, but I can certainly think of a few.
Dr. Harris: I do not want to drag out the debate, but the Government have made it clear that the basis upon which they will decide whether to exclude or remove people because their presence is not conducive to the public good is not only public order or good relations with other countries; they will also consider the list of unacceptable behaviour consulted on and finalised in the summer. On Monday, however, that list was criticised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, especially in respect of the provision whereby someone who is judged not to have glorified or encouraged terrorism but merely justified it could be removed or excluded. I bow to the hon. Gentleman's greater knowledge, but I think the action will be there rather than in the area of discrimination.
Mr. Grieve: The hon. Gentleman may be right, but my experience is that those who challenge Government decisions tend to load their shotgun with as many pellets as possible. It is highly likely that one of the pellets will be about the contrast between the requirement of a public authority not to discriminate and the exception in subsection (4)(f). It could be argued that although Parliament has expressly provided that exception, clause 51 generally prohibits discrimination in the widest possible terms. I am sure
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that the hon. Gentleman can see the incompatibility between those two provisions. Somebody will then argue that we should consult the European convention on human rights, and that the provision is not ECHR-compliant. That is what I apprehend may happen.
One's position is arguably weakened by the fact that the general prohibition has been spelt out so clearly and that that contrast has been included. The Government will argue that the measure is reasonable and proportionate—the classic words used in such cases. We should have in mind that the provision is a major exception, when subsection (4)(g) seems innocuous and exceptions can be allowed. I say to the Minister genuinely that I wish the Government well with the provision. I wait with interest to see what happens, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: No. 16, in clause 51, page 32, leave out line 47.
No. 17, in clause 51, page 33, leave out line 11.
No. 18, in clause 51, page 33, leave out line 14.
No. 19, in clause 51, page 33, line 17, leave out
'(but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment)'.—[Paul Goggins.]
4.15 pm
Mr. Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 138, in clause 51, page 33, line 41, at end insert—
'(n) action in relation to—
(i) acts of worship or other religious observance organised by, or on behalf of, any public authority,
(ii) the maintenance of places of worship or of any chattels, furnishing or equipment for religious worship or instruction on behalf of any public authority, or
(iii) the payment of any person for the purpose of facilitating acts of religious worship.'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Protection of Christian heritage—
'Nothing in this part shall require
(a) the removal of any copy of the Bible,
(b) the removal of any cross or other Christian symbol,
(c) the removal of any Communion table,
(d) the ending of Christian prayers,
(e) any restriction on the celebrations of Christmas, Easter or any Christian festival,
(f) the withdrawal of funding from a Christian organisation,
(g) a religious organisation in receipt of funding to change or cease any practice relating to its religion or belief as a condition of the funding.'.
Mr. Grieve: We now come to one of the Bill's more important issues that we must consider. The matter has certainly given rise to much anxiety. It may be possible for the Minister to allay that anxiety during the sitting; it may be, of course, that some members of the Committee will consider that there is no anxiety to be allayed, and that they shall want to take the thrust of clause 51 to its logical conclusion, which is, effectively, the secularisation of public authorities.
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The amendment and the new clause try to provide a foundation for a debate about the issue. I shall try to explain the concern. New clause 13 is substantially lifted from an amendment proposed by the Christian Institute. It is concerned that applied to a public authority, clause 51 would involve a public authority removing any connection it might have with the Christian religion. Amendment No. 138 seeks to address that anxiety by providing for a specific exception towards the end of the clause, after subsection (4)(m).
Why is the anxiety present, and will the Government provide reassurance? The Minister will agree that we must accept that a feature of this country is its long Christian past. Although there are other, minority religions, some of which feature prominently today and have featured consistently for the past 300 years, their minority status has nevertheless been accepted. It has often been accepted and, indeed, enshrined by the special position given to the Church of England in our constitutional arrangements, that the country has a Christian foundation. That is reflected by the census, which shows that although many people do not practise their religion very much, upwards of 70 per cent. consider themselves Christian.
As a consequence, many institutions in Britain are suffused with recognition of their Christian heritage—not only organisations that have an overtly religious purpose. I am satisfied that those organisations and educational establishments have been provided by the Government with adequate protection in the Bill. I am more troubled about institutions that might qualify as public authorities but which, while fulfilling largely secular functions, including the provision of services to people on a completely equal basis, nevertheless contain recognition of their Christian heritage, which manifests itself from time to time. Let me give an example.
I mentioned earlier that I am a member of an inn of court—I am a bencher of the Middle Temple. That is not an overtly religious foundation, although its symbol, the lamb and flag, undoubtedly has a Christian derivation and represents an element of Christian symbolism. The inn, however, although it looks after students, grants scholarships and provides facilities without any religious discrimination of any kind, also celebrates the Christian deity and provides support for the Christian religion. It does that through grace before meals and, more pertinently, by providing support and subsidy to a church, the Temple Church. That might come out of separate funds; I have not researched the matter. It is clear that it does not do the same thing for Jews, Muslims, Hindus or anybody else, although, doubtless, if a Jewish, Hindu or Muslim organisation wanted to book a room for something with a religious aspect to it, there would be no problem about their doing that.
The question that arises, therefore, is whether anything in clause 51 makes that impossible. Having read and re-read the clause, I was left with a doubt in my mind as to whether there might be a problem. I am aware that when this was debated in the other place, it was looked at specifically in the context of harassment. Because the harassment clause has gone—properly, in
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my view—some of the mischief has disappeared with it.
The obvious anxiety that was manifest and, indeed, debated in the other place was that somebody would come along and say, ''I, as somebody of another faith, find the saying of grace before the meal in the hall of the Middle Temple in some way harassing or offensive.'' The disappearance of the harassment clause removes that limb. However, it could be argued that, in providing part of the service of the inn, although the question remains whether it is a public service or can be distinguished from it, the inn would in some way be discriminating.
An inn of court is a good example, because it is a body that has functions that I can think of as ''public authority functions'' as well as other functions. Other examples might include a corporation such as the City of London. That undoubtedly celebrates its Christian heritage. I do not know how that is manifest in funding terms, but the Lord Mayor has a close connection with the church of St. Lawrence Jewry and there is, again, a lot of Christian symbolism enmeshed in the corporate structure. Other local authorities have civic services. When I was a councillor, not only did we have a civic service once a year, but, every second year, I think, we went to the local synagogue. Such things evolve of themselves, and I have no doubt that corporations now make visits to local mosques and Hindu temples.
All those things are done on what I would call a basis of natural progress, not on the basis of somebody coming along and saying, ''I have a right here; what you are doing is discriminatory.'' I cannot think of anything more likely to bring this legislation into disrepute than if we end up with a challenge to the way in which public authorities conduct their normal routine and engage at the same time in a celebration of the deity—a Christian deity, in all likelihood. They may suddenly find themselves hauled over the hot coals. Unfortunately, as the Minister will be aware, there is plenty of evidence of public authorities behaving in a, frankly, barmy fashion in response to pressure from various minority groups.
That has been fairly well documented. The examples range from public authorities being told that they cannot replace an antique statue of a wild boar in a public park because it has some offensive quality for a minority religion, to a public authority allegedly saying—although I do not know whether this is true—that its employees cannot have piggy banks in their office desks. I think that particular public authority was a Conservative one. These things are troubling, because they suggest that people wish to pick quarrels on matters of the utmost triviality, and offend people in doing it. Since those things are not fanciful, it is important to get the legislation right. I am mindful that there is an exception at subsection (4)(k), but I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman before I discuss it.
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