National Lottery Bill |
|
Mr. Caborn indicated dissent. Mr. Swire: Well, I hope that they are worth a lot of money, or else the situation is even worse than we in the Opposition and the majority of people in the country ever deemed it to be. For the fiasco that it has turned out to be, I hope that the Minister will get some money for it at the end of the day. Everyone is talking about principle, on which we are keen in the Conservative party. What is the principle of allowing all the finance and money realised by the sale of assets owned by or previously operated by the Millennium Commission to go automatically to the Big Lottery Fund and not to be shared among the other good causes? This is another occasion on which I will not be able to withdraw the amendment. Mr. Caborn: If we were to take that to its logical conclusion, would the other distributors also accept the liabilities? A proportion of any liabilities for Millennium Commission projects should be accepted as well as the assets. Is that what the hon. Gentleman is arguing? Mr. Swire: I believe that the Minister is to write to the Committee to clarify whether a commitment follows the money. Again, we alluded to that earlier and you would not allow us to go back over that ground, Mr. Cook. We have had two or three different answers. Mr. Caborn: I was very clear. The remaining assets of the Millennium Commission will transfer to the Big Lottery Fund with liabilities, which it will take on board. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the cash would be transferred—something in the order of £15 million to £20 million—and that those to whom it is transferred would also take on their proportion of the liabilities? Somebody somewhere has to pick up the liabilities. We have, in law, to accommodate for that. Is it fair that those who receive the remaining assets also stand to pay for the liabilities? That is what we have to understand; there are assets and liabilities. He is saying, “Let us distribute the assets, but do not bother about the liabilities.” Is it fair that whoever receives the assets also receives a proportion of the liabilities? Mr. Swire: The point is that the Minister has an advantage over the Committee as, presumably, he knows what the net assets, if there are any, are. We must assume that there are, and if there are then the situation presumably does not arise. Column Number: 183 Adam Afriyie: There is a simple concept in accounting called net assets, which is the difference between assets and liability. It is not complicated. Whatever net assets remain after calculating liability minus assets need to be transferred somewhere. The question is whether those net assets should go to the Big Lottery Fund or be shared between all the funds? Mr. Caborn: I see. Mr. Swire: I am glad that the Minister sees. Mr. Foster: Before the last fascinating exchanges took place, the hon. Gentleman was about to complete a sentence which began something like, “This is another occasion on which I have not yet been convinced by the Minister and I will not be prepared to withdraw the amendment.” If that is how the hon. Gentleman was planning to finish the sentence, it may be helpful to tell him that the Liberal Democrats will not support him if he presses the amendment to a Division, for the simple reason that the amendment does not refer to net assets at all—will he please confirm that?—and, were it accepted by the Committee, it would mean handing over to different distributors money that had already been committed. We are not dealing with net assets, even if that were a good idea, and I am not convinced that it would be a good idea. Mr. Swire: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I am sad that he would not support me if I were to press the amendment to a Division. I have enjoyed his support during the past few days, but the Conservative party has survived without Liberal support since 1912 and will do so again. However, I take his point. Mr. Turner: Twenty-two. Mr. Swire: I stand corrected—1922. By extending the debate on this point, with your indulgence, Mr. Cook, I have tried to tease out what the Minister is getting at. Until the confusion about distributors and the reallocation of funds and what goes with that is cleared up by the Minister, we should not divide. Mr. Turner: As the clause refers to money, I am beginning to wonder whether the Minister, who has suddenly become interested in liabilities, believes that the funds will be in debt. He shakes his head. He does not believe that the funds will be in debt. Does he therefore believe that, apart from the money—apart from the bank account, as it were—the funds will have some other net liability when they are wound up, or does he believe that there will in fact be a net asset as described by my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor when the funds are wound up? Mr. Swire: The question is directed to me, but I am unable to answer on behalf of the Minister. It is clear that the Minister does not know the position of the Millennium Fund. That is strange, given that he seeks to wind it up and to transfer assets and liabilities, whichever they may be, to the Big Lottery Fund. It is strange that the Minister cannot give us even a
I am happy to let the Minister answer on the bigger question and then seek to return to this matter on the Floor of the House. At that time, we may have had greater clarification from the Minister as to the net position of the Millennium Commission. Therefore, I do not wish to prolong this debate any further. I have succeeded in my aims and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 18 Consequential amendments Mr. Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 11, in clause 18, page 11, line 32, leave out ‘, 30’. This minor technical amendment completes several consequential amendments that fall out of the Horserace Betting And Olympic Lottery Act 2004. Amendment agreed to. Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 3 agreed to. Clauses 21 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 1 Constitution Mr. Swire: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, after ‘members’, insert
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 19, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, leave out subsection (3). No. 20, in clause 1, page 1, line 19, leave out subsection (4). Mr. Swire: What a cracking pace we are going at. Mr. Caborn: A canter. Mr. Swire: A canter, says the Minister, great aficionado of the turf that he is. Clause 1 and amendments Nos. 18 to 20 deal with the make-up of the National Lottery Commission. Amendment No. 18 would insert the words
after “members”. Amendment No. 19 would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to appoint the commission’s chairman. Amendment No. 20 would remove her ability to appoint the chief executive or any other employee of the commission. Most such organisations maintain a split between commission members and staff, and the amendment would
We are not convinced of the need for more than seven commissioners. Again, we debated that on earlier clauses. In any case, the commissioners are presumably paid out of lottery funds, although we have established that we do not know how much. We also do not believe that the commissioners’ current practice of selecting their own chairman needs to be changed. In an earlier exchange, the Minister suggested that the arrangement had not worked well and that it had not been a happy one. Perhaps he will tell us exactly why he thinks that that is the case. I suspect that he will again say that he is merely doing what he has been asked to do; this time by members of the National Lottery Commission. Although I understand that the practice of electing a chairman every 12 months might have its drawbacks, I am not convinced that that justifies the new powers in the clause. In any case, the issue is worth debating. If the timing is the problem, why not allow the members of the commission to elect their own chairman for two, three or four years? I do not see why the power has yet again to be vested in the Secretary of State, which, as the Minister will have discovered by now, makes me uneasy. Can he point to any members of the commission who are saying, “Please take this democratic power away from us. We are completely incapable of selecting our own chairman”? It is interesting that schedule 2A to the 1993 Act, as amended in the document that the Minister has so kindly provided, shows just how the Secretary of State proposes to extend her powers in this regard. Why is the issue of who selects the chairman so important? The commission has wide-ranging powers over the lottery licence and holds the key, in effect, to a multimillion pound commercial operation. A decision on a new licence is just around the corner, and we shall come to it in 2009; well, we in the Committee are not coming to it in 2009, although at this rate we might do. We are coming to it later in our proceedings. Given that that is about to happen, we should adopt the arm’s-length principle and keep the selection of the chairman as far out of ministerial hands as possible. The issue should be managed by the impartial commissioners. It is also possible that the Minister might not be in place in 2009, at which point someone else may have different ideas about it. 11.45 amThe amendments pursue the theme that we have followed throughout the Bill whereby, at every turn, we seek to resist the move towards a concentration of power with the Secretary of State. Where better to resist that move than in the composition of the commission, who should chair it and for how long. I hope that the Minister considers the amendments reasonable. I look forward to his response. Column Number: 186 Adam Afriyie: First, it seems to me that, whether organisations are public or private, the power lies in the hands of whoever is able to appoint the chairman of the board of directors or of the body corporate and the chief executive who takes the day-to-day executive decisions. Without the amendments, the Secretary of State can appoint as many members as he sees fit. Who is to say that if five members did not agree with the Secretary of State, he could not water down the board by adding another 20 or 30 members? I do not mean the present Secretary of State, of course, but a future holder of the office. Secondly, if the members have been appointed in the correct fashion, what is the problem with them selecting the chairman of the board? They have to work with him. It seems to be standard procedure for many public and private bodies. My third observation is that having the power to appoint the chief executive officer—the person who makes the day-to-day decisions—means that the Secretary of State would have complete control of the day-to-day operation of the organisation and not simply of the overall direction or strategy that needs to be implemented by that organisation. I hope that the Minister has some clear answers, and that he has some concessions in mind. Mr. Caborn: I can assure the hon. Gentlemen that 97 per cent. of my Department’s expenditure goes to non-departmental public bodies. The Secretary of State does not spend her time micro-managing all those quangos. It is the last thing on her mind. We live in the real world. There is no micro-management of NDPBs. We have broad policy statements, and act on the Nolan principles, within the civil service code and with all the other constraints put on the Secretary of State. The real world is not as the hon. Gentleman describes. The amendments seek to change the composition of the board of the National Lottery Commission. Amendment No. 18 seeks to limit the number of commissioners to seven. The purpose of clause 1(2) is to remove the current limit of five commissioners and to allow, when it can be shown to be desirable, for extra commissioners to be appointed. That will allow flexibility for the commission to be strengthened if required; for example, when undertaking the competition for a new operating licence, which is a significant undertaking. The amendment would remove some of that flexibility and prevent the appointment of more than seven commissioners, even if those additional people could contribute expertise and experience to the successful regulation and licensing of the national lottery. Amendment No. 19 would prevent the Secretary of State from appointing the chair of the commission, which would return us to the current system under which the members appoint their own chair and the chair changes every year. That was identified as a significant weakness of the current arrangements during our review in 2003. It significantly hinders the commission’s ability to maintain direction and the ability to acquire persons of the highest calibre. There was considerable support from respondents to the review for a permanent chair, to be appointed by the
Amendment No. 20 will prevent the Secretary of State from appointing a chief executive and possibly another member of the commission staff as commissioners. It will provide increased flexibility to enable the commission to carry out its functions effectively. It will also bring the commission in line with arrangements such as those in the gambling commission, and those that are common among the commercial companies with which it deals. Mr. Foster: Will those new powers to appoint the chief executive as a member of the commission be exercised on the basis of a recommendation from the commission? I note further that in relation to another member of staff being appointed to the board by the Secretary of State, the Bill makes specific reference to
Will the Minister provide an assurance that in both cases the appointment will take place only if there is a recommendation from the commission to the Secretary of State that that person be appointed to the commission? Mr. Caborn: The answer is yes, on both counts. The provision will apply to the chief executive and to other members. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman made it clear, because there has been a misunderstanding. The Secretary of State will not appoint the chief executive. That will be done in the normal way. It is only the appointment to the commission that the chief executive is concerned with. There is a clear distinction. The chief executive is appointed by the operation, not by the Secretary of State. Mr. Foster: In view of those clear assurances, will the Minister explain why in relation to another member being appointed to the commission, there is specific reference in the Bill to
but in relation to the chief executive being appointed, there is no reference to that recommendation? Will the Minister, for example, be willing to table his own amendment to make matters clear? Mr. Caborn: Yes, I shall consider the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised so there is no misinterpretation of the provision. I have given him a clear assurance, and I shall ask my officials to revisit the provision. For those reasons I hope that the hon. Member for East Devon will withdraw the amendment. Mr. Swire: My fear is that we may be deserted again by our new comrades in arms, the Liberal Democrats. The hon. Member for Bath is clearly satisfied that the Minister will tidy up the Bill by bringing clarity to it, and by clarifying in particular the point about whether the Secretary of State will appoint a member of the
The Minister again calls for flexibility, and he cites the gambling commission. It makes me nervous, but in the scheme of things, other aspects of the Bill make me more nervous. Therefore without further ado, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Disclosure of information Mr. Caborn: I beg to move amendment No. 2, in clause 2, page 2, line 19, leave out ‘of Customs and Excise’ and insert
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 3, 100 and 101. Mr. Caborn: Government amendments Nos. 2 and 3 replace references to the commissioners of Customs and Excise in new section 4B, which is inserted by clause 2, with ones to the commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. The merger of Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue under the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 took place after the introduction of this Bill. The hon. Member for Bath and others had to address the same issues when considering the London Olympics Bill. Hence the need to update the reference in clause 2. Government amendments Nos. 100 and 101 need a little more explanation. Clause 2 provides for a gateway to allow for information to be exchanged between the National Lottery Commission and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. The main purpose of the gateway is to allow the commission to seek information from HMRC in order to vet applicants for lottery licences to ensure that they are fit and proper persons, and to allow HMRC to obtain information to allow it to administer lottery duty. A similar gateway exists under the Finance Act 1993, but the clause updates the gateway to allow the onward disclosure of information to the National Audit Office in response to requests from the Public Accounts Committee. The information provided by HMRC under that gateway is sensitive. Information that is held by HMRC is subject to a statutory duty of confidentiality, and is protected against wrongful disclosure by a criminal offence, such is the importance placed by the Government and Parliament on the confidentiality of such information. The Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 reflects the fact that there was clear cross-party support for the principle of ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect HMRC’s information. Having considered the strength of feeling shown on the issue in all parts of the House during the passage of that Act, I would not wish to weaken those safeguards. Therefore Government
The amendment delivers the protection for customers’ confidentiality that is needed to ensure that the public have confidence in the way in which HMRC handles information that it obtains, and I have equal confidence in the management and staff of the NLC, who remain committed to the principle of confidentiality. Mr. Turner: The first two amendments appear sensible, but I am concerned about the subsequent ones, which seem to allow a considerable amount of information to be disclosed. Although the purposes set out in the amendments seem to be sensible, I am not clear whether subsection (ac) in amendment No. 100 applies to any information that is disclosed by the NLC or whether information may be disclosed without the consent of the commissioners of HMRC. Can the Minister give some more information about the purposes for which the information might be disclosed without the consent of the commissioners and why that information might not have been sought from the commissioners in the first place? Chinese whispers are never an effective means of communication, and information that has been obtained from HMRC must surely be better communicated by that body in the first place. Moving on to proposed new section 4C of the 1993 Act, I am not clear whether it applies to the disclosure of information by an individual or by the commission in general. Is it an offence for the commission to disclose information that it is not entitled to disclose or to require an individual who is an employee of the commission to pass on information that he is not entitled to disclose? Alternatively, if an allegation were made that an employee of the commission had wrongfully disclosed information, would it be a defence for him to say he had been instructed so to do by the commission? Mr. Caborn: To be honest, I did not follow the whole of the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but I shall try to explain what we aim to achieve through the amendments. There is no dispute about the first two amendments. Their purpose is to protect the confidentiality of the information that the Revenue holds. If that information is passed to a third party, the same standards on confidentiality that apply to the Revenue must apply to the receiving organisation. That is what the amendments would achieve. The staff would have the same responsibility. The other amendments would also apply that to the NAO and introduce consistency throughout the organisations—there is no dispute about that—and
Procedures will be put in place to deal with any transgression by an individual who has received information and the same procedures will carry through. That is the object of the exercise and that is what the amendments would do. We want consistency and protection of confidentiality for people who deposit information with the Revenue. Mr. Swire: Have there been any cases of criminality within the national lottery to date that have prompted the change? Mr. Caborn: No. 12 noonAmendments made: No. 3, in clause 2, page 2, line 22, leave out ‘of Customs and Excise’ and insert
No. 100, in clause 2, page 2, line 26, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
No. 101, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, at end insert—
Column Number: 191
Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 Licensees Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill. |
| |
| ©Parliamentary copyright 2005 | Prepared 2 November 2005 |