



House of Commons
Transport Committee

Personal passenger safety in railway stations

Oral and Written Evidence

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2006*

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The Transport Committee

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Witness

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Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons), British Transport Police; **Mr Len Porter**, Chief Executive, Rail Safety and Standards Board; and **Mr Colin Foxall**, Chairman, and **Ms Christine Knights**, Board Member, Passenger Focus

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Oral evidence

Taken before the Transport Committee

on Wednesday 19 April 2006

Members present:

Mrs Gwyneth Dunwoody, in the Chair

Mr David Clelland
Clive Efford
Mrs Louise Ellman
Mr Robert Goodwill
Mr John Leech

Mr Eric Martlew
Mr Lee Scott
Graham Stringer
Mr David Wilshire

Memorandum submitted by Association of Train Operating Companies

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

Train operators are committed to maintaining a safe environment for their passengers on stations and in trains. We understand that some passengers are nervous about travelling at night, and we would not wish our passengers to feel threatened. We have transformed the position we found ten years ago and have been successful in reducing crime by broadly 40% and in attracting 40% more passengers to use the railway. More staff are employed by train operators than at privatisation, specific training on security has been introduced, and we contribute 60% more to policing costs. Help points, CCTV, better lighting and opening up the station environment are all practical initiatives by train operators to improve security as well as passengers' perceptions.

Operators aim to improve passenger security further on stations and trains and some ideas for doing so are set out below. However crime is a wider societal issue not confined to the railway station and tackling it requires an integrated approach involving police together with local and national Government.

PERSONAL SAFETY HAS BEEN A PRIORITY FOR TEN YEARS

Ten years ago, the station environment was often poor. Routine ticket checks at the entrance to the platforms came to an end at many stations between 1990 and 1994 as an economy measure, being replaced by a kind of honour system backed up by the £10 penalty fare levied under the British Railways (Penalty Fares) Act, 1989. The consequences were serious. In London, fare evasion was high at around 8%, and antisocial behaviour was widespread on many routes.

Besides the loss of revenue from ticketless travel, train operators with problem routes considered that the level of disorder faced by their passengers was unacceptable. They set about reclaiming control over the railway space and returning the railway to passengers.

Train operators take the responsibility for passengers in their care very seriously. Looking after passengers is an inherent part of being a train operator and is not simply something in a franchise agreement. But stations are not citadels on a rock, they are part of the local community, and train operators cannot achieve safety on stations without community support, nor can it be guaranteed once passengers have left the station.

Whilst train operators will take all reasonable measures to ensure passenger security, beyond a certain point it becomes a wider issue shared with Government. The railway and Government, particularly local Government, must tackle the issue together.

HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE THE MEASURES BEEN?

Over the last ten years, train operators have recruited security staff to patrol trains and stations, installed ticket gates at stations, provided help points, cleaned and painted stations, removed graffiti, set up a proper process for litter clearance (recognising the removal of litter bins for security reasons) and introduced 20,000 CCTV cameras, which have proved very valuable both as deterrents and for securing convictions. In some cases, stations have been remodeled or redundant buildings removed to eliminate hidden corners which might encourage crime.

The measures taken by train operators and BTP have had a considerable degree of success, but the picture has been confused by changes in definitions and recording procedures. Further information is given in the Annexe *Data on Crime on the Railway*, attached to this paper.

If account is taken of these changes in definitions, the picture which emerges is of a decline in crime on the railway of broadly 40% in the last ten years.

In absolute numbers, the level of crime on the railway is small compared with that in the community at large. To put the total figure in context, there is less crime on the whole of the railway in England and Wales than in the single London Borough of the City of Westminster. Stations are safer than the streets around them.

CONCERN FOR SAFETY AT STATIONS AND IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

Notwithstanding the safety measures taken, there is no doubt that some passengers remain concerned at making certain rail journeys at night. Though it varies by locality, the National Passenger Survey shows overall that 10% of passengers are dissatisfied with their personal security whilst using rail. (This is 3% lower than in the previous survey.) Variations between train operators are quite wide generally reflecting their locality, as shown in the Annexe to this paper.

But this concern for personal safety is not confined to the railway. People are similarly concerned about their personal security in their own neighbourhood.

In answer to a British Crime Survey 2000 question: “How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?” 33% answered “a bit or very unsafe”. This is a particularly significant figure, given that it refers to the area where the respondent lives and could be expected to be most comfortable. A similar concern is shown in a British Crime Survey 2004–05 question which indicated that 26% of people in London had a “high level of worry about violent crime” (16% for England and Wales).

Thus, concern about safety, particularly at night, applies to people walking in their own neighbourhood as much as it applies to people travelling on the railway.

LONDON—CRIME AT STATIONS

The figures for stations within the M25 show the nature of the challenge. As the table below shows, most crimes are committed at the largest stations, where the number of passengers is highest, even though they are fully staffed and have security measures in place. There are relatively few crimes at small stations, even though they may be unstaffed or partially staffed. These figures are the key to prioritisation of resources to give best value for money.

The first table below shows all notifiable crime incidents excluding theft of railway and passenger property and car crime. The second table includes all notifiable crime incidents without exclusions. The tables also show the measures taken at the stations:

Table 3.1
(CRIME EXCLUDING THEFT AND CAR CRIME)

<i>Incidence of crime on London stations</i>	<i>Number of stations</i>	<i>Crime incidents in 2005</i>	<i>Measures taken</i>				<i>CCTV</i>
			<i>Gated</i>	<i>Full</i>	<i>Staffed Part</i>	<i>Min</i>	
Very large stations	16	160	11	16	0	0	16
Large stations	90	28	40	50	35	5	88
Medium stations	152	13	20	15	132	5	144
Small stations	115	6	6	5	58	52	101
TOTAL	373	—	77	86	225	60	349

Notes:
 “Crime Incidents” are all notifiable crime types including criminal damage, drug offences, fraud, line of route offences, public order, robbery, sexual offences, violence and other. But it excludes theft of passenger or railway property and car crime; (figures are available for these).
 “Full” means staffed till last train. “Min” means either not staffed, or staffed for 4 hours or less Monday to Friday only.
 This table shows 373 stations—a greater number than in London Zones 1–6.

Table 3.2
(ALL NOTIFIABLE CRIME)

<i>Incidence of all notifiable crime on London stations</i>	<i>Number of stations</i>	<i>All Crime incidents in 2005</i> <i>Per station</i>
Very large stations	16	633
Large stations	90	69
Medium stations	152	30
Small stations	115	13
TOTAL	373	—

Source: BTP/ATOC.

The table showing all notifiable crime might exaggerate the concentration of crime at very large stations as some crime occurs elsewhere but gets reported at the large station.

PART TWO: THE COMMITTEE'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. *What are the most effective means of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?*

This needs to be approached in the context of tackling crime in the communities the stations serve, and of targeting resources to where they are most needed—usually the busier stations with higher crime rates. No single measure will deal with crime. It requires a combination of measures which can be approached systematically through the “Five Es”: Evaluation, Enabling, Engineering, Education, and Enforcement—a well established approach to crime prevention.

The principal initiatives by train operators are listed below:

Train Operator Measures to prevent crime

Measures making it difficult to commit an offence (or “target hardening”) include:

- Designing crime out through station renovation or rebuilding, including removal of “blind spots”.
- Gating stations to exclude those who are not genuine passengers—about 140 stations have ticket gates nationally, of which 77 are within the M25.
- Focus on patrolling known “hot spots”.
- Deployment of people and patrolling:
 - Deployment by train operators of staff specially trained and accredited by BTP, examples being Rail Enforcement Officers (South East Trains) and Travelsafe officers (South West Trains).
 - Deployment of security staff contracted by train operators, for example, Task Force (Southern).
 - Deployment of Police Community Support Officers, both employed by BTP and train operators, such as Arriva Trains Wales.
- Higher lighting levels at stations and in car parks.

Other measures include:

- Increased financial support for BTP, up 60% over the last five years.
- Intelligence used to detect organised crime.
- Help points linked directly to a control room.
- CCTV, including systematic surveillance and evidence gathering.

Some of these measures have been funded or part funded with help from local Government.

Train operators have increased their front line staff. While total train operator staff numbers came down from about 46,000 to 39,000 after privatisation, in the last five years staff numbers have increased to about 47,000. Most of the increase has been in front line staff. These figures do not include agency staff and police community support officers which are additional to the numbers quoted.

The mix of initiatives described above is a more effective way of promoting safety and security on the railway and provides better value for money than conventional ticket office staff or platform supervision on their own. Full staffing of stations would not stop crime happening, as demonstrated by figures in Table 1, and by the figures for LUL stations which are staffed but still experience crime.

Train Operator measures which help in catching offenders

The increasingly widespread use of CCTV plays a role in both preventing and detecting crime. Many train operators are expanding the deployment of CCTV and increasing its effectiveness by providing a live feed to a monitored control room and through providing resources for evidence gathering.

There are now about 20,000 CCTV cameras on the national railway, including stations and depots. About one-third of passenger coaches also have CCTV on board. Guidance on use of CCTVs has recently been produced by ATOC and Network Rail.

There is merit in including smaller stations in town centre CCTV schemes, and this could be encouraged through guidance from DfT and the Home Office to local authorities.

Improving information exchange with the British Transport Police (BTP)

Some train operators participate in the BTP's National Intelligence Model through the Area BTP Tasking and Coordination Group. This helps ensure the most effective deployment of both police and railway security resources.

Developing links with the local community

There has been some success in train operator engagement with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and there is scope to extend these. Further progress may require some framework to manage the expanding matrix of relationships—the Northern Rail franchise, for example, has 80 such schemes. Northern Rail also has a particularly extensive station adoption scheme.

Other opportunities at the local level include station adoption schemes and community rail partnerships, which encourage the development of businesses at unstaffed stations, examples of which include cafes, taxi offices and even a church. The Northwich station project in Cheshire is a good example of a multi-agency partnership that is bringing people and activity to an unstaffed station. Opportunities also include improving the integration of stations within the National Neighbourhood Policing Programme.

The Government's initiatives announced in the Budget to provide an additional £100 million to support and extend community policing and double the number of community support officers to 16,000 is welcome and in line with the approach of train operators to work towards community policing.

2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not what changes should be made?

Defining minimum standards or requirements.

Train operators aim to take all reasonable steps to secure the safety of their passengers, and to fulfil their duty of care. There are some standards which help to fulfil this duty:

- Specific requirements for investment included in franchise agreements (these may relate to, for example, Secure Station accreditation or CCTV).
- The train operators' own internal station management control processes.
- The opening hours of ticket offices are regulated, but often exceeded by TOCs.
- The Secure Stations Scheme.
- A guidance note on CCTV systems, recently produced by ATOC and Network Rail.

In practice, over the last ten years, the majority of improvements to security have come about from action by train operators, rather than from Government specification.

Are these standards high enough, are they clear, what changes should be made?

These standards or requirements, coupled with train operators' commitment to improvement, have been effective in reducing crime on the railway.

Notwithstanding the reduction in crime, and the measures taken on problem routes, it has to be recognised that has not resulted in the removal of concern by some people about travelling at night, though, according to the National Passenger Survey, that fear has been reduced.

Train operators aim to achieve further reduction in crime and progressively greater confidence amongst passengers travelling at night, as discussed in paragraph 7 below.

3. *Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?*

Train operators comply with the standards and requirements set out above, and these are policed. They also have internal control arrangements to ensure that their management processes are followed. Where any standards at stations are part of a franchise agreement, they are monitored by the Department for Transport. All breaches of franchise requirements are recorded and persistent breach results in action under the terms of the franchise agreement. The recent National Audit Office report stated that an investigation had found high level of compliance with franchise obligations at stations.

In the case of counter terrorism, DfT is able to direct the measures to be taken through Transec and the national Rail Security Programme.

4. *Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?*

Yes. The responsibility for creating a safe and secure environment for passengers at a station rests clearly with the relevant station operator. All franchise agreements require that there is an information display giving the contact details for the person who is responsible for the station and that the information is kept clearly legible and current. At smaller stations, help points connect directly to a staffed control office. Contact points of the Train Operator and for Passenger Focus or London Travelwatch are posted at every station.

5. *Why are so few stations accredited under the secure stations scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?*

To obtain accreditation for secure station status:

- The design of the station must conform to standards judged by the local BTP Crime Reduction Officer to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions.
- The management of the station must enable you to take steps to prevent crimes, respond to incidents, and communicate effectively with passengers.
- Crime statistics for the station over the 12 months prior to the inspection must show that you are managing crime.
- A survey of users must show that, on the whole, passengers feel secure when using the station.

The principles underlying the scheme, which are essentially those of designing crime out of the station (and car park) environment, are sound. Following its introduction in 1998 there was considerable enthusiasm for the scheme as a tool for improving station safety. Station accreditation was included as a commitment in a number of franchise agreements and delivered.

By 2003, many of the stations which would yield most benefit had been accredited. The DfT reviewed the scheme, and some helpful changes were made in 2005. However, the scheme is not and was not designed to be suitable for all stations. Accreditation can involve costs, administrative processes and time, without any evidence that they would lead to improved safety. The time taken to collect data and make physical changes means that this initiative cannot be implemented quickly, and the present system disadvantages smaller stations. Nonetheless, the scheme has merit as it is; if it was changed to make it applicable to all stations, it would lose some of its existing merits.

In recent years train operators progressed other means of enhancing passenger security—specialist staff to patrol trains is one example and further, more sophisticated use of CCTV another. They have continued to apply the principles underlying the Secure Station Scheme, even though they have not sought accreditation for many more stations and in some cases have allowed accreditations to lapse. Nevertheless, 21 train operators participate in the scheme, and some have achieved accreditation for all their stations.

We do not think that the scheme should be made compulsory, and certainly not for all stations, particularly the smaller ones with little or no evidence of recorded crime or disorder. However it does have merit and it should have more prominence in the future.

6. *What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?*

A holistic approach is required that covers bus, underground, light rail and station environs, as well as National Rail stations themselves. Significant reductions in crime levels have been secured over the last five years, and the objective must be to continue this progress. The most obvious measures would be those which reduce antisocial behaviour in the community at large. Partnerships with local police and local authorities are likely to be most effective in reducing crime and the fear of crime.

ATOC has formed a Police and Station Security Group to disseminate best practice. A wide range of measures have been taken already and more can be done and achieved through a shared understanding of what has been found to work and how best value for the money available can be obtained. A research project has been initiated through RSSB to create a robust factual basis for this work.

7. Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

The approach outlined above has been effective, and train operators aim to continue to take the lead in improving security at stations. They believe that in the main the most cost effective approach is commercially driven and targets resources where they are most needed.

Nonetheless, there comes a point beyond which the requirements to address public concern and public order have to be addressed jointly by train operators and Government. Accordingly we welcome the support received from Local Government, including TfL, and we welcome the Secretary of State's intention to include additional measures in new franchise agreements, which enables them to be properly specified and funded.

Train operators, for their part, intend to seek further improvements. They can achieve this through patrolling (with police, agency and their own trained staff), equipment (CCTV and station design to deter crime and assist detection) and partnership (with central and local government and Home Office forces and other agencies). In particular, they will:

- Work with BTP, particularly to develop a programme of neighbourhood policing in the railway environment.
- Work with local authorities and other partnerships, including station adopters.
- Support the Secure Stations Scheme where it is most suitable.
- Continue to “design out” crime in stations as they are rebuilt or renovated.
- Continue to deploy CCTV where justified to stations not so far covered, and linked to town centre schemes where appropriate.
- Further develop live monitoring of CCTV and evidence gathering with local authorities and BTP, as has been successfully done with TfL and in Scotland.
- Complete research to establish a better understanding of the trends of crime and of the measures effective in reducing it.

In addition, we would encourage:

- DfT to introduce appropriate transitional arrangements to ensure that short franchise lengths do not deter the introduction of security programmes and initiatives.
- DfT to encourage local authorities to include stations in town centre CCTV schemes.

31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by the National Express Group PLC

INTRODUCTION: ABOUT NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP PLC

National Express Group (“NX”), one of the UK’s leading transport operators, is pleased to submit evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee for its important inquiry into passenger safety at railway stations.

NX serves more than one billion passengers a year worldwide on its train, bus, light rail and express coach operations. Our 40,000 employees, of which 20,000 are in the UK, are dedicated to improving continuously the quality, value for money and, above all, the safety of all our services for our passengers.

We operate the following train franchises; c2c, Central Trains, Gatwick Express, Midland Mainline, “one” and Silverlink.

We manage each of our businesses for growth—by investing in all aspects of our services, by working in partnership with key stakeholders including customers and industry/Government bodies and by integrating our services with the wider public transport network. An important element of our business philosophy is to attract more people onto our services—and to maximise the use of public transport systems to bring about economic, environmental and social benefits to the communities we serve.

An important consideration for people when deciding whether or not to use public transport is their perception of their own personal security and safety. It is, therefore, both a commercial imperative—as well as a moral one—for our passengers both to *be* as safe as possible and to *feel* as safe as possible.

We believe in local devolved management teams to serve the communities where we operate, rather than imposing too heavily from the corporate centre. Nevertheless, we share best practice between our businesses, and will give an important illustration of our approach later in this paper. By focusing on customer service, innovation and marketing our ultimate goal is to make public transport the first travel choice.

Like many other publicly-quoted transport companies, NX is a commercial organisation with an obligation to produce a fair return for its shareholders. In NX's case, many of these shareholders include a substantial number of our employees, as well as a range of financial institutions specialising in ethical investments. This shareholder base reinforces the wider sense of our social responsibilities as a successful and profitable business.

RESPONSES

1. *What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?*

Stations vary enormously in their size, architectural history, facilities, and numbers and types of passengers. Safety and security cannot, therefore, be approached on a "one size fits all" basis. Appropriate investment must be made according to the level of risk at any given facility.

It is important to remember that most safety and security problems are concentrated at relatively few stations. Targeting these stations and working in the closest collaboration with the British Transport Police and other agencies generally proves to be the most effective strategy.

Before making investments in safety and security, it is sensible to make a proper risk assessment of the needs of passengers at each location. Due to these factors we do not believe that the *Evening Standard's* recent campaign to ensure manning of all railway stations in London as being practical or necessarily the most suitable solution.

Sometimes it is possible to enhance safety and security at relatively little cost, for example by the removal of blind spots and dark corners in station premises. Indeed, it could be argued that the single most beneficial investment that any operator can make to improve station security is modern lighting, provided that it is then properly maintained.

Risk assessments have demonstrated that there is a need for more sophisticated solutions, such as the introduction of CCTV or security personnel, or a change to the hours of duty of railway operational employees. CCTV ensures that a record of incidents is achieved with greater probability of detection, capture and prosecution.

During our stewardship of the ScotRail franchise, NX designed, implemented and operated one of the most sophisticated CCTV networks anywhere on the UK rail network, in partnership with the Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive (SPTE). Implementation was possible thanks to funding by the SPTE, who recognised the wider social benefits of this improvement. We believe that such examples of partnership working should be further encouraged across the railway industry.

An operator's approach can also play an important part in affecting the behaviour of potential offenders. Our Central Trains business deploys and widely advertises its policy of zero tolerance towards crime on the railway. This is especially directed at those considering assaulting railway employees, who, in their front-line roles, have to deal with increased antisocial behaviour which may take place around railway facilities. Another example of the Central Trains' approach has been its crackdown on fare evasion across its network which is often associated with other forms of anti-social behaviour.

Through our own research we know those passengers who travel without tickets are more likely to be involved in instigating crime on our services. We therefore believe one of the best ways to prevent crime on the railways is to prevent the criminals from gaining access to the network. Our experience in gating the c2c network is described below.

2. *Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?*

To the extent that minimum standards exist in the heavy rail network, these are laid down by the franchise agreements. For the original franchises and, indeed, most of those subsequently awarded, the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and DfT Rail have in turn not been heavily prescriptive regarding the way in which franchisees should manage their station facilities, leaving this very much to the commercial discretion of operators. Such bodies have the ideal opportunity to specify their preferred requirements in the Invitation to Tender process, therefore ensuring that options are priced as part of the bid.

Even without a particular contractual requirement to do so, our Silverlink business has paid a high level of attention to the rapid removal of graffiti from its stations, employing a control team based at Camden for this specific purpose. This makes good business sense, as well as contributing towards the perception of security for passengers. Moreover, NX has invested almost £2 million in security measures during its stewardship of Silverlink.

The original franchise approach began to change with the award of the Greater Anglia franchise from 1 April 2004, when the SRA applied “Service Quality Standards” (SQS) to the ambience of stations. The SQS scheme was built on the good practice developed by the Passenger Transport Executives through their Service Quality Incentive Regime (SQUIRE). Although the SQS regime does not automatically lead to additional safety and security measures, by requiring the operator to focus on such issues as cleanliness, the removal of graffiti, and the repair of vandalism, a significant impact can be made on the perception of safety and security by passengers. Equally, a station which manifestly is looked after will be less likely to attract antisocial behaviour.

Under the stewardship of NX, the Greater Anglia franchise—now known as “one”—has built upon the SQS regime to achieve even higher standards of station quality than were specified by the SRA.

3. Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?

To our knowledge, no operator has been penalised for failure to comply with the standards, but the key point is that the reputational and commercial penalties for being seen to neglect the safety and security of passengers are serious.

The recent campaign by the *London Evening Standard* has drawn to the public’s attention the enormous task faced by train operators in managing the behaviour of the small number of unruly and criminal people who can make the experience of travelling miserable, or even dangerous, for law-abiding passengers.

As part of our stewardship of the Silverlink franchise, we have now delivered CCTV at all of the 48 stations managed by the business. Some 30 of these stations are monitored around the clock from our Willesden control centre.

Station staff are on duty around the clock at Silverlink’s key interchange stations: Harrow & Wealdstone, Queens Park and Wembley Central, with staffing at Willesden Junction being extended to the close of services from the end of April 2006.

4. Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

The complex pattern of ownership of Britain’s railways undoubtedly can cause confusion to passengers. However, there is no doubt that responsibility for providing the best possible safety and security rests with the station operator, whether this is a franchisee, Network Rail or London Underground.

Clarity can be provided by the presence of uniformed staff employed by the station operator, and by the installation of help points where staffing is not the best solution. Our c2c business has installed help points at all of its stations and such features have also been installed at Silverlink Metro stations.

5. Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?

The Secure Stations Scheme provided a very useful kick-start to security and safety initiatives in the 1990s. However, the scheme is now in need of modernisation to become less bureaucratic and applicable across routes rather than on a station by station basis. NX would enthusiastically participate in such a review. NX approached the original scheme with particular vigour in its Silverlink franchise, where Harrow & Wealdstone, Watford High Street, Hatch End, Camden Road and Dalston Kingsland have secured accreditation.

However, most of the “quick wins” have now been obtained, and the railways are left with a large number of stations for which the securing of this award is either impractical or prohibitively expensive. Indeed, money may be more effectively spent on other security measures than on pursuing the badge of accreditation.

6. What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and underground stations?

Measures which can prevent crime include:

- Designing crime out.
- Gating of stations.
- Help points.
- CCTV.
- Patrolling of hot spots.

The best example of the full suite of measures available is given by our c2c business. We have been able to install ticket gating at every c2c station (except Southend East), tackling both ticketless travel and the antisocial behaviour with which it is often associated. Some 475 CCTV cameras have been installed. A number of c2c stations have achieved or are working towards Secure Station accreditation, and four car parks have been awarded the equivalent status.

The c2c business is currently investing £1.5 million on improvements to its CCTV network, including the installation of new digital recording equipment. The company spends £1 million per year on security patrols over and above its funding of the BTP, and regularly organises multi-agency sweeps of crime hotspots on its network involving bodies such as the UK Immigration Service as well as law enforcement bodies. In addition, c2c has been employing security consultants to assist in the next stage of its efforts against the criminals.

Nevertheless, c2c is an example of how the wider issues of crime and disorder affecting society can spill into the railways. The company has identified crime displacement as a result of local authority CCTV schemes as a serious issue, and is working in partnership with these authorities to try to link their respective systems. This is, however, a complex and expensive task.

In a further example of partnership, c2c has been working with Transport for London (TfL) to create an integrated staffed CCTV control centre for stations within the Greater London boundary. This centre—at Barking—is about to open. In addition NX has established an integrated CCTV control centre at Willesden station on the Silverlink network. These facilities are operational 24 hours a day.

The perception of crime by passengers can be significantly affected when a station is seen to be populated with other users. NX has sought to encourage this perception by bringing retail opportunities on to its stations in partnership with local businesses. This is well illustrated at stations such as Willesden Junction on the Silverlink network.

7. Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

For several years, the main focus of the Government's railway policy has, quite rightly, been on improving the performance and value for money of the railways. In the wake of the decline in punctuality and reliability after the Hatfield disaster and the collapse of Railtrack, Ministers had very little choice but to deal with these issues.

As far as safety was concerned, the principal areas for attention were the prevention of accidents such as Hatfield caused by poor maintenance of infrastructure, and of accidents such as Ladbrooke Grove where Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) were the cause.

The progress made by the railways on performance and operational safety in recent years has contributed to the enormous growth in ridership. This is now creating the intellectual space in which operators and agencies can begin to address some equally important questions of passenger perception, such as personal safety and security.

NX would welcome a more prescriptive approach from the authorities in the awarding of the next round of rail contracts, in which bidders are encouraged to come forward with more creative ideas for improving station ambience as well as physical security measures. It is important to recognise, however, that some improvements of this kind can only be paid for over periods greater than the typical length of rail franchises, so the mechanisms for the underwriting of these kind of investments by the authorities must be as creative as those which have been applied to, for example, the procurement of rolling stock.

OTHER INFORMATION

NX is a multi-modal public transport operator, and is always looking for opportunities to spread best practice amongst its businesses.

In 1999, Travel West Midlands—the largest bus operator in the region and a subsidiary of NX—introduced in partnership with West Midlands Police and other agencies a project known as “Operation Safer Travel” (OST).

OST aims to deter and detect crime, vandalism and graffiti on the region's buses and trams. It has done much to establish a safer bus and tram network, and has won several awards.

Under the OST strategy, 211 joint police operations or “Gateway Checks” took place during 2005 in the West Midlands. Nearly 30,000 bus services were checked during the year and 570,528 bus and metro passengers had their tickets and travel arrangements scrutinised.

The OST partnership now extends to NX UK Bus Division operations at Travel Coventry and Travel Dundee, the latter in partnership with Tayside Police.

OST aims to explain the consequences of criminal behaviour on public transport to the very young. This is delivered by targeted school liaison work, through the respected “SMART” Schools Project. The scheme is also strong in community involvement in both the West Midlands and on Tayside.

NX plans to extend the principle of OST into its train businesses, in particular Central Trains, Silverlink and c2c.

April 2006

Memorandum submitted by Stagecoach Group: Rail Division

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Crime, and particularly the fear of crime, is a major issue for our customers and our staff, and therefore for us as a company. At Stagecoach Group and South West Trains we are committed to dealing with the issue as an urgent priority.

2. The South West Trains network offers a test case of the problems facing train operators. It is the busiest franchise in the country, and is also the most complex, covering suburban services around London and cities such as Southampton, as well as long distance services and those calling at small rural stations.

3. South West Trains is also an illustration of best practice. We have worked with partners such as British Transport Police and Transport for London, to introduce innovations like TravelSafe Officers and CCTV evidence gatherers, and a wide range of other measures. As a result South West Trains has won the Sir Robert Horton safety award at the National Rail Awards in two of the last three years.

4. Over the past decade we have cut the number of reported crimes at our stations by 18%, at a time when passenger numbers have increase by 50%. We have reduced the number of crimes at unmanned stations by nearly half in the past three years, to 142 crimes in total across 27 stations.

5. Crime on the South West Trains network is falling. In answer to the Committee's questions, therefore, we believe that new requirements and enforcement are not needed to deliver better standards. Good management, and close working with partners, can deliver significant improvements, as our experience shows.

6. However, we are not complacent: our customers deserve to be safe and to feel safe as they travel with us. It is after all vitally important to the success of our business that passengers are not deterred from travelling with us by the fear of crime. Therefore as an integral part of our business plans Stagecoach and South West Trains will continue to invest substantially in new technology, new people and new approaches to dealing with crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.

7. We welcome the Committee's inquiry into this issue, and look forward to learning from the findings of its report.

INTRODUCTION

8. Stagecoach Group is one of the world's leading transport operators with train, bus, tram and express coach operations in the UK and North America. Our rail division includes being franchise holder for South West Trains and Island Line on the Isle of Wight, as well as a 49% holding in Virgin Rail Group, which runs the West Coast and CrossCountry franchises.

9. In this submission we refer to our experience since 1996 of operating the South West Trains franchise. South West Trains is the most extensive and complex in the UK, serving London Waterloo and operating throughout and around Surrey, Hampshire and Dorset. The franchise includes inner-London urban services, rush-hour commuter services into London and other major towns and cities in the south, long-distance routes from along the South Coast to London and leisure services to holiday destinations in the region.

10. We are proud of the way in which we have managed the South West Trains franchise. In 2006 we were awarded the HSBC Rail Business of the Year Award, and we were named the Passenger Operator of the Year at the National Rail Awards in September 2005.

INVESTMENT IN SECURITY

CCTV (introduction)

11. CCTV is a vital weapon in the detection of crime, allowing offenders to be identified and providing evidence against them. It also contributes to reducing the incidence of crime, by spelling out to potential offenders that they are likely to be filmed, and so prosecuted. We also believe that CCTV can play a major role in reducing fear of crime. For these reasons we have invested substantially in CCTV on our stations and on our trains over the term of our franchise.

CCTV on stations

12. 134 of our stations (76%) now benefit from CCTV. In total there are 1,888 cameras covering our stations, and 90% of car parking spaces on the SWT estate are covered by CCTV. 72 of our stations with CCTV are linked to our Customer Communication and Security Centre (CCSC) at Wimbledon. This allows 24-hour monitoring of 1,044 cameras.

13. We continue to expand coverage. Hamworthy in Dorset will be the next SWT station to benefit from CCTV, and plans also been agreed in conjunction with Dorset County Council for a CCTV system at Upwey near Weymouth.

14. To deal with concerns about coverage at “borders” between the CCTV network covering the railway and that of local authorities we have agreements in place with councils, including those in Runcy and Kingston, which allow us to overlap with one another to provide seamless coverage. In other words the Councils can access our system, and we can obtain feed from their cameras around our station as required. We are keen to conclude similar agreements with other local authorities across our network.

CCTV on trains

15. The introduction of our new Desiro fleet from late 2003 allowed us to benefit from on-train CCTV for the first time. We now have 1,788 cameras fitted to our trains. In addition, as part of the refurbishment of our Class 455 rolling stock we have specified that CCTV is installed. This will mean a further 1,456 cameras on trains. The result is a more secure environment for passengers and for staff as they travel on our network.

Evidence gatherers

16. Gathering evidence via CCTV is only part of the story: without skilled staff to sort through and analyse the material it is not helpful to the British Transport Police or the Courts. South West Trains has employed two trained evidence gatherers to collate CCTV footage on behalf of various stakeholders, primarily the police.

17. The evidence gatherers:

- Collect CCTV footage from trains and stations following incidents.
- Facilitate one-to-one viewing sessions with managers and the police.
- Maintain databases of all video data and related company assets.

18. Employed since May 2005 the evidence gatherers have presented the British Transport Police with 1,003 CCTV footage download incidents. Employment of the evidence gatherers led to SWT and the police winning the Sir Robert Horton rail safety award at the National Rail Awards in 2005.

Help points

19. South West Trains has help points at each of our 177 stations—there are 365 in all. Help points provide a value service to customers, particularly at times when stations are unstaffed. They allow our customers to speak to an operator about general inquiries, and are especially useful in emergency situations. Within the London area all help points can be monitored by CCTV enabling operators to view the person they are talking to, and providing reassurance to passengers.

Customer Communication and Security Centres (CCSC)

20. CCSCs play a major role in providing a safe and secure environment. From our centre at Wimbledon we respond to help point queries and monitor CCTV at 72 of our stations. The CCSC is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and is often first to identify a specific problem. It has three core duties:

- Manage the customer information system.
- Monitor CCTV.
- Respond to help point queries.

21. In addition, the Centre takes a lead role in the reporting of faults and in arranging alternative transport during times of journey disruption.

Secure Stations

22. The Secure Station Scheme was launched in 1998 by the Department for Transport and British Transport Police. It establishes standards of good practice and for accreditation in relation to: station design; management of the station; falling crime statistics; and rising passenger perceptions of security.

23. The Scheme is generally viewed as very effective. Statistics demonstrate that crime is lower at accredited stations as opposed to those that are not. The vital importance of addressing *perceptions* of crime is an integral part of the Scheme, since accreditation can only follow favourable survey results.

24. Over the years South West Trains has established itself as the industry leader in relation to the Secure Station accreditation scheme. We currently have 49 Secure Stations, and one more recognised by the Scheme as “working towards secure stations” status. By April 2006 we expect to have 50 accredited stations.

25. Because we are currently involved in re-franchising we cannot comment in detail on what commitments we might make to future investments. However, if Stagecoach is successful in its bid to win the South Western franchise again we will continue to invest in passenger and staff security as a key part of our business plan, and we will work in partnership with other agencies able to help us to reduce crime and the fear of crime.

Personal Security Group

26. Throughout the South West Trains network there are Personal Security Groups comprising the group station manager for the relevant area, British Transport Police and a selection of employees from different functions. They provide a forum for discussion of issues relating to vandalism, violence at work and anti-social behaviour. The Groups are then encouraged to develop and propose initiatives to reduce or eliminate the problem.

27. The company-wide Personal Security Group is tasked with supporting the local Groups in delivering the proposed initiatives, and with formulating company policy for dealing with issues highlighted. It is chaired by the Customer Service Director and attended by senior managers from SWT as well as British Transport Police.

TravelSafe Officers

28. Together with British Transport Police we identified a need to develop a deterrent against disorderly and anti-social behaviour. In August 2003 TravelSafe Officers, paid for by South West Trains, but deployed by the British Transport Police, were introduced to provide support and reassurance to customers and employees.

29. The primary duties of TravelSafe Officers are:

- To provide a highly visible presence to reassure passengers and staff.
- Conducting train/station patrols.
- Carrying out station searches as required.
- Providing a deterrent to anti-social behaviour.
- Acting as a liaison officer with local partnership forums.
- Providing intelligence to British Transport Police.
- Enforcement of railway byelaws.
- Assisting with crowd control at major events.

30. Decisions by the police about the co-ordination of the activities of TSOs is based on information from the Customer Communication and Security Centre and SWT personnel. There are now 56 TravelSafe Officers located at Clapham Junction, Richmond, Guildford, Portsmouth, Bournemouth/Weymouth and Basingstoke

Contracted security guarding

31. To supplement the TSOs and British Transport Police personnel, security guards are contracted to patrol key stations at the most sensitive times—generally at the end of the week during the evenings—to reassure and support our employees and our customers. Their remit includes a particular focus on the deterrence of anti-social behaviour and disorder.

Crime and disorder co-ordinator

32. Our focus in addressing the problems of disorder and anti-social behaviour is to a large part on ensuring that there is a highly visible presence of TSOs and others at our stations and on our trains. This is highly effective, but may displace the problem or serve as a short-term fix, rather than dealing with it once and for all.

33. We have recruited a Crime and Disorder Co-ordinator to:

- Reduce the vandalism and disorder that affects services and stations.
- Identify and implement actions in order to reduce crime within the area.
- Develop partnerships with local authorities.
- Identify resources to combat crime, and institute change via external agencies.

34. Supporting the Crime and Disorder Co-ordinator is a data analyst, whose remit is to collate all types of crime data and present them to both the company and local Personal Security Groups for analysis and action plan development.

35. The first role of the Co-ordinator was determined by our Security and Information Group, which developed a plan aimed at the Guildford-Ascot-Feltham-Windsor routes (covering 20 stations). During the first nine months of the project in this area we have achieved a reduction of 56% in criminal damage, and of 13% in violent crime across the 20 stations.

36. In part our success results from our partnership with the Government Office for the South East, allowing us to access funds from the Safer and Stronger Communities Fund. This has, for example, provided better fencing and visual enhancement at Aldershot station. Other new projects currently being planned include a cycle security campaign across Hampshire, and upgrades to the lighting at Hook, Eastleigh and Fareham.

Violence at work

37. The terms of reference of the Committee do not refer to the safety of railway staff. However, many of the problems of crime, and also of the uncertainty and stress caused by the *fear* of crime which affect passengers are of equal concern to our staff. Therefore, reducing the number of physical assaults on our employees is a particularly key commitment of our Safety and Environment Plan.

38. Many of the initiatives highlighted earlier in this report are aimed at reducing violence at work. All of our revenue protection personnel and guards are trained in conflict management.

39. Some specific initiatives aimed at reducing violence at work include:

- Internal assault reduction workshops.
- Distribution of safety advice cards.
- Monthly briefs to employees.
- High profile multi-agency exercises (such as Operation Ripple and Operation Unity, combining our revenue protection staff and TSOs with British Transport Police and other police forces).
- The employment by South West Trains of a dedicated member of staff to follow up all incidents of assaults on our employees.

White lighting

40. Amongst the legacies of British Rail was the usage of lower wattage bulbs in and around many stations. This contributes towards feelings of unease about crime. In the last two years in particular, working in partnership with Transport for London, South West Trains has invested heavily in improved lighting at our stations in the Greater London area. As a result 40 stations have benefited from the installation of white lighting, enhancing personal safety, the perception of greater security, and also aiding the quality of CCTV footage.

Partnerships

41. We have referred in this submission to the importance of working with partners, including particularly the British Transport Police and local authorities. We have also worked with Transport for London to improve security at stations in London. For example, between 2004 and 2005 TfL contributed £3 million towards a £10 million upgrade of our 53 London stations, which invested in CCTV, enhanced lighting, security fencing and other matters.

OUTCOMES

42. In 1995 there were 7,511 crimes reported at stations on the South West Trains network. By 2005 that figure had fallen to 6,175 incidents, notwithstanding the fact that the number of passenger journeys had grown by nearly a half, to just over 150 million journeys. In other words, the number of reported crimes had fallen by 18%; and the incidence of crime was four in every 100,000 journeys.

43. An area of particular concern are unmanned stations. In 2005 there were 142 crimes reported at 27 stations on our network regarded to be unmanned. This represented a fall of 46% from 2002.

44. In addition, over the years South West Trains has been widely recognised by its peers and by third parties as being a leader in addressing the challenge of ensuring that personal security for staff and passengers is improved. For example, we received the Sir Robert Horton safety award at the National Rail Awards in both 2003 and 2005.

45. In addition, the British Transport Police has said that “*we very much value the strength of the partnership we have with you*”, and in particular “*BTP gratefully acknowledge the pioneering ‘complementary policing’ initiative SW Trains took with its very successful Travel Safe Scheme. It has provided a model for the rest of the industry*”.

46. Nevertheless, there remains more to do. Crime, and the fear of crime, continues to be a major concern for our passengers and for our staff. We are committed to continuing to invest in new technologies, people and systems to address the issue, and we look forward to learning the lessons of the Committee's inquiry.

CONCLUSION

47. We do not support proposals to introduce further forms of compulsion on train operating companies to improve standards. We believe that it is an integral part of our business to encourage larger numbers of passengers to use our services, particularly at off-peak times—and doing so requires passengers to feel safe and secure. In our view South West Trains demonstrates that much has been and can be achieved by train operating companies, working alone or in partnership with others, under the existing regulatory regime and franchising structure. However, if Government wishes to signal to the industry that it requires further improvements in personal safety standards then the franchising process can and should be used to give security an enhanced weighting at pre-qualification and bid evaluation stage.

48. The Committee will of course wish to reflect on what else can be done to ensure that best practice spreads across the whole of the industry. We certainly welcome fair and measured assessment of the issue—such as this inquiry by the Committee—which we believe will raise awareness and standards by allowing the benchmarking of best practice.

31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by FirstGroup plc

SUMMARY

At First, we believe that our stations, along with our trains and staff, are a key part of how our customers judge whether we deliver what we say we will. We know how important it is that the customers' first and lasting impression is a positive one. First impressions really do count.

We consider the safety of our passengers, staff and the general public to be paramount in operating our rail and bus services. There is no panacea to make stations safer for passengers. We have operated rail services for ten years and passenger safety is now a more complex picture than it was then. There is clear evidence that demonstrates an overall reduction in recorded crimes at stations. However, this has not removed the fear of crime although, according to the National Passengers' Survey, it has reduced.

First is also committed to continually improving our security arrangements to reduce the fear of crime and to ensure that every aspect of our operation is perceived as safe and secure. We recognise that these aims will be achieved through a combination of crime prevention methods all designed to complement each other and deliver a perceptibly safe and secure railway. Key elements of our strategy are outlined below and include:

- A commitment to review current arrangements and facilities including lighting, staffing, automatic and manual gatelines, CCTV provision, information provision, Help Points, cleaning and maintenance regimes and station design.
- A commitment to continually review crime prevention measures.
- A commitment to funding additional Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) in key locations across the network.
- Continuing to foster a strong relationship with the British Transport Police (BTP) and Home Office forces to work on joint solutions to address crime hotspots.
- Developing relationships with, and taking a prominent position within our local communities, fostering links with local businesses, local authorities and residents.

Q1 *What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passenger?*

We consider the safety of our passengers, staff and the general public to be paramount in operating our rail and bus services. We accept that perception of safety and fear of crime are key determining factors in the decision making process for potential customers when choosing their travel mode. However, there is no simple solution to making stations safer for passengers.

Over a number of years, First has adopted a "package of measures" approach to passenger security at our stations in line with Department for Transport (DfT) guidelines. We have moved towards a greater security presence at stations and, dependent on the known risks, this can range from simply having an open, well lit environment to increasing the number of frontline staff or mobile patrols at stations; from CCTV coverage with Help Points to a full Police presence. Each station has different characteristics and we do not think there is a "one size fits all" solution.

Stations are the initial focal point of the customers' journey and should be accessible, welcoming, safe, secure and easy to use. Facilities at the station must be clean and offer a pleasant environment that is presentable, modern and user friendly. Station infrastructure should be cared for, well maintained, free from graffiti, presentable and in good working order; and routes around the station are well signed, appropriately lit, accessible and welcoming.

In reality, stations are a part of the fabric of a local community. Therefore, the most effective method of making stations safer for passengers is to build a sense of community ownership; integrate station security into community policing; and cooperate and involve the full range of partners involved in the wider management of community safety.

Crime and anti-social behaviour on the railway cannot only be a matter for the train operator and Network Rail. There are many agencies that can contribute to crime reduction and helping people feel safer. Central to this partnership approach is the BTP, a specialised and dedicated police for the railways. The BTP, through its close working relationships with other police forces, is perhaps likely to be the most effective in reducing crime on the railway. Like other Train Operating Companies we have committed a 60% increase in funding for the BTP over the past five years.

We will continue to promote and support complementary policing through the funding of additional Police Community Support Officers. We are also reviewing the Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme (RSAS). The RSAS will bring more people into the wider "policing family". Based on similar Home Office Community Safety Accreditation Schemes, it allows organisations and their employees involved in railway safety and security to be accredited by the police.

Q2 Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not what changes need to be made

Apart from the Health & Safety at Work Act and the civil law Occupiers Liability Act, which require that Train Operating Companies take all reasonably practicable and proportionate steps to reduce the risks to public and staff, additional standards have been applied through the franchising process and franchise agreements which contain detailed commitments on passenger safety and security. Irrespective of franchise commitments we recognise the importance of working towards delivery of what our customers perceive to be safe and secure station environments.

We believe the minimum standards accompanied by a programme of continuous improvement are the key components to drive down crime and fear of crime concerns. There is no need for changes to the requirements.

Q3 Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently clear?

The standards and requirements are policed and complied with.

Breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act are policed by Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate and carry the risk of a criminal prosecution. Breaches of the Occupiers Liability Act leave the operator open to civil action.

All train operators have internal control arrangements to ensure that their management processes are followed.

The DfT monitors standards where a commitment to a secure station environment is part of a franchise agreement. Any breach of a franchise commitment is recorded and persistent breaches result in action under the terms of the franchise agreement. The recent National Audit Office report *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations* (HC 132 Session 2005–06, 20 July 2005) stated "the SRA's surveys typically detected a high level of compliance with franchise obligations and other commitments."

Q4 Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

A safe and secure environment for passengers at a station is the product of partnership between a large number of organisations including the relevant station operator, Network Rail and the BTP. Every station operated by First is clearly branded and it is a key statement of what we represent for customers and staff. We use our strong brand to underpin our plans to fundamentally change customers' perception of train travel. It provides customers with an assurance of a consistent level of quality, safety and security.

Q5 Why are so few stations accredited under the secure stations scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?

The number of stations with accreditation under the Secure Stations Scheme is growing and there is much work going on to make stations more secure for passengers. Since the scheme was introduced First Great Western has secured accreditation at 25 stations. In the past few weeks alone First TransPennine Express has secured accreditation for a further three stations and there are more in the pipeline. However, there are two reasons why the Secure Stations Scheme should not be made compulsory: firstly, accreditation does not make a station instantly secure and secondly, stations without accreditation are not necessarily unsafe. Another view is that action taken should be proportionate to the risk. A good example is in Scotland where BTP figures show a 12% drop in recorded crime yet whilst there is an exceptionally strong centrally controlled CCTV infrastructure in place, none of the stations operated by First ScotRail has sought secure stations accreditation as the Scottish Executive and SPT, the two co-signatories to the franchise, monitor the condition of stations and trains through SQUIRE (the Service Quality Incentive Regime).

Q6 What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?

The refranchising process is a good time to review rail network outputs. It allows the DfT to clearly specify its priorities and aspirations. Bidders then look to meet that specification as cost effectively as possible taking into account not just the cost of such measures but the potential revenue implications as well. Having recently bid successfully for two franchises it might be helpful to set out First's approach.

We are committed to raising standards at all stations in the Greater Western franchise region by undertaking investments of £1 million where it is needed. This helps to create a virtuous circle, as customers and non-customers are more likely to travel. We will invest a further £13 million in 29 of the larger stations (including Paddington) and a number of the important regional stations to provide improved passenger facilities. This will underpin the future viability of these stations. We will ensure that stations are properly maintained and clean. We will improve security through the extension of lighting and CCTV in vulnerable locations and install Help Points so that all stations on the Greater Western franchise network have them. Over and above our contribution to the British Transport Police, we will employ an additional 12 Community Support Officers and we will install or extend ticket gatelines at five stations.

During the recent process for the Thameslink/GN franchise, First outlined its plans for ensuring that the security of customers and staff is maintained. We set out our strategy for increasing the number of stations to achieve Secure Stations Accreditation. We are committed to achieving Secure Station Accreditation at a further 12 stations within two years of the start of the franchise.

DfT guidelines on the deployment, role, and training of staff, published after its 2005 review of the Secure Stations Scheme, stated:

“The desire for a staff presence can be addressed by the sensitive deployment of staff, by increasing their visibility and mobility, and by widening their range of responsibilities.”

Our stakeholder consultation and market research conducted during the bid process found that personal security at stations although an issue for the GNTL customers was not of overwhelming importance. Research from the Rail Passengers' Council showed that 57% of passengers said that security at stations was of high importance to them but 64% of them also stated that they were either satisfied or very satisfied with the standards achieved.

As a result, our proposal for station security for the new First Capital Connect franchise was based on a “package of measures” approach in line with DfT guidelines. We are appointing a new Head of Security to work with the BTP, the Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police, Transport for London and other agencies to improve the on train and station environments. We will invest to improve on the arrangements currently in place and our commitment to the safety and security of our customers will bring two Sergeants and three Constables from the British Transport Police and 24 Police Community Support Officers plus 35 additional frontline staff on to the network.

We also accepted a recommendation from the Rail Passengers' Council to introduce a new CCTV control centre. Following consultation with the BTP we identified that this, together with of an additional mobile PC/PCSO resource, would give the best overall response and deterrent mix.

Additionally, in line with the Secure Stations Scheme guidelines, a redeployment of some staff from single-duty train dispatch to multi-functional customer service and security staff has been factored within the longer-term strategy. These staff, located at the busiest stations, will be better able to deter the higher general levels of crime associated with greater concentrations of people, for example, pick-pocketing, bag-snatching and anti-social behaviour.

We believe that whilst the Secure Stations Scheme has its benefits, it is not always necessary or suitable in all circumstances and the same or better results can be achieved by:

- Working in partnership with the BTP, Home Office Police, other agencies and the community on initiatives to remove or drive down crime in the area.

- Improved design of stations to ensure they are more open plan, removal of hiding places, providing better lighting and the inclusion of CCTV and Help Points.
- Providing a visible response to our customers' safety concerns by introducing more mobile staff patrols to stations, which are known to be crime hotspots.

Q7 Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

Yes, crime on the railways is falling. A continuation of the concerted effort between train operators and Network Rail, the BTP, police forces and local authorities such as TfL, PTEs and Councils—with support from central Government departments such as the Home Office and the DfT—to address both crime and the fear of crime should continue to improve passenger safety in railway stations.

31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by Go-Ahead Group

The Go-Ahead Group welcomes the opportunity of presenting evidence to the Committee in relation to passenger safety at stations.

With effect from 1 April 2006, Go-Ahead will operate two of the largest franchises in London and the South-East with responsibility for over 330 stations. The Southern and Southeastern franchises carry in excess of 110 million passengers a year, 15% of the National rail business.

We fully recognise the importance of safety and security in our rail operations. We are acutely aware that confidence in public transport is essential not only for the success of our business, but also in terms of the London and thus National economy, and the ecological benefits of encouraging greater use of environmentally friendly transport modes.

Personal security is a priority for our business. We will produce evidence describing the measures we have taken and the substantial financial investment made. These measures go far beyond the obligations in our Franchise Agreement.

The recent high profile press campaign on crime at London stations has exaggerated the risks to the travelling public and has raised the fear of crime. Reported crime levels are significantly lower than in the community at large, and the risk of exposure to crime is low. East Croydon, one of our busiest stations, had a reported crime level of 270 notifiable offences during 2005, set against a passenger throughput of some 22 million passengers per annum. Crime levels at all our Southern stations have reduced significantly over the last three years. (See Annex "A")

Nevertheless, we are in no way complacent about security, and recognise that more needs to be done to counter the fear of crime and to encourage use of the railway during the more vulnerable off-peak periods of the day.

What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

There is rarely a single solution to combating crime and disorder. Under the guidance of a professional Head of Security and in close cooperation with the British Transport Police, the Group adopts a holistic approach to combating crime and disorder. We follow the accepted crime reduction strategies based around the principles of the five "E"s: Evaluation, Enabling, Education, Engineering and Enforcement. This strategic approach ensures that a proper risk based evaluation based on the combined intelligence of the police and our own data, is the precursor to any solutions or counter-measures.

The key issue is to create a safe environment for our passengers and staff, which in turn will improve the perception of personal security. Perception of crime at stations is often influenced by the geographic location. Railway stations do not sit separately from the communities they serve and consequently they are a reflection of the fears of the community in general. If the public feel secure in their neighbourhood this perception is likely to be reflected in their view of their local station, and vice versa.

In general terms, passengers are likely to feel most secure in a well-lit, well-maintained, clean and open environment where there is natural surveillance from fellow-travellers, railway staff or from adjacent properties. Conversely, an area that is poorly lit, and where there is litter graffiti or evidence of vandalism, will have the opposite effect and create a sense of isolation and vulnerability that feeds the fear of crime.

As a consequence, Go-Ahead has concentrated on improving the cleanliness, appearance, and lighting standards at all of its stations. It has fitted CCTV, Help Points, improved waiting accommodation, car parking and cycle storage facilities, amongst other measures.

Most research relating to passenger security indicates that the public believe that the presence of staff is particularly reassuring. In our Southern franchise we have recognised this concern, and over the last three years have increased staffing levels at stations in the London Metro area by 70 people. Furthermore, where circumstances have indicated a need, we have also employed private security officers to supplement our own

staff presence. It is not simply the presence of railway staff, but having the right people in the right place doing the right job. In terms of combating the albeit low levels of station crime, it is no more realistic to expect a security presence in every station than it is to expect a police officer on every street corner. In our view a holistic approach, by risk assessing stations and providing appropriate physical and material solutions, is the most appropriate way to address passenger concerns.

For ease of reference, we attach at “Appendix A” a brief summary of security measures implemented in the Southern franchise over the last three years, together with “Appendix B” for Thameslink.

Is the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough?

Train operators are required to ensure the safety of their passengers under Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, and in the civil law Occupiers’ Liability Act. Both these require that train operators take all reasonably practicable and proportionate steps to reduce the risks to the public and staff. Train operators have a legal duty of care.

The National Rail Security Group sets a high level strategy for crime prevention, and the tactics for delivery are determined within Network Rail Regions. Individual operators fully participate in this process as well as setting their own crime strategy (See Annex “C”) and by setting measurable objectives in their Safety and Environmental Plan.

The opening hours of ticket offices are regulated, which together with the number of windows to be opened, partly determines station staffing arrangements.

The only other requirements under the terms of a Franchise Agreement are those which are negotiated with the Department for Transport (DfT) when individual companies enter into a Franchise Agreement. In the case of Southern, this is contained in Schedule Four of the Franchise Agreement. It also covers issues of presentation and cleanliness that have a bearing on perceptions of security. Other parts of the Franchise Agreement include specific obligations such as “Secure Station” accreditation, “Park Mark” standard for car parks, CCTV on stations and trains, and Help Points at stations.

In recent years the DfT has placed greater emphasis on station security as evidenced by the Invitation to Tender in franchise competitions. There are other minimum standards, such as those contained in the counter terrorism measures of the National Railways Security Programme, which also serve to set standards for security. The counter terrorist measures are considered to be appropriate and sufficiently robust to deter terrorism and other forms of crime without being unduly restrictive on an open public railway transportation system.

Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?

These basic standards and requirements, coupled with the Group’s strong commitment to improvement, has reduced crime on the stations in our franchises.

Otherwise, there is a clear expectation that operators will include security plans and measures for the safe operation of the railway in their Franchises. Crime levels at stations are generally low, and security spend has to be on a sensible and risk assessed basis. It may be perfectly feasible for example, for the DfT to specify stations that need to have “Secure Stations Accreditation”, to specify the provision of “Help Points” and CCTV or indeed to specify levels of station staffing. These costs would not be matched by additional revenue, and the resultant extra subsidy requirements would have to be prioritised alongside other demands for railway funding.

Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?

The internal standards of a Rail Operator and the commitments entered into through Safety and Environmental Plans are the subject of both internal and independent external audit. A failure of any of our Group companies to perform against published targets would be a matter of a focus by our Board where there is no less concern about security issues than other aspects of railway safety. The consequence of significant failure to meet safe operating practices would have significant impact on both Directors and Management of the company concerned.

Minimum standards specific to station security differ in our Franchise Agreements, and where these form part of the Franchisees obligations, they are subject to audit by DfT. In recent years the process has been more one of “self audit” or “certification” by the train operator. However we are, from time to time, subject to verification by DfT Audit random checks. Minor non compliance can result in the operator being served a notice of breach and being required to produce, at their own expense, an action plan to achieve compliance. In severe cases, or what is known as a “material breach” of the franchise an operator could lose the franchise with severe reputational and financial consequences.

In the case of compliance with the provisions of the National Railways Security Programme, stations in the higher security groups are subject to regular audit by DfT Transport Security Inspectors. Any failures to comply with mandatory elements can result in warning notices and ultimately in prosecution of the franchisee or duty holder.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who are responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

Emphatically, yes. Train Operating Companies (TOC) are the public face of the railway, and passengers look to TOC staff for all their needs, including their safety. Our staff wear distinctive uniforms, and we prominently display at all stations details of the station manager and contact details for enquiries.

It may not be quite as clear to the public so far as policing is concerned. Whilst we have the benefit of a distinct railway police the public may often see the local police force as being the first point of contact, and not appreciate the demarcation lines between Metropolitan and Home Office police forces and the British Transport Police.

Why are so few stations accredited under the secure stations scheme?

The Secure Stations Scheme represents a national standard for passenger safety and security at Britain's railway stations. The Scheme was first launched in 1998, but following an independent review was subsequently revised and re-launched in 2005. These revisions are aimed at simplifying some procedures with the objective of encouraging more operators to take part. There are seven guidelines to accreditation and four specific elements that need to be addressed by station operators. These are:

- Design and crime—the design of the station must conform to standards judged by the local BTP Crime Reduction Officer to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions.
- Managing a secure station—the management of the station must allow the operator to take steps to prevent crimes, respond to incidents, and communicate effectively with passengers.
- Recording and monitoring of crimes and other incidents—crime statistics for the station over the twelve months prior to the inspection must show that the TOC is managing crime. This entails a crime level in relation to people using the station that is below specified crimes per footfall.
- Passenger perceptions—a survey of users must show that, on the whole, passengers feel secure when using the station.

It will be noted that the process of accreditation is not simple. The process is quite rightly challenging, and has to be so if accreditation is to have any purpose, significance or credibility. Neither is accreditation a quick process. It requires considerable engagement from a limited crime reduction police resource and a process of rectification of any physical shortcomings arising from the police audit. In some cases this may involve capital expenditure although generally cost is not the principal bar to accreditation.

It can take some time for the physical and managerial measures to impact on crime and to reduce it to a qualifying level in proportion to footfall. Stations with relatively low levels of crime, but low usage, often struggle to meet the crime per footfall criteria, whereas a larger station with higher levels of crime and high usage may pass the criteria more easily. It has been pointed out repeatedly to the DfT and to BTP that small stations are disadvantaged in the “managing crime” per footfall formula.

In its original form a very costly element of accreditation was the need for an independent passenger survey of specific age groups by gender. The survey had to show that on the whole, passengers felt secure when using the station. The cost of the survey and analysis was disproportionately expensive and produced unreliable results, even after high levels of investment in the station. Further, as public perception is often dictated as much by the area outside the station, over which the railway has no control, as by the reality of the risk of crime on the station itself, the scheme became discredited. For this reason Go-Ahead chose to invest finite security resources in making improvements to security across the board rather than in expensive public surveys.

In its revised form the Secure Stations Scheme permits the use of existing surveys in relation to perceptions of security—for example the National Passenger Survey conducted by the Oxford Research Institute—provided a sufficiently large sample is obtained, which obviates the need for further surveys by train operators. Southern currently has only three accredited stations, and is working towards accreditation of an initial tranche of 40 stations that we expect will result in 25% of our stations achieving secure stations status. However, as indicated above, the process is not a “quick win” and involves time and effort to engage staff in actively managing crime and security, physically improve the station environment, reducing crime to footfall ratios and gaining passenger confidence.

By comparison, 22 Thameslink stations (79% of total), have achieved Secure Station Accreditation.

Should the scheme be made compulsory?

No—we think this would be counter productive.

Much is already an integral part of Go-Ahead's bidding strategy and franchise management processes—namely infrastructure provision—intelligent CCTV, Help Points, long-line PAs, completed by adequate staffing both static and peripatetic.

The burden of processing a significant increase in SSA applications would fall to the Police, who would not be able to cope.

Further, by mandating SSA, additional sanctions for failure would be necessary. In our view, it would be unreasonable to penalise an operator who had used reasonable endeavours to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour but who had failed due to circumstances or perceptions beyond their control. It may also lead operators to fail to report crime.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?

Passenger safety and confidence may be improved by a more visible presence of Police and other complementary policing resources during off peak times. Southern has already contributed to this element of confidence building in its own multi disciplined "Task Force" and through the employment of some 50 Rail Security Officers. However, crime and disorder can occur anywhere and it is unrealistic to expect every station and every train to maintain a permanent security presence, just as it is unreasonable to expect Police or Community Support Officers or Street Wardens to be visible on every street in the land. All resources whether human or physical are finite and to be most effective need to be directed on an intelligence led basis.

A joined-up approach which involves bus, underground, light rail and heavy rail stations environments needs to be encouraged. For example, there remains scope to develop railway CCTV capability along the lines of the joint Southern and Transport for London scheme in London. By Autumn of 2006 monitored CCTV and help points will be introduced to 50 metro stations. When integrated with on board CCTV this has the potential of providing a comprehensive public security and surveillance system. We also look forward to forthcoming proposals on the future of the British Transport Police that has the potential of refocusing policing efforts on a transport led agenda rather than a more generic National Policing Strategy

Is the government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

With the exception of counter terrorism, much of the initiative for improved station security has come from within the rail industry, aided by local and national government partnership arrangements.

Greater emphasis could be given to transport security in the work of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and a Government lead would be useful in that context. The introduction of the Railway Accredited Persons Scheme with enhanced powers of enforcement under railway bye-laws has also been welcomed. However the scheme could have been more attractive had the enforcement powers been more relevant to the railway rather than being a direct copy of powers, scope and offences currently available under Community Safety Accreditation Schemes. Further, the process of accreditation of railway businesses, managed by the Association of Chief Police Officers Crime Prevention Initiatives Ltd is viewed as being unnecessarily onerous and bureaucratic, which is also a disincentive to participation.

Conclusions

Since privatisation and through the process of competitive tendering for rail franchises the industry has made significant investment in the security of stations and trains. Public perception of security measured through independent survey has steadily improved as have passenger numbers. Crime at stations has fallen consistently, but more can be done.

In the new Go-Ahead franchise for the Southeastern franchise, the most significant element of £70 million of proposed investment is £20 million on security.

31 March 2006

Annex A

**SOUTHERN SECURITY AND CCTV
(FRANCHISE ACQUIRED IN 30/8/2001)**

Significant improvements in passenger security in the last three years. These include:

- Installation of a comprehensive monitored CCTV network linked to passenger announcements, with help points and new waiting shelters (delivered in partnership with TfL).


- A positive working relationship with BTP and full participation in tasking meetings following the Police National Intelligence to ensure that policing activities and our own complementary security resources are deployed in the most effective manner.
- Appointment of CCTV Data Profilers trained to police standards to profile offenders and provide evidential packs for police investigation and taking the pressure off frontline police officers.
- The creation of a Crime and Disorder Task Force in partnership with BTP and a private security firm. This team tackles anti-social behaviour issues, on an intelligence led basis to ensure that low level disorder does not discourage travel.
- The employment of 50 rail security officers to enhance security and improve passenger confidence on the network.
- Increased staffing levels at Metro area stations—by more than 70 in the last couple of years.
- The employment of Private Security Guards in covert operations to detect and detain graffiti vandals and to combat anti social behaviour.
- The provision of a discrete security budget to enable recommendations on security improvements by both police and our own Head of Security to be implemented speedily and effectively.
- The adoption of a zero tolerance approach to graffiti on stations, with all but the most difficult damage cleaned off or painted out within 24 hours.
- Three stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme and a further 40 comprising 25% of all stations actively being promoted for accreditation by the end of 2006.
- Upgraded lighting at all our Metro area stations.
- Re-painting and re-signing all our London area stations using finishes which are easier to clean and keep free of graffiti.
- The introduction of maintenance teams to ensure levels of cleanliness and the state of repair of stations is maintained at the highest possible level.
- A five day customer service training programme for staff which includes personal security issues and leads to an NVQ qualification.

In addition, all of our Metro area stations have real time train information displays, our busiest stations have ticket gates to control access/egress and we have recently replaced all of our ticketing equipment, adding to the sense of regeneration/renewal.

Through these initiatives, we have seen recorded crime reduce substantially on our stations over the last two years.

SOUTHERN—STATION CRIME STATISTICS AS SUPPLIED BY BTP

<i>Calendar Year</i>	<i>Total Notifiable</i>	<i>Total Non Notifiable</i>	<i>Total All Crime</i>	<i>% Change</i>
2002	7,273	1,639	8,912	
2003	8,120	2,137	10,257	15
2004	7,882	1,657	9,539	-7
2005	4,233	778	5,011	-47




There was an overall increase from 2003 which coincides with the introduction of changed Home Office Counting Rules for Recorded Crime. However across the board there has been a reduction in recorded crime in 2005 especially in recorded robbery offences (Down 55.2%).

**CRIME STATISTICS FOR EAST CROYDON STATION
(PASSENGER THROUGHPUT 21,162,691 PER ANNUM)**

EAST CROYDON

<i>Calendar Year</i>	<i>Total Notifiable</i>	<i>Total Non Notifiable</i>	<i>Total All Crime</i>	<i>% Change</i>
2002	340	69	409	
2003	367	89	456	11
2004	354	69	423	-7
2005	240	80	320	-24



There was an overall increase from 2003 which coincides with the introduction of changed Home Office Counting Rules for Recorded Crime. However across the board there has been a reduction in recorded crime in 2005

Annex B

THAMESLINK SECURITY


- Secure Stations Accreditation—22 of the 28 stations managed by Thameslink have achieved this status. This is the highest ratio (79%) of any Train Operating Company in the UK.
- Significant investment (£2 million) has been made at our Metro stations in partnership with TfL over the past two years. Improvements to security at these stations includes Newand extended CCTV; upgrade of CCTV to Digital format; New and improved HelpPoints; improved lighting, fencing, seating and waiting facilities and signage.
- Dedicated CCTV monitoring centres at Luton and Tooting.
- Dedicated security guards at several of our central London stations.
- Deployment of security guards on trains around the Wimbledon LoopComplete regeneration of Thameslink managed stations on the Wimbledon Loop resulting in a drop in crime rates and awards of Secure Station status.
- Tickets gates installed at Elstree & Borehamwood station to ensure that only fare paying passengers should be able to enter the station.
- Dedicated External Liaison Manager—working closely with the community around the Wimbledon Loop—liaising with Schools and Colleges, giving talks, encouraging good behaviour on the railway—and rewarding pupils for good citizenship.
- Thameslink Website—Comprehensive station database giving details of station facilities which enables a passenger to make an informed choice of where to travel from—helping to give a sense of safety at each station.
- Thameslink Website—link to “The Teaching Zone” website which gives teachers the opportunity to download lesson plans and other materials to deliver lessons on the dangers of the railway and the benefits of good behaviour.

- Heavy cleaning task forces—rapid response to remove graffiti on stations Introduction of Alcohol Free Zones at St Albans and Harpenden stations in association with the BTP and local Authorities.
- Effective participation in BTP National Intelligence Model Crime tasking meetings.

THAMESLINK—STATION CRIME STATISTICS AS SUPPLIED BY BTP

<i>Calendar Year</i>	<i>Total Notifiable</i>	<i>Total Non Notifiable</i>	<i>Total All Crime</i>	<i>% Change</i>
2002	144	21	165	
2003	178	31	209	27
2004	165	15	180	-14
2005	158	21	179	-1

Thameslink Station Crime



There was an overall increase from 2002 which coincides with the introduction of changed Home Office Counting Rules for Recorded Crime. However across the board there has been a reduction in recorded crime in successive years.

OUR VISION

Think like a Passenger

To offer high quality rail travel, providing our passengers with a welcoming, well managed, safe and reliable service.

OUR VALUES

- Trust us to be **PROFESSIONAL**
- Our trains run on the dot.
- And **HONEST** too, we won't say something's OK if it's not.
- You'll find us very **FLEXIBLE**
- We'll help you if we can
- We're **FRIENDLY** not officious, and
- We're **SAFE** – you're in good hands

OUR GOALS

- We want to run a railway that's **SAFE AND SECURE**. That requires professionalism and a focus on safety.
- It is professionalism and safety that will help us improve **PERFORMANCE**
- Top performance will help us to win **CUSTOMER SATISFACTION**, but not without professionalism, honesty, friendliness and flexibility from our staff.
- That means we must improve the motivation and **PERFORMANCE OF OUR STAFF** and encourage their **PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**. For that we need an honest, professional, flexible culture.
- The bottom line is we want to be **PROFITABLE** and that comes from achieving all these goals

CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY

In delivering our promise to provide a welcoming, safe and secure railway for our passengers and staff, as detailed in our Vision and Values. Southern will actively pursue a policy to preserve the railway from “open access”. We will introduce cost effective measures based on the crime reduction principals of Evaluation, Enabling, Education, Engineering and Enforcement to control our environment and to reduce both crime and the fear of crime on the railway. Whenever possible we will seek to achieve this goal through the development of effective partnerships with other stakeholders.

Our Passengers: Southern is committed to providing a safe, secure and welcoming experience for our passengers from the time they access the railway until they leave our care. With this in mind, we will introduce and pursue initiatives, in support of the National Rail Standard for Personal Security of Rail Travellers, the National Railways Security Programme and the Rail Safety and Standards and Board Personal Security Working Groups initiatives, intended to increase passenger confidence and to reduce the fear of crime.

Our Staff: Southern acknowledges its responsibility and promise to provide a safe and pleasant working environment for our staff. We acknowledge that in carrying out their jobs some of our staff may face hostility and personal danger. We will ensure that staff likely to experience confrontation are aware of potential risks to their personal safety and are provided with adequate and appropriate training. Whenever possible the Company will also provide technical or physical support to enhance the personal safety of vulnerable staff. Whenever a member of staff becomes the victim of crime we will ensure that support, counselling and legal advice is provided.

Our Stations and Environs: Southern recognises that our stations are the gateway to the rail infrastructure and as such provide the means to control the railway and to preserve the network from “open access”. We will introduce access control through the appropriate use of automatic gating and staffed gate lines. We will work towards the introduction of an integrated system of passenger information and actively monitored CCTV surveillance designed to reinforce our promise to maintain a safe and secure railway environment. We will adopt a policy of continual improvement in the maintenance, management and appearance of our stations and car parks, in appropriate cases seeking accreditation for stations under the DfT “Secure Stations” initiative and/or accreditation for Car parks under the Secured by Design “Park Mark” scheme. We will fully comply with the requirement of the National Railways Security Programme.

Our Trains: Southern recognises that poor design features in rolling stock provide opportunities for criminal and anti social conduct which has a significant impact on reliability, on the comfort and safety of our passengers and on company profitability. We will work in partnership with Rolling Stock Leasing Companies and our own Engineers to improve the design of existing stock and to remove or redesign features vulnerable to misuse. For new trains we will work in close co-operation with the builders in adopting a policy of “secured by design” which will minimise opportunities for vandalism, anti-social behaviour and misuse of vehicles. Where appropriate we will enhance security on services through the presence of trained Security Staff and greater staff visibility.

Our Timetable: We understand the annoyance and inconvenience caused to our passengers by the cancellation and delays to train services as a consequence of the irresponsible and criminal acts of, a minority. Southern will work with other railway partners to preserve the railway from “open access” and to eliminate delay and losses arising from external factors.

Young People: Southern acknowledges and welcomes responsible use of the railway by young people. Together with other industry partners we will adopt an education and marketing strategy intended to ensure that young people appreciate the value of rail travel but are also aware of the inherent dangers to themselves and others if the environment is misused.

Other Organisations: Southern believes that maintaining a secure and a safe railway environment cannot be achieved alone, but depends upon a commitment from all members of the Railway Industry and external agencies to the principals of crime reduction. The Company will actively encourage other stakeholders to share our vision for a secure railway environment. To achieve our goals we will work in partnership with others, including but not exclusively, the British Transport Police, Civil Police, DfT and other Government Agencies, Transport for London, Network Rail, Rail Safety & Standards Board, Health and Safety Executive, Other Train Operating Companies, Rolling Stock Leasing Companies, Industry, Local Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships, Local Authorities, Schools and Youth Organisations.

Memorandum submitted by Network Rail

1. Further to the Committee's announcement of its inquiry into Personal Passenger Safety in Railway Stations, Network Rail would like to take the opportunity to provide a number of comments on this subject and in relation to the questions posed.

2. We do note that this inquiry is separate from your on-going inquiry into transport security, "Travelling without Fear", in response to which we have already made a detailed submission. However, the committee are invited to take our earlier submission into account as it deals in detail with significant activities related to passenger safety such as the £17 million upgrade of Network Rail's London CCTV network of 2,500 cameras across our 10 directly managed London stations.

3. As the committee will be aware, although Network Rail owns around 2,500 stations, all but 17 are leased back to the Train Operators who manage and maintain the stations on a day-to-day basis and are responsible for the provision of on-station staff. Over 50% of all passenger journeys start or finish at a station managed by Network Rail. They are the hub of the rail network where the needs of hundreds of thousands of people are met every day. Over 650 million people pass through our stations every year.

4. By virtue of the size of the those stations that Network Rail does manage (mostly the London termini and a number of the city centre stations such as Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow), they are all continuously staffed and are recognised by our stakeholders as delivering high levels of personal security.

5. Whilst the National Audit Office (NAO) grouped responses of passengers using the 28 largest "hub stations" at the highest level, our own customer satisfaction surveys show that there is a 92% satisfaction with security at Network Rail's stations.

6. Overall, Network Rail strongly believes that stations play a key role in the service provided to passengers. Stations influence the experience at the start and end of every journey, which is why Network Rail and its predecessor have invested almost £400 million over the past five years in its 17 major stations.

7. Network Rail continues to work with train operators, the Government and other funding partners to improve the standards and facilities at railway stations.

8. Outside of those for which we have daily management responsibilities, we believe that there is much left to be done to improve station environments, thereby addressing a number of issues including safety. Network Rail has work underway to make it easier to collaborate with other organisations to deliver station improvements and is seeking to lever in some £4bn of investment over the next 10 years from property developers to help fund station improvements.

9. In respect of the Secure Stations Scheme, with the exception of one Station currently undergoing its periodic re-accreditation, all our stations are members of the scheme. Obviously, as a supporter, Network Rail would welcome more activity by all industry bodies in this area to raise passenger awareness of, and support for, these initiatives. As we have recently completed our own investment in improved facilities, we are keen to welcome greater TOC participation in the schemes, particularly for stations where there are high levels of crime.

10. Network Rail's stations therefore all operate at a level of security above the minimum laid out in the scheme. In addition, by way of their size and high profile, they are subject to a wider range of inspection regimes which cover a range of standards and processes. As such we would not propose to comment on the impact of the scheme at the minimum level of accreditation and inspection.

11. Of those few (8%) of passengers who do report not feeling safe at our stations, the main reasons cited are: threat of terrorism, lack of security presence, overcrowding, undesirables, threat of theft, and threat of assault.

12. Our experience is that a number of simple measures generally have a significant impact in the perceived security of a station including: the maintenance of a clean and well-lit environment, the prompt repair or removal of vandalism and graffiti, a visible presence of railway or police personnel, good signage and information, and the removal of people begging, sleeping or loitering around the station premises.

13. The Secure Station Scheme, while specifically covering the station and car parking facilities only, does recognise the security elements of the "whole journey"—eg the local street lighting, car parking facilities, the availability of bus timetables and information, and telephone numbers and accessibility of local taxi services—may make all the difference to the passenger's perception of the rail journey. Again these are elements built into our planning of station facilities and information in as far as possible.

14. As well as independent customer surveys, our main London termini have nominated contacts from London Travel Watch to inspect and report on the services and facilities, our station managers engage in face-to-face passenger contacts to receive comments and criticisms, and we share best practice with security and police bodies as well as members of other railway industry bodies.

15. The overall protection and improvement of passenger safety at stations is a concern of our Safety and Environment Plan. The principle risk identified in this context is through the boarding or alighting from trains at stations—something that remains one of the main causes of passenger accidents.

16. The train operating companies are responsible for control of this accident risk, and the replacement of Mark 1 slam-door trains with modern rolling stock with automatic doors will reduce it. We will support the train operators in the management of this risk by progressing the risk-based platform stepping strategy agreed by the SRA, ORR and HSE.

17. With regards to the question of clarity to passengers of responsibility for security, we would comment that passengers tend to regard security holistically—believing that the vast majority of those industry representatives they interact with during the course of their journey bear a shared degree of responsibility for their safety—as indeed they and their fellow passengers do themselves.

18. As I hope the above demonstrates, Network Rail is always striving for practical opportunities to improve safety at our stations, we believe these efforts are delivering results for passengers and that our staff and customers can rightly be proud of the levels of satisfaction we are largely achieving.

30 March 2006

Witnesses: **Mr George Muir**, Director General, Association of Train Operating Companies, **Mr David Franks**, Managing Director, National Express Group, **Mr Ian Dobbs**, Chief Executive, Rail Division, Stagecoach Group, **Mr Andrew Haines**, Managing Director, Railways, First Group, **Mr Keith Ludeman**, Chief Executive, Rail, Go-Ahead Group, and **Mr Robin Gisby**, Network Rail, gave evidence.

Chairman: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome. We do have one or two bits of housekeeping to perform, but I should warn you that I am threatened with a division so I would say to the witnesses that should the entire Committee rise to its feet and leave, I trust that you will not take this personally! Members having an interest to declare?

Mr Martlew: Member of the Transport & General Workers' Union and General & Municipal Workers' Union.

Mr Clelland: Member of Amicus.

Graham Stringer: Member of Amicus.

Clive Efford: Member of the Transport & General Workers' Union.

Chairman: ASLEF.

Mrs Ellman: Member of the Transport & General Workers' Union.

Mr Wilshire: South West Trains provide me with a car park pass.

Q1 Chairman: I hope this extravagance will not go to your head! Perhaps we could send them a list of what we would like! Gentlemen, can I ask you first for the record to identify yourselves, starting with you Mr Muir.

Mr Muir: George Muir, Director General of the Association of Train Operating Companies.

Mr Franks: David Franks, Chief Executive of the National Express Group's Trains Division.

Mr Dobbs: Ian Dobbs, Chief Executive of the Rail Division at Stagecoach Group.

Mr Haines: Andrew Haines, MD of the Rail Division of First Group.

Mr Ludeman: Keith Ludeman, Chief Executive of the Go-Ahead Group's Rail Division.

Mr Gisby: Robin Gisby, Director of Operations and Customer Services at Network Rail.

Q2 Chairman: Because you are now in the posh end of the establishment of Westminster you have proper microphones operating in front of you, so with any luck we shall be able to hear what you have to say. Did anybody have a short statement they wanted to make before we begin. Mr Muir?

Mr Muir: Train operators were very pleased that you did decide to have this hearing on safety at stations. It has been on the news recently of course in London and it is very important to our passengers. Looking back over the last 10 years, it is perhaps easy to forget that 10 years ago the conditions on trains and stations were in many places really very poor, and that in the last 10 years the situation on trains and stations has been improved enormously. Train operators regarded the situation they found 10 years ago as quite intolerable for their passengers. Since then they have been recruiting specialist staff and have provided a large number of gated stations, cleaned and painted stations, removed graffiti, introduced CCTV cameras, and supported the British Transport Police. These measures have been effective. Crime on the railway has declined by a good deal in the last 10 years. What happened in the past of course is interesting but it is more important where we go from here. We need to achieve continuous improvement in the safety of our passengers and we have to do this through analysis and good thinking.

Q3 Chairman: Mr Muir, a lot of these areas will be covered by the questions that we are about to ask you. Did you have a particular point that you wanted to make?

Mr Muir: I was going to add that the three areas that we found most effective are patrolling, equipment and partnership with the police.

Q4 Chairman: Thank you. Can I ask our friend from Stagecoach first of all, you said you are in favour of a voluntary approach to raising standards and that high standards of passenger safety are in the interests of commercial companies. If that is the case, why do we have a problem with crime and the fear of crime at stations?

Mr Dobbs: I think in actual fact what we have seen over the last 10 years is a reduction in crime. On our particular franchise, South West Trains, we have seen a reduction of 18% since 1995, despite the fact that passenger numbers have gone up 50%, so in real terms there has been a considerable improvement. That has been against a background of a lack of

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prescription. We have done that for good business reasons. We have also seen a significant reduction in the amount of reported incidents at unmanned stations, which is interesting, particularly over the last three years. Only about 2.3% of crime is actually at those stations whereas the vast majority is at staffed stations, and that is where we have targeted resources.

Q5 Chairman: If this is the result, why would you have a problem with compulsory standards?

Mr Dobbs: I do not think we have got a problem with it as such. We will look at whatever Government puts to us. We have to bid as franchisees on whatever terms are put to us, but we think that over the last 10 years we have seen that the voluntary approach, which is customer focused, it is targeted at our customers on the ground, has actually worked.

Q6 Chairman: Given the large numbers of stations there are, how can the Government ensure that they are safe for passengers across the whole of the network without some very sensible, basic, compulsory standards?

Mr Dobbs: We have actually employed voluntary standards during the last 10 years to get where we are today. It is clear that as we go forward in the way the franchises are put to us, the way we have to bid, that things are changing slightly. There are often requirements when we bid and we take on franchises to improve the position that we inherit. Certainly on South West Trains, as an example, we have done that to a huge degree, both in terms of the staffing we have put on the ground and in terms of the technology we put out there as well. It is a joint thing.

Q7 Chairman: Mr Franks, you have got a rather more prescriptive approach in mind from the Government. Tell us why that is?

Mr Franks: I think a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate to solving this problem across the whole of the railway network. The current arrangements are that our franchise agreements outline a number of requirements, and if there is a standard in place at the moment that is where it sits, and so we have things like in some cases secure station accreditation, provision of CCTV, help points, *et cetera*. That does feature in some franchise agreements but it does not feature in all of them. So there is some inconsistency.

Q8 Chairman: I am going to stop you there. If there are 2,500 railway stations and only 323 of them are accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme, it is not a very good percentage, is it?

Mr Dobbs: No, but I do not think the Secure Station approach as it is currently set out and as it currently works is appropriate for all stations.

Q9 Chairman: Why?

Mr Dobbs: It can be bureaucratic and it can be very expensive to introduce. I will give you another example.

Q10 Chairman: No, do not leave that one. Bureaucratic in what sense? If you have not got compulsory standards to comply with why is the system bureaucratic and why has it cost you a lot of money?

Mr Dobbs: I will give you one example. If you take a very small station today, if you want to get Secure Station accreditation, you have to carry out passenger surveys, you have to have a crime reduction plan, you have to put in CCTV, and there are a number of other requirements, for example the design of the station itself. In some cases, the cost of doing that would be far too much and it would be better to come up with a different approach to managing the problem at that station. You asked earlier on about why does National Express prefer something more prescriptive. I think in some cases if at the outset of a franchise it was very clear to bidders what they were bidding for and it was clear what was required at individual stations, then all bidders would bid for that franchise against that specification. If that specification, as I say, was clear, there would be an equal bid from everybody.

Q11 Chairman: How many stations do you actually manage?

Mr Dobbs: We manage directly 488.

Q12 Chairman: How many of those are accredited?

Mr Dobbs: I have got the details here somewhere. I can give that you information a bit later.

Q13 Chairman: It would be what, a majority of them or a tiny percentage of them, given that you have got this feeling about it?

Mr Dobbs: It is a relatively small percentage of the stations. I think there is a real opportunity to improve the Secure Station approach to life.

Q14 Chairman: So what would you want that would encourage you to seek accreditation for all of your stations?

Mr Dobbs: I think what we would need to do is perhaps not have a pass/fail approach to Secure Station accreditation; we ought to have something like a star rating. An approach which we would support at National Express Group would be to say at a small station, where perhaps we provide help points and we provide a plan to monitor and manage crime, it might be suitable for a one-star rating, whereas at a larger station where we are providing the full gambit of facilities—staffing around the clock, the design is adequate, CCTV coverage and the other requirements that are currently set down in Secure Station accreditation—in that scenario we would perhaps get a five-star rating. In that arrangement we could work towards accreditation of all stations.

Q15 Graham Stringer: Can I just follow that up. Certainly the specialist press seem to be surprised by the Minister Derek Twigg's answer to a Parliamentary question last month where he said in

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new franchises he was looking on a station-by-station basis at security. From what you were saying in answer to the Chairman, does that mean to say you would be happy with that approach?

Mr Dobbs: If it is specified at the outset in the invitation to tender for that franchise, everybody would be bidding against that. Today if National Express Group were to bid for a franchise on the basis of Secure Station accreditation in the franchise, we would not win the bid.

Q16 Graham Stringer: Do you think that the Minister has enough information to be able to specify in the franchises exactly what is required, both for health and safety reasons and personal security at stations?

Mr Dobbs: They would need to talk to the current operator to get that information because obviously it requires surveys and risk assessments at stations. There are a number of factors that are relevant.

Q17 Graham Stringer: From the information that you have, is the Department for Transport collecting that information at the present time on each individual station for which you are responsible?

Mr Dobbs: The next franchise that is going out to tender will be the current Silverlink Metro franchise which will become the North London concessions part of Transport for London's remit. We are providing information for that franchise.

Q18 Graham Stringer: On a station-by-station basis?

Mr Dobbs: Yes, there is a specific requirement from the Mayor for that information.

Q19 Mrs Ellman: What proportion of stations has CCTV? Perhaps Mr Muir could give us the reply across the network and then the individual operators can tell us for their operations.

Mr Muir: In London about three-quarters to 80% of stations have CCTV.

Q20 Mrs Ellman: And outside of London?

Mr Muir: I would have thought a very much smaller percentage. I cannot guess the percentage.

Q21 Mrs Ellman: Why is it that you know the figure for London but you do not know the figure for outside of London?

Mr Muir: Because I had a lot of data about London. For the preparation for this report I just had more data about London.

Mr Franks: We operate at National Express a number of stations outside of London. Of our 488 stations in total, 199 have CCTV, so just shy of 50%.

Mr Dobbs: We have 76% of our stations covered by CCTV, 1,888 cameras on stations, a further 1,788 cameras on trains, and another 1,400-odd cameras to come on trains that are to be updated, so over 5,000 cameras.

Q22 Mrs Ellman: And your plans for the future?

Mr Dobbs: Our franchise at the moment is in the rebidding phase so I imagine my competitors along here would—

Q23 Chairman: The important thing Mrs Ellman is concerned about is that you did include the ones actually on the trains there, did you not?

Mr Dobbs: On trains and on stations, yes.

Q24 Chairman: So it is not quite the same thing, is it? What are the numbers actually on the stations?

Mr Dobbs: 76% of stations have cameras.

Q25 Mrs Ellman: And what are you planning for the remainder?

Mr Dobbs: We have only got a few months of the franchise left and obviously for confidentiality reasons I am not able to say in public what our bid is going to be. I am sure my competitors will be in exactly the same position sitting around me, but suffice it to say we are planning to invest further in station security and clearly it is a very important issue for the business and for our customers.

Mr Haines: We run all the stations in Scotland and about half of those are covered, about 188.

Chairman: I am very sorry, the Committee stands adjourned. I would be grateful if Members would be back in 10 minutes. I hope to rely on your speed.

*The Committee was suspended from
2.59 pm to 3.10 pm for a division in the House.*

Chairman: Mrs Ellman?

Q26 Mrs Ellman: Do you agree that minimum standards should be put in place for the standard of images on CCTV? Has anyone got any views on the proposal that there should be minimum standards for images produced on CCTV?

Mr Muir: Yes there should and the new Code of Practice that we have brought out indicates that they will be when people upgrade them. What one has to appreciate though for CCTV is that the train operators moved very quickly into introducing CCTV before digital cameras were available, and as a result we have got a large investment in analogue cameras. However, the cameras we have been bringing in more recently have been the updated digital ones. When people change cameras or put new ones in they will be to that standard.

Q27 Mrs Ellman: How does that standard compare with European stations?

Mr Muir: I do not know but it is a very good quality. I have seen it, it is stunning quality.

Q28 Chairman: Does anyone else have any ideas?

Mr Haines: I would support the move to digital cameras as they are replaced. In fact, I think it would be a better use of resource than 100% coverage of stations where there are maybe only one or two passengers a day to upgrade to digital cameras. It is

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a good example of where a jam spread may not be the most effective way of getting a secure environment for people.

Q29 Mr Leech: My follow-up question was whether or not the extra investment is now being spent on replacing existing camera technology rather than making up the rest of the network that currently does not have cameras.

Mr Haines: In our case it is very much a mix of both. We aim to get 95% of passenger journeys monitored by CCTV. We think the increment beyond that would be prohibitively expensive for the value and it is much better to spend the money in upgrading existing cameras.

Q30 Mr Leech: When you say monitored by CCTV do you mean live monitored so someone is always looking at it, or do you mean having CCTV there so that it can be looked at if necessary?

Mr Haines: A mix. Certainly in the next two years the vast majority of our cameras will be monitored 24 hours a day by dedicated staff. There are some stations where the cost of doing that is very expensive. It is typically about £50,000 to link into a single station. If it is a very lightly used station it may not be the best use of resource, but the majority will be manned and supervised as opposed to just recorded.

Q31 Chairman: Mr Gisby also wanted to say something on that.

Mr Gisby: We run the 17 largest stations. They are obviously all covered extensively with modern systems. The next money that we will spend will be on image recognition, processing and the management of the information that is coming from the cameras. I think that is where we have to go now. If you look at the time it takes to process information and then lead to prosecutions and convictions, the effort involved in that—and I am sure the Chief Constable will speak to this later and I also speak as a member of the British Transport Police Authority—that is where the investment has to go next. Instead of chasing coverage of 2,500 stations at 100% we should be looking at better links between the data gathering we already have and the processing of that subsequently. That is where we need to go next. We are capturing an awful lot of information, not just in our industry but links with local authorities and with communities, with the civil as well as the Transport Police, to be 100% sure we are making 100% use of the information that we are gathering, I think that is where we should look next.

Q32 Mrs Ellman: What other work is being done on using the information that is gathered?

Mr Ludeman: If I may offer an example. Within Southern we have a control room that looks after a good deal of the Metro stations in the network which runs from Victoria, London Bridge, *et cetera*. That was an initiative we embarked on jointly with TfL and we have 24-hour monitoring of those stations.

We look for particular patterns of behaviour because what we are after eventually is getting a prosecution and deterring people from committing crime on our stations. So it is a mix of the information that you have in front of you, the quality of the image, and the degree to which you can then pursue a prosecution in a way that then leads on to identifying individuals you can find on other parts of your network to try and stop crime in the future. There is one example where we work with TfL within a London TOC to aggressively reduce crime on the network using the most up-to-date CCTV we have.

Q33 Chairman: Is that analogue or digital?

Mr Ludeman: Digital.

Mr Dobbs: Just to reinforce what Mr Ludeman was saying there, the quality of information, the quality of image you get is very important from a prosecution point of view. One of the things we have done in our CCTV room, which monitors about 70-odd stations, is we have employed two full-time evidence gatherers whose sole job it is to sift information, to extract it, and to package it up in such a way that it is admissible in court to prosecute people, because if you do not do that then the system becomes just a toy.

Q34 Mrs Ellman: How far is the CCTV system linked up with the PA systems?

Mr Dobbs: Certainly in our case most of the stations, if not all of them, are from Wimbledon CCTV centre link.

Q35 Mrs Ellman: Is that the same everywhere?

Mr Ludeman: You tend to have facilities at the larger stations that then allow you to speak to the smaller stations in your network. We are able to speak to most of our stations from various points within our network, a long-line PA and we can reach most of our customers in that way.

Q36 Mr Martlew: On that very point, recently in the Underground there has been a situation where somebody is watching the monitor and announces this young lad has either jumped over the gate or whatever, and it is very reassuring to the public that somebody on the PA sees something happen and announces it and puts a spotlight on the individual. Is that something you are thinking of continuing or expanding?

Mr Haines: We are just in the process this week of letting a contract for the Trans-Pennine Express for all its stations, and that is very much an integrated system where we will buy customer information systems at the same time as a CCTV intelligent network.

Mr Franks: I was going to make two quick points. One was that our own facilities within National Express Group are being upgraded too, so we do not have just analogue systems, wherever we can we upgrade. On c2c—that is the route between London-Southend-Shrewburyness, for example—it is completely digital. We are just about to build a control centre which will be manned 24 hours a day

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and do the sorts of things that have just been described. That is the way forward. The other point I wanted to make very quickly is that I am not sure whether the Committee has seen the guidance note that has been issued for CCTV on stations. It is a joint guidance note between ATOC, the British Transport Police and Network Rail and it does cover a number of the things that have just been talked about. I have a copy here which I am prepared to leave behind.

Chairman: That is very helpful.

Q37 Mrs Ellman: What are your policies on staffing stations at all times while trains are running?

Mr Franks: Staffing is one approach to tackling the problem of security for both our customers and also our staff. We take our responsibilities at NEG very very, seriously. We want to provide a secure environment but, as I say, staffing is just one approach to tackling the problem. Other approaches include mobile teams.

Q38 Mrs Ellman: Could I just stop you there. I want to focus for the moment on staffing, so what are you doing about staffing on stations?

Mr Franks: What we do in National Express Group is assess the risks at each of our stations. The evidence comes about in various forms. For example, we have crime data which is provided by the British Transport Police. We have comments from our staff and from our customers. We have our own research where we talk to our customers. That forms the basis for a risk assessment. On the basis of that assessment we then determine the right levels of security that are to be provided at a particular location. For a very small station where perhaps the design of it is adequate and maybe the footfall at that station is quite light, and it does not have a history of any crime, then the staffing at that station would be very much dependent upon the commercial needs. At other stations, say where the crime rates are particularly high—and I can give you a very good example on Silverlink Metro which will become the new North London franchise—all of the stations where the crime levels are relatively significant are actually staffed from the start of service to the close of service. Where the crime rates are lower different approaches are taken.

Mr Dobbs: It is very difficult to add very much to what Mr Franks has said. He has summarised what all train operating companies do and that is about assessing the risk.

Q39 Chairman: I think we are going to have to ask all of you for rather more precise information on some of this. Mr Muir, we would like the exact figures on some of the numbers of stations that are covered and how many of them.

Mr Muir: I have the figures for London but I do not have them with me.

Q40 Chairman: As an Association I am sure you have members outside of London, Mr Muir?

Mr Muir: Yes.

Mr Ludeman: Would it be helpful, Chairman, if I gave an example of one of my train companies as to which stations are manned and which ones are not?

Q41 Chairman: Yes, we would like that.

Mr Ludeman: Within Southern in the Metro area, we have 58 stations and 52 of those are fully staffed Monday to Friday. When you dip down to Saturday 46 are manned and Sunday 35 are manned. That is reflecting the various levels of activity at those stations on those days. Re-emphasising what Mr Franks said, we look at how we allocate people to serve those stations, not necessarily locating them permanently at those stations—they might move around in a peripatetic way, they might be a security person or a ticket person. It depends on the commercial requirements at that station at that time. You will see from that very quick analysis that the majority of stations are manned for most of the traffic day. It is only on Sundays when less are manned but the majority of them are.

Q42 Mrs Ellman: Do any of you know how much would it cost to staff your stations at all times trains are running?

Mr Ludeman: Yes.

Q43 Chairman: Not this afternoon, but would you be prepared to do us a detailed note?

Mr Ludeman: We have researched the numbers so if you take the country as a whole you are looking at about £25 million in the London area if every station was manned.

Q44 Chairman: But that is everybody, not just you?

Mr Ludeman: That is all the London operators within the London area.

Q45 Chairman: We would welcome a short supplementary note from all of you. Those with large stations I am sure will give large submissions.

Mr Gisby: We are all manned 100% so I do not think I need to give you anything further.

Mr Dobbs: I think one thing that we should stress is that we do put a lot of credence on having flexible staffing in these areas, so that rather than having one person in one place at one time, which can be difficult, we move people around and we have specially trained groups of staff, whether they be TravelSafe officers or Transport Police obviously as well, going round providing a visible presence on stations as required, which is risk based.

Q46 Mrs Ellman: Could you give us the reasons why the CCTV you have got is not fully monitored? What is the reason for that?

Mr Muir: When it was introduced it was impractical because it was originally analogue and it was extremely difficult to get the images from the stations up to a central office. The first people to do a live monitor were in fact in Scotland in about 1999. I remember them introducing the first live monitoring

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of trains to very, very good effect. It is now being live monitored because now it is practical because of digital technology.

Q47 Mrs Ellman: Any other explanations?

Mr Ludeman: I suppose if you consider the amount of potential images that you would have to be looking at, we are not just talking about stations, we are talking about on our trains as well. In one of my franchises we have 1,054 rail vehicles and in the other one we have 1,313. That is an awful lot of images to look at.

Q48 Chairman: I am very interested in this. Who looks at the stuff? Is it digital on the rolling stock, in the carriages?

Mr Ludeman: What we do is follow up incidents so when we know there has been an incident we will go back and look at the evidence.

Q49 Chairman: So somebody has to create a bit of a fuss before anyone takes any notice of what is coming through? When it is on a carriage where is the point at which that material is monitored and checked?

Mr Ludeman: We have all that information in the depots that we operate and we do review that information. We are only looking at incidents because of the sheer volume of the material.

Q50 Chairman: You have made that point. We are perfectly prepared to accept that, but you have made a very sensible point about the numbers of CCTVs there are on your carriages as well as at your stations. What I am saying to you is where are those images going and how often are they monitored? Are you telling us that they will only be monitored if what is described as an incident comes up?

Mr Ludeman: If it is trains it is the depots.

Q51 Chairman: Are they monitored in the depots so that someone 24 hours a day is checking the stuff coming into the depots?

Mr Ludeman: No, they look at specific incidents.

Q52 Chairman: How do they know there is an incident if they are not actually looking at the screens?

Mr Ludeman: Because it is reported.

Q53 Chairman: So you have to wait for the train staff to tell you "we had a problem on the Liverpool line" before you realise—

Mr Ludeman: You have to wait for the train to get back into the depot.

Mr Martlew: So it is not live transmission to the depot.

Q54 Chairman: So it is not live transmission, it is a recording and someone has to draw your attention to a particular incident?

Mr Ludeman: Our staff or the individuals involved in the incident will make a report. We gather the report and we will check back.

Q55 Chairman: And how often have you prosecuted from that evidence in the last 12 months?

Mr Ludeman: We do not of course make the prosecution.

Q56 Chairman: How often have you brought in the BTP and asked for action on something?

Mr Ludeman: I do not have the figures immediately to hand.

Q57 Mr Scott: A couple of points. From what you are saying it is mainly reactive rather than proactive. You are looking after someone has reported an event rather than trying to immediately notify the authorities of that?

Mr Haines: I think there is a big distinction there between trains and stations.

Q58 Chairman: Not if they are not monitored, Mr Haines.

Mr Haines: The distinction I am trying to draw is that of the 188 stations we have got, 98% of the footfall is continuously monitored, but we do not do that on the trains. There is no continuous monitoring of every single vehicle on every single train. For that we wait for an incident but at the stations 98% of passenger movements are continuously monitored.

Q59 Mr Scott: On a number of the stations you have town centre CCTV which is monitored 24 hours, seven days a week. Has it been looked at plugging into that so you would not have the additional staff costs that you mentioned earlier? How many have looked into that?

Mr Franks: You make a very good point. There are examples where that is happening, where we are linking our stations into town centre schemes. There is a lot more that should be done.

Mr Dobbs: We have a couple of schemes in South West Trains again which are linked to the local councils. Again, to reinforce what Mr Franks said, we will do more in the future. It is a partnership that we need to take forward.

Q60 Clive Efford: Can I just follow up on CCTV because my experience of CCTV is that my local monitoring station is as big as this room and it is a room full of TV screens. The idea of 24-hour monitoring is just a myth, is it not? You have got two or three people looking at 40 or 50-odd screens. Is not CCTV a limited tool and are there not regulations about the use of CCTV that require a certain size image of anybody who has committed a crime before you can go to any sort of action against an individual? I do not know who would like to answer that, but I think it is a very limited tool in my experience.

Mr Haines: There are some limitations to it but the evidence is there for our own eyes. We have seen significant reductions in crime and we have also seen significant reductions in passenger fear of crime. If you look at CCTV in control centres, you are right, if you walk into a control centre where there is a

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bank of 50 TV screens, it can be quite mind-blowing. Having worked alongside the professionals who work in there day after day, they get very, very attuned to picking up hot-spots and being able to notice differences. There is technology being developed that is meant to be intelligent CCTV that will trace unusual movements. Thus far when we have tested it in procurement processes it is not as good as salesmen tend to suggest. It is something we look at closely because, you are absolutely right, if you could get something that could target risk locations or risk activities then it would make it an even better tool.

Q61 Chairman: Why do we not ask Mr Gisby that?

Mr Gisby: Which of the many questions would that be?

Q62 Chairman: Mr Gisby, if you have got these big stations and we know that most of the big crime is happening on big stations, what would your attitude be to that? Do you have a problem with your existing systems?

Mr Gisby: We use them in a number of ways. We do monitor them. We have in London, as it says in the papers, 2,500 screens and one person can look at three or four screens. Do I have 600 or 700 people looking at the screens all the time? No I do not. We monitor them where we expect trouble. We advise jointly with the police where there might be trouble. However, it is one of a number of things. We have a lot of police community support officers provided by the BTP and we have a lot of our own staff across the stations as well.

Q63 Chairman: What do you call a lot across 17 stations?

Mr Gisby: We have a couple of hundred round London and all our stations are manned fully all the time, 580 staff across 17 stations.

Q64 Chairman: Do you pay for those?

Mr Gisby: Yes. So it complements other things that we do on the station. We use it reactivity, obviously following up incidents and prosecutions. When we have had an incident reported it is very effective in helping us. We also use it proactively just for managing crowds. It is also very useful to us in the ebb and flow of things across the network. We can see where we have got hot-spots, and if we have got certain incidents we can react to those as well.

Q65 Clive Efford: How many of the people who are monitoring the screens are in radio contact with the British Transport Police or any other enforcement officers?

Mr Gisby: They would be on each station jointly with the Transport Police where they are based as well as through the station management structure. We can provide a back-up note on that if you require.

Q66 Clive Efford: So where cameras are monitored as opposed to the ones that are on the carriages if an incident is reported, then the person monitoring the screens can focus in on that particular area and then play their part in dealing with the situation?

Mr Gisby: Yes. I think we should be clear here though, the vast majority of the usage of this equipment is reactive, to follow up after incidents that are reported elsewhere which have occurred because a number of complementary systems have not worked—people on the platform, staff here, police there, support officers elsewhere, the deterrent effect of CCTV and other things. That is mainly where they are used. I would not like this Committee to go away with the idea that we have across the industry large numbers of people in real time monitoring people across stations and proactively nipping events happening in real time at the time. It is not like that.

Q67 Clive Efford: If an incident is reported on one of your stations, is it then immediately brought to the attention of the people monitoring the CCTV cameras so that they can play their part in recording any incidents that might take place?

Mr Gisby: Yes and that can happen very quickly. It can also, depending on the quality of the image, the cameras and the co-ordination with BTP, take some time, hence my comment earlier that further investment in this area and further co-operation and liaison in this area is about sharing in real time and quickly the information we are already gathering. I would not put up an awful lot more cameras in my 17 major stations. What I am interested in is quick, real time processing, sharing that information with other authorities and other CCTV networks, and some of the stuff to which Mr Haines referred, which is more computer-based image recognition equipment so that we can get to the heart of the matter quicker. I am sure the Chief Constable will talk about it later, but if you go to the video editing suite of the BTP, it can take an awful long time to go through an awful lot of images in order to get patterns of behaviour and to capture people. I think you will remember that after the incidents last summer the images that Luton were produced fairly quickly. The images which obviously helped come from our cameras of previous work there took some weeks to find because 17,000 tapes and images were taken away in the first couple of days. It takes time to go through that stuff, whether you are dealing with very major incidents or relatively minor ones. That is probably where more of the investment should go now so that people can respond more quickly.

Q68 Clive Efford: Is there an issue about the quality and the size of the image before any action can be taken?

Mr Gisby: With the investment that is going into digital equipment and so on, it is moving in the right way. You are seeing the end result of some years of frustration, I think, within the industry and elsewhere about the degree of evidential definition

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you do finally need to get for a conviction. It is quite a challenge to get sufficient evidence, particularly given where some of these events happen, the lighting, the dress of the person, and so on, simply to get a conviction, but I think with the information and images we are getting now that is getting much better.

Q69 Clive Efford: Can I ask Mr Dobbs, you pay for TravelSafe officers who are deployed by the British Transport Police. How effective have these been as compared to fully trained police officers and community support officers in preventing crime on railways?

Mr Dobbs: They have proven to be very, very effective. We originally gave an undertaking to introduce just over 30 officers and we have brought in 56, so we obviously believe that they have a very—

Q70 Chairman: Are they identifiable, Mr Dobbs?

Mr Dobbs: They are dressed in very distinctive uniforms. They do not try to look like policemen but they wear hats, jackets, trousers, they are smartly dressed, and they are out there to make sure that anti-social behaviour does not fall on to railway property and on to trains. They are very flexible. We can put them in different combinations in different places at different times, again based on risk.

Q71 Clive Efford: What are the significant differences between them and community support officers?

Mr Dobbs: That is a question that I am not qualified to answer. I will have to give you a reply on that afterwards. I do not know the answer to that.

Q72 Clive Efford: What powers do they have? Do they have the powers to stop someone and ask to see their ticket or remove someone from a station or do they call the police in those situations?

Mr Dobbs: They have limited powers but they do not have the power of arrest. If that is required the Transport Police officers back them up. They are deployed by the Transport Police as a means of gaining intelligence and also getting out there on the trains and having a very visible presence.

Q73 Clive Efford: Do they have an accreditation under the Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme?

Mr Dobbs: I do not think so.

Q74 Chairman: Mr Haines has something to tell us.

Mr Haines: I was only going to help my colleague out because it is a bit of an incestuous industry and I introduced the TravelSafe officers in a previous life. They were the precursor to the community support officers. If you like, they were the pilot.

Mr Gisby: So you know the difference between them and the CSOs?

Mr Dobbs: There is not a lot of difference. I do not believe they are accredited. The accreditation is much more an initiative by the British Transport Police and most operators are still reviewing the merits of that.

Q75 Clive Efford: Do they give the public a false sense of security by deploying officers with fewer powers or are they effective in dealing with anti-social behaviour?

Mr Haines: My experience of both TravelSafe officers and community support officers is that they are more readily available than police officers, you can deploy them more quickly, and they are easier to recruit.

Q76 Chairman: Are they cheaper?

Mr Haines: Per head yes, but that was not the driver originally. It was a shortage of British Transport Police officers that drove us down that route at the time. We had vacancies at local police stations which they were struggling to recruit to in the south-east of England in particular.

Q77 Clive Efford: Do they have to undergo CRB checks?

Mr Haines: Very much so. They are recruited alongside the British Transport Police who are involved in the process.

Q78 Clive Efford: Is it not likely to create confusion in the eyes of the public if you have got private security guards which are yours, TravelSafe offices, community support officers, railway enforcement officers and police officers, if there are so many enforcement officers for them to deal with?

Mr Gisby: I think you are looking at a number of proposals over the last couple of years to come forward and solve this problem. You are looking also at a possible restructuring of the Transport Police and moving perhaps towards a more focused force. I think there will be an evolution here. Different operators and ourselves have all come at this in slightly different ways. There has been an overlap to that as a response to what happened last summer and so on. I believe there is a role for a body of men and women that are not as expensive to train and maintain and as specialist as the Transport Police themselves, but fit somewhere between what one might call straightforward railway station staff and a higher level of security staff but not going as far as a fully-fledged Transport Police officer. Whether that is a CSO coming a little downwards from a fully-fledged constable or it is the rail industry moving a little further forward into more measures of hands-on security—

Chairman: I think we need to ask the police about that, Mr Gisby.

Q79 Mr Wilshire: Mr Gisby touched on the point that concerns me. I would like to ask all six of you would merging the British Transport Police with a different police force make your railway stations safer?

Mr Gisby: No. Absolutely not.

Q80 Chairman: But does that mean that you would consider some form of private force if you all seem to be seriously considering employing—

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Mr Gisby: I am not sure about that.

Q81 Mr Wilshire: Could we get the answer from each of the six?

Mr Ludeman: British Transport Police has done a first-class job for the railways because it is a specialist force and it is a national force.

Q82 Chairman: Is that a yes or a no?

Mr Ludeman: I am working towards one—but money is important and we have to live within our means. We have looked at other means of expanding the number of people visible in our stations.

Q83 Chairman: So is it a yes or a no, Mr Ludeman?

Mr Ludeman: We do not want the BTP merged with the Home Office force. We want the specialism of a force that knows what the railway needs to continue.

Mr Haines: I do not think it is a yes or no answer. It would depend on the terms. I think there is real value in retaining the British Transport Police but it would depend on the terms of policing the stations.

Mr Dobbs: We do not want a merger but we believe that there is probably a modified role that makes their presence on stations even more effective.

Mr Franks: Our position is the same as Mr Dobbs'.

Mr Muir: My position is the same as the gentleman's on my left.

Chairman: I would hope it was, Mr Muir, that is why I did not bother to ask you!

Clive Efford: Is there anything more that the British Transport Police could do to improve safety on our railways? It is an open question to any of you. There are no burning issues amongst any of the train operators?

Q84 Chairman: Nothing they do not do? Mr Muir, you are going to take it upon yourself?

Mr Muir: If I can recover from the last question. Yes, I think we can do more in local policing. There is more to be done in co-ordinating staff—train operator staff and BTP staff—locally under the rubric of neighbourhood policing.

Q85 Chairman: You mean you would like railway staff trained like policemen?

Mr Gisby: No I did not mean that. I meant more careful, organised, thought-through collaboration at a local level between us and the BTP: "can I get more with the resources we have got?"

Q86 Chairman: I do not want to keep you very much longer, gentlemen. Tell me about crime against staff; what measures are you taking to protect your staff against crime?

Mr Ludeman: Railway crime against our staff obviously means assaults and there are a number of different initiatives we have followed over the years. If you look at the number of assaults at the moment, it is largely a London and South East issue.

Q87 Chairman: How many people have you prosecuted over the last two years?

Mr Ludeman: I could not give you the figure for prosecutions.

Q88 Chairman: Would every one of you give me a short note on the numbers of people who have been prosecuted for assaults against staff, and if there is any special classification of those perhaps you could provide the Committee with that as well.

Mr Ludeman: There is, Chairman, a good news story in that over the last 12 months we have seen the tide turn gradually on the number of assaults.

Q89 Chairman: Is that anything to do with the Rail Personal Security Group?

Mr Ludeman: I think it has got to do with the amount of investment that my colleagues and I have described to you today in our stations and on our trains. It is to do with the training we have instigated with our staff, assault avoidance techniques and the like, changes to the design of stations to improve the environment, but also at a national level the group that you have just mentioned, which we believe is a first-class group. There are plenty of examples of initiatives that that group is involved in that enable best practice to be shared amongst the TOCs which has seen the number of assaults on our staff of a serious nature at long last start to reduce.

Q90 Chairman: So you have got a target for the reduction of assaults on staff?

Mr Ludeman: We set ourselves our own targets within each company, but it is always too many.

Q91 Chairman: If you could tell us that as well.

Mr Ludeman: We could do.

Q92 Chairman: Who can tell us about the multi-operator stations and the difficulty of explaining to people who is actually in charge?

Mr Haines: I am happy to pick that one up.

Q93 Chairman: Mr Haines, how do you tell the public that you are in charge?

Mr Haines: The relationship with passengers is with the train operators. I think that is pretty clear on most stations. As part of every franchise agreement you have to have details of who runs the stations, who provides the services, contact details for the company, and the local manager. That is very clear. First Group's policy is to brand everything very clearly "First".

Q94 Chairman: So why are the public so dismayed because they feel nobody is responsible for their safety?

Mr Haines: I have not seen evidence of that dismay. If you look at the national passenger satisfaction surveys you will find that for some of our companies three% of people are dissatisfied with station security.

Q95 Chairman: Do you have a co-ordinated approach across the whole of the train operating companies?

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Mr Haines: Yes and we are developing that further. Mr Franks has already offered the document that shows you our best practice.

Q96 Chairman: Have you also agreed to things like standardised signing?

Mr Haines: I would have to get back to you on whether or not that is an industry-wide standard.

Mr Muir: We have a Code of Practice on standardised signing.

Q97 Chairman: You make sure that all your members adhere to that Code of Practice?

Mr Muir: Not yet.

Q98 Chairman: When are you going to make sure they adhere to it?

Mr Muir: When they upgrade their signing—

Q99 Chairman: Mr Muir, forgive me but some of our stations are not only very ancient but are not going to be upgraded for many years, are they?

Mr Muir: You are correct.

Q100 Chairman: To say that when they are upgraded they are going to have their signs improved so that people will know who is responsible for the station and their safety is not much of an undertaking, is it really?

Mr Haines: That undertaking is already there for everyone, so there is no dubiety on that.

Q101 Chairman: So you can deal with the gap between the time that it is going to take to modernise the stations and the existence of this kind of signage?

Mr Haines: Signage for who is responsible should be at every single station today. People are failing in their duty if that is not the case.

Q102 Chairman: How many of them have you seen yourself, Mr Haines?

Mr Haines: Hundreds.

Q103 Chairman: Hundreds?

Mr Haines: Absolutely but that may be because I know where to look.

Q104 Chairman: You could not actually read them but you knew they were there.

Mr Haines: They are normally at the front of the station, very visible to people if you know it.

Q105 Chairman: If you know where to look. If I know where to look I can see it and it is clear, and I know when I get attacked that I can at least be sure that someone will have some kind of record of it even if they cannot actually read it when they get it?

Mr Haines: I would encourage you the next time you are at a station to look. I think you will find one very quickly. They have to be in a visible location. If not, the operators are failing in their duty under the franchise agreement.

Q106 Chairman: You have given me my task for the next 12 months. I shall enjoy going round taking pictures! I just want to finish on transparency generally. The Rail Action Group says that in the East of Scotland at present there is a feeling that no-one is responsible for safety. What are you doing about that?

Mr Haines: In Scotland, for example, we yesterday announced a 30% reduction in violent crime and a 30% reduction in staff assaults at stations.

Q107 Chairman: Then you had better tell some of your passengers because they do not seem to know about it.

Mr Haines: This morning's newspapers in Scotland are full of it, I am glad to say.

Chairman: I think, gentlemen, you have been very indulgent. We do still have one or two questions which we will send to you and ask for written answers. I apologise again for making you wait but you have been very helpful. Next time we shall expect to see an equal opportunities panel. Thank you very much indeed.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Association of Train Operating Companies

I am responding to your letter of 28 April which we received on 4 May. The answers to the questions you raise are set out below:

1. *Question 12: Exactly how many stations are managed by ATOC members, and how many of these are accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?*

Response: ATOC members manage 2,498 stations. Of these, 191 are accredited under the scheme. One further station is working towards accreditation. 23 further stations have been assessed and formal accreditation by the DfT is awaited. Plans are in hand to seek accreditation for a further 59 stations—some of these plans are well advanced with submission to the BTP Assessor due next month.

2. *Questions 41–44: What would be the extra cost of staffing all the stations managed by ATOC members at all times when trains are running?*

Response: Unfortunately, it is not possible to supply the cost of staffing all stations at all times trains are

running. Many stations have been unstaffed for many years, and some have always been unstaffed halts. In most cases there is no accommodation for staff at these stations. Clearly the cost of providing new buildings and servicing them could only be determined after substantial research and it would not be possible to do this in the timescale set for reply. Full time station staffing at all stations is not prescribed in franchise agreements and our evidence made clear that station staffing would not of itself deal with the crime and security issues discussed. In particular, it would have little value at stations with very low footfall.

3. *Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have ATOC members asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis of CCTV evidence?*

Response: Our members make CCTV evidence available to BTP at their request. BTP decides whether or not to prosecute.

4. *Question 64: Across all ATOC members, how many staff monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with BTP officers? What proportion of monitoring staff does this figure represent?*

Response: 560 stations are “live monitored” at one or other of 15 central CCTV monitoring control rooms. The Wimbledon Control Centre, for example, has live feeds from over 1,100 cameras, so continuous monitoring of all is impractical. Live monitoring means that a rotating selection of cameras are monitored with the ability of staff to focus on individual locations as required. All of these centres are in telephone contact with the relevant BTP area control. In some circumstances, for example during major events at Cardiff Millenium stadium, BTP staff are present in the monitoring centre. The CCTV cameras in other stations are monitored locally by station staff. These staff are able to contact BTP by telephone.

5. *Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against the staff of ATOC members, in each of the past five years? And what is the breakdown into different categories of violent crime?*

Response: We do not hold these figures, but the following data from BTP may be helpful. In 2005–06, violent crime comprised the following number of offences:

7,348	Violence against the person
717	Sexual offences
1,692	Robbery offences
9,757	Total, violent crime

The figure for staff assaults represents some 20% of the above total. We do not have details of the number of prosecutions brought by BTP, but the detections for staff assaults for that year totalled 957.

6. *Question 89: What targets does ATOC promote among its members for reducing the number of incidents of violent crime against your staff?*

Response: TOCs have a zero tolerance approach to assaults on staff no matter how minor. The aim is to see year on year reductions in reported assaults. The number of reported assaults is high because TOCs have been putting every effort in to encouraging the reporting of all assaults. TOCs ensure that all staff receive training (and retraining), based on the role that they perform, to minimise the incidents of assault. TOCs have instituted close working relationships with the BTP to ensure that all assaults are thoroughly investigated.

9 May 2006

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the National Express Group PLC

Further to your letter of 28 April I am pleased to enclose the responses relating to National Express Group train operations. You will note that we have been unable to respond in detail to all questions but have endeavoured to respond to the best of our ability across our operations where possible.

<i>Question</i>	<i>c2c Response</i>	<i>Silverlink Metro Response</i>	<i>Silverlink County Response</i>	<i>MML Response</i>	<i>Central Trains Response</i>	<i>One Response</i>	<i>Gatwick Express Response</i>
1 Question 12: Exactly how many stations do you manage, and how many of these are accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?	– Operates 24 stations. – 4 currently hold SSS. – 13 have just received the initial assessment by BTP with a view to being progressed to full accreditation.	– Operates 54 stations. – 5 stations currently hold SSS.	– Operates 29 stations. – 7 stations currently hold SSS. – 4 car parks hold Secure Car Parking status.	– Operates 7 stations. – 5 stations have SSS.	– Operates 193 stations. – None accredited under SSS.	– Operates 166 stations. – None accredited under SSS.	– Manages no stations. – Neither London Victoria nor Gatwick Airport are accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme.
2 Questions 41-44: What would be the extra cost of staffing all your stations at all times when trains are running?	Cost unknown—see ATOC response which makes our points.	Cost unknown—see ATOC response which makes our points.	Cost unknown—see ATOC response which makes our points.	All MML stations are staffed from first to last train.	Cost unknown—see ATOC response which makes our points.	Cost unknown—see ATOC response which makes our points.	Manages no stations. Staff attend all GX departures and arrivals at London Victoria station. Network Rail staff attend all GX arrivals and departures at Gatwick Airport.
3 Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have you asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis of CCTV evidence?	c2c has had over 125 instances where we (and/or the BTP) have requested a CCTV download following an incident. In each case these have been forwarded to BTP for prosecution.	There are no instances where CCTV monitoring has been used to drive a prosecution. CCTV evidence is used upon request from the BTP following an incident or report of crime.	There are no occasions where we have asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis of CCTV evidence.	There are no instances.	BTP will normally request sight of CCTV. No instances known.	BTP will normally request sight of CCTV. No instances known.	None. The BTP has taken decisions to prosecute on other grounds, but not solely on the basis of CCTV evidence.
4 Question 64: How many of your staff monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with BTP officers? What proportion of monitoring staff does this figure represent?	Zero—c2c staff monitoring CCTV would contact the MICC via telephone.	Zero—Silverlink Metro staff monitoring CCTV would contact the MICC via telephone.	Zero—Silverlink County staff monitoring CCTV would contact the MICC via telephone.	Zero	Zero	Zero	Although there are CCTV monitors in our operations delivery centre on platforms 13/14 at London Victoria, they are provided to assist with train working and are not monitored in connection with passenger safety. GX Controllers are not in radio contact with BTP officers. Requests for BTP assistance are made via Network Rail’s Station Control.

<i>Question</i>	<i>c2c Response</i>	<i>Silverlink Metro Response</i>	<i>Silverlink County Response</i>	<i>MML Response</i>	<i>Central Trains Response</i>	<i>One Response</i>	<i>Gatwick Express Response</i>
5 Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against your staff, in each of the past five years? And what is the breakdown into different categories of violent crime?	Of six staff physical assaults five prosecutions have been brought.	Unknown—not available from BTP.	Although there have been a number of investigations into alleged staff assaults, there have been no prosecutions brought.	Two prosecutions have taken place with county court judgments.	Information not available within timeframe from BTP.	Around 10 incidents per year.	Physical assaults against GX staff are rare. The average number of physical assaults over the past 5 years is three per year, and these are typically instances of pushing, shoving, spitting, etc. Details not known. We have in the past worked with the BTP in connection with Anti Social Behaviour Orders. GX has set no target.
6 Question 89: What targets do you have for reducing the number of cases of violent crime against your staff?	The target set for the reduction of violent crime against c2c rail staff for 2006 is approx 18% against that seen in 2005. 2006 Target = 18 2005 Actual = 23	The target set for the reduction of violent crime against Silverlink Metro staff for 2006 is approx 14% against that seen in 2005. 2006 Target = 15 2005 Actual = 18	The target set for the reduction of violent crime against Silverlink County staff for 2006 is approx 15% against that seen in 2005. 2006 Target = 17 2005 Actual = 21	5% reduction per 1,000 employees from 2006 against the 2005 figures.	During 2005 we suffered 100 violent assaults. Our target is a 5% reduction.	5% reduction.	

9 May 2006

Supplementary memorandum submitted by Stagecoach Group: Rail Division

1. Stagecoach Group was very glad to contribute to the Select Committee’s hearing on 19 April 2006. A number of issues were raised during that meeting about which the Committee sought further information.

SECURE STATIONS ACCREDITATION

2. As mentioned in our original submission, the South West Trains franchise covers 178 stations. Of those 50 now have Secure Stations accreditation.

STAFFING OF STATIONS DURING SERVICE HOURS

3. The Committee asked for more detail about the hours during which our stations are continuously staffed. The information is contained in the following table:

<i>Staffing hours</i>	<i>Numbers of stations</i>	<i>Notes</i>
24 hours a day	19	Including (eg): Waterloo, Woking, Winchester etc
Early and late shift	68	Typically 6.00 am until at least 10.00 pm
Early shift only	65	Typically 6.30 am to 1.30 pm
Unstaffed (Monday to Sunday)	26	Includes both suburban and rural stations
Total: 178 stations		

4. It is worth noting that staff will be present on occasion at these stations at other times, for example if they are targeted for attention by TravelSafe Officers or revenue protection staff.

5. The Committee has also asked how much it would cost to ensure that all our stations are staffed during service hours. We have two observations to make about this point:

- It is not a straightforward calculation—as well as additional staff costs there would be a need to provide proper accommodation and facilities for staff, and to ensure that the right number of staff (usually more than one) is on hand;
- Stagecoach Group is currently involved in the competition for the South Western trains franchise, and to supply our estimate of costs in public to the Committee would advantage others applying for the franchise.

6. We will write to the Chairman of the Committee to provide further information on this point.

PROSECUTIONS FOR CRIMES AT SOUTH WEST TRAINS STATIONS

7. The Committee has asked for more details of the numbers of prosecutions for crimes committed at South West Trains stations during the past five years. This is not an easy figure to identify, since many crimes are reported directly to the police, and do not involve our staff.

8. We are also not able to provide comprehensive information about whether CCTV evidence was used as part of each prosecution, since this information is not held centrally. It is certainly the case that CCTV evidence is very valuable in securing successful prosecutions of those committing crime on railway stations and on trains, and we are working with BTP to develop a system which will provide detailed statistics about the way in which CCTV is used.

9. However, it may help the Committee to say that in 2005–06 South West Trains received and responded to 1,600 requests for footage from CCTV systems at stations. 971 of these requests came from the British Transport Police, and a further 242 from other agencies such as Surrey Police. The other requests were made by organisations including South West Trains itself.

10. We received and met 566 requests for footage from trains. 323 requests were made by BTP, and 27 others from agencies including HM Customs and Excise (now HM Revenue and Customs) and Hampshire Police.

PROSECUTIONS FOR ASSAULTS ON STAFF

11. At Stagecoach Group and South West Trains we regard the safety of our staff as paramount. As our original evidence said, we have instituted a wide range of measures to protect and support staff, including employing a dedicated member of staff to follow up all incidents of assaults on our employees.

12. Part of our strategy has been to encourage staff to report assaults, and in part as a result of this the number of reported assaults has risen in recent years. The number of reported physical assaults on staff during each of the past five years is as follows:

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
219	238	258	314	290

Our safety plan sets a target of no more than four physical assaults per 1,000 staff during each period of a year. In 2005 we achieved a figure of 4.15 assaults per 1,000 staff, and we continue to work hard to ensure that we meet our target.

13. In the past year, there have been 44 successful prosecutions following assaults on staff. In addition there have been a number of ASBOs given to those involved in crime and anti-social behaviour on trains and at stations. We will continue to work with the police and prosecution authorities to do all we can to ensure that those who assault our staff are prosecuted.

POWERS OF TRAVELSAFE OFFICERS

14. Our TravelSafe Officers provide a uniformed presence on trains and at stations to respond to crime and anti-social behaviour. They are trained and deployed by the British Transport Police, but their remit is to deter crime, rather than to arrest criminals: they have no greater powers of arrest than an average citizen.

15. However, TravelSafe Officers have been trained by the British Transport Police to evict and restrain people, using physical force if required. They are trained and empowered to enforce railway byelaws and to undertake activities such as station searches as required.

16. Thus the powers of TravelSafe Officers overlap with those of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), but are not as extensive. PCSOs also do not have the power of arrest, but they are able to issue fixed penalty notices and so on. TravelSafe Officers are intended to deter crime and gather information, and have proved very effective in doing so.

17. There are now 56 TravelSafe Officers, located at Clapham Junction, Richmond, Guildford, Portsmouth, Bournemouth/Weymouth and Basingstoke. There are PCSOs on the South West Trains network, mainly located around Waterloo.

CONTACT BETWEEN CCTV MONITORING STAFF AND BTP

18. The Committee has asked whether the staff monitoring CCTV are in “radio contact” with the British Transport Police. The contact between monitoring staff and BTP is not through radio, but by telephone through the BTP’s Management Information and Communication Centre.

MINIMUM STANDARDS

19. A major aspect of the Committee’s inquiry is to investigate whether minimum standards for passenger safety at stations should be required of train operating companies. Given the tenor of the questions asked during the evidence session it may be worth clarifying the view taken by Stagecoach Group.

20. Stagecoach Group is not “opposed” to minimum standards of passenger safety and security. Indeed such standards are of course already set in existing and planned franchise agreements. We are very happy that further, higher minimum standards are set in future franchise requirements. However, companies must continue to strive to exceed minimum standards.

21. It has always been our belief that it is in the business interests of train operating companies to ensure that passengers and staff are—and feel—as safe as possible from the threat of crime. We believe that South West Trains has taken a leading role in addressing concerns about crime on the railways, and has demonstrated what can be achieved by companies, often working in partnership with others, to exceed defined minimum requirements.

CONCLUSION

22. We hope that this additional information is of interest and use to the Committee. Should it require further evidence we are of course ready to assist.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by FirstGroup plc

Further to your letter dated 28 April 2006 seeking additional information, we have outlined a response to each of the questions tendered.

Question 12: Exactly how many stations do you manage, and how many of these are accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?

For purposes of clarity the response to this question has been broken down to reflect the current position within each of our four Train Operating Companies,

First Great Western (FGW): The Greater Western Franchise which started on the 1st of April 2006 includes the direct management of 210 stations (Prior to the 1st of April First Great Western and First Great Western Link managed a total of 86 stations, of which 41 had secure stations accreditation). Of the 124 former Wessex stations which joined FGW on the 1st of April 2006 none had secure stations accreditation. Within the first two years of the new franchise FGW are working towards the accreditation of 105 stations and a further 63 within the first three years. Accreditation will also be maintained at stations where it has already been achieved.

First Capital Connect (FCC): FCC commenced operations on 1st April 2006 and directly manages 74 stations. Of these, 22 have achieved accreditation under the Secure Stations scheme and most have already gone through at least one re-accreditation. This demonstrates that measures needed to obtain secure stations accreditation have been maintained. Of these stations 16 are within the TfL area. Through a targeted investment programme FCC is also committed to achieve Secure Stations accreditation at a further 12 stations by April 2008, as well as re-accrediting all 22 currently held.

First TransPennine Express (FTPE): FTPE directly manage 30 stations. Of these, nine have achieved secure stations accreditation. FTPE are working towards achieving secure stations accreditation at the remaining 21 stations within the next 18 months.

First ScotRail (FSR): FSR directly manage 341 stations and despite having a strong CCTV infrastructure in place has not sought secure stations accreditation as the Scottish Executive and SPT, the two co-signatories to the franchise, monitor the condition of stations and trains through SQUIRE (the Service Quality Incentive Regime). In support of this different approach recent BTP figures show a 12% drop in recorded crime in Scotland.

Question 41–44: What would the extra cost of staffing all your stations at all times when trains are running?

Unfortunately, it is not possible to supply the cost of staffing all stations at all times trains are running. Many stations are permanently unstaffed halts with no accommodation for staff. Clearly the cost of providing new buildings and services could only be determined after substantial research and it would not be possible to do this in the timescale set for reply. Full time station staffing at all stations is not prescribed in franchise agreements and our evidence made clear that station staffing would not of itself deal with the crime and security issues discussed. In particular, it would have little value at stations with very low footfall.

Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have you asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis of CCTV evidence?

The BTP regularly use CCTV footage in the investigation of their cases and this has led to a significant number of convictions. The BTP have built up good relationships with our CCTV centres and are well aware of the areas that CCTV covers. Their objectives are very much focused on crimes against the person on stations and trains and for every reported crime of this nature, at CCTV covered stations, they will request the footage.

A number of significant cases have been solved using our CCTV footage. Two such instances are of note. There was a serious assault on a woman at Sutton Common and the CCTV footage was shown on Crimewatch. The person was apprehended, charged and sentenced to a custodial sentence. Another case was at Elephant and Castle where the Police identified a person committing a robbery on a person and the CCTV footage was used to not only prove the guilt of the individual committing the crime but also had to be used to identify the victim as they hadn't come forward at the time of the person's arrest.

CCTV footage has been especially useful in prosecuting those committing theft from vehicles in car parks and on assaults on staff. An area that we will be working more closely with the BTP on is on using CCTV footage to gain convictions for vandalism and damage on stations, which is not currently within the BTP priorities or objectives but adds to the fear of crime to the travelling public.

Question 64: How many of your staff monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with BTP officers? What proportion of staff does this figure represent?

None of our staff monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with the BTP officers but all our CCTV staff has access to a direct line to the BTP Control Room, which is also BTP's preferred method of managing communication. However, during special operations BTP may provide a mobile phone number, which provides direct contact to an Inspector in charge.

As part of an FGW/local crime partnership initiative in Reading, the station cameras can be accessed by the town centre control room where the staff are in contact with the Thames Valley Police Officers and BTP officers by radio.

Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against your staff, in each of the past five years? And what is the breakdown into different into different categories of violent crime?

Due to the limited timescale the BTP are not in a position to provide a breakdown of crimes against Staff for the past five years at present. Thankfully we have not experienced many cases where staff have suffered a major assault which resulted in a serious injury. In all these cases we have worked closely with the BTP to obtain a prosecution where the assailant has been identified. There were two cases where a prosecution was not pursued and a caution issued. In both these cases civil actions was funded, by the company, on behalf of the staff members. Both of these lead to a civil compensation payment to the staff members.

The vast majority of assaults on staff are however of a more minor nature, predominantly verbal abuse and threatening behaviour of which there has been little success in prosecuting these cases as they do not fall within the Home Office guidelines to the CPS that it is in the public interest pursue the cases. Where a physical assault occurs, most fall within the area of common assault. On nearly every occasion these have lead to the assailant, where identified, receiving a caution and no further action being taken. Once again this is in line with Home Office guidelines.

Question 89: What targets do you have for reducing the number of cases of violent crime against your staff?

First are currently targeting a 20% reduction in the number of cases of violent crime against our staff.

8 May 2006

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Go-Ahead Group

The Go-Ahead Group welcomes the opportunity of presenting further evidence and clarification to the Committee in relation to passenger safety at stations.

With effect from 1 April 2006, Go-Ahead operates two of the largest franchises in London and the South-East with responsibility for over 330 stations. The Southern and Southeastern franchises carry in excess of 110 million passengers a year, 15% of the National rail business.

1. *Question 12: Exactly how many stations do you manage, and how many of these are accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?*

Answer: We manage 163 Stations in our Southern Franchise of which seven are currently accredited. A further 15 are planned to achieve accredited status by the end of June 2006. A follow on tranché of 28 stations are being considered for 2006–07. By July 2007 we would expect to have 50 (30%) of Southern stations accredited.

In our newly acquired Southeastern franchise there are 182 stations, of which nine on the Hayes Line are accredited. Southeastern has plans to extend accreditation to other stations on a rolling programme, 10 accreditations in the first year of the franchise, and more in successive years.

Our former Thameslink Franchise included 28 stations, of which 22 (79% of total), achieved Secure Station Accreditation.

2. *Questions 41–44: What would be the extra cost of staffing all your stations at all times when trains are running?*

Answer: Notional staff costs alone, excluding building and other costs, would be circa £7.5 million for Southern and circa £10.3 million for Southeastern.

3. *Question 55: How many times in each of the last five years have you asked the BTP to prosecute on the basis of CCTV evidence?*

Answer: We are not in a position to ask BTP to prosecute. Rather, we prepare CCTV evidence packages for BTP (and other police forces) and respond to their requests for CCTV evidence, or pro-actively advise them of its availability for use in their investigations.

Further, CCTV forms only part of a prosecution case, and we are unable to provide quantifiable data on the usefulness of the CCTV evidence alone in terms of identification, or indeed the prosecution of offenders.

In our Southern franchise, from 30 November 2005 up to the present date we have supplied CCTV evidence in 638 cases from our Hove CCTV Centre and from the 24 July 2005 to 29 April 1,037 downloads from our Streatham Hill CCTV Centre. This equates to an average of 2,913 cases per annum.

In our Southeastern franchise, A central CCTV monitoring system has only been in operation since March 2005 when new digital CCTV, funded by TfL, commenced roll out to 52 stations within South-London/North-Kent Metro.

From March 2005 to end of April 2006, we have prepared 512 CCTV evidence packages for police, (starting with just two in March 2005 rising steadily to 131, 138 and 108 in February, March and April 2006 respectively.)

It is worth noting that following the terrorist attacks in London on 7 and 21 July 2005 that CCTV from our Group systems proved vital in identifying suspected terrorists. In particular CCTV from Luton (Thameslink) and Kings Cross (NR) provided vital evidence.

In Southern all CCTV for the relevant period of interest was preserved. In additional 581 VHS tapes, 170 CD/DVDs and 28 Digital hard drives were handed to the police.

In Southeastern at all 71 stations within the M25 CCTV was secured. Police requests were subsequently made for download from six trains and nine stations for a 48-hour period.

4. *Question 64: How many of your staff monitoring CCTV cameras are in radio contact with BTP officers? What proportion of monitoring staff does this figure represent?*

Answer: There is no direct radio link between any of our monitoring centres and the police. However all the monitoring centres are able to contact the BTP Control Room (MICC) by telephone and the MICC has a direct radio link with operational officers.

5. *Question 87: How many prosecutions have been brought for violence against your staff, in each of the past five years? And what is the breakdown into different categories of violent crime?*

Answer: See Attachment—Data provided courtesy of British Transport Police

6. *Question 89: What targets do you have for reducing the number of cases of violent crime against your staff?*

Answer: Each Franchise operates as a distinct business and sets its own performance targets. In Southern the target is set at not more than 104 Staff Injury Assaults in 2006 (actual in 2005 115) seeking a reduction of 10%.

In Southeastern the target is set at not more than 47 staff assaults in 2006–07 (year end figure for 2005–06 was 53 hence also seeking an overall reduction of 10%).

8 May 2006

SOUTHERN:
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS

		2005–06	2004–05	2003–04	2002–03	2001–02
B00	Wounding/GBH with intent	1	0	0	2	3
B01	Wounding/GBH without intent	1	1	1	0	0
B02	ABH	45	39	26	24	32
B06	Threats to kill	3	1	5	1	2
B22	Injury by dangerous dog	0	0	1	1	0
S07	Harassment	1	3	2	0	2
X02	Racially aggravated ABH	10	1	1	0	0
X03	Racially aggravated common assault	6	12	72	2	
X07	Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress	18	39	8	9	4
X08	Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence	22	13	6	3	2
X10	Racially aggravated harassment	1	1	0	0	0
Z70	Common assault	141	144	80	114	84
TOTAL		249	254	137	156	131

NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS

		2005-06	2004-05	2003-04	2002-03	2001-02
B00	Wounding/GBH with intent	0	0	0	1	1
B01	Wounding/GBH without intent	1	1	1	0	0
B02	ABH	13	16	11	59	
B06	Threats to kill	1	1	3	0	0
B22	Injury by dangerous dog	0	0	0	0	0
S07	Harassment	0	0	1	0	1
X02	Racially aggravated ABH	6	0	1	0	0
X03	Racially aggravated common assault	0	8	3	0	0
X07	Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress	3	11	4	2	2
X08	Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence	8	7	3	2	1
X10	Racially aggravated harassment	1	1	0	0	0
Z70	Common assault	21	33	17	24	15
TOTAL		54	78	44	34	29

SOUTHEASTERN:
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS

		2005-06	2004-05	2003-04	2002-03	2001-02
B00	Wounding/GBH with intent	1	1	0	1	0
B01	Wounding/GBH without intent	0	1	1	0	0
B02	ABH	38	42	18	67	12
B06	Threats to kill	4	2	0	3	2
B22	Injury by dangerous dog	0	0	0	0	0
S07	Harassment	1	2	2	1	0
X02	Racially aggravated ABH	0	2	2	0	0
X03	Racially aggravated common assault	3	7	0	1	1
X07	Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress	11	2	1	1	3
X08	Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence	8	0	1	1	3
X10	Racially aggravated harassment	0	0	1	0	0
Z70	Common assault	124	106	118	97	59
TOTAL		190	165	144	172	80

NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS

		2005-06	2004-05	2003-04	2002-03	2001-02
B00	Wounding/GBH with intent	1	1	0	1	0
B01	Wounding/GBH without intent	0	0	0	0	0
B02	ABH	13	13	11	10	2
B06	Threats to kill	0	0	0	1	0
B22	Injury by dangerous dog	0	0	0	0	0
S07	Harassment	0	0	0	0	0
X02	Racially aggravated ABH	0	1	0	0	0
X03	Racially aggravated common assault	2	2	0	0	0
X07	Racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress	2	0	1	0	0
X08	Racially aggravated fear or provocation of violence	0	0	1	1	1
X10	Racially aggravated harassment	0	0	1	0	0
Z70	Common assault	19	21	22	20	8
TOTAL		37	38	36	33	11

Supplementary memorandum submitted by Network Rail

Further to your request to Robin Gisby, Director of Operations and Customer Services, please find below follow up notes on a number of the questions raised by the committee. In respect of: assaults on staff, action taken by the BTP in each of these, and the role of CCTV in prosecutions, I am able to provide the following information.

In respect of Q55, please be aware that the BTP does not technically prosecute people itself, this is the job of the Crown Prosecution Service. Therefore, they do not have prosecution related data.

The BTP instead uses the term "detection", which is where:

- A person has been charged or summonsed for a crime.
- An offender has been cautioned or given a final warning or reprimand.
- The offender admits the crime and asks for it to be taken into consideration by the court.

- No further action has been taken by the police, which usually occurs if the offender is dead or severely ill; or when an essential witness or victim is permanently ill.
- A penalty notice for disorder has been issued.
- A formal warning for cannabis possession has been issued.

The following data is for the BTP force as a whole (excluding LU) in order to provide you with a complete picture of the overall level of violent crime on the railways.

	<i>Force excluding LU</i>				
	<i>2001-02</i>	<i>2002-03</i>	<i>2003-04</i>	<i>2004-05</i>	<i>2005-06</i>
Violence against the person	4,737	5,776	6,432	7,126	7,348
Sexual offences	718	692	799	893	717
Robbery offences	2,625	1,769	2,088	1,724	1,692
Total violent crime	8,080	8,237	9,319	9,743	9,757

It is not possible to provide data as to how many people have been prosecuted on the basis of CCTV evidence as the BTP do not keep this type of data.

In respect of question 87, the following table shows overall BTP detections for staff assaults (again, excluding LU):

<i>Detections for Staff Assaults (excluding LU Area)</i>	
2001-02	430
2002-03	526
2003-04	645
2004-05	779
2005-06	957

Network Rail's own record of staff assaults for the last full year (2005-06) was 162. Assault figures comprise two categories: Verbal and Physical. Verbal abuse is any verbal statement that the victim considers to be offensive, abusive or insulting, but not accompanied by a threat of force, this includes anything of a racial or sexual nature. Physical abuse includes both actual physical contact and direct threats and gestures of violence, including those with a weapon.

Due to a change in the categorisation of assaults in April 2005 which was accompanied by a campaign to encourage staff to report more verbal assaults, there are no directly comparable figures for previous years.

In respect of question 89; the overwhelming majority of assaults on Network Rail staff occur at the stations we manage. At each of these there is a safety action plan aimed at reducing the level of assaults, this is backed up by training and information to our employees, public campaigns and liaison with the BTP and community support officers who have a high profile at each of these 17 large stations. In addition, where the CPS does not bring a case forward for prosecution and we feel that there may be an opportunity to bring a private action, Network Rail will seriously consider doing so on behalf of an employee.

With regards an overall target, the assault figures are monitored and reported on at senior level: there is no specific target figure for assaults on staff, rather the aim of Network Rail's efforts is to drive the overall figure down.

I trust that the above information helps in the committee's considerations on safety at stations. Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch.

10 May 2006

Memorandum submitted by the British Transport Police

INTRODUCTION

British Transport Police (BTP) is the national police force for the railways providing a policing service to rail operators, their staff and passengers throughout England, Wales and Scotland.

BTP has developed valuable expertise and the skills required to police a modern railway network. Fully integrated with local policing, BTP works closely with industry and community partners to provide a specialist, dedicated service protecting passengers, staff, and the network infrastructure from disruption and fear of crime.

BTP's policing of Britain's railways is considered to be among the most sophisticated and successful of any railway policing in the world. In terms of what can be done to make railway station safer it outline what BTP is doing in terms of its policing priorities; increasing visibility through extending the police family, and mounting specific operations to further its objectives and reassure staff. It also addresses station security and the need for properly maintained stations, the Secure Stations scheme accreditation process and how the scheme could be improved.

INCREASING PERSONAL SAFETY—BTP PRIORITIES

BTP is determined to increase actual and perceived personal safety on the railway network and this is illustrated by the priorities included within the BTP Policing Plan 2005–06. These include:

Combating anti-social behaviour

Low level disorder offences such as ticket touting (often selling travelcards to feed drug habits), travel fraud, trespass, vandalism and others can adversely affect feelings of personal safety on the railways and can also be an indicator of wider criminality. BTP uniquely maintains a database of all non-recordable offences, and detections of low-level disorder have increased dramatically over recent years. Economic costs to the railway industry are enormous, and BTP has worked hard to ensure that the criminal justice system recognises the effect of a crime that is often seen as victimless.

Staff assaults

BTP has included targets surrounding staff assaults on the annual Policing Plan since 2004–05. This was in response to a significant increase experienced in 2003–04. Various tactics are employed by BTP to tackle staff assaults and increase the safety of rail staff. These include encouraging rail staff to report all assaults; ensuring minimum standards of investigation are implemented; working in partnerships with TOCs to highlight workplace violence; creating specialist units on some Areas to tackle this type of crime; issuing spittle/DNA kits to rail staff to gather evidence in instances of assault; and working with TOCs through crime reduction opportunities to improve station CCTV systems to aid the identification of offenders.

Robbery

Robbery is a BTP priority due to the aggravating feature of actual or threatened violence and the disproportionate impact this crime has on public perceptions of safety whilst travelling on the rail network. BTP met the National Policing Plan target of reducing robbery by 14% by 31 March 2005 and continues to successfully target perpetrators of this crime.

Violent assaults

Detecting violent offenders was a target for BTP during 2005–06 and will be again in 2006–07. The inclusion of offensive weapon offences within this category further underlines BTP's resolve to eradicate violence on the network and supports initiatives such as Operation Shield, which is described in detail below. It is impossible to overestimate the negative effects on personal safety these types of crime on the railway community and BTP are committed to bringing those who commit them to justice.

Hate crime

Hate crime constitutes any crime where a person's prejudice against an identifiable group is a factor in their choice of victim and causes extreme distress to both staff and passengers when it occurs. The offence could be motivated by hatred, bias or prejudice and is based on the actual or perceived race, gender, colour, religion, national origin, disability or sexual orientation of another individual or group, including domestic disputes.

This target underpins substantial BTP activity in this area. BTP has established a Hate Crime Unit, and has joined the *True Visions* website, which exists to encourage people to report hate crime. BTP is committed to vigorously investigating all reported incidents to the satisfaction of the victim, identifying and successfully prosecuting offenders, implementing a positive arrest policy and, where a prosecution is not feasible, identifying other methods of resolution so as to provide protection, comfort and reassurance to victims.

BTP's other Policing Plan priorities are focused on reducing the threat of terrorism, fatality management, reducing and detecting theft of passenger property, combating graffiti and investigating route crime. In 2004–05, BTP achieved all of its objectives, and is on course to achieve all of its objectives in 2005–06 despite the increasing demands of the terrorist threat following the July bombings. This is a magnificent achievement.

BTP's performance has contributed substantially to the overall decrease in crime on the railway network of 1.6% between financial year 2003–04 and 2004–05. It is expected that it will go down another 2% during 2005–06. It is important to remember that the railway network is actually a very safe place to be. Based on 2004–05 footfall data, there are around 89 offences recorded on the railway network for every million passenger journeys, whilst there are 31 offences recorded on the underground for every million passenger journeys. The extremely low levels of crime on London Underground reflects the considerable investment in BTP by TfL, which has resulted in a substantial increase in police numbers on the Underground. Both the mainline and London Underground are actually very safe environments.

Passenger volume will also inevitably have an effect on crime and it is likely that the railway community will continue to grow. As Transport 2000 commented in 2005:

“Passenger journeys on Britain’s railways last year exceeded one billion, the highest since 1959, and train operators estimate that demand for rail travel will grow by 66% over the next 20 years. But parts of the network are already bursting at the seams and desperately need expanding. Other parts of the network will soon reach capacity as demand for rail use continues to rise.”

The overall decrease in recorded crime on the railways is even more impressive when viewed in the context of year-on-year rise in passenger volumes.

INCREASING PERSONAL SAFETY—INCREASING THE POLICE FAMILY

Complementary policing is about working with a range of people who support the work of regular police officers. These include volunteer Special Constables, sponsored Special Constables, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), security staff, customer care and other rail staff. The introduction and continued expansion of BTP’s complementary policing options is a key method of increasing BTP visibility and increasing personal safety on the railway network.

Railway safety accreditation scheme

The Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme (RSAS) is the latest addition to complementary policing. The RSAS will bring more people into the wider “policing family”. It allows organisations and their employees involved in railway safety and security to be accredited by the police. Under the scheme, accredited persons are given limited powers aimed at providing a better quality of life for the railway community.

RSAS accredited people will be able deal with certain situations without involving police and, as part of the wider policing family, improve liaison and information sharing. This leads to more effective action and prioritisation on issues affecting local railway communities, and allows for locally driven approaches to solving problems.

Southeastern Trains were the first Train Operator to make an application for accreditation under the RSAS, which meant a steep learning curve for both them and the BTP. Since the accredited Railway Enforcement Officers (REOs) came into being they have been involved in the following:

2,724	Tickets issued
1,195	Penalty Fares issued
648	Persons reported under the Regulation of Railways Act Level 3 Offence (for which the penalty could be up to 3 months in prison and/or £1,000 fine)
474	Recorded verbal warnings given
225 +	Occasions of drunks or undesirables being removed from trains and stations
82	People reported for anti-social offences under Railway Byelaws (for which the penalty could be up to 3 months in prison and/or £1,000 fine)
18	TVM Blockages removed preventing thefts from the machines
15	Passengers at high risk assisted arrests as a direct result of activity.

It is difficult to quantify the saving made in the terms of lost minutes in the cases where disruptive passengers have been removed from trains by the REO’s. Without the intervention of the REO’s local station staff would have had to deal with these individuals, which would have caused delays and had knock-on effects as staff would be distracted and unable to despatch other services.

The main purpose for the introduction of this new role was to improve passengers feeling of safety and security whilst travelling on Southeastern Trains. In their most recent passenger survey conducted on the Catford Loop lines in February, policed by REOs, the percentage of passengers stating that they felt good or very good about their safety rose from 36% to 42%—a significant improvement of 6% over a short period of time.

Police Community Support Officers

Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) work alongside BTP officers to ensure high visibility policing, increase the travelling public’s sense of security whilst upon the railway, and support police officers in their work on the rail network.

The main role of PCSOs is to deal with quality of life issues that do not always require the presence of a police officer. Even so, all PCSOs are given full training to enable them to take appropriate action in the event of difficult circumstances. They are supervised by police officers and have radio access to enable them to call for assistance should it be required. They do not need to be accompanied by police officers except during a tutor period following training, or where the type of duty being undertaken makes accompanied patrol more appropriate.

In BTP's London South area, PCSOs have been deployed since March 2005. They have been warmly received by station staff, the general public and local businesses. The introduction of PCSOs has made a difference to crime figures, as well as the overall feeling of security of the public. There has been a big reduction in beggars and thieves at stations such as Waterloo, Victoria, Charing Cross and London Bridge. BTP, in partnership with the railway industry will continue to use PCSOs and other appropriate forms of complementary policing to further increase safety on the rail network.

INCREASING PERSONAL SAFETY—BTP IN ACTION

BTP mounts many operations and strategies throughout the year to further its policing objectives, reassure passengers and staff, and to detect and arrest offenders. Following a number of recent incidents involving the use of knives, BTP has implemented a preventative strategy aimed to promote "zero tolerance" in the use and carrying of knives and other weapons within the railway environment.

Operation Shield involves the deployment of electronic scanners staffed by Police Officers in uniform working in partnership with Community Support Officers and Revenue Inspectors at railway stations.

The electronic scanners are similar to those deployed at airports and other controlled zones. The operation is intelligence-led and focuses on areas of the network where violent crime is more prevalent.

Initial results have been encouraging. Since the launch of the operation on 6 February 2006, 55 people have been arrested and 33 weapons have been recovered including an axe, hammer and a CS gas canister. All persons arrested have been known to Police previously.

The impact on the travelling public and rail staff has been very positive and encouraging. The presence of Uniformed Officers and the electronic arches has afforded BTP an opportunity to further engage with the community and provide general crime prevention advice.

The operation will continue in London until the end of March and will be extended Force-wide to cover the entire Country. The first deployment outside London is to be in Scotland in both Glasgow and Edinburgh in April. Targeted deployment of these resources should bring about a decline in weapons related crime and associated violence. It is the intention of British Transport Police in conjunction with its industry partners to create a "weapons free" environment on Britain's railway.

INCREASING PERSONAL SAFETY—THE SECURE STATIONS SCHEME

BTP welcomes any efforts by TOCs need to improve safety and security at stations. However, the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts publication "*Maintaining and Improving Britain's Railway Stations*" published in December 2005 came to the following conclusions:

- Few train operating companies have joined national schemes to reduce crime and improve personal safety at stations even though research in 1996 and 2002 suggests that introducing additional security measures can increase patronage by up to 11%.
- The original franchises awarded on privatisation of the railways failed to put sufficient emphasis on improving station facilities.
- Network Rail has been seen as a barrier to station improvement through unduly complicated and inflexible procedures, an unwillingness to share risks associated with improvement projects, and a lack of targets for developing franchised sites.

The Secure Stations Scheme is an excellent opportunity for the rail industry to work with BTP in improving safety and security for passengers. The Secure Station scheme started in 1998 as a partnership between Crime Concern, BTP and the DfT.

Accreditation

A new and more simple accreditation system was introduced in 2005 after negotiations between DfT, train operators and BTP. The main changes were around the "scoring" attributed to crime at stations and this was replaced with a benchmark of comparative crime figures to passenger footfall at the relevant station. The other main change was the "Working Towards" criteria which was introduced to encourage operators to join the scheme. BTP is responsible for reviewing the station after notification from the TOC that any work etc has been carried out and if successful is re-inspected every two years. There are currently 240 accredited stations in the scheme. 4 are "Working Towards" accreditation and 60 have lapsed over the last two years.

How could it be improved?

The Secure Stations scheme does appear to reduce crime, particularly when combined with the Safer Car Park scheme. However, there is no specific process or policy for identifying stations which should be selected as priority cases, although some franchises do stipulate that all stations must be in the scheme. At present (other than by franchise stipulation) it is left to the franchisee to apply for the scheme. Local Crime

Reduction Officers do promote the scheme with operators. The Secure Stations scheme has few specific security standards as it is mainly designed around safety standards. The scheme could benefit from some specific standards which would ensure that materials such as fencing, lighting, CCTV etc were fit for purpose. The Safer Car Park award administered by the British Parking Association does have specific standards for design and materials.

There should be a process in place whereby BTP can influence train operators and the DfT in the selection process and ensure that priority stations are dealt with. It could be made part of the franchise agreement for each TOC to achieve Secure Station status at stations which reach a particular “risk” threshold which would take account of crime rates. This would obviously have to be dealt with carefully, as some TOCS will have more problem stations than others.

There are many instances of stations being built or re-furnished without early engagement of the BTP Crime Reduction Unit & Architectural Liaison Officer and Counter Terrorism Security Advisor. The BTP is best placed to advise Network Rail and TOCS on plans which are likely to have any Crime and Disorder Act implications. Under Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act, authorities must consider these issues in their strategies. It is therefore important that BTP is appraised of any plans likely to have this effect at the earliest opportunity.

Train design and CCTV should also be a key consideration when designing stations. BTP are working with Industry Partners to formulate guidance on the minimum levels for CCTV—it is essential that CCTV systems become standardised, and that the quality of CCTV images is sufficiently good for them to be properly used.

31 March 2006

Memorandum submitted by the Rail Safety & Standards Board

THE RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS BOARD (RSSB)

1. RSSB is an independent not-for-profit company owned by major stakeholders in the rail industry including Network Rail and train operators.
2. The RSSB response to the questions posed by the Transport Committee reflects the company’s role in relation to:
 - Safety policy and the industry’s Strategic Safety Plan.
 - Research and development.
 - Facilitation and support of industry initiatives, in particular the Rail Personal Security Group (RPSG).
3. Essentially all of the stations on the national rail network, formerly the responsibility of British Rail, are owned by Network Rail. Franchised train operators manage all but 17 “major stations” operated by Network Rail. It is therefore inappropriate for RSSB to respond to some of the specific questions raised by the Committee.

PASSENGER SAFETY AND SECURITY

4. More than a billion passenger journeys are made on the main line network each year and the vast majority are incident-free with the British Transport Police (BTP) recording less than one assault for every hundred thousand passenger journeys made. Of the assaults that take place approximately four fifths are to members of railway staff. The risk to the public within the railway environment is lower than it is in the wider community.
5. The industry’s Strategic Safety Plan for 2006 addresses personal security and station safety as set out in Annex A of this submission.

THE RAIL PERSONAL SECURITY GROUP (RPSG)

6. RPSG was established in response to a recommendation in the research project “Reducing Assaults on Railway Staff” (December 2002), that “the industry should establish and equip (including the provision of financial support) a Task Force to develop a common strategy and promote it within the industry, to local and national government, law enforcement agencies and the media”.
7. The industry agreed that a group focused on personal security issues would be beneficial, but that to concentrate solely on staff assaults would be restrictive. For that reason, customer and public security (excluding terrorism) are addressed by RPSG.

8. RPSG first met in August 2003 and has continued to meet every two months since then. Membership of RPSG is drawn from passenger train operators, Network Rail, railway trades unions, British Transport Police (BTP), Passenger Focus, the Department for Transport (DfT), Transport for London and the Home Office. RPSG is facilitated and supported by RSSB.

TRANSPORT COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

9. RPSG identified that it could best contribute to making stations safer by raising the profile of personal security on the railway, to encourage sharing of best practice thereby supporting train operators and Network Rail in discharging their duties to manage the risk.

10. Assaults occurring at railway stations cannot be addressed in isolation as this risk has to be addressed in the context of the communities within which stations are located. RPSG recognises the importance of working with communities and wishes to see transport representation in Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP). Because violence is a wider societal problem, a holistic approach is needed to tackle it. Accordingly RPSG is currently working with the Home Office and BTP to develop guidelines for the rail industry and CDRPs to use in their joint activities.

11. RPSG is dependent on the willingness of the members to share their ideas and learn from each other not only in respect of successful measures but also the unsuccessful, with the aim of improving personal security and reducing anti-social behaviour on the railway. The following are amongst the successful initiatives that individual train operators have adopted to improve personal security for staff and passengers.

- “Adopt a Station”—community involvement to improve the environment at unmanned stations (which is also the subject of further research—see below).
- Progression of “Secure Stations” scheme.
- Increased visibility of staff and funded recruitment by BTP of railway staff as Special Constables and Police Community Support Officers (PCSO).
- Creating links with local schools to encourage rail travel in a safe environment, including agreement of “Schools Charters” and accreditation of those who go into schools as presenters of railway safety messages.
- More use of station and on train CCTV systems.
- Installation of automatic ticket barriers which act as a deterrent to antisocial behaviour by limiting access opportunities for fare evasion.
- Strict imposition of penalty fares for ticketless travellers.

12. RSSB is, on behalf of the wider industry, currently in dialogue with the Crown Prosecution Service to promote the view that the range of sanctions available within the criminal law is appropriate but that there are occasions where the public interest would be better served if prosecutors were more aware of the impact on the railway of assaults and other crime.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?

13. Individual duty holders are best placed to determine the configuration of stations and determine the levels of staff appropriate to the levels of use of each station and the risks of assaults and other inappropriate behaviour.

Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?

14. The combined economic and safety regulatory regime to be introduced in April 2006 is appropriate as is the range of penalties provided for in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

15. Duties under the law are clear.

Why are so few stations accredited under the secure Stations scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?

16. This question is best addressed to station operators.

What measures would be required to ensure sufficient improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?

17. Research into personal safety and security at stations is a component of the wider DfT funded research and development (R&D) programme managed by RSSB on behalf of the rail industry and associated stakeholders. Public behaviour has been subject to scrutiny since the inception of the programme in 2001. Early outputs of the R&D programme generated recommendations that led to the setting up of RPSG (see paragraphs six to eight above).

18. All reports generated by projects within the R&D programme managed by RSSB are available on-line at www.rssb.co.uk

19. Published research reports specifically addressing issues of personal security can be summarised as follows:

— *Reducing assaults on railway staff (T039), published 2002*

This project provided a better understanding the size of the growing problem of assaults on railway staff, and identified measures to counteract it. A range of techniques was used in the study, including focus groups, staff surveys, gathering information from train and station operators, comparing data from operators and the Safety Management Information System (SMIS) and the modelling of experts' views about influencing factors. The project recommended that railway organisations review their countermeasures, publish plans, set targets and share information. The project also proposed that the industry establish a personal security task force on the issue (as previously indicated this led to the creation of RPSG). This project further recommended better and more consistent data should be input to the industry's Safety Management Information System (SMIS) and that there should be regular reporting from SMIS. RSSB has since upgraded SMIS to deliver the requirements specified by RPSG on behalf of duty holders.

— *Fears and experiences of assault and abuse on the railway (T047), published 2004*

This project Investigated the fears and experiences of railway staff and customers in relation to assault and abuse on the railway. The report identified measures to improve personal security—better data, risk analysis, best practice and partnerships. This project has helped inform industry's response to concerns about personal safety and security amongst the travelling public. It surveyed existing rail users and non-rail users to determine which groups consider themselves to be at risk, and which groups actually are at risk. Specific recommendations were to improve industry data (changes to SMIS have been made) quality and systems, to undertake further analysis of risk at stations, to determine and share best practice and to work in partnership with other agencies to ensure appropriate skills and resources are brought to bear on the problem. This report is also material to the industry having set up RPSG.

20. A number of other research projects also of relevance to the subject of personal security have also been published. They relate to the perception and evaluation of route crime, the benefits of CCTV, trespass and vandalism, the benefit of complementary policing, cost of assaults and the development of suitable materials for teachers and schools. Further research is ongoing and projects under development with the support of RPSG and other community safety stakeholders include Safety at London Stations—Review of Existing Knowledge

Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

21. The principles set out in the Government's National Community Safety Plan are appropriate.

31 March 2006

Annex A

EXTRACT FROM STRATEGIC SAFETY PLAN 2006 RELATING TO STATIONS AND PERSONAL SECURITY

Statistics on crime at stations may reflect changes in the level of reporting rather than the number of actual crimes. The most reliable estimate is that violent crime is generally falling, although this may mask acute problems in specific locations, or rises in certain categories of violent crime. What can be said with certainty is that the overall risk to the individual passenger is very small.

Anti-social and dangerous behaviour by the public remains a cause of concern. For example, drivers frequently report encountering dangerous practices such as sitting on platform edges.

Actions:

Station operators will:

- Continue to improve station environments with improved lighting and core safe areas, where appropriate;
- Continue to work with the British Transport Police, supporting the police community support officer scheme and employing dedicated security staff, where appropriate;
- Make greater use of CCTV;
- Work towards an agreed industry specification for CCTV installation and download to simplify the process of making use of recorded images in tackling crime;
- Bring more stations into the Secure Stations Scheme¹.
- Review the impact of the proposed change to 24-hour licensing on public behaviour issues on the railway.

Memorandum submitted by Passenger Focus

1. SUMMARY

1.1 The Transport Committee of the House of Commons is conducting an inquiry into “the current standards of passenger safety in railway stations”. In this context, “safety” refers to personal security and protection from crime and harassment, rather than physical safety and protection from accidental injury. Among the issues which the Transport Committee wishes to identify are:

- What are the most effective methods of making railway stations safer for passengers?
- What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway stations?

1.2 This Memorandum and its Annex seek to draw together the evidence emerging from recent research in this field. The key messages are:

- Tracking of passengers’ priorities shows that personal security is not highest on the list of aspects of performance in which they most wish to see improvements. Concerns about reliability, frequency, cost and comfort almost always take precedence.
- It is plain, however, that many passengers do wish to see enhanced security, and some are deterred from travelling by such concerns.
- Research suggests that, overwhelmingly, they regard more adequate levels of staffing, and the more visible and authoritative presence of those staff who are currently deployed, as the appropriate solution.
- Physical or technical measures such as CCTV, help points, and enhanced lighting and sightlines are regarded as ancillary improvements rather than as substitutes for staffing.
- Except in the still-limited areas where complementary policing personnel such as community support, travel safe and/or rail enforcement officers are routinely deployed, passenger-facing railway staff are not recruited and trained primarily to perform security functions, and they are not necessarily equipped or willing to act in the protective roles which passengers expect.

2. PASSENGER FOCUS’S POLICY

2.1 Passenger Focus believes that the safety and security of passengers is of paramount importance.

2.2 Passenger Focus presses for stations to be staffed wherever possible. This is not only to provide ticket sales and direct revenue protection but also to provide a reassuring staff presence for both personal security and information and as a deterrent to crime. To achieve this, staff must be visible and conduct regular patrols. They must be trained in the skills necessary to exercise authority when required and to provide reassurance through their presence, appearance and demeanour. They should be invested with the legal powers (eg under the police accreditation scheme) necessary to allow them to discharge this role effectively. Passenger Focus’s definition of full staffing covers all times when trains call at the station; the industry’s definition is less rigid and obvious: “fully staffed” can refer to a situation where two shifts are covered but where early-morning and late-evening trains, and often all day at weekends, are uncovered.

2.3 Passenger Focus believes that the role of staff should be complemented, not replaced, by technology. Help points (capable of both summoning assistance in emergencies and obtaining information at other times) should be prominently available and conveniently sited at stations and be maintained in good order.

¹ Stations are accredited under this scheme as complying with a set of minimum standards.

More information is available at:

<http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft—mobility/documents/divisionhomepage/036930.hcsp>

We support the system used in Scotland and parts of London whereby the help point and CCTV system are linked. CCTV should be monitored rather than just recorded, and be of a standard capable of allowing the successful prosecution of offenders. We would also like to see CCTV systems at stations linked with those outside so that offenders can be tracked once they leave the station.

2.4 Passenger Focus supports initiatives such as the Secure Stations and Secure Car Parks schemes, but believes that their effectiveness (and entitlement to continuing accreditation) should be related to their measured impact on passengers' perceptions of security, not simply a checklist of physical features. We endorse the recommendation of the RSSB report *Fears and experiences of passengers from assault* that the Home Office Fear of Crime Matrix (in a suitably modified form, as the current version applies only to major stations) can be a useful tool to help rail companies develop strategies and priorities for action.

2.5 Passenger Focus accepts that the railway does not operate in a vacuum and suffers from the same problems with crime and disorder as the rest of society. Tackling issues of security on the railway is, therefore, a wider social issue and not a problem for the industry to resolve in isolation. Passenger Focus therefore welcomes and encourages the active participation of rail industry in local community safety partnerships, and its engagement with all relevant agencies working in this field. We welcome the successful introduction of anti-social behaviour orders on the railway, and the work being done by RSSB Rail Personal Security Group with the Crown Prosecution Service to increase judicial awareness of the seriousness of railway crime.

2.6 We are particularly keen that in its plans for station regeneration, Network Rail should encourage the use of station precincts for a range of activities (not necessarily directly rail-related) which will foster a continuous flow of people and help overcome the air of isolation and abandonment which can be a deterrent to passengers.

2.7 Passenger Focus believes that there should be a clearly located source of authority within the industry partnerships charged with the responsibility of championing such activity in each region, and that promoting specific security initiatives (including station staffing) should become obligatory upon operators through the franchising process. We warmly welcome the priority to be given to this facet of passenger service in the new franchising regime to be introduced by TfL on the North London Railway, and commend this as a model to the DfT.

3. NATIONAL PASSENGER SURVEY

3.1 The only quantified country-wide index of rail users' views is the National Passenger Survey (NPS), originally commissioned by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and now compiled twice-yearly under the direction of Passenger Focus. This is based on the results of polling more than 28,000 passengers twice a year in the course of journeys made on the National Rail network.

3.2 In the most recently published wave of results (Autumn 2005), 59% of those polled declared themselves to be satisfied with security at stations, placing it only ninth out of twelve station-related service attributes covered¹. This rating has risen by 5% over the past three years, but its relative position in the rankings has remained constant.

3.3 Leisure users are most likely to be satisfied with station security (65%), followed by business users (59%), while commuters' satisfaction rating was only 55%. Of users of high speed long distance trains, 68% were satisfied, compared with 59% of passengers on regional services and 57% on London and south east routes. Among the last of these, the off-peak/peak differential was 59% to 55% respectively. Frequent users therefore have more negative perceptions than those who travel occasionally.

3.4 Those who voiced active concern about station security (less than a quarter of the total) were invited to indicate their reasons. In descending order of frequency, the principal reasons given were:

57%	Saw rowdy behaviour by other people on station
43%	Lack of station staff
37%	Fear of terrorism
20%	Lack of other passengers
18%	Poor on-station lighting
17%	Lack of information
11%	Saw actual vandalism or violence

3.5 When asked about their reasons for being concerned with personal security in the *vicinity* of stations, the same respondents' answers were:

23%	Poor lighting around station
19%	Fear of terrorism
19%	Lack of other people in neighbourhood
16%	Station in an isolated position
11%	Insecure station car park
9%	Saw vandalism or violence in neighbourhood

3.6 It is noteworthy that only a small minority had been witnesses to actual vandalism or violence, as distinct from rowdy behaviour, so that a sense of isolation and an absence of effective authority are sufficient in themselves to engender feelings of insecurity. This underlines the strength of passenger perception.

4. PASSENGER PRIORITIES

4.1 Although the NPS gives a valuable snapshot of how passengers in general perceive the level of security currently achieved on stations, and the reasons underlying the dissatisfaction of those who believe it is inadequate, it does not give any direct indication of the importance ascribed to *improving* personal security *relative* to other service attributes. This was investigated by SRA in May 2005 by means of a specially-commissioned study using multivariate analysis². When passengers were invited to rank different journey elements to show their priorities for improvement, personal security at stations came only 16th out of 30. There was little variation between the ratings of different categories of respondent.

4.2 The NPS data also do not address:

- the views of non-passengers who may be deterred from rail travel because of a perceived lack of security on the system,
- other sub-sets of users within the total body of passengers (differentiated by, for example, gender, ethnicity, age, or time of travel) who may have distinctive views, or
- the measures open to the industry which would be likely to raise satisfaction levels, and the cost-effectiveness of these.

4.3 The last of these considerations is important. This is not only because improving personal security has an opportunity cost (it consumes resources which would otherwise be available to meet other passenger expectations) but also because it may be that the remedy to the problem lies partly or wholly outside the industry's control. If some people will only use door-to-door transport because they are unwilling to run the perceived risks encountered while travelling to or from a station at either end of the rail trip, it is immaterial to them what level of security is offered while on the railway itself.

4.4 It is therefore necessary to turn to other sources of information to explore these issues in greater depth. There is a substantial body of research literature relating to public attitudes to safety and security on transport systems in general and the railway in particular, including the solutions which are seen to be most likely to be effective. The Annex to this Memorandum comprises a review of some of the most significant studies.

5. WHAT PASSENGERS WANT

5.1 2005 saw the publication by the then Rail Passengers Council (now Passenger Focus) of *What passengers want from stations*³, the findings of a series of focus group studies conducted in various parts of the country. In relation to security, this work confirmed the conclusions of previous researchers:

5.2 Security both inside and outside the station is a high priority for passengers with fear of or direct experience of car crime and a low perception of personal security in and around station entrances, especially so at night. Commuters and business passengers feel that some smaller stations are "lonely places" and that leaving them at night is "dangerous". Other participants do not use train services at night because this is considered "too risky".

5.3 The main concerns with travelling at night can be summed up as:

- no staff or supervision at the station when returning home late;
- ticket office is closed;
- gangs of youths hanging around the station or in waiting rooms drinking;
- lack of people;
- lack of adequate lighting in stations and in car parks;
- bushes and foliage along walkways/exits.

5.4 It was thought that stations being staffed would be the most effective way of improving station security at night. In general it was felt that stations should be staffed as long as trains were running. The presence of retail facilities in the station which were open also led to a higher perception of security. Retailers were seen as a point of help if it should be required . . . A major concern, particularly for the smaller stations, was that although staff would be desirable it would [not be] practicable because of concerns about personal security of staff.

5.5 Although it was generally thought that the introduction of CCTV and panic buttons could do little to improve personal security, participants thought they should be fitted as standard, even if stations were staffed. The benefits of CCTV were thought to be that film could be used for identification purposes and might reduce car crime. If introduced, participants thought that CCTV should be clearly and very obviously signposted so that people knew it was there.5.6 When prompted it was agreed that better lighting would

benefit passengers emotionally leading to an increased feeling of personal security. There was an awareness of help points at medium [sized] stations, but they were underused by participants who seemed to be unsure of their purpose or of what would happen if they used one.

6. MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING STATIONS

6.1 The July 2005 report by the National Audit Office (NAO) on *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*⁴ suggested (quoting Crime Concern's research) that measures to improve personal security would result in 15% more travel by rail and Underground, much of it out of peak hours (when there is spare capacity). Staff presence, good lighting and CCTV surveillance were seen as being the three most important factors reassuring passengers about their personal safety while waiting for a train. Passengers felt less secure at small stations which are unstaffed for all or part of the day, and after dark.

6.2 The NAO also commented on the limited impact of the Government-sponsored Secure Stations scheme. It was felt that it suffered from a lack of support from train companies (partly because of the cost of the regular surveys required to acquire and retain accreditation). Many of the accredited stations had a low level of crime initially, so accreditation was achieved without making significant changes, and had little practical impact. Passenger awareness of the scheme was low, so it did little to affect perceptions of crime. In January 2005 only 118 stations (out of more than 2500) were accredited, and the number was declining—although as these included 87 of the busiest stations on the network, more than two thirds of journeys began or ended at a “secure station”. The difficulty faced by the industry is that although recorded levels of crime are highest at the busiest stations, passengers' concern for their security is greatest in relatively unfrequented locations. A review in 2003 of the separate Secured Car Park scheme showed that improvements made to achieve this award had a positive effect on users' perceptions, but in March 2004 only 125 station car parks were covered by it.

6.3 Standards will not be driven up in the absence of an enforcement regime. The SQUIRE regime used in Scotland and in PTE areas indicates the need for and effectiveness of monitoring. NAO reported that the regime cost £600,000 to implement in 2003–04 while the train operators paid £1 million in penalties. The NAO report highlighted the absence of a single organisation co-ordinating the development of stations and facilities at them.

7. CRIME AND SAFETY AT LONDON STATIONS

7.1 Earlier this year, the Transport Committee of the London Assembly published the findings of its own scrutiny of *Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations*⁵. This report was critical of the lack of integration between CCTV systems operated by local authorities and those found on the railway. It expressed concern at the lower level of policing provided on the National Rail network compared with the Underground. It described many suburban stations as being “poorly lit and sparsely staffed” which made for “an unwelcoming, sometimes threatening environment hardly designed to encourage greater use—especially during off-peak periods.” The Secure Stations award scheme was felt to be well-intentioned but “misdirected and too concerned with corporate procedure rather than the experience of the passenger.”

7.2 The Committee “sought to highlight that by providing better and brighter lighting inside and outside the station, better street level real time travel information, more consistent signage, offering more commercial lettings and raising basic design standards, stations can become more welcoming to the passenger.” But quoting research conducted by Transport for London (TfL), which confirms that increased staffing tops the list of passenger preferences for improving station safety, it noted that “it is rare that any Tube station is unstaffed during service hours and yet on London's rail network it is common to find stations after a certain time in the evening completely devoid of staff.” It accepted that staff represent a greater cost over time than some of the other improvements discussed, but suggested that they could be more imaginatively deployed. “Ticket office staff, though essential during peak time, may provide a more visible presence elsewhere in stations during off-peak hours.” It applauded TfL's declared intention of requiring stations on the North London Railway to be continuously staffed when it assumes responsibility for this franchise next year.

8. IN CONCLUSION

8.1 Passenger Focus welcomes the Committee's inquiry and its opportunity to present evidence. We highlight four aspects which must be tackled:

1. More staff—visible and clearly uniformed—at stations;
2. Physical facilities which complement staff presence: help points, CCTV, good lighting, clear sight lines;
3. Better co-ordination between the numerous bodies which share responsibility for rail operations; and
4. Monitoring regimes incorporating SQUIRE requirements/passenger perceptions.

8.2 We also wish to address the points raised by the Committee more specifically. These points are largely addressed in the preceding paragraphs, but for sake of completeness we cover them again in brief below. Many of the concepts in the questions overlap, and we have therefore brought both the questions and our direct responses together for ease of reference.

8.2.1 *What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers? Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?*

- Staffing is the single most effective means of making stations safer. Staff should be visible, easily recognisable, trained in the skills necessary to exercise authority when required and invested with necessary legal powers. They must patrol frequently. Staffing is clearly a greater cost over time than some other expedients, often depending on how they are deployed—but it is the one which passengers consistently expect. Questions of station staffing need to be addressed through the franchising process. There seems to be merit in examining the role and effectiveness of South West Trains’ “travel safe officers”. Staff presence must be complemented with appropriate technology: CCTV, help points and good lighting. Design, especially to ensure clear sight lines is vital, as is the active engagement of the industry with all other relevant agencies to deter crime and disorder. Ensuring CCTV coverage of help points is beneficial as is integration of railway and external CCTV systems. Monitoring of such systems, rather than only recording is important, as is ensuring that recordings made are of prosecutable quality. Greater effort needs to be made in providing another human presence at stations, such as offering commercial lettings of more station buildings. Pilot schemes have been undertaken for various situations; these should be evaluated and where successful, implemented more widely and good practice shared.

8.2.2 *Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made? What measures should be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers’ safety in railway and underground stations? Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?*

- In certain areas SQUIRE regimes are in operation, specifying the level and number of features and facilities to be provided and maintained. Monitoring of their provision is a key component and levels of penalty have exceeded the costs of operation, indicating non-compliance. Absence of any regime would doubtless permit even greater non-compliance. Extension of this type of measurable provision and monitoring for enforcement, in future franchise specifications, is a possible way forward. Overall responsibility for co-ordinating station developments should be vested in a single organisation. Different requirements apply under different franchises which complicates definition of satisfactory standards, and any absence of monitoring renders them meaningless in any case. It is preferable for contractual obligations to enhance station security, as a requirement without a contract to underpin it will be ignored.

8.2.3 *Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?*

- The scheme is useful in focussing on station security. At the outset, larger stations achieved accreditation with little need to make alterations. However, the cost, both of accreditation and monitoring to retain accreditation, is a drain on scarce resources and has led many train companies to give little priority to the scheme which has, in any case, minimal passenger awareness, and no business case was made for smaller stations. Compulsory introduction of the scheme to current operators could have a major financial impact on them. Reincorporation may be best achieved through the refranchising process; for this reason, we welcome the requirement in the SWT Invitation to Tender for those stations experiencing the significant majority of footfall to achieve Secure Station Accreditation (SSA), incorporating an appreciation of the stations’ experience of crime. The requirement to liaise with BTP on assessing the security/crime risk at all the franchisee’s stations and ensure that the proposals include all identified high-risk locations is a particularly significant new development. A priced option of up to 95% footfall coverage is most encouraging. These requirements should be adopted in other new franchises.

8.2.4 *Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?*

- The franchise agreement is the government’s principal tool in this respect. (Our comments on the SWT ITT, in 8.2.3 apply equally here.) However, bidders are left to make their own suggestions. While this heavy hint is welcome, it stops short of a requirement or compulsion. Bidders for different franchises may easily offer different levels of provision, which will make a common national approach much more difficult to achieve, unless a common level is specified. The absence of targets hampers enforcement.
- Good practice can be shared but introduction of such measures must be tempered by the evaluation of passengers’ perceptions and needs and the recognition of the differing circumstances during daytime compared with evening and of station size and location. Clear responsibility for the implementation of measures to enhance passenger security should be based on a partnership

approach where each partner has contractually enshrined objectives. Passengers need to understand what they can expect and confidence should not be undermined by confusion over staff roles or unmet expectations.

REFERENCES

- ¹ *National Passenger Survey—Wave 13—Autumn 2005—Consultees Report*. Passenger Focus (2006).
- ² *Passenger Expectations and Priorities for Improvement* (research summary RS0501). Continental Research for Strategic Rail Authority (May 2005, unpublished).
- ³ *What passengers want from stations*. Rail Passengers Council (June 2005).
- ⁴ *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*. National Audit Office (July 2005).
- ⁵ *Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations*. London Assembly Transport Committee (January 2006).

Annex

DETAILS OF RESEARCH

A. HOME SAFE

Home Safe Research undertaken for Merseytravel in 1993¹ revealed the proportion of rail users who felt “at risk” of attack when travelling at night to be:

	Female %	Male %
Walking to/from station	40	35
Inside station	35	25
Waiting on the platform	43	39
On board the train	31	25

This work found that

Arrangements for the manning [sic] and supervision of stations are often optimised for operational convenience and cost minimisation rather than concern for passenger security. The result is that stations are frequently unstaffed at times when travellers feel most vulnerable.

The situation on many rail stations can seem particularly threatening. The frequency of arrivals and departures is substantially less than at a bus station and the secluded nature of the platforms means there is considerably less potential oversight of activity from people passing by. The design of many stations with alcoves and gaps between platform buildings also creates potential hiding places. Access to platforms may require use of subways which are also seen as an especially intimidating environment.

Replacement of station booking office staff by machines for ticket vending heightens perception of risk. People unfamiliar with how the machines work may adopt behaviour which invites contact or may feel obliged to ask strangers for advice/assistance who, in other circumstances, they might avoid.

Feelings of insecurity can become acute outside normal shopping/business hours when the number of passengers falls and retail premises close.

It is noteworthy that this study showed (a) that many people, including current users, feel insecure while travelling by rail, (b) that this is especially true after dark, and (c) that the absence of staff is seen as a significant contributory factor. Very similar findings have emerged from subsequent investigations of the same issue.

B. PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY FROM CRIME

A study of *Perceptions of safety from crime on public transport* undertaken for the Department of Transport in 1996² found that

Passenger surveys in this country and abroad consistently reveal that, despite low levels of reported and recorded crime, passengers have real fears for their personal safety whilst using public transport. There is evidence that these fears influence their decisions to travel and, in particular, their use of public transport. Some people avoid travelling after dark, some avoid particular modes of transport or particular routes or locations, while others do not see public transport as a viable option and resort to either the perceived relative safety of their car or to staying at home.

In the course of this study, focus groups were held in various parts of the country, with participants selected to take account of a range of personal attributes. The discussions were not limited to rail travel, so it is noteworthy that the authors concluded that:

The greatest concerns for personal safety were expressed by participants in the London [Underground station] and Birmingham [train station] focus groups, often linked to their fears about mentally disturbed people whose actions were described as unpredictable and erratic.

In a household interview survey conducted as part of the same project, fewer respondents rated their personal safety while travelling as poor or very poor than gave this rating for other journey factors—i.e. cost, reliability, usefulness, ease of boarding/alighting. But there were some noteworthy variations within the sample, dissatisfaction being higher amongst women, amongst people travelling after dark, amongst people not in employment, amongst those with no car, and amongst residents of metropolitan counties. About 12% had experienced or observed incidents of crime or anti-social behaviour while travelling. In the case of rail users, waiting on platforms was seen as markedly less safe than travelling on trains, and the Underground as less safe than main-line railways.

The study found that:

The absence of staff or visible and available staff contributes substantively to people's anxieties about personal safety. Uniformed staff [transport, security or police] were seen as being 'in authority' and helping to create an atmosphere of "control" which passengers closely associated with a safe and secure environment. However, the absence of staff is not only a contributing factor to people's anxiety about personal safety in these circumstances. The lack of staff is also an indication that there was [sic] likely to be few passengers travelling as well . . . It is not solely staff that fulfils [sic] people's desire for a human presence, but people want larger numbers of people because they perceive that the majority will not cause a problem for their personal safety.

When asked to rate the effectiveness of eight different possible means of improving safety when waiting for trains, the largest vote went to the presence of staff at the station.

C. FEAR AND EXPERIENCES OF ASSAULT

A 2004 report for the Rail Safety & Standards Board (RSSB) on *Fear and experiences of passengers from assault* ⁽³⁾ analysed the information contained in databases maintained by RSSB and the British Transport Police (BTP). When passenger/national demographics were compared with the actual likelihood of different passenger groups being assaulted, the consultants found some intriguing paradoxes. Specifically:

Males are much more likely to be the victim of assault, although females are more concerned about personal security.

Young people (under the age of 25) are victim of 68% of assaults. Passengers over the age of 45 are rarely the victim of an assault but are very concerned about personal security.

People from ethnic minority groups are far more likely to be assaulted but this could be the reflection of the fact that assaults tend to be concentrated in metropolitan areas which have larger ethnic populations.

Another phase of the same study surveyed samples of rail users and non-users to ascertain the extent to which they had actually experienced assaults or abuse while travelling. Only 1% of users claimed actually to have experienced a "physical attack", and these mostly occurred during the day, were of a sexual nature and committed by commuters. It was concluded that these are incidents where women are molested on busy trains, and go largely unreported.

But 7% had experienced an incident of some kind during the past year, and a further 8% had witnessed one. Only 12% had reported them. Again, the profile of incidents was quite different from that of people's fears. Incidents occurred mainly on trains, but concerns were greater about stations. Incidents occurred as frequently in daylight as after dark, but the latter aroused more fear. They were committed both by individuals and groups, but concern was mainly about groups of youths. Current users have a low level of concern about travelling during the day, but 18% will not travel (or travel alone) after dark, compared with 25% of non-users who would not do so during the day and 38% after dark. The greatest fear is of being robbed, felt by 23% of users and 30% of non-users. This fear is felt disproportionately highly by women (who are also concerned about sexual assault) and by disabled people. Students and young people are particularly worried about the possibility of being beaten up.

A series of focus groups was held to explore directly the views of passengers who are, or who feel, more vulnerable when travelling by train. It emerged that:

Few of those consulted had had direct experience of being targeted for or witnessing assaults, exceptions being male school pupils and male students. This supports national statistics which confirm that males aged under 25 are the most likely group to be the victim of violent crime. There was broad consensus across the groups that alcohol and drugs are significant factors contributing to aggressive behaviour, whilst others highlighted passengers' frustration and discomfort linked to unsatisfactory rail services.

Many people spoke of feeling afraid and anxious when travelling by train and highlighted smaller, unstaffed stations as being particularly unpleasant. They provided anecdotal evidence of making sometimes quite significant detours to avoid these stations, inadvertently contributing to the problem.

Opinions about the effectiveness and attitude of rail staff were mixed. Many people acknowledged the difficult circumstances in which some staff have to operate and several cited positive and sensitive responses when they had needed help. Youths and male students were more critical in their comments about staff, which may point to mutual defensiveness and concern.

There was also strong support for increased staff training, both to help related issues to ensure they respond appropriately to these passengers. Notwithstanding the above, there was consensus across all groups that levels of staff need to be increased.

D. PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

In March 2004 the Department for Transport published *People's perceptions of personal security and their concerns about crime on public transport*⁴, a report of research in which the specialist consultancy Crime Concern revisited the issues explored in its 1996 study (see paragraphs 4.1 to 4.5 above) to assess changes which had occurred meanwhile and the impact of various policy initiatives which had been taken. The summary of key differences noted that, among other findings:

There is some evidence from the household surveys, reinforced by the findings from the discussion groups, of greater concerns about travelling by train, especially by women. Perceptions of the actual train journey compare negatively with those of the stations where security features, including the presence of staff, are in place.

There are greater concerns in 2002, both during the daytime and after dark, for waiting on or travelling by the Underground.

There are stronger feelings expressed in 2002 about the presence of litter and graffiti at infrastructure and on trains and buses. Participants in the discussion groups identify increases in takeaway foods and the removal of litter bins for security purposes as contributing to a greater sense of the transport environment without proper care and management.

The absence of visible transport staff is a key contributing factor to insecurity in 1996 and 2002. In this later study, however, participants place greater emphasis on the need for staff to be trained, proactive and in control of the travelling environment.

In the 2002 discussion groups, greater emphasis is placed on the perceptions of insecurity that arose from the anti-social and sometimes violent behaviour of those influenced by alcohol and/or illegal drugs. Much more emphasis is placed in the 2002 study on the impact of illegal drugs and concerns that potentially violent or erratic behaviour could result.

As in the 1996 study, the presence of groups of rowdy young people is a source of insecurity for those travelling by public transport. That such young people could be the source of vandalism as well as nuisance behaviour is made more explicit by adults in the 2002 discussion groups.

Especially in and around city centre transport systems (and London in particular), begging is more commonly identified as a concern in the 2002 study, possibly reflecting the apparent increase in the numbers of those begging. Participants in the discussion groups tend to feel irritated rather than threatened by the requests for money. However, participants say they could feel threatened when those begging are aggressive or drunk.

In a detailed review of the findings of a household survey on how best to address these concerns, it concluded that between 1996 and 2002 the popularity of the presence of staff at stations rose still further, particularly among young people, among travellers in London, and among black (but not Asian) people.

Escorted journeys and discussion groups were conducted for a range of different stations.

In the escorted journeys and discussion groups at the Secure Stations and at other train stations in London and Merseyside, the presence of staff and CCTV camera surveillance were the prime reasons why people felt secure.

It was concluded that:

Most in the discussion groups were in favour of patrols by uniformed officers on trains and at stations with requests that such patrols should be regular and frequent.

and that:

Surveys and discussion groups consistently identify the importance of visible and available staff to provide reassurance to passengers. The training of staff is important to enhance their role in reassuring passengers and for their own security. Increasingly, there are initiatives to provide additional personnel to complement the role of more traditional transport staff. For a number of train operators providing local services in Greater London and other cities, security personnel or guards have been contracted to enhance the personal security of passengers and staff. There is now a move to build on the experience of using security staff by combining their security and customer assistance roles.

The report describes in approving detail the deployment of travel safe officers (TSOs) by South West Trains (SWT) in November 2002.

The objective is to achieve high levels of customer service and security, and create a general feeling of well-being and safety when travelling by train. South West Trains commented that the TSOs are really providing a second tier of policing and are there to safeguard customer service standards. SWT and the British Transport Police (BTP) provide recruitment and training for the TSOs. The officers come from a range of backgrounds and are expected to have the key qualities of communication, motivation and commitment. They are skilled and trained to communicate with the public and to offer support and reassurance in difficult situations.

Following training, the TSOs have a period of “on the job” coaching with the BTP. The TSOs are provided with access to intelligence provided by the BTP to identify hotspots for crime and anti-social behaviour. For example, the presence of TSOs is targeted to deter a growing practice of begging on local train services coming into Waterloo station. Their presence will also reassure passengers who are known to feel intimidated by aggressive begging in a confined environment where, unlike the street or station, they cannot easily walk away.

The role of the TSOs is to provide reassurance to the travelling public on trains and stations, enforce the railway by-laws and provide support and assistance to passengers. They are also expected to attend local managing out crime meetings and to develop contacts with local schools and their pupils. The officers also help with crowd control and managing events.

At the time of the study, the deployment of TSOs was too recent for most participants in the discussion groups to be aware of them, but when the idea was explained the initial responses were very positive.

REFERENCES

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² *Perceptions of safety from crime on public transport*. Crime Concern and Transport & Travel Research for the Department of Transport (June 1997).

³ *Fears and experiences of passengers from assault*. Rail Safety & Standards Board (2004).

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March 2006

Witnesses: **Chief Constable Ian Johnston CBE QM BSc (Hons)**, British Transport Police; **Mr Len Porter**, Chief Executive, Rail Safety and Standards Board; and **Mr Colin Foxall**, Chairman, and **Ms Christine Knights**, Board Member, Passenger Focus, gave evidence.

Q108 Chairman: May I apologise to you for keeping you waiting. I am sure that the quality of your evidence will have improved like good wines with a slight detention. Starting with the Chief Constable, would you be kind enough to identify yourselves for the record.

Chief Constable Johnston: Ian Johnston, Chief Constable for the British Transport Police.

Mr Porter: Len Porter, Chief Executive of the Rail Safety and Standards Board.

Mr Foxall: Colin Foxall, Chairman of Passenger Focus.

Ms Knights: Christine Knights, Board Member for Passenger Focus.

Q109 Chairman: Do any of you particularly want to make one or two remarks before you start or are you prepared to go straight into questions?

Chief Constable Johnston: I would like to make just a couple of very short points, if I may. First, ensuring the personal safety of passengers is very important for BTP. About half of the 79,000 notifiable offences committed on the railway do occur on stations so stations are obviously an important part of it. We recognise there is a very real sense of fear experienced by many passengers. Obviously there has got to be absolutely no complacency here but it is worth noting that in comparative terms the

railways are a reasonably safe place. There were, for example, nearly as many crimes in the Borough of Westminster as there were on the entire railway system throughout England and Wales last year.

Q110 Chairman: And most of those were fraud! Do carry on.

Chief Constable Johnston: What I think we need is a multi-agency strategy which does a number of things: first, something that positions stations more at the heart of local communities, and I think that is very important; something which influences the physical environment more effectively than it does at the moment; something which targets initiatives to key areas rather than the ones that are easiest to do; something which expands complementary policing, something which enhances the neighbourhood policing style you have heard mentioned here already; and something which raises the significance of personal safety within the franchising arrangements. We are very keen to take part in any ideas that emerge from here.

Q111 Chairman: Chief Constable, it is very clear that some of the train operating companies are very much opposed to the imposition of standards and they think a voluntary system will do instead. They think that high standards of safety are in their own

commercial interests and therefore they do not agree with compulsory methods. Do you think that is an argument borne out by evidence?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think some have taken their responsibilities very seriously. South West Trains pioneered the use of TravelSafe officers and I thought that was a very good initiative which we have certainly found very, very helpful in supporting us. I think the point Mr Franks made about an even playing field for all the operators could probably only be achieved through arrangements which were mandatory and supported by legislation.

Q112 Chairman: So are you saying—?

Chief Constable Johnston: I would be for a mandatory arrangement.

Q113 Chairman: Does anybody else want to comment on that?

Mr Foxall: I did want to make a very short statement. Can I do that in three quick points.

Q114 Chairman: Please do.

Mr Foxall: First of all, could I explain I have asked Christine Knights to join us because she is one of the board members who specialises in this area so I hope her evidence will be helpful to the Committee in quite a broad way. There are three short things I wanted to say. There are a large number of initiatives and regimes in play on this subject of personal safety in station facilities generally, but the problem is that it is a patchwork of things. What we need is a strategy or vision to guide things. We lack a controlling mind, body or a person to do this. I hear that the DfT is producing a single person to look after policy. I think that is likely to be a good thing but we need to watch quite carefully to see if it makes progress. The third point is that with all the regimes that we have around we want to make sure they are designed to meet passenger needs because you can have lots of regimes but if it amounts to ticking boxes and checking things on forms, we want to make sure the things that are done in terms of personal safety, things on stations for example, actually work. The last thing I would say is both Ms Knights and I sit on the BTP Authority but we are here today plainly as Passenger Focus.

Q115 Chairman: Let me be quite clear, are you saying there should be fewer standards but they should be compulsory and they should be standardised?

Mr Foxall: I think we would like to see it clearer. We would like for there not to be so many conflicting different sorts of schemes all over the place.

Q116 Chairman: I accept that and that is clear but what I am saying to you is do they need to be compulsory standards across all the train operating companies because it is clear they are all over the place.

Mr Foxall: I am really torn in answering this question.

Q117 Chairman: Well then forgive me, Mr Foxall, I will go to somebody who does not feel torn.

Mr Porter: I will give you the answer. They should be compulsory but we need to be careful that the compulsion does not turn into simply ticking boxes. That is my point.

Q118 Chairman: I accept that but Ms Knights, then, are you saying it would be possible to have a set of compulsory standards as long as they were agreed right the way across the network and as long people knew they corresponded to reality, which is what Mr Foxall is actually saying?

Ms Knights: I think there needs to be a set of standards which are appropriate for the circumstances of each station.

Q119 Chairman: Wait a minute. Are you saying we need a ground base of standards with individuality built in for each individual station?

Ms Knights: No. At the moment what we are looking at is passenger satisfaction being lower in medium-sized and small stations and what we are generally getting through the franchise is requirements for certain standards at the larger stations where there is high crime and high footfall. If we consider the passenger satisfaction, I think what we need is a set of basic standards but with additional or lesser standards in the different sizes and types of station.

Q120 Chairman: Mr Porter, what are your views on this?

Mr Porter: I think the last time I appeared at one of these Committees you were concerned about the cost of standards, so I certainly could not propose standards in this area. I think the rail industry—

Q121 Chairman: I am rarely accused by anyone of being concerned about costs but I am happy to hear it.

Mr Porter: I think the rail industry has grown more knowledgeable about risk. The way that we police this ought to be according to risk.

Q122 Chairman: That does rather lean towards flexibility.

Mr Porter: I would agree with that.

Q123 Chairman: Chief Constable, I am going to come back to you because I am not now clear what it is that is being proposed. Are we saying that we should have a very straightforward set of minimum standards but over and above those minimum standards there should be some flexibility for individual stations to put in bits that they like?

Chief Constable Johnston: I would go for a gold, silver, bronze approach which would be mandatory through the franchising arrangements which would be set at different thresholds, so small stations with low footfall, low crime levels, meet one standard, those with more crime, more people would meet another standard and the bigger ones where there is most crime would be required to meet the higher standard. I would want some system which had

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flexibility and some system which targeted—which the gold, silver, bronze thing would do—the places at which it was most needed because at the moment requirements within franchises are often specified in terms of “You must have X number of secure stations” and they quite intelligently go for the ones that cost least.

Q124 Mrs Ellman: There seems to be a discrepancy here between where need is greatest as identified by high crime and where people feel there is a need because they are uneasy. Who should decide which of those areas has higher priority in terms of action needed?

Mr Foxall: I think the answer to that is that is why we think we should have a strategy which tries to address precisely that sort of question. At the bigger stations it is fairly plain that you can make decisions about what you need to do and maybe Network Rail can help do that without too much difficulty. When we get further down—I hesitate to say “down the line”—to the smaller stations it then becomes very difficult to say what is necessary and what I would like to see happen there is to encourage the local community to become involved in making decisions about local stations and how they should be protected.

Mr Porter: I do not think it is a question of who should decide, it is a question of what the data and information tells you as to where the priority risk is and then it is absolutely clear without anybody taking a view as to where work should be done.

Q125 Chairman: To be devil’s advocate for a moment, Mr Porter, are you not really saying that is if, for example, the information gathered by CCTV is on digital, if there is someone monitoring it, if there is some means of filtering that information? Are there not a lot of ifs in that statement?

Mr Porter: I do not think it is anything to do with CCTV.

Q126 Chairman: No, but it is the quality of the information. Where do you gather the information from if it is a small station with no staff and it has not got CCTV that anybody can decipher? I am sorry to be boring about this but you have got to know what the information is before you sort it out, have you not? It is no use looking at the Chief Constable, I know his views but I want your views.

Mr Porter: We have information in the various databases that would describe where the incidents are taking place, that was why I was looking at the Chief Constable because he has the database.

Q127 Chairman: So you could draw us a nice coloured map of the whole of the railway system of the United Kingdom suitably graded as to the level of crime in each individual area?

Mr Porter: Can we?

Chief Constable Johnston: We certainly can. There is crime data for each station.

Q128 Chairman: What do you do with what information, Chief Constable? You tell the train operating companies and what do they do with it, if the answer is not a lemon?

Chief Constable Johnston: Some respond responsibly and effectively on occasions and others are unable to do so.

Q129 Chairman: Are unable or unwilling or do not intend to cough up the cash?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think resources are a key issue.

Chairman: I suspect they might be.

Q130 Mrs Ellman: Would you say the Secure Stations Scheme is successful?

Chief Constable Johnston: I would say they are part of the successful formula. There are other things to improving the lives of passengers on stations than just the Secure Stations Scheme but it is a big step in the right direction and I am very supportive of it.

Mr Porter: I would agree with that.

Mr Foxall: From our point of view we see it being much more applicable to the larger stations and difficult to apply to the smaller stations. Commenting on the earlier discussion, we have talked about identifying needs but that ignores one very important thing and that is passengers’ perception. If passengers are fearful of going into stations it does not matter whether there has or has not been a problem on that station, it is a question of whether they perceive it to be an environment where there might be a problem. Somehow we have to take that into account, which is why I think we need a wider discussion about this. It is not just a statistical bean counting exercise, it is an exercise about what the passengers think and what will make them secure in travelling.

Q131 Mrs Ellman: Why do you think there are only 323 secure stations registered under the scheme from over 2,500 stations?

Mr Porter: Cost.

Q132 Mrs Ellman: Cost of?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think the scheme could be made easier and more flexible, which is why I would quite like a gold, silver, bronze approach. That is part of it. I think they see it as more difficult to achieve than it would be. There is an issue of cost in this as well. One of the things the scheme does is survey passengers so you do pick up on passengers’ feelings and fear of crime through the present Secure Stations Scheme.

Q133 Mr Leech: I am interested to know whether there is any difference between the levels of fear of crime in stations where they have the Secure Stations Scheme in place and whether people are aware that those stations do have that scheme.

Ms Knights: One of our concerns is that passengers are not particularly aware, nor is it particularly publicised, whether a station has accreditation under the Secure Stations Scheme or not. Clearly

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there is a balance to be struck as to whether to reassure people or to engender more fear, but there has been research on the Secure Car Parks Scheme and when people found out about that it seemed to reassure them. Surely there is work to be done on looking at reassuring people through further publicity on the Secure Stations Scheme.

Q134 Mr Wilshire: Somebody said, and this concerns me, if this is what people “perceive” to be a safe environment. Can any of you see any danger in trying to reassure people beyond the point that you can actually deliver and, therefore, make them less aware of their surroundings and less responsible for their own safety?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think you can do things to make people feel safer by the way the environment is constructed. Places that are dark and dirty do not give people a sense of reassurance and comfort and you can do something about that regardless of the actual crime levels that are there. Paradoxically, places where there are no people around are quite frightening for some people and having people around, whoever those people are, in a way helps people to feel safer. The issue of fear of crime is very much a separate issue from crime itself. The people who are worried about crime are by and large the elderly and people who are victims are the young. The people who are worried about it are women, men are much more often victims of crime. People are worried about crime at night, most of the crime is during the day. People on the railways are worried about crime most on trains but mostly crime occurs on the platforms, on the stations. There are two challenges to be addressed around crime and fear of crime and they require different strategies.

Q135 Mrs Ellman: Should accreditation only be given to stations which are deemed to be at risk?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think that would be a very sensible use of resources. You are into an issue about how do you define to what extent they are at risk but that is exactly the point I am saying, at the moment sometimes secure stations are places which have accreditation and that investment could have been more usefully spent somewhere else.

Mr Foxall: I think that is problematic, Chairman. I do not like disagreeing with the Chief Constable but I think that is problematic because I still think the perceptions people have influence travel. I accept there is a boundary that you cannot go beyond. You cannot go to ridiculous lengths to make people feel absolutely comfortable because if they innately fear, they innately fear, but I am worried about saying you do it simply on a risk assessment basis or on the basis of experience.

Chief Constable Johnston: My point around risk was I was including fear of crime as one of the elements within the risk assessment.

Mr Foxall: Then we are in agreement.

Q136 Mr Scott: We have heard about the CCTV on station platforms. In a number of areas the town centres are already monitored 24 hours a day, seven

days a week. For economy reasons, as the staff are already there monitoring them, would you recommend it as a way forward for all stations to be linked to town centres?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think there is a challenge nationally across all organisations about the integration of CCTV systems for police forces, for local authorities, for football grounds. There is a whole series of work to be done here. The Home Office, God bless them, have commissioned some work and are due to report at the end of this year which will be about achieving a working towards common standards to enable exactly that process to take place. Whilst that is going on there is lots of work that can be done. Lewisham, for example, has got cameras from the station into their borough control room and there are other places around London that I know of where that currently happens. There is scope for a lot more of that work which would be very good operationally in terms of tying up events because often the people who are misbehaving on the stations turn out to be the people who misbehave in the towns, so there are some operational links there, and there is some resource saving in terms of who is sitting in front of these cameras watching them.

Mr Porter: I think that we should see rail personal security as part of a community safety initiative, which is the point you are making. Just backing up the Chief Constable’s point, if we do a very good job on the railway, and I think that is happening, all that is going to do is push people out into the car park first and then into the community centre or into the shopping centre or whatever and there is no point spending the money to move them from A to B, we need to take a rather more holistic view.

Q137 Mr Scott: I wonder if I could ask Mr Foxall and Ms Knights if you agree that this would help with the feel or the perception that people fear, which we heard is wrong?

Mr Foxall: I think it would be good. In fact, I agree with the last point that Mr Porter has just made. If you make the station tremendously secure and if the four streets outside the station are terribly insecure you have created another sort of problem unless you are always going to guarantee someone comes to the station in a car or whatever. It does need to proceed in that context. We must not ignore the fact that crime on the railways is part of society’s crime. We cannot isolate it. Yes, clearly it is a specialist area and we have to treat it in a particular way but it is part of society’s crime and that is why I believe the local community has to get involved too in looking at the issues that are raised in the stations. You cannot shut the station in a box.

Ms Knights: This goes back to Mr Foxall’s point at the beginning that it is about a partnership to try to resolve these issues where different bodies, local authorities, BTP, RSSB and the train companies and Network Rail, all need to work together, but there does need to be one controlling body or one controlling mind having an overview to make sure there is a catalyst for action in each area.

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Chief Constable Johnston: I would very much want to see stations positioned much more in the heart of local communities because that is a way into resources, you can get town centre wardens engaged and interested in stations, local shopkeepers, develop Neighbourhood Watch capability. If we were able to develop more ownership of the railway stations within local communities we could bring in resources, bring in community support and get lots of help alongside the CCTV.

Mr Porter: I fully agree with that because if—

Chairman: Mr Porter, forgive me. If you agree I am going to move on.

Q138 Mr Martlew: Listening to yourselves and the previous witnesses, is station security a success story, is it getting better, or do I believe what I read in the papers?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think it is a mixed bag. In some places there have been big improvements and some places are pretty grim and people are quite right to be anxious about spending time there. I do think there are lots of good initiatives going on so the situation overall is getting better. As a police force we have had better support in the last year or so to enable us to make a contribution to it. Developments in CCTV are very positive although I do share Robin Gisby's comments about more investment needed in the monitoring and use end of the business to get the full investment returns out of it. The front end is not quite done but enough has gone into it, it is more in the back end and how we utilise the materials like CCTV and the like. I think the picture is improving. Crime was down last year, it was down the year before on the railways by small percentages but it is a step in the right direction. I do think overall that we are going in the right direction but not fast enough.

Q139 Mr Martlew: Chief Constable, earlier you indicated that you needed legislation and then you appeared to contradict yourself to the extent that you said you could put it in through the franchise. Politicians know the idea that you are going to get legislation quickly is very unlikely. What would you say?

Chief Constable Johnston: I was clumsy with my language there. I regard the franchise as a regulatory requirement when I was talking about a legal basis for it. There needs to be a regulatory requirement which is mandatory and not an opt-in and opt-out basis.

Q140 Mr Martlew: And you would put it in the franchise?

Chief Constable Johnston: I would see an easy route through the franchise.

Mr Foxall: The satisfaction levels from passengers in surveys we do show a steady improvement in this and although it is not great, you have got 60% levels of satisfaction in general with personal safety. I agree with the Chief Constable, I think it is extremely variable and one of the things I would like to do later on is have a look at the variability in a

much more careful way but it is interesting that the general perceptions are not as bad as you would like to think.

Q141 Chairman: I cut Mr Porter off before so I must give him another chance.

Mr Porter: I am glad that I have been given the opportunity to come back in because that is exactly the point I wanted to make. We have done some general research on perception and the issue of societal concern. Without being too generalistic, it is largely associated with media hype and there is no real concrete reason for societal concern with personal security on the railway, and an awful lot of this is driven again by the media. That does not matter to the public, the public have a perception of a problem and that is what we must deal with by communicating in the right way.

Q142 Mr Martlew: Are you saying that the media are frightening people?

Mr Porter: Yes.

Chairman: I think any minute now Chief Constable, you are going to find yourself censoring the newspapers, that would be a good rally.

Clive Efford: Can I clarify, I may have missed your answer earlier on, if I did I apologise. Mr Foxall or Ms Knights, do you agree that all stations should be manned at all times when trains are running?

Chairman: Staffed, I think.

Q143 Mr Martlew: That is not like you, Chairman.

Mr Foxall: I do not think we have answered that yet. I think the answer to that is passengers like to see people around, it would be a good thing. We have campaigned for ticket offices to be manned in London. We generally oppose reductions of manning on trains and things of that kind.

Q144 Clive Efford: I am still not clear, is the answer yes or no?

Mr Foxall: The answer, of course, is yes but the reality is that the train companies find that difficult to respond to.

Q145 Clive Efford: Who do you speak for, the train companies?

Mr Foxall: I do not speak for train companies, and you know that well, I speak for passengers and I have said that very clearly. Passengers would prefer to see staff and it would be desirable to have staff but what we have to respect and understand is there are some stations which have such low footfall, it would be difficult to put staff there, that is a fact.

Q146 Clive Efford: Is it not a fact that footfall will get even lower if you do not have staff?

Mr Foxall: Indeed, and that is a major consideration and I think it needs to be taken into account when the franchise is let. Adequate staffing on stations is something we want to see.

Q147 Clive Efford: Ms Knights, would you like to add anything?

Ms Knights: Yes, I would like to add something that has not cropped up already. Mr Martlew asked is it a success story or not and I think there are examples of good practice but I think what is not happening is that the measures being taken have not been evaluated against the impact on passengers' of perceptions. This is a good case in point. There may be a package of measures which are the solutions for smaller stations where there cannot be staff. We do not yet have sufficient evaluation of measures in place.

Q148 Clive Efford: Is there any evidence or any research which anyone has done that can demonstrate having staff at a station increases people's confidence and therefore increases use of the transport network?

Chief Constable Johnston: The evidence I would point to is that at a number of the major stations over the last year in Central London we have been able to introduce PCSOs, for example, at Victoria and crime at Victoria over the last year has gone down by—

Q149 Chairman: What are PCSOs, Chief Constable?

Chief Constable Johnston: Police community support officers. They are part of the extended police family and they were introduced, for example, at Victoria and crime has gone down there by about 11%. It dropped initially by about 25 or 26%, it is down for the year by about 11%. I think one of the significant factors of that is there is a significant number of additional yellow jackets visibly present around the station which has made a difference to actual crime levels. Certainly the feedback that we have—I guess it is not a proper evaluation—is that it is very welcome.

Mr Porter: If I can comment. I am fairly sure in saying that we have done some research on this and there is a correlation between increasing numbers of people and reducing crime.

Q150 Clive Efford: Can I clarify something on CCTV. Mr Johnston, you suggested that it is important that CCTV systems are standardised across the country and that minimum standards should be set for the quality of images. Do such common standards exist at all yet and why is standardisation so important?

Chief Constable Johnston: A step has been made, as I think you have heard from George Muir. There is an agreement between us, the train operators and ATOC, in moving forward to stick to a common format for the recording of the new visual images. This is very important to us because at the moment to download images we require different equipment for different sets of digital imaging and this is very expensive and very inefficient and can be very, very slow indeed. I think the standards are very, very important in that sense. They are also important in terms of the quality of the pictures although I can say most of the things on the market today is

infinitely better than things that were there five years ago because poor images do not do the job in court, so the standard for images is very important as well.

Q151 Clive Efford: How does that sit with co-ordinating station systems with local community systems?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think it is part of the bigger picture that the Home Office working party has got to wrestle with because this is a problem that has got tentacles everywhere and is, I think, probably beyond the world. The way into it for me is through a data warehousing approach which is the way they resolve incompatibility of computers, having some piece of machinery there into which you can dump data which then comes out in a format which is for common usage. I would see that sort of approach as being the interim measure.

Q152 Clive Efford: Is CCTV more about being a deterrent rather than detection and actual convictions?

Chief Constable Johnston: 20% of all the people we caught for robbery in London south last year was through CCTV. The bombers were identified primarily through CCTV. It is a fantastic device in terms of detection and I think it has got massive value to the police service in terms of detection as well as in reassurance terms to the public.

Q153 Clive Efford: Southwest Trains pays for TravelSafe officers who are deployed by your force. In your view, how effective are these officers compared with fully trained police officers or community support officers?

Chief Constable Johnston: They are less physically able. They have fewer powers but what they do offer is a very friendly and very reassuring presence. I think they were a fantastic initiative by Southwest Trains. They were the first train company to pick up on this and I think they were the precursor to community support officers. I think they are still a very worthwhile part of the extended police family but they do not have powers of arrest and they do not have a means to enforce regulations other than some of the byelaws for the railways which railway employees can enforce.

Q154 Clive Efford: Is there any danger of confusion in the eyes of the public with so many different enforcement officers?

Chief Constable Johnston: I have not experienced that. To use an anecdotal approach, my wife does not know the difference between any of them. She finds them all reassuring and I think that is fundamentally the point, do you find them reassuring or not.

Q155 Chairman: If she was arrested by one of them when he had not got the legal right, she might take a mild interest.

Chief Constable Johnston: She has had some good advice from me about that and it probably would be to plead guilty. I take the point. They have badges

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which are very visible which says exactly what they are. Police officers have very visible police badges on, the police community support officers have very visible badges on. What they are is easy to see, what that means to people is a very fair point and I do think there is some risk of confusion but I am then back to the point of fundamentally do they reassure and help and support. I think they do. The risk of confusion is worth the asset that we have got.

Q156 Clive Efford: You recently carried out Operation Shield which was detecting people carrying knives. How successful do you think that is? Will you use it in the future and can it be adapted to identify other things that people may be carrying?

Chief Constable Johnston: I think it is a fantastic operation. We had lots of really good feedback from members of the public about it. We have had a large number of arrests, in fact the numbers you have got are about doubled now to what we reported in the paper to you when the paper was prepared a few weeks back. They are very, very effective indeed. We had people with carving knives up their sleeves stopped by our officers using these machines. More importantly, we watch people who come towards them and then decide they do not want to go near them and that raises our suspicions to the point where we conduct an investigation and frequently find either they are wanted or they have some weapon or some other paraphernalia on them which they should not have. It is a very effective tool. We put out a couple of these arches to start with in each of our areas up and down the country. They are going to be used in Scotland as part of the anti-knives campaign they are running up there. It will be part of the national knives amnesty activity by Government later this year.

Q157 Clive Efford: Are the train operating companies investing in this technology?

Chief Constable Johnston: We have done that through the budget provided to us by the authorities, that is one of the initiatives we have been able to take on the back of the money that we have got from them. We have had support from the operators because it is on their property that we have to place these arches and I think that they have proven themselves to be a really worthwhile asset and if the extension around the country is equally successful we want to do more of it.

Q158 Mr Leech: Very briefly going back to the issue of all the different kinds of security, is there a danger that without a co-ordinated approach we could have a situation where you have got CSOs, TravelSafe officers, police officers, everybody on one station and nobody somewhere else. How does the co-ordination work?

Chief Constable Johnston: We operate according to the national intelligence model where we have tasking arrangements where we invite the industry along, they come along to the meeting, they say, "These are the resources that we have got available", we say "These are the resources that we have got available". We look at the problems and we jointly deploy. That is something that has started fairly recently. There is a mixed level of take up across the industry at the moment but it is building and it is for us to market that with industry to avoid that sort of overlapping deployment, Southern in the shape of Keith Ludeman, who we heard from earlier, they have a team of security guards who work jointly alongside us. They are part of that tasking arrangement. We have got pretty good joined-up arrangements with these high level supports, like the PCSOs, the specials that we have, the accredited officers that we have on the rail industry and the TravelSafe people.

Q159 Mr Leech: Have there been any examples where the co-ordination has failed and, if so, do you, as the transport police, try and take control of the situation?

Chief Constable Johnston: We have been able to show a bit of leadership on this with the support of the rail industry. I have never seen it fail in any sense because there is more than enough for all of us to do out there anyway. There are examples where we could have targeted resources more closely in one spot and perhaps have been more effective by joint activity but that is part of the learning process of working together.

Q160 Chairman: Before you go Mr Johnston, tell us about the rail personal security group? Is it being effective? Are you managing to deal with the whole question of assaults against railway staff?

Chief Constable Johnston: We have put a lot of effort into dealing with assaults on railway staff, we think they are entitled to proper protection. They are in a very difficult position sometimes and if we want them to look after the public, we have got to look after them. We were the first force in the country to use DNA to detect offences of spitting against railway staff. We have improved the number of clear-ups, they have increased over the last three years by something like 85%. A lot of initiatives that we have taken have made a big difference to the number of people who we have been able to detect. The new group will help to get support from other partners in tackling this very important point.

Chairman: On that note I suspend the Committee and I am very grateful to the witnesses. Thank you very much indeed.

*The Committee suspended from
4.25pm to 4.35pm for a division in the House.*

Memorandum submitted by the Department for Transport

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Committee with a summary of the Department's position on personal safety at railway stations. The sections below set out the Department's views under the following headings :-

- Opening statement;
- Responsibility for passenger safety.
- Government initiatives:
 - Personal security measures at stations;
 - The Secure Stations Scheme;
 - Policing.
- Summary and conclusions.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Government is committed to continued improvements in personal safety at railway stations. Providing a rail system which passengers regard as safe to use at all times is not a straightforward task. Many of our stations were built by the Victorians and have suffered badly from underinvestment since. We are addressing that neglect through an unprecedented level of investment; by making money available for station improvements; by encouraging improved personal safety for passengers and staff through specific initiatives like the Secure Stations Scheme (the new South Western franchise will, for the first time, impose specific requirements on an operator to achieve and maintain Secure Stations Scheme accreditation) and by increased BTP spending.

More generally, the Government continues to support the work of the police, local authorities, Crime and Disorder Reduction partnerships (CDRPs) and transport operators to tackle crime on all modes of public transport. We continue to develop, evaluate and disseminate good practice in reducing crime and the fear of crime wherever it occurs in the transport system. We also continue to raise the profile of transport crime as an issue that CDRPs should consider within their crime and disorder strategies. The rail industry is committed to working with CDRPs and others to improve community safety.

The following sections of this memorandum highlight the progress that has already been made and describes the Government's future plans in this area.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSENGER SAFETY

There are just over 2,500 stations on the network. All but a handful (such as St Pancras International and Prestwick) are owned by Network Rail. Seventeen—the main London termini and a small number of major stations outside London—are managed directly by Network Rail themselves. The rest are leased to and managed by the main train operator serving the station. The operators' responsibilities include the personal safety of passengers.

Regular users are generally well aware of who their train operators are and so have a good idea of where to take their complaint when things go wrong at their local station. At multi-operator stations, however, this may be much less obvious and there needs to be more information at stations making it clear where responsibility lies. This is already addressed at Network Rail stations. Displays on train departure boards identifying not only the company responsible but also the name of the duty manager are a feature of some Network Rail stations which might usefully be adopted elsewhere.

A particular issue arises at stations shared by Underground and main line trains. In these cases, too, more imaginative use of signing could go a long way towards ensuring that passengers know who is responsible for their safety.

GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE PASSENGER SAFETY

A range of current Government initiatives are directed specifically at dealing with crime and the fear of crime among users of railway stations:

Personal safety measures at stations

The Government is spending £87 million a week on the railways. Spending specifically on stations is difficult to identify separately because it comes from a wide variety of sources including Network Rail, train operators, private investors and local authorities. The National Audit Office, however, have estimated that around £675 million was spent on station maintenance, operations, renewals and improvements in 2003–04. Even with investment at that level, it is inevitable that there will be competing calls on funds. Operational

safety, for example, was rightly the priority following Hatfield and other major accidents. Even now that those issues have been addressed, there continue to be other areas which matter to passengers—punctuality and reliability being the outstanding examples—as well as personal safety.

The Department has been undertaking research into the most effective ways of tackling crime at those stations with the highest rates of crime, and especially those in socially excluded areas, to see whether the need is for conventional crime reduction or wider regeneration solutions. We hope to make the results available to operators and others later this year.

Franchise agreements increasingly require train operators to make improvements to stations in their area. We now routinely expect train operators, in submitting their bids, to demonstrate that they have considered the appropriate level of safety at stations. Operators are expected to have priced station upkeep into their bids and Network Rail is fully funded to maintain the physical structure of stations through the income line set by the Office of Rail Regulation in the interim review. A well maintained station is valuable in reassuring passengers and is less likely to attract anti social behaviour.

There is, additionally, central funding for stations. Network Rail has a £50 million a year pot for small investments which can be used both directly to pay for improvements like CCTV installation and to lever in third party funding. Around a third of stations nationally, and over half the three hundred or so in London, now have CCTV and the number is increasing steadily as operators and Transport for London continue to invest in increased passenger safety. For the longer term, improved passenger safety is one of the items Ministers will want to specify in the High Level Output Specification.

Recent media reporting of station safety issues has concentrated heavily on the benefits which might flow from insisting that all stations are staffed whenever trains are running. This is something we will continue to examine but which is likely to prove an expensive option that may well not make the best use of what are inevitably limited resources. A more sophisticated approach which targets crime hot spots is likely to be much more effective than a blanket requirement that every station, regardless of circumstances, must be staffed at all times.

This memorandum has already drawn attention to the level of current investment in the railway but the very fact that so much public money is being spent underlines the need to ensure that we are getting the best value for it. Responsibility for stations within the Department is currently spread across a number of different Divisions, reflecting the wide range of current initiatives in the area. There is, though a clear need to ensure that the various strands of policy relevant to stations in general and personal safety at stations in particular is properly coordinated. A post is therefore being created within the Strategy and Finance Directorate of the Department's Rail Group specifically to take responsibility across the board for stations issues and to ensure a sharper focus.

The Secure Stations Scheme

The Secure Stations Scheme is directed by the Department and the British Transport Police and enables operators to gain accreditation for stations which have a comprehensive package of measures to reduce crime and reassure passengers. Accreditation is based on four criteria:

- the physical design of the station, ensuring that crime is, as far as possible, designed out;
- ensuring that the station is being managed in a way that reduces crime;
- statistical evidence showing that crime at the station is being managed; and
- survey results showing that the majority of passengers feel secure.

Accreditation can be withdrawn at any time if standards are not maintained. In any case, accreditation lasts only two years, after which it lapses if it is not renewed. Once accreditation has been gained, there are incentives on operators to maintain standards. In some cases this will take the form of a specific franchise obligations; we expect this to become an increasingly common feature of franchises in the future. Even where there is no direct obligation, however, operators will want to avoid the negative publicity that would result from allowing accreditation to lapse.

The strength of the scheme is that it both gives a good coverage of the things that matter to passengers and specifically measures users' perceptions, not merely those of the operator. The Scheme was the subject of a formal independent review in 2003. The review generally endorsed the Scheme and proposed no major changes. Those recommendations which were made were aimed at improving the effectiveness and take up of the Scheme by reducing its cost, simplifying administration and giving a clearer steer in the case of stations which failed to meet the accreditation standard.

Following the Scheme's relaunch in March 2005, there has been a 52% increase in accreditations. Most train operators and Network Rail now participate. We have considered whether accreditation should be compulsory and we have, in fact, made accreditation of more stations a franchise requirement. Insisting on it across the board would, however, be an expensive option and one which would have to be phased in over a period. We are considering, as an alternative, whether franchise bidders might be required to state what percentage of their stations would be accredited and to what timetable.

Policing

Total crime on the railways decreased by 1.9% in 2004–05. The British Transport Police (BTP) currently deploys 2,773 officers, an increase of 11% on the number employed in 2004–05, which itself saw a then record rise of 9% on the previous year. This does not include either Special Constables or Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). 200 additional Specials will be recruited over the next three years, bringing the numbers up to 426. An extra 60 PCSOs have been recruited during 2005–06, bringing the total to over 200.

PCSOs have been deployed at the main London termini, Leeds, Birmingham New Street, Manchester Piccadilly and Cardiff Central. These stations are among those with the highest passenger numbers and also the highest crime levels.

PCSOs do not have all the powers of police officers but they are a visible, and uniformed, patrolling presence. They are an effective deterrent, especially to the type of low level anti-social behaviour that can add to the fear of crime. They have a range of powers not available to other railway staff. They can require a person's name and address, can confiscate alcohol being consumed in a public place and can detain people for up to thirty minutes pending the arrival of a police officer.

By introducing the legislation to allow the BTP to deploy PCSOs, the Government has enabled the force to extend its policing capability. We have also put in place legislation to allow the BTP to establish a Railway Safety Accreditation Scheme. This allows the BTP Chief Constable to confer limited police powers on specific employees (such as Network Rail or train operating company station or security staff) once they have been suitably trained and accredited under the scheme. Accredited persons can be deployed on trains and at stations. They do a valuable job in reassuring the public and contributing to the fight against crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour.

On 11 October 2005, the Secretary of State announced a review of the BTP. His decision to carry out the review was made in the context of the review of the 43 local police forces in England and Wales which is being undertaken by the Home Secretary but which does not cover the BTP. The wider review is addressing proposals for major restructuring of policing across England and Wales and the Secretary of State considered it right to review the BTP at the same time.

Summary and conclusions

Part of the Government's vision, as set out in its Ten Year Plan for Transport, was safer and more secure transport accessible to all. This memorandum has made the point that attention to rail safety issues in the early years of the period covered by the Plan concentrated on learning the lessons of major accidents like that at Hatfield. Personal safety was nevertheless identified as an important issue from the outset. The Plan specifically identified the need for "station improvements including improved . . . personal security, with greater coverage of CCTV at stations and station car parks and increasing numbers of stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme."

Good progress has been achieved in those and other related areas, as this memorandum has described. That is reflected in the results of the Autumn 2005 National Passenger Survey conducted by Passenger Focus which showed that 59% of passengers nationally rated personal security at stations as satisfactory or good. 10% rated it unsatisfactory or poor. Results for London and the South East were almost identical (57% and 10% respectively). The survey also showed that satisfaction ratings in this area were improving. We recognise that there is work still to be done to reassure passengers not only that rail is a safe means of transport but also that their personal safety is not at risk while on trains and at railway stations.

3 April 2006

Witness: Derek Twigg, a Member of the House, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport, gave evidence.

Q161 Chairman: Good afternoon, Minister, we are very grateful to you for coming.

Derek Twigg: Good afternoon.

Q162 Chairman: I assumed you engineered the vote so that you could make an entry on a high note.

Derek Twigg: Once a whip always a whip I think, Mrs Dunwoody.

Q163 Chairman: Could I ask you to identify yourself?

Derek Twigg: Yes, I am Derek Twigg, Minister for Railways.

Q164 Chairman: Did you have something you particularly wanted to tell us, Mr Twigg?

Derek Twigg: Yes, I would like to make a short statement before you ask me questions. Clearly, I believe this is a very important issue and I welcome the investigation by this Committee. I think it is important to put it in context as well. We are an increasingly successful railway. There is £87 million

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being invested a week now and a billion passengers so a growing railway. We want to see that growing railway continue and therefore personal safety is an important part of that in terms of encouraging people onto the railway. As you will know, Mrs Dunwoody, we have put in place a new structure now with the new DfT rail group put in place and of course Network Rail have responsibility for performance in the TOCs service division and of course they have the most responsibility for what happens at stations in terms of the management and operation. As I have said in my submission, we intend to create a post to co-ordinate station issues within the new Department for Transport rail group.

Q165 Chairman: Forgive me, you “intend to create”, future tense?

Derek Twigg: Yes, we are in the process of doing that, we have not done that yet because a number of responsibilities are spread across different parts of the divisions. In the new franchises, and South Western in particular, which is the one we have just done and sent out, we will be putting much greater stipulation in that in terms of secure station accreditation, and, of course, also we have done some research which will report later this year in terms of tackling crime at high crime stations in socially excluded areas.

Q166 Chairman: When could we expect that?

Derek Twigg: Some time later this year.

Q167 Chairman: Thank you very much. Some of our train operators strongly oppose the imposition of standards by Government because they think a voluntary approach is better. They say high standards of passenger safety are in their own best commercial interests and therefore compulsory measures are simply unnecessary. Are these arguments borne out by the state of passenger safety in stations across the network?

Derek Twigg: I think it is true to say that comparing crime, stations and safety is much less of a problem in wider society generally. However, it is an important issue that we have got to tackle and there are a variety of ways that we can do this. In terms of the train operator companies, I think they are best placed to determine what needs to be done at individual stations because there is a variety of different types of stations with different throughput and different ages, et cetera, around the country. Obviously that is correct but also, as Government, I think we have a responsibility to see that we do work with the industry and help standards improve in terms of personal safety of passengers on the railway.

Q168 Chairman: Does that mean you do approve of compulsory standards or does that mean you do not approve of compulsory standards?

Derek Twigg: What we say is that one size does not fit all.

Q169 Chairman: I understand there are lots and lots and lots of train stations, in fact I sometimes think I have been to every one, but what I am asking is something rather simpler. Some train operating companies think that there should be a degree of compulsion and some train companies think that there should not. What is the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government?

Derek Twigg: We do not think we should compel every single train operating company to do something at every single station. We believe there are different remedies and approaches to stations.

Q170 Chairman: So you do not believe that there should be compulsory standards?

Derek Twigg: Not for every station. What we are saying is that the secure stations accreditation programme should continue to grow and that is why in the South Western—

Q171 Chairman: How many stations does that cover?

Derek Twigg: It is roughly about 250 stations at present.

Q172 Chairman: How many stations are there on the United Kingdom railway system?

Derek Twigg: As you are aware, there are 2,500 stations.

Q173 Chairman: Would you think that was a satisfactory percentage?

Derek Twigg: First of all, I agree that we need to improve on that and clearly—

Q174 Chairman: Anything other than 200 when we have got 2,000-odd stations would be an improvement.

Derek Twigg: We want to do that. That was why we launched it last year and we have had over 100 new accreditations since then. I would also like to say, Chairman, that what is important here is that the stations that are accredited account for most of the throughput of passengers on our network.

Q175 Chairman: Wait a minute, say that again.

Derek Twigg: Most of the stations that are currently accredited are the busiest stations. Not all of them, but most of them.

Q176 Chairman: You are saying that therefore we do not have to worry too much?

Derek Twigg: No, I did not say that. What I am trying to say is in terms of the total coverage of people using the stations it is greater than 250. If you look at 250 stations in isolation compared with 2,500 then clearly I can see the point you are making and clearly we want to improve on that but what I am saying is that the stations, particularly the Network Rail stations, are some of the busiest stations in the country and, therefore, most of the passengers going through them are covered by the accredited stations scheme.

Q177 Chairman: The difficulty is, Minister, they can get on in those stations but where do they get off?

Derek Twigg: That is why I agree with you that we do need to see more secure stations accreditation. That is why, for instance, in the South Western franchise documentation we have just sent out we are asking the bidders to cover 80% of the footfall through stations with secure stations accreditation status and also every station is surveyed with the BTP.

Q178 Chairman: So you are moving towards a tougher line with the franchise agreements you use to lever up safety standards?

Derek Twigg: Yes. We have not set it at 100%, we think the figure of around 80% of footfall going through stations is a reasonable figure. We have got to look in terms of what is the best option for different stations and for a lot of stations it would be suitable to go through that process but for others it may not be. For instance, it would depend how well used stations are. Some stations already have security installed.

Q179 Chairman: I think we have been round that bit of the track before. Are you saying one single body should hold overall responsibility for station development?

Derek Twigg: No, station responsibility is clearly with the train operating companies and Network Rail when it is their stations. As a Government we want to work with them and see improvements at the stations and that is why we are doing some of the things I outlined to you a few minutes ago.

Q180 Chairman: So you are prepared to be tougher when franchise agreements are being used but you do not think we should have a single body and you are not looking for minimum requirements to set common standards and requirements for all stations?

Derek Twigg: As I tried to make clear, and maybe I did not and I apologise for that, we believe that—

Q181 Chairman: It is probably just me, I am easily confused.

Derek Twigg: The best people to determine the security in terms of what needs doing and what can be developed at stations, working with the likes of the BTP, would be the train operating companies because they manage and run the stations every day. We are not in the process of managing and running stations.

Q182 Chairman: I do not think we actually asked you that, Minister. I think we asked you something a lot simpler. You do not actually run the trains but you do require them all to comply with certain safety standards, do you not?

Derek Twigg: Yes.

Q183 Chairman: You do not actually run the stations but why should you not ask them to comply with certain safety standards?

Derek Twigg: That is why we are looking at how we can continue to improve on the secure stations status for accredited stations and why, as I mentioned a few moments ago, we are looking at the South Western franchise and how we can improve that in the franchises in the future. As I say, I do not believe we can be prescriptive about every station because there is such a variety of difference of stations.

Chairman: You have been kind enough to explain that three times now.

Q184 Mrs Ellman: Passenger surveys show very clearly the importance that passengers attach to visible staffing at stations. What is the Government doing to act on that?

Derek Twigg: I would answer that by saying there are a number of options for improving security at stations. Staffing will be one and where train operating companies think that is something they wish to do clearly they will do that, but it is not always the case that having staffing at stations necessarily mitigates crime or, in fact, deals with a particular problem. For instance, someone sitting in a ticket office at a station may not have a good handle on what is happening on the platform or on the periphery of the station where a lot of crime takes place, so it might not necessarily be the best option. There is a variety of options in terms of CCTV, information on the platforms, lighting, and mirrors in dark alleyways.

Q185 Mrs Ellman: There are all those things but let us just stop for a moment and look at the staffing issue because the surveys that have taken place, including those commissioned by the Department, show what a major factor visible staffing on stations is for passengers travelling. Is that not something that you would respond to as a Government, as the Minister?

Derek Twigg: We would ask in terms of the whole security approach, the personal security approach, what is the best option to take it forward. It may be the case in certain stations that additional staffing may be the best option but, having said that, some of the highest crime stations do have more staff than others. On a rural station with a very small number of people going through it every day, would you decide that was the best way to spend money on security, would it not be better doing something else?

Q186 Mrs Ellman: Are you saying that the Government does not single out staffing at stations as an item of particular importance?

Derek Twigg: It does have an importance but it is a—

Q187 Mrs Ellman: Is it of particular importance?

Derek Twigg: Staffing can play a very important role, the most important role in some stations, but there has to be a variety of measures. This is why the train operating companies, who have to run and manage the stations, are the best placed people to determine that.

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Q188 Mrs Ellman: Do you not think they might be tempted to look at cost rather than what the public want?

Derek Twigg: There will always be an issue about cost in terms of what is affordable. You will know, and I do not need to go through it, and I know the Chairman would not let me go through it, the substantial amount of money that the Government has put into the railways in the last seven or eight years in terms of the improvements that have been brought about. It is a judgment that has to be made on the ground as well in terms of what is the best way of taking forward security at particular stations.

Q189 Mrs Ellman: Has the Department made any assessment of the cost of there being staffing at stations while trains are running?

Derek Twigg: No.

Q190 Mrs Ellman: That is not an issue you have looked at?

Derek Twigg: No.

Q191 Mrs Ellman: What about safety of rail staff against crime, what has the Government done about that?

Derek Twigg: Again, the prime responsibility is for the train operating companies and Network Rail who employ those staff in terms of security. I am sure the people you have had previously before the Committee today will have made clear what their approach is to that. It is very important that there is good security for staff, they are delivering an excellent service and play an important role in developing and improving the rail service. In terms of the civil issues, in terms of CCTV, lighting, how the management of security is done, that is for the train operating companies or the station operator. I know that DNA packs have been given to some staff in recent times.

Q192 Mrs Ellman: Are there any targets the Government has set for reducing attacks on staff?

Derek Twigg: There is no target that we have because we do not have prime responsibility for that, that is for the train operating companies and Network Rail.

Q193 Mrs Ellman: The Government have not taken any particular interest in that?

Derek Twigg: No, we do take an interest in terms of security as a whole on the railway and security of passengers and the staff and that is why we have invested significant amounts of money in the railway over the last eight years and why you see the improvements in security that have taken place around the network.

Q194 Chairman: Minister, that money you have invested over the last eight years has not been specifically targeted towards safety, has it? Is there any element of that that you could point to where you have insisted on certain safety improvements?

Derek Twigg: Obviously there has been a whole range of expenditure on various things on the railway and some of that will have gone into security but there is also other money that has come into dealing with security and improving stations in terms of local authorities, for instance, in Crime Reduction Partnerships.

Q195 Chairman: You were the one who was insisting on the amount of money that has gone into the railway system, and I agree with you absolutely, I think you are doing extraordinarily well, but I am interested to know which bit has been targeted at security?

Derek Twigg: I am saying as part of the overall package some of that money has been spent on security.

Q196 Graham Stringer: I would like to go back to the points you were making about putting requirements in the franchises to improve the security at stations. I have got a copy of the answer you gave to Peter Luff last month about putting those requirements into the franchise. How do you get the information that enables you to put that information into the franchise?

Derek Twigg: If it is helpful, Chairman, I am happy to read out the small paragraph of what was said in the South Western franchise which would deal with Mr Stringer's points.

Q197 Chairman: Please do.

Derek Twigg: It says: "It is proposed that the base case specification should require bidders to deliver secure station accreditation for those stations with 80% of the franchise footfall. The bidders will be required to assess with the BTP the security crime risk at all stations in the franchise and ensure that their proposals covering 80% of the footfall include all identified high risk locations".

Q198 Graham Stringer: So you are asking the bidders to go through the process?

Derek Twigg: With the BTP.

Q199 Graham Stringer: You yourself do not have any of that information by which you can identify particular crime hotspots on stations?

Derek Twigg: We have not got not statistical information on all stations but we will get the information back as part of the bidding process.

Q200 Graham Stringer: Do you have, like the Mayor of London has, a list of crime-ridden stations? I do not want to get into problems of order of magnitude, we know there will be more crime on Euston and the big London stations than anywhere else. If we take the huge Manchester, Birmingham, London stations out, do you have a target of crime-ridden stations throughout the network that you would like to do something about?

Derek Twigg: Not in that sense, no, because it is for the train operating companies as the managers of the stations, or Network Rail, to develop the approach to dealing with crime. Clearly the secure stations

accreditation process is one way we support that and want to see that improved and that does cover some of the biggest stations in terms of the greatest footfall going through those stations. What we are looking at as well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, is we are doing some research looking at those stations with the highest crime in the most deprived areas to learn lessons from some of those stations that already have accreditation status but also to look at those stations that have not and compare issues and look at what can be done to improve it. They can also be linked into wider deprivation issues and issues outside of the stations which we need to look at. There are things we are looking at and developing.

Q201 Graham Stringer: You have commissioned research into crime on the railway system, the stations. Would you care to share with the Committee any of the early findings of that investigation?

Derek Twigg: Ministers have not got that yet, we hope to have that later this year. Clearly we are happy to share that with the Committee when we have that information.

Q202 Graham Stringer: Presumably this has happened to you as a Minister. Take Clitheroe station in the North West, if the Member for that area wrote to you and said there had been five serious attacks on different people on that station, would you feel it was your responsibility to do something about it at that stage?

Derek Twigg: Clearly we would want to raise that with the train operating company and the BTP, who I am sure in that instance would already be aware of the situation. Again, it would be worth exploring with them whether they wanted to go for secure station accreditation. As you know, the Member of Parliament can be a very important implement in terms of ensuring some changes are made. For instance, with secure station accreditation the Member of Parliament is always informed who generally—not always, but generally—takes an interest in what is going on. There are opportunities there to try and do things but, as I say, it is for the train operating companies who manage and run the stations to do something about it.

Q203 Graham Stringer: Would you be prepared to lean on the train operating companies, threaten to change the franchise, which I understand you have the power to do?

Derek Twigg: Are you talking about for one station?

Q204 Graham Stringer: I am just using it as an example, it might be part of a network, it might be one station.

Derek Twigg: I think it is a difficulty in terms of what would be in a particular franchise. As you know, South Western is the first one that we have done as the Department for Transport from start to finish and you have seen what we are doing in terms of the additional security issues we want to put in there. I suspect that some of the franchise agreements

previously were not as proscriptive so it may be more difficult but as part of the franchises there are penalties that can be imposed and plans to recover from situations that need to be implemented if we seek that as part of the franchise agreement.

Q205 Graham Stringer: Apart from the research you have commissioned, what is your source of information about crime on stations?

Derek Twigg: We get the annual reports from the BTP and we have regular meetings with the BTP and with the train operating companies. MPs write to us on issues.

Q206 Graham Stringer: In those statistics you get from BTP, is crime against the person on railway stations separated out from the other statistics?

Derek Twigg: Violent crime, you mean? Yes. It is categorised in terms of what the crimes are. I am happy to let you have a list of that.

Q207 Mr Goodwill: We have received evidence this afternoon about the use of CCTV systems and some of the information has been a little bit patchy about the deployment of these, particularly outside London. Do you have the big picture? Could you tell us, for example, what proportion of stations across the entire network is now monitored using CCTV?

Derek Twigg: About a third of stations.

Q208 Mr Goodwill: We have also heard that there are different ways that CCTV is being used. Some of it seems to be reactive and if an incident occurs they can go back, pull the tapes and see that incident. Others are being monitored and others are being monitored and backed up with PA announcements to people who may be starting to behave in a disruptive or antisocial way. How important do you think those different types are and how would you like to see the deployment of those in the future?

Derek Twigg: I think CCTV is a very important weapon and defence in terms of issues around crime at stations or crime generally. Clearly there are differing standards of CCTV around and we would like to see the best quality, particularly if they could be linked up with other CCTV systems.

Q209 Chairman: So you have written that into the franchise, have you?

Derek Twigg: No, we have not. What I am trying to say, if I can just finish my answer and I will hopefully be able to give you some further information on that,—

Q210 Chairman: I am sure you will.

Derek Twigg: In terms of the accredited secure station status that is something we looked at as part of that process. Again, it is down to the train operating companies that manage the stations to determine these things working with the BTP. I know the BTP work very closely with them about this. I was at Wimbledon station recently and they have got an excellent system there and went through the process in terms of they were backtracking over footage where they were able to pinpoint offenders

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and deal with that in one particular case where someone fired off an extinguisher at the station when a train was coming into the station. Yes, there are different systems and maybe that is something that needs to be looked at in terms of the future deployment of CCTV.

Q211 Mr Goodwill: Can you see a situation in the future when all stations would be required through the franchise agreement to deploy CCTV?

Derek Twigg: I think more and more will be. I come back to the earlier point. Whether it is right that every station needs to have CCTV—Mrs Ellman made the point about staffing—is it staffing, is it lighting, is it having the particular design of the station changed, or some part of it, or mirrors where there are subways, et cetera, there are lots of different approaches. Is it the same at a rural station where only a small handful of people go on it every day compared with a busier town station?

Q212 Chairman: Are you asking us, Minister?

Derek Twigg: No, I am not asking you, I am just saying these are some of the considerations that have to take place.

Chairman: I beg your pardon, I was not clear.

Q213 Mr Goodwill: In those circumstances do you think that the cost of manning of CCTV could even contribute to the closure of stations or lines?

Derek Twigg: That is an interesting line you are trying to draw me down but, as you know, we are not in the process of closing hundreds or dozens of railway stations, in fact we want to grow the railways. You will have just seen our recent announcement on Northern Rail and, despite the suspicions and innuendo, there were no closures. We want to grow the railway. Having the sorts of security measures we have spoken about here today we will encourage more encourage people to use the railway which is already something that is becoming more and more attractive by the day.

Q214 Mr Goodwill: I think one failure that has been highlighted this afternoon is the situation where a local station has a CCTV system that is not being monitored but the local authority does have a monitoring room. Do you think it has been a mistake not to encourage more stations to link into their local CCTV systems?

Derek Twigg: We have encouraged them to work with the Crime Reduction Partnerships which exist in areas to deal with crime. Often crime will not just be relevant to a particular station, it might be a general wider problem in the area around the station which may involve the station at some point. Clearly closer partnership work is something that we would encourage and I know that a number of operators are already doing that quite well. In fact, Wimbledon is one of those operators as part of the South Western Franchise who are doing that.

Q215 Mr Goodwill: We have heard how having more people around the place in fluorescent jackets and having more cameras around has reduced crime in

stations. Have you any information as to how far that crime has been negated completely or whether there has just been a displacement into areas around stations or other city centre areas? Are we genuinely reducing crime by these systems or are we just displacing it to other areas?

Derek Twigg: I think BTP have said that they see secure station accreditation has helped reduce crime but clearly it will vary from station to station. There are a number of factors that need to be brought into play in terms of what is the best solution for a particular station.

Q216 Mr Leech: Do you agree with the train operating companies who are arguing that it is better to upgrade a lot of the existing CCTV on the old analogue systems to digital rather than trying to extend it to 100% coverage of all the stations?

Derek Twigg: I think it is a matter of judgment that the train operating companies need to make on their stations in terms of how they spend the resources that are available.

Q217 Chairman: Minister, does the Department have any view at all about how safety should be handled?

Derek Twigg: I tried to explain that is part of the reason that we support and deal with the secure stations accreditation, why we put the clause in the South Western franchise and why we are working closely with train operating companies and the rest of the industry. I am trying to make clear that, yes, we have a strategic view in terms of the Department under the new structure but in terms of the actual operation and management of the stations the people best placed to determine what happens there are the train operating companies and we will work with them.

Chairman: I do not think we were asking you to operate the cameras.

Q218 Mr Martlew: Can we go back to the policy which appears to be to push up standards through tightening the franchise, improving the franchise, and that seemed to be the view of the Chief Constable, as opposed to new legislation. You mentioned that you want 80% of secure stations from South Western trains.

Derek Twigg: Of the footfall.

Q219 Mr Martlew: What is it at the present time?

Derek Twigg: In terms of what we have asked them to do?

Q220 Mr Martlew: You are asking them to improve to 80% of the footfall at the stations but what is it at the present time? Is it a high target for them or are they already there?

Derek Twigg: I could not give you the answer to that today. I can come back to you on that.

Q221 Mr Martlew: You mentioned Northern Trains and I have two stations just outside my constituency that could be closed. Obviously my concern if they had been fully staffed would have been the

economics would have been such that they would have closed. Nobody has mentioned the cost of security. Do you believe that there is a case for increasing the take from the fare box and putting up prices to increase security on the railways?

Derek Twigg: Sorry, putting up the price of rail so we can increase security?

Q222 Mr Martlew: For example, in Spain they put a tariff on the ticket which pays for security. Do you think that is a policy that should be taken up here?

Derek Twigg: You come to an interesting area in terms of the price of railway tickets. Our policy remains, as you well know, it is RPI plus one. There is over 87 million a week being spent on the railways. A lot of the staff and a lot of the security cameras are already there and a lot of the other improvements are part of that money, which is a significant improvement from where we were a few years ago. In terms of staffing generally it comes back to the issue I am trying to make a point on. It does not mean that every station needs to be staffed, that may not be the best solution.

Q223 Mr Martlew: I am not arguing with that. I am not arguing for the Government to put extra money in. What I am saying is if the train operating companies came to you with a good security case saying, "We can improve security at stations by this much but we need to increase prices", what would be your view of that?

Derek Twigg: As you know, we are currently reviewing the Saver tickets and fares but I would not like to say at this stage that we have not had that approach. We would listen to any approach made by the train operating companies but our policy remains as it is.

Q224 Graham Stringer: Have you any quantitative estimate in actual figures of the amount that has been spent on an annual basis on increased security at stations?

Derek Twigg: We do not have that for a number of reasons. The money has been spread across a number of expenditure areas on the railway. A lot of the money specifically has been spent in terms of upgrading the railway from where it was a number of years ago but also there is other money coming in in terms of local authorities and private sources. The actual amounts do not come just from the Department or the train operating companies.

Q225 Graham Stringer: I know that it comes from different sources, it is just that reading through the written submissions that are before the Committee, the different train operating companies say, "We have spent money on this" but all of them are pretty reluctant to say, or they have not said, "We have spent five million, 10 million" or any figures. In your concern about safety and security of stations I wonder whether the Department have bothered to ask or find those figures out.

Derek Twigg: It is not so much have been bothered to ask but, as I say, as I am sure you would recognise, there has been an increase in investment in the

railway and that includes safety and there are a variety of sources from which to do that. The key responsibility remains with the train operating companies and Network Rail where they have stations. We have not got that information. We have not done that.

Q226 Graham Stringer: Let me lead on to another question related to that. As I am sure you are aware, we are doing a concurrent investigation into security of transport across the whole of the UK. One of the issues that we have come across is that, of course, the rail system is a completely open system and I am sure terrorists know that as well. Do you not think it would be sensible to know against the background of a potential threat from terrorists how much is being spent on security and whether that could be used to help in the general security of the system against terrorist attacks? Do you not think the Government should have some idea of those issues and figures?

Derek Twigg: As I say, there are a variety of sources of investment that comes into the railway and we have not had those figures. What we do know is that there have been significant amounts spent on the railway and that includes security as well.

Q227 Graham Stringer: Really that is not good enough, is it? To know that there are different sources is not really an excuse for not knowing how much has been spent on it and whether it is improving and whether that will help or not in general security as against a terrorist attack?

Derek Twigg: Security is improving *per se* because there are more CCTV cameras around, there is better lighting at a large number of stations and, as I say, we are improving the franchises in terms of the way we deal with the security issue. The overall crime rate has dropped, although I accept in certain categories it has not. There is already evidence of what has been done in terms of improvements. What I want to do, like everybody else around this table, is see further improvement in that. Because of a variety of sources of income coming into the railway, and into stations in particular, clearly that is something we do not currently have the figures on.

Q228 Clive Efford: There has been a proliferation of categories of names of enforcement staff on our railways: TravelSafe officers, community support officers, railway enforcement officers as well as police officers and the BTP themselves. Is there any danger that in this proliferation of different categories of officers there is going to be confusion in the eyes of the public?

Derek Twigg: No, I do not believe there will. As you know the number of BTP officers has significantly increased in recent years, as has the number of community support officers, which I think, eventually, in the next year or two, will go up to over 400. There is the new railway accreditation scheme, the one I launched recently, at Victoria Station for the South Eastern Trains. These are all helping to reassure passengers, helping to deal with crime, particularly low level crime and anti-social

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behaviour. I think that complements the British Transport Police. I know the Chief Constable has been very supportive and is very enthusiastic about those improvements that are taking place.

Q229 Clive Efford: Has the Government made any assessment of the effectiveness of the Southwest Trains' TravelSafe officers as a deterrent for anti-social behaviour or preventing crime?

Derek Twigg: We have not made any particular study of that but clearly we believe that having more personnel in terms of security has helped that. The BTP, as I say, work very closely with the different bodies but I think the community support officers will increase and the railway accreditation scheme, which has been launched recently, has already had success in terms of dealing with some of the low level anti-social behaviour.

Q230 Clive Efford: Is there any concern on the Government's part that we are seeing a proliferation of officers who have got limited powers and, therefore, we are giving the public a false sense of security?

Derek Twigg: It is also hand in hand with an increase in the number of British Transport Police officers which I think is now at record levels. There has been an increase in both British Transport Police officers and also in terms of the other safety and security officers who come on to the railway. I think also we have made major contributions to the British Transport Police in terms of the investment in capital projects and helping in that way as well. There is a lot of investment gone into British Transport Police as well, as you know, from the industry as a whole.

Q231 Clive Efford: What about new technology? Operation Shield was very successful, I believe, in detecting people carrying knives on the rail network. Does the Government intend to invest more money in technology of that kind and what other items might be detected that we might not want people to take on the railways using that sort of technology in the future?

Derek Twigg: I know it is going slightly outside this work, but we have done some trials in terms of terrorism issues and things. In terms of the specific one, Operation Shield, that was an initiative by the British Transport Police which we welcome. As you know they are extending it and this has had some success in detecting a number of individuals who carry knives so clearly we welcome that sort of initiative. As I say, the overall budget of the BTP has been increased by the train operating companies, who are funding it, and of course in terms of capital which includes improvements in the BTP's ability to operate.

Q232 Clive Efford: If this technology, as it appears to have done, proves to be effective, will the Government be approaching train operating companies to say, "Contribute some more towards this and we can make the railway safer"?

Derek Twigg: The train operating companies contribute significant amounts anyway in to the British Transport Police. One point in answer to that is to say it is for the BTP to decide operational matters and they decided with Operation Shield to put that in place. That has brought success in a number of areas and they want to extend it but that is part of the overall budget deliberations. I cannot say today whether that will change the amount of money that will come into the BTP. What I can say is there has already been an increase in the funding available. There has been an increase in the number of BTP officers; there has been another increase in the community support officers and of course, we have had the railway accreditation scheme as well. There has been a significant increase in security from the BTP and those who work with them.

Q233 Clive Efford: Does the Government have the authority in any way to turn around to the train operating companies who are making money and running the railways and say that we have concerns about safety and we think you should be contributing more in this area in terms of safety on the railways?

Derek Twigg: We talk on a regular basis to the train operating companies, Network Rail and to the BTP and clearly issues of security will come up and we will talk to them about that. Where we think things work well we would encourage that. In terms of the overall budgets of that, that is something that has got to take part of the annual negotiations around the budget settlement. I can only repeat the budget has increased.

Q234 Clive Efford: Does the Government have the authority to say to train operating companies, "Spend some more money in this area"?

Derek Twigg: If we put in a franchise we could in that sense but, as I say, in terms of what we franchise the train operating company to do, clearly we would want to work with them rather than saying you must not do this or that. There are certain things we would put in, we have said certain things in the South Western franchise. We would work with them and hopefully if we find something that works well, we would look at how we could improve things. I think we try to work together in partnership and develop better and more appropriate means of security but, as I say, the train operating companies, working with the BTP, are the best people to deliver that.

Q235 Clive Efford: We have seen in the past in other areas, to put it bluntly, that the train operating companies have not invested where people would have liked them to have invested the money. At the end of the day, if there is a concern about safety and we are saying this train operating company is not taking its responsibilities in this regard seriously, does the Government have the power to say "do more and spend more"?

Derek Twigg: If it is part of the franchise you can do it by the franchise mechanism itself. We have a contract with the train operating companies.

Q236 Chairman: Is it the intention of the Government that all the new franchises will include a standard minimum safety requirement that they will expect the company taking the franchise to comply with?

Derek Twigg: It is an operational matter for the BTP working with the train operating company. In terms of what we have done in the South Western franchise clearly we will continue with that in the new franchises. We will also learn lessons from this franchising process as well so whether we can improve or do things in a different way as the franchises roll out over the next few months and year, then clearly we will look at that as well.

Q237 Mr Leech: The Department for Transport has admitted that in some multi-operator stations it is often difficult for passengers to work out who is responsible for safety. What is the Department doing to try and address this problem?

Derek Twigg: It really is the responsibility of the operator and Network Rail to ensure that the passengers and the people who are using the station know who is responsible for the station and for safety, and we would encourage that. We would like to see that made clear for the operation of the station.

Q238 Mr Leech: If they are not doing it, what is the Department going to do to make sure that they do it?

Derek Twigg: It is something that we can look at. In terms of worthy examples, clearly we would have to look at that and talk to the train operating company or Network Rail in terms of ensuring that happens. We would have a discussion with them about that. It is important, as you rightly say, that information is available to passengers.

Q239 Mr Leech: Do you not feel the Department should show some leadership when people do not seem to have any idea who is responsible for the security of the station that they are on?

Derek Twigg: If we receive complaints, and there is an issue which is raised at a particular stage, then that is something that we will look at.

Q240 Chairman: Minister, I wonder if I can ask you one or two simple questions.

Derek Twigg: There is always a danger on this, Mrs Dunwoody.

Q241 Chairman: I am a very uncomplicated woman and my questions are terribly uncomplicated. When is your new post with the responsibility for co-ordinating the Government's policy going to be filled?

Derek Twigg: As soon as possible.

Q242 Chairman: A week, a month? Have you started the advertising?

Derek Twigg: As soon as possible. I would hope by the autumn and before the end of the year, hopefully.

Q243 Chairman: You could send us a copy of the advertisement that you put out?

Derek Twigg: When we do it we will do so, yes.

Q244 Chairman: Preferable within the next fortnight. What grade are you advertising?

Derek Twigg: That is currently being determined.

Q245 Chairman: So you want it, but you do not know when you are going to advertise it and you do not know what grade it is going to be?

Derek Twigg: The new structure has only recently gone into place and we have been evaluating that and looking at how we can improve things. There has been a number of issues around stations recently. For instance, you would know we have just launched the Access For All Fund, £370 million, to improve access at stations for disabled and other people and the issues around franchises, et cetera, and, of course, security at stations. We are currently considering that and as soon as we come to a conclusion about those issues, I will certainly write to you and let you have that information.

Q246 Chairman: As soon as. What sort of timetable are you envisaging?

Derek Twigg: I would imagine we would have somebody—

Q247 Chairman: I can write to you every week, I am not above that.

Derek Twigg: I can say as soon as we can, Mrs Dunwoody.

Q248 Chairman: Of course. I do apologise but I am still not absolutely clear what the Cabinet's position is. Do you intend, in each of the new franchises, as they fall vacant, to write in a requirement for standards of safety in stations that you expect the train operating companies to adhere to?

Derek Twigg: In terms of South Western franchise, we have asked for a station accreditation for 80% of footfall. On a franchise by franchise basis, we will look at that and put in a particular requirement by improving security. We are not going to be prescriptive about every station but we will put in requirements depending on that particular franchise.

Q249 Chairman: I do not think franchises are awarded on individual stations are they, Minister, or has it changed?

Derek Twigg: No.

Q250 Chairman: Let us start again. When the franchise comes up, is it the Government's intention to include a requirement for safety in stations?

Derek Twigg: Yes.

Q251 Chairman: Unspecified?

Derek Twigg: As I say, we will hopefully learn lessons from what we are doing now.

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Q252 Chairman: I see. How will you reach that standard agreement? What are the standards that you are going to ask for? Are they going to be the ones that you asked for in the franchise that has just been agreed?

Derek Twigg: It is likely to be but clearly this is the first time we have gone through this process on a franchise. Clearly we want to evaluate what has taken place, there is the BTP and the bidders approach to this in terms of the individual stations and the percentage of those that should be included. We will look at that and assess that but we will include in every franchise now an issue of personal security.

Q253 Chairman: More than once today you have mentioned how efficient BTP were, how you rely on them for the gathering of information, how you rely on them for the efficient policing of trains and of stations. It is Government's view that we should retain a specialised force of police officers funded by the industry and partially administered by Government, is that right?

Derek Twigg: As you know we are due another hearing on this next week. I will say to you on this, clearly we have narrowed our review down to two options which are to abolish them or to look at a re-focus BTP which I am sure we will go in to in more detail next week. That is currently where we are and we hope to complete that process by around May.

Q254 Chairman: When are you going to complete your research into the whole question of crime on stations?

Derek Twigg: The specific research that we have already asked for, which is taking place now, that will be later this year.

Q255 Chairman: Later, will that be after?

Derek Twigg: As soon as we can do it but it will be at a later point this year. It will be in the very near future.

Q256 Chairman: The timetable will be that at some point quite soon we are going to advertise for the role of someone who will co-ordinate policy on stations.

Derek Twigg: With the Department, yes.

Q257 Chairman: That person once they are appointed, you will tell us not only when that is going to be and what their grade is going to be, that person will then have the responsibility of drawing together all of these different strands and formulating a policy that will enable us all to feel totally safe on the railway system?

Derek Twigg: We are working with ministers as we formulate policies on the system, yes.

Q258 Chairman: Good. Is there anything else you would like to enlighten us with this afternoon?

Derek Twigg: No, I think that is about all, Mrs Dunwoody.

Chairman: It has all been very revealing. Thank you ever so much, Minister, we are very grateful to you and I am sure we will see you again ere long.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Department for Transport

In the course of giving evidence to the Committee on 19 April, I promised to write with further details on a number of points. Two are items that I can deal with immediately. On the others, I shall write again as soon as the information is available. Taking them in order :—

- The new South West franchise: I explained that the new franchise will require the operator to gain Secure Station Scheme accreditation for enough stations to account for 80% of the total franchise footfall. Mr Martlew asked what percentage is already covered in this way. The answer is 67%;
- Crimes against the person: Mr Stringer asked about statistics on crimes against the person. The figures are set out in the attached table;
- The new post being created in the Department's Rail Group to co-ordinate policy on stations: the detailed job description for the post is in the process of being drawn up and will be ready shortly. I will make sure that a copy is sent to the Committee Clerk as soon as it is available;
- Results of research into crime at stations: I explained that it will be later this year before the preliminary results from this research are available. Again, I will make sure that the results are sent to the Committee as soon as possible.

REPORTED CASES OF CRIME AGAINST THE PERSON BY BTP AREA 1998–09 to 2004–05

BTP Area	1998–99	1999–2000	2000–01	2001–02	2002–03	2003–04	2004–05
London North	659	742	809	920	1,126	1,334	1,632
London South	1,849	2,160	2,107	1,837	2,265	2,350	2,509
London Underground	1,456	1,575	1,471	1,424	1,880	2,295	2,622
North Eastern	243	204	285	306	495	605	625
Scottish	345	396	348	406	545	631	617
North Western	466	551	526	604	654	787	786
Western	388	461	497	594	691	725	957
Force Total	5,406	6,089	6,043	6,091	7,656	8,727	9,748

Notes

Crime at stations is not recorded separately. The figures in the table therefore cover all relevant crimes in the relevant category reported to the BTP. For the purposes of the table, “crimes against the person” are defined as violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery.

A change in counting rules occurred in 1998. This was built upon by changes in the National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) in 2002, introduced by the Home Office. All police forces in England and Wales were required to adopt the NCRS. It had the effect of increasing the number of recorded crimes by an average of 22% in all forces in England and Wales. BTP adopted this standard on 1 April 2002. The principle of NCRS is that if, on the balance of probability, a crime has been committed it is recorded as a crime. The standard has made crime recording more victim-focused.

Written evidence

APPENDIX 1

Memorandum submitted by Mr Alan D Crowhurst

I refer to the invitation to submit memoranda on the above topic as given in your Press notice 31/2005–06 of 16 March and would like to submit the following observations:

1. To make stations appear to be safer it is my view that staff should be present and visible at all times that the station is open for passenger traffic. This would also enable facilities such as toilets to be kept open rather than closed in the very early evening as is so often the case. Removal of graffiti would also be a factor.
2. It would be necessary to define what the minimum standards are at this time for any worthwhile comment to be made. The use of a security telephone is of little use if the operator, as and when a response made be obtained, is at a remote office and may not even be aware of what station telephone is being used.
3. In my experience policing is not common except at major termini and there does not seem to be a system of regular calls by local police forces to back up BTP.
4. It is not at all clear as to who the station operator might be nor how they may be contacted in the case of problems or defects especially at unmanned locations.
5. It would be helpful for security if stations were to be developed to have more than their transport role, eg provision of mail boxes, telephones, recycling facilities, Public toilets, bus and taxi information and other services. This would enhance public use and thus make stations less frightening.
6. Since the railway industry is now so much under DfT control initiatives are less likely to be offered especially if involving investment. Further compulsion however might not be a good idea unless the DfT financed and rewarded the participants.
7. More staffing would ease the problem especially if they are visible, able to communicate properly and if other methods of communication with rail staff were to be prominent and clearly marked.
8. I am not convinced that this is a matter for the government, *per se*, but for Rail Operators, local authorities and the various Police Authorities together with B T P. Involvement at central government level is likely to add layers of bureaucracy and expense, slow down implementation and produce a negative response from the public who are beginning to distrust measures promoted Centrally.

It is my view that staffing and multiple uses of station facilities is at the core of ordinary security, ie from crime and vandalism.

Despite the neglect we still have a very worthwhile rail system with many stations of architectural interest and value although there are far too many bus stop type stations which provide neither security nor protection from the weather.

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APPENDIX 2

Memorandum submitted by Rail Action Group East of Scotland

1. *What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?*

Without doubt, the presence of staff is a major factor in contributing to feeling safe in a station. If passengers know there is a staff presence nearby, they will feel more secure if any incidents should occur. It would be helpful if there was a manned Police office or desk at larger stations. At the moment, there is a heightened police presence in larger stations, but there is no information for the travelling public as to where police officers are located in a station at any given time. They do not give the impression of being there for the assistance of passengers.

A secure waiting area is very helpful, particularly to passengers with children. The large open waiting area at Waverley Station, Edinburgh, does not give a feeling of security to lone passengers, especially those travelling late at night. It is also very cold and unwelcoming. Such a secure area should be close to any staff presence.

Sufficient lighting is also important, both in the station area and in any adjacent car parking area. Dark corners and alleyways are intimidating. Travellers want to feel that they can make a safe exit from their train through the station to collect their car.

2. *Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?*

I am not aware of the terms of the specific standards, but the minimum requirements should include the following, some of which I have noted above:

- Staff presence and staffed enquiry desk.
- Permanent police base in larger stations, not just a police presence.
- Good (not just adequate) lighting within and outwith the station.
- Secure, well-lit waiting area adjacent to staff presence.
- Clear signage.
- Sufficient toilet provision (more than one facility in larger stations).
- Reasonable facilities for disabled/parents with children (ie disabled toilets/baby changing rooms should be available during all times the station is open).

From my own journeys I know that the above standards do not apply at all stations, indeed they do not apply at all mainline stations. This does not encourage travellers, particularly those who perceive themselves as vulnerable—lone travellers, women, disabled and parents with young children.

3. *Are the minimum standards sufficiently policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?*

I am not aware of any policing which may take place, other than monitoring by specific interest groups. Likewise, I am not aware of any penalties payable.

4. *Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?*

Absolutely not. There is no information available that I have ever seen giving details of the Station Manager/Duty Train Manager, who presumably has responsibility for passenger safety in his station. On some occasions, I have found my way to a Station Manager's office: on every occasion it was not easy to find, and took the form of a firmly shut door, rather than an accessible official.

Information on passenger satisfaction within a station should be available in a central location e.g. next to the ticket desk, and in large letters so it can be read by everyone. In addition, passenger feedback forms should be readily available at locations throughout a station, so that passengers do not feel they have to "hunt down" the Station Manager/Duty Train Manager if they have reason to give feedback.

5. *Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?*

I can only assume that it is because Network Rail and the Train Operating Companies do not think it is a priority. However, my viewpoint as a woman often travelling alone, sometimes in the evening, at other times accompanied by children, is that a secure station is extremely important. If I do not feel safe when travelling to a particular area by rail, I will choose another form of transport.

Some stations feel secure, even though they may not fit all the criteria. York has good lighting, a central waiting area, a welcoming environment and a taxi rank right outside the door. Newcastle, on the other hand, has the toilets shunted off into a dark area underneath the bridge, instead of in the main station area. Dundee has central facilities and taxi rank/car parking immediately accessible, and Aberdeen is also well lit and welcoming. Stansted, approaching from the airport, can be hard to find because of insufficient signage, and the platforms feel isolated, cold and draughty. I have not found a secure waiting area here, and don't feel I want to use this station in the evening. Toilets were also hard to find and a long way from some of the platforms.

6. *What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?*

As noted at question 2 above. At present there is a feeling that there is no-one responsible for passengers' safety. It is not clear to passengers who they should approach if they have any concerns.

I rarely see any staff when I travel by Underground, especially at platform level. This form of travel can feel threatening and intimidating to a lone traveller at night. A helpline could be set up—as is currently available from unmanned stations—for passengers to contact if they had concerns while travelling. This should be publicised within the stations, on the platforms and within the train carriages. The existence of the helpline would go a long way towards increasing the feeling of security among passengers. At the moment there is a feeling that "anything could happen to you but there's no-one around if it does" which is very worrying and intimidating.

7. *Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?*

Clearly not, or else their approach is not being taken seriously by those responsible for managing stations. Please get Station Managers out of their offices and engaging with the travelling public. Tell us where they are, and how we can contact them if we have concerns. Have the police at a staffed desk instead of strolling round the station, and have this desk well signed. Provide areas where travellers who feel vulnerable can feel safer and encourage us to use the railway more. It's a great form of transport—don't make it so hard for us to use it!

27 March 2006

APPENDIX 3

Memorandum submitted by the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety

The Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) is a registered charity and an associate Parliamentary Group. Its charitable objective is, "*To protect human life through the promotion of transport safety for the public benefit*". Its aim is to advise and inform members of the Houses of Parliament on air, rail and road safety issues. PACTS brings together safety professionals and legislators to identify research-based solutions to transport safety problems having regard to cost, effectiveness, achievability and acceptability. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the current inquiry.

This submission will focus on the key issues of passenger perception of safety at stations and passenger behaviour in overcrowded conditions. The discussion of these issues aims to inform the Committee's deliberations on the inquiry questions regarding effective methods of making stations safer, responsibility for passenger safety and measures required to improve passenger safety.

There has been much criticism of railway stations in the media in recent months, with commentary focusing on passenger concerns about personal security including:

- lack of staff;
- poor lighting;
- narrow or dark passageways and stairwells;
- lack of accurate timetable information;
- lack of waiting areas; and
- lack of facilities (shops etc).

Confirming this, the autumn 2005 Rail Passenger Council national passenger survey found that only 57% of people are satisfied with personal security at railway stations—which was an increase of 3% from the previous autumn.

PACTS' primary interest in railway station safety lies in its implications for people choosing rail as their preferred mode of travel, above the option of a private vehicle. Road trauma is the leading cause of accidental death for people under the age of 50 and the second most common cause of all deaths of children aged 10–16. Although significant and commendable progress has been made in reducing the casualty rate, it remains the case that each year more than 3,000 people are killed and more than 30,000 are seriously injured in collisions. By comparison, rail is a very safe mode of transport. The 1994–2003 average rate of fatality per billion passenger kilometres across the modes shows that rail is much safer than road-based travel:

Fatalities across the modes per billion passenger km

Air	0.00
Rail	0.4
Bus/Coach	0.3
Car	2.8 ¹
Motorcycle	113
Pedal cycle	39
Pedestrian	52

(DfT, *Road Casualties Great Britain*: 2004, p116)

¹ This includes the driver and passenger.

Improving railway station safety has the potential to play an important role in reducing casualties by encouraging people away from private vehicles on to trains. In its report *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*, the National Audit Office (NAO) notes that:

Research carried out for the Department in 1996 and 2002 suggests that improving personal safety would result in 15% more journeys by train (and Underground), much of it outside peak hours. (National Audit Office, *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*, 2005, p.2)

The station environment therefore has a significant impact on both actual and perceived safety and, consequently, on transport choices. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) points to the importance of public space in its *Living Places: cleaner, safer, greener* policy statement, which notes that:

Every one of us, every day, takes decisions about which areas to use and when and how we use them. Many of our decisions and activities are influenced by our perceptions of the quality and safety of the spaces we encounter. (ODPM, http://www.odpm.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1127644&P77__9838)

Given that the additional journeys cited by the NAO research are outside peak hours, they are likely to be discretionary trips such as shopping or travelling for leisure and a proportion of potential passengers may therefore choose not to travel at all if personal railway safety were not improved. However, a proportion of journeys will be rail replacing car as the preferred travel option and this has benefits for reducing road casualties.

As such, PACTS is concerned that current anxieties regarding railway station safety are an obstacle to greater use of trains and supports station improvement measures that will contribute to modal shift away from road-based transport.

The issue of overcrowding on trains and at stations is one many commuters, especially those in the south-east, are unfortunately familiar with. This committee inquired into this issue in 2003 and commented on the lack of research available to inform policy makers and train operating companies on the health and safety effects of overcrowding. Although the risk of a crowding-related fatality or serious injury at a station is statistically low, experience would suggest that large numbers of passengers combined with the narrow platforms that characterise many older Underground stations and the speed with which trains enter the platform area has the potential to result in an accident and could also contribute to health related conditions like stress and anxiety.

Less serious accidents are known to be a result of overcrowding at stations. A 2002 report prepared for Transport for London, *The Tube: Moving On, A Report for The Tube Future Priorities Investigative Committee*, commented that, "evidence received also pointed to safety implications in stations, for example the recent upward trend in injuries sustained on escalators, to which overcrowding has been a significant contributory factor."²

The Transport Committee's inquiry recommended that more research be undertaken to assess the health and safety effects of overcrowding on both trains and stations. A recent literature review on overcrowding and health on the railways, *Rail passenger crowding, stress, health and safety in Britain*,³ confirms that little research has been done into this area. PACTS would support more research on this issue to gain an understanding of how to minimise potential risks from passenger congestion on platforms.

PACTS is also concerned to ensure that the staffing levels at and design of major London Underground stations are appropriate to respond to an emergency evacuation situation. The passenger congestion levels and design features typical of many 19th century stations, such as narrow platforms and passageways, elevators and multiple flights of stairs, could slow evacuation. Although there is little scope to improve the layout of these stations, it is possible to deploy staff to ensure smooth evacuations. Research published by PACTS shows that a major influence on the behaviour of passengers in an emergency is the performance of the staff. In the field of aviation, one assertive cabin crew member can evacuate passengers more quickly than two non-assertive cabin crew. In those accidents where a successful rapid evacuation of all the passengers is achieved, the cabin crew will have managed to control the passengers and prevented disorderly behaviour⁴.

The presence of sufficient numbers of staff at the major Underground stations, who are trained to respond in mass evacuation situations, is important when considering rail station safety.

PACTS would urge improvements to railway stations in an effort to attract potential passengers—who could otherwise choose to travel by car—on to trains as part of the road casualty reduction strategy, to reduce the health and safety risks due to over crowding and to ensure sufficient staff are available to assist in evacuating in emergencies.

27 March 2006

² National Economic Research Associates, *The Tube: Moving On, A Report for The Tube Future Priorities Investigative Committee*, 2002.

³ Tom Cox, Jonathan Houdmont & Amanda Griffiths, *Rail passenger crowding, stress, health and safety in Britain*, 2005.

⁴ Helen Muir, *In times of crisis, how do passengers react?*, PACTS 2004, p.7.

APPENDIX 4

Memorandum submitted by Group 4 Securicor Services (UK)

Group 4 Securicor Security Services (UK) is pleased to have the opportunity to respond to the Committee on the issue of personal passenger safety in railway stations. We have a number of comments on this subject, which are detailed below.

What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

There are no minimum staffing levels for stations under franchise agreements. However, research has shown that a visible staffing presence at stations is the single most important factor in making passengers feel secure (Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations, January 2006, London Assembly Transport Committee). New research conducted by Group 4 Securicor with 1500 people aged 16–64 between 2 and 6 February 2006 reveals that 76% of UK adults would feel safer when travelling by train or tube if there was a uniformed security presence.

There are many contributing factors which create the perception of being within a safe environment; CCTV (with highly visible warning boards) and bright lighting, as well as signs confirming that Secure Station status has been achieved are just a few. Unfortunately the award of Secure Station status alone does not significantly reduce the potential vulnerability felt by passengers when entering or leaving an un-manned station. The most effective method of assuring the travelling public is by deploying staff at all times when the facility is open. It is important that the personnel deployed on stations should be highly visible and perceived to be professional and competent. This may be achieved in a number of ways:

1. By contracting with a Security Industry Authority (SIA) accredited company to provide security staff at stations and a rapid response service.
2. By deploying suitably trained internal (TOC) staff as security staff. It should be obvious to both the traveler and the potential offender that these staff members have the security of passengers as their primary role.
3. By deploying Police Community Support Officers accredited by BTP.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?

There is no requirement to provide staff at stations throughout its opening hours. Many stations are unmanned for significant periods on a daily basis. A permanent security presence may not be a cost effective option, particularly at quiet, suburban stations. However, a mobile security force deployed around the network with the ability to respond rapidly to incidents will improve the public perception of station security.

Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?

There do not appear to be any penalties for TOCs that do not provide a secure station environment. Nor do the TOCs seem to have a "duty of care" to their passengers when they are in danger or threatened in some way. Health and Safety legislation requires that companies take the safety of visitors to their premises as seriously as that of their employees. Perhaps H&S considerations should be applied to the travelling public with the associated penalties for TOCs that were in breach of their obligation to provide a safe environment.

Once Secure Station status is achieved it should be maintained with a series of regular checks. Whilst the principal of achieving accreditation, is detailed in the scheme there is no documented requirement to maintain the management practices throughout the two year validity period.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

It is not clear where the responsibility for security & safety lies on mainline and suburban stations. Most passengers would assume that the British Transport Police are responsible, however, the BTP are chronically under-resourced and under-funded.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?

It is a voluntary scheme with little incentive for the TOCs to seek accreditation. Also the criteria scoring system is confusing and there is little consistency in the standard of security at Secure Stations. Furthermore, there is low public awareness of the scheme and how it benefits the travelling public. The measure of how secure a station is should be based on criteria that are passenger focused, for example if a minimum staffing level was established for Secure Stations then customers could be reassured that they would not be alone at a station when travelling in the evening.

There are so few stations currently accredited because it is not compulsory. The TOCs are likely to seek accreditation for those stations where it can be achieved with little or no capital outlay or significant changes to management processes. Where significant cost or management effort is required stations are unlikely to be accredited unless the Secure Station Scheme is made compulsory.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?

1. An increase in uniformed security presence with minimum manning or patrol frequency standards during station opening hours.
2. A public awareness campaign to explain who is responsible for passenger safety.
3. A compulsory Secure Stations Scheme with penalties for failure to achieve auditable performance standards.
4. Regular "mystery shopper" visits to stations at unsociable hours.

Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

The Government should make measures to improve passenger safety at railway stations a condition of the tendering process for future rail franchises.

SUMMARY

- We believe that the most effective method of assuring the travelling public is through the deployment of a uniformed security presence at train stations with set minimum standards on their patrol frequency.
- At present, there is little incentive for TOCs to seek accreditation under the Secure Station Scheme or provide the appropriate duty of care to their passengers at railway stations. A compulsory Secure Stations Scheme with penalties for failure to achieve auditable performance standards could address this.
- The Government should also introduce measures to improve passenger safety as a condition in the tendering process for future rail franchises.
- It is not clear where the responsibility for security & safety lies on mainline and suburban stations. There is also low awareness of the Secure Stations Scheme and how it benefits the travelling public. A public awareness campaign may be required to address these issues.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the problem of personal passenger safety in railway stations is best addressed by finding ways to increase the presence of uniformed staff with clear responsibility for passenger safety and security. Given the resource constraints on the BTP, an unbiased approach should be taken as to which organisations could provide these staff. The private security industry has demonstrated that it can deliver innovative and flexible manpower solutions that are cost-effective and offer best value. Now that the private security industry is regulated it is better prepared than ever to make a significant contribution to the safety of passengers at railway stations.

30 March 2006

APPENDIX 5

Memorandum submitted by Mr Nigel R Gansell

SUMMARY

In my 60 years of using the “crown jewels” of our country namely our prized railways never have I seen such appalling standards of public safety on both main line railways and Underground stations.

A smattering of CCTV cameras won't I repeat won't solve the problem of safety for passengers. Their needs to be far more penalties fixed against the railway companies for plain incompetence. It has taken the London *Evening Standard* to Highlight and investigate our atrocious lack of security on main line stations.

I personally use Wood Street Station operated by One Railway. A man was murdered late at night on Wood Street in September of last year. I have never used this station at night.

On the day of the London Bombings I walked quite freely into the side entrance of Wood Street Station. The situation still exists. There is NO security at Wood Street Station. You can walk in. A terrorist bomber could walk into Wood Street Station and indeed other stations. Quite freely. An appalling situation! Walthamstow Central Station is a dump! It must be very frightening for women at night. May I stress at this point that politicians of all hues are quite incapable of improving the situation. Railways are now considered big business with priority to shareholders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. What are the most effective methods of making railways and Underground stations safer for passengers?

- (a) Re introduction of railway guards—a priority. Plus more station staff at nights. (There is no night staff at Wood Street, Walthamstow. There is no staff at Walthamstow Bus Station—laughable.)

2. Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Answer: Of course not. Minimum standards of safety and security should be scrutinised by the general public. With no guards on trains you have no personal security. Staffing levels at main line stations are poor. I overheard a woman at Kings Cross Station in February (I was boarding a Hull Trains express says “Where are all the porters”(!). I see no personalised service any more although on board Hull Trains the service by attendants was excellent.

3. Are the minimum standards effectively policed? NO. The standards are poor. Penalties. I would not know what they are!

4. Who is responsible for safety of passengers. NO. I assume the railway companies are responsible. For example do the railway companies operate any evacuation procedures for passengers? I am not thinking in terms of an Airbus A380 evacuation with broken arms and limbs. Just a small scale exercise done perhaps in some siding or exhibition area?

5. Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme. I know or have no knowledge of such a scheme. Why not a Passengers Manifesto for Safety drawn up by passengers and not by professional bodies? The private rail companies are a law to themselves. There needs to be more “kick ass” approach to the rail companies.

6. Measures to ensure significant improvements in passengers's safety in railway and underground stations. ANSWER: Will the penny ever drop in simple terms you need Re Introduction of Train Guards. More station staff especially during the evenings. More security in the form of police patrols operated by the British Transport Police.

At this point worth mentioning the tremendous amount of luggage carried by passengers during the working day. No luggage vans on many trains. None whatsoever on the Tube system. Separation of luggage from passengers on the tube system whilst ideal is probably not workable.

Is the Government approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective? Answer: I am at a loss in comprehending just what the Government approach actually is. There was no Public Inquiry into Passenger Safety (from memory) in the London Bombings.

If over there was a “botched” police operation this was it. Four men caught on video camera at Luton Station who could not be tracked. The Stockwell Tube Station shooting should also be brought into the equation. Where was the safety for other passengers? If the Met Police has a shoot to kill policy then there are ramifications for the general public at large. As a personal opinion the Government approach to passenger safety is poor. And I am kind in saying its poor.

Conclusions: What is needed is a Task Force of passengers, Company representatives and politicians (cross party) to mount a serious get tough approach against the rail companies. Huge amount of investment needs to be poured into public safety at rail stations. Certainly the visibility of more police at stations is crucial. Personally I have no fears of railway stations but the grass roots thinking is missing.

Only until the needs of passengers are really taken into consideration will the travelling public feel more secure and confidence. Some basics could be brought on line. What about some public toilets opened at night. Some strip lighting on the most dismal of stations. Floodlit if necessary.

Railway station security—its a farce!

ADDITIONS

SUMMARY ADDITION

(a) *First Aid. Safety precautions on Main Line Stations and London Underground Stations:*

Has there been a review of all first aid equipment carried by both train and platform staff. How much training is undertaken in First Aid measures by the train operating authorities?

Of major concern to this writer was the removal of fire hydrants from all London Underground trains. What in case of a fire on the train? I fully understand that under the previous LU regime fire hydrants were removed due to vandalism.

First aid equipment (bandages etc) should be stored on all LU trains.

(b) *Overcrowding on main line platforms/surbanan service and LU tube stations:*

This is an ever increasingly worrying problem. Coupled with the added dangers of many suitcases and travellers' bags left on platforms. Surely platform staff should be more visible.

(c) *Personal train attendants:*

Train operating companies may wish to look at Hull Trains and how they look after the travelling public both on the train and at Hull Mainline Station. Far more station couriers should be visible on the concourse of many stations. That many main line surbuban train stations are unattended both during the day and night is nothing short of scandalous.

Better lighting at all stations is a priority. And may I add that many stations facia are never cleaned. There are two marvellous inventions that train operating companies might take a look at—namely water to wash down station platforms on a daily basis and paint.

(d) *Awarding of Rail Franchises:*

Written into all rail franchises should be a section of Personal Passenger Safety in Railway Stations, eg current situation within the operators Charter and impending improvements etc.

29 March 2006

APPENDIX 6

Memorandum submitted by the British Transport Police Authority

The Authority welcomes the Committee's inquiry into personal passenger safety at railway stations and the opportunity to contribute to the debate. We restrict our submission to non-operational matters, operational issues being properly matters for consideration by the Chief Constable.

We make this submission in the context of the current review of the British Transport Police (BTP) by the Department for Transport, which has identified abolition and "refocusing" of the BTP as the two most likely outcomes in a recent letter to train operating companies. Refocusing is not clearly defined but seems to refer to a focus only on low level crime and a greater role for train operating companies providing private security.

Our fundamental position is that successive reviews have confirmed the need for a national specialist (and properly funded) police force for the railways. Nothing has changed since to suggest this is not the case, and any proposals to the contrary would be to the detriment of the travelling public, and indeed the railway industry as a whole. The track record suggests train operating companies would not invest sufficiently in dealing with security matters.

1. WHAT ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF MAKING RAILWAY AND UNDERGROUND STATIONS SAFER FOR PASSENGERS?

The BTPA believes that it is important in this debate to distinguish between crime and security. Whilst security is a matter which the private sector plays a role in, both on the railways and in many other areas, crime is rightly something which should be dealt with by the proper authorities, which are both public and accountable, and therefore in a position to prioritise the public good. Security personnel and the police should (and do) work together, but security personnel should not be deployed instead of police officers and police community support officers, but should complement policing activity. One of the fundamental functions of the police is to detect and deter crime. This is achieved by proactive operations based on the national intelligence model. The police also react to emergency calls from the public. The right balance has to be struck between security personnel, who can give a physical presence, and police officers with the full range of statutory powers.

The BTP is funded by the railway industry, and therefore largely by passengers. This gives it a unique role as a police force which can and does prioritise the concerns of the railway industry, staff and passengers in a way they would not otherwise be.

Securing adequate funding for the BTP is one of the key functions of the BTPA, and is essential to making railway and underground stations safer for passengers and for railway staff. The source of that funding has long been based on the ‘user pays’ principle. Whether this needs to be adapted to reflect additional requirements for anti-terrorism or wider social issues is a question for government rather than the BTPA. Our concern is that the Force is well-funded and this continues to be our priority during the current review of the BTP being held by the Department for Transport.

The right balance between private sector interest and the public good is fundamental to the effectiveness of the BTP. The restructuring of the BTP Committee to create the BTPA has enabled us to tackle legacy issues of inadequate funding settlements and secure increased funding for the Force. It is of note in the context of the current debate that TfL, which is a public body, has funded significant additional BTP officers for the Underground. We believe that any erosion of these important reforms of the governance of the BTP would be a step backwards for passenger safety.

2. IS IT SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO PASSENGERS AND OTHERS WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS IN RAILWAY AND UNDERGROUND STATIONS?

Having a national railway police force which operates throughout the UK is helpful for passengers as they have a single point of contact no matter their location. Investment planned by the BTPA will secure a 24-hour call answering centre which will be a great improvement for passengers. Visible policing at stations is also critical for passengers. The BTPA has funded increased numbers of police officers and community support officers with investments of £2.05 million in 2005–06 and £288k in 2006–07 (specifically for PCSOs for use in Wales).

Erosion of the BTP’s role, or abolition of the national force to be replaced by regional ones, will lead to greater confusion around responsibility and accountability for passenger safety.

3. WHAT MEASURES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN PASSENGERS’ SAFETY IN RAILWAY AND UNDERGROUND STATIONS?

Particularly due to the legacy issues caused by previous inadequate funding settlements, significant improvements to passenger safety require increased funding of the BTP. The BTPA has addressed the need for investment in its three-year Strategic Plan and it will be important in future to maintain its ability to secure adequate funding settlements from the railway industry. At a time of heightened terrorist security alert, BTPA with industry support has increased its funding for counter-terrorism activities. It seems to us that an individual has the right to expect the State to protect him or her against certain activities. This should include terrorism and an element of government funding in the future may assist industry in providing for anti-terrorism activities, as was the case for example in additional Department for Transport funding for increased BTP activity during July 2005 as a result of the bombings on the London Underground.

There is a continued need for a specialist, national railway police force. This has been identified by numerous reports including by HMIC and by this Committee, and government has in the past been supportive of the BTP. Abolition or downgrading of the BTP as a consequence of either the DfT review or the restructuring of Home Office forces would deal a blow to passenger safety, both in the short term as operations are disrupted and in the long-term, as HMIC noted in its 2004, Report on the BTP:

“ . . . the enforced amalgamation/merger of the whole or part of the British Transport Police with one or all Home Office Police Forces would unquestioningly lead to a dilution of the specialist service given to the rail industry and its public users and, most probably, would lead to a significant reduction in the number of police officers and police staff left to police the network.”

4. IS THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO PASSENGER SAFETY IN RAILWAY STATIONS EFFECTIVE?

In 2004, the government reviewed the BTP and created the BTPA to replace the BTP Committee. This restructuring has led to increased funding for the BTP and consequential operational improvements. All nine operational targets were met for 2004–05 and the BTPA is currently meeting all eleven operational targets for 2005–06.

We believe this is the right approach and has allowed for investment and modernisation of the BTP via the BTPA's three-year Strategic Plan and increased budgets to address the legacy issues. These investments will improve the effectiveness of the Force and secure greater passenger safety in railway and underground stations. If the BTP were downgraded or abolished, these achievements would be compromised and passenger safety would suffer.

The GLA Transport Committee's report of January 2006 into crime and safety at London's suburban railway stations noted the lack of priority given by train operating companies to passenger safety. This has demonstrated that it is not sensible to give the private sector too much responsibility for passenger safety, and that it is important to maintain the proper role of the BTP in protecting against crime on the railways. Security personnel should be an addition, not a replacement for police officers and police community support officers.

30 March 2006

Annex

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this annex is to provide the Transport Select Committee with evidence of the Authority's work in supporting the British Transport Police's work in addressing this important issue. This includes information on:

- The ways in which BTPA has set the Force's strategic direction to address concerns around personal safety on the rail network.
- How BTPA is directing the Force to target the causes of passengers concerns about personal safety by setting the appropriate policing plan targets.
- Where the Authority has invested in reassurance policing.
- How the Authority has contributed to developing partnership working with the industry.
- Details of the Authority's membership profile.
- How the Authority meets its statutory duty to consult with the travelling public.

2. SETTING THE FORCE'S STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The Authority is fully conscious of the importance of passenger safety and reassurance in all areas of the rail network and has reflected this in the aims and objectives it has set out in the Force's current three year Strategic Plan. Specifically, the Authority has set the following three year objectives⁵:

- Promote public safety and assurance by working in partnership with others to make the railway a safe environment for all.
- Reduce crime by working with our partners and our railway community to tackle the causes of crime, as well as dealing with crime incidents.

Further, the Chair of the Police Authority, in his foreword to the three year Strategic Plan, has stated that:

"We are committed to providing policing excellence for Britain's railways to help build a safe railway environment that is free from disruption and fear of crime. We believe we are well on the way to achieving this, and the actions described in this Strategic Plan will enable us to continue developing and delivering the effective modern policing that our communities demand and deserve. Much, however, depends upon continued support of our communities and strategic partners, with whom we intend to work even more closely than we have in the past⁶".

The Strategic Plan also sets out the policing style that the Force will adopt over the three year period and this explicitly refers to the Force's role in "reducing crime, fear of crime and to provide reassurance . . . (and in) taking the lead in . . . dealing with low-level crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour, which is in line with the Government's drive to improve the quality of everyday life for all"⁷.

⁵ British Transport Police (2005) Strategic Plan 2005–08, p5.

⁶ British Transport Police (2005) Strategic Plan 2005–08, p7.

⁷ British Transport Police (2005) Strategic Plan 2005–08, p10.

3. SETTING THE FORCE'S POLICING PLAN OBJECTIVES

In achieving these wider strategic aims, the Authority has set the Force policing plan targets in 2005–06 and 2006–07 that specifically contribute to passenger (and rail staff) reassurance in all areas of the rail network, including railway stations. In 2006–07 these targets will include the following which are particularly relevant to the issue being investigated by the Select Committee⁸:

- Anti-social behaviour—increase number of offenders brought to justice to at least 13800 by 31 March 2007.
- Graffiti—increase number of detections to at least 750 by 31 March 2007.
- Theft of passenger property—5% reduction in offences by 31 March 2007.
- Staff assaults—increase detection rate to at least 46% by 31 March 2007.
- Robbery—to increase detection rate to at least 34% by 31 March 2007.

4. INVESTMENTS IN REASSURANCE POLICING

Increasing investment in reassurance policing has been a priority for both the Force, and the Authority since its creation in July 2004. The Authority has made the following specific investments in relation to reassurance policing:

- For 2005–06 the Authority approved various bids relating to counter terrorism and increased policing visibility such as Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), which totalled £2.05 million.
- For 2006–07 the Authority has approved £288k of investment for additional PCSOs for use in Wales.

5. DEVELOPMENT OF A PARTNERSHIP WORKING APPROACH

The Authority has been supportive of the Force's desire to enter into more partnership working with the industry, and other key, stakeholders. They have demonstrated this commitment by setting this out as a key objective within the current three year Strategic Plan (as detailed in section 2 above). In addition the Authority has also instructed the Force to progress work around developing jointly owned policing plan targets with industry partners⁹, and the Authority expects to play a key role in any dialogue with the industry around meeting this objective. Clearly there is a need for a genuine commitment from the rail industry to be fully engaged in the process of developing partnership working in relation to personal security on all areas of the rail network. However, while the Authority does accept that there is significant scope for further development of a partnership approach to improving passenger security at railway stations, it believes that it is necessary to properly differentiate between security and criminal risks and to ensure that the Force plays an appropriate, but secondary, role in any activities which relate solely to security issues.

If further investment in policing is required then the Authority is happy to take that decision, however it is crucial that this decision making is carried out in partnership with the industry. The Authority also feels that it is for Government to decide how to ensure that the various agencies engaged in these partnership arrangements deliver on the commitments they have made.

6. AUTHORITY MEMBERSHIP

The Authority membership brings together individuals representing a range of interests, including those of rail passengers, thus ensuring that the travelling public have a voice in the decisions that the Authority takes on their behalf. The required profile of British Transport Police Authority member is set out in the Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003 as follows¹⁰:

- At least four members representing the interests of providers of railway services;
- At least four members representing the interests of persons travelling by rail;
- A person representing the interests of employees of the rail industry;
- A person nominated by the Strategic Rail Authority;
- A person representing the interests of Scotland and appointed following consultation with the Scottish Executive;
- A person representing the interests of Wales and appointed following consultation with the Welsh Assembly;
- A person representing the interests of England.

⁸ British Transport Police (2006) Paper to the Police authority Meeting of 7 March, Agenda Item 8 "2006–07 policing plan targets".

⁹ British Transport Police (2006) Paper to the Police authority Meeting of 7 March, Agenda Item 8, Section 5, "2006–07 policing plan targets".

¹⁰ Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003, Schedule 4, Part 1, *Membership*. London, HMSO.

7. A DUTY TO CONSULT WITH PASSENGERS

As set out in part 3 of the Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003, the Authority has a statutory duty to consult with (amongst others) (a) passengers on the railways (b) groups of persons representing passengers on the railways¹¹. In meeting this duty, the Authority has sought to capture rail passengers' security and safety concerns by including questions on the spring wave of the National Passenger Survey, currently administered by Passenger Focus. These questions ask passengers to identify their own priorities for the Force's policing activities and are fed directly into the policing plan and budget setting process.

8. CONCLUSIONS

This memorandum has set out the ways in which the British Transport Police Authority has already demonstrated a commitment to improving personal passenger safety at railway stations through its work with the British Transport Police Force and industry partners, and will obviously continue to do so.

Finally, we thank the Committee for the opportunity to put forward our views on this issue, and are happy to provide any additional documentation or comments which may be of assistance.

APPENDIX 7

Memorandum submitted by South Eastern Trains

1. SOUTH EASTERN TRAINS

South Eastern Trains operates trains services from Kent and East Sussex into London. We run approximately 1,700 trains a day, 1,400 into the capital. We carry 120,000 passengers a day into London during the morning peak and 132.2 million passenger journeys are made with us every year.

We have 178 stations on our network of which 142 are covered by Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). SET is responsible for day-to-day operations at these stations, save for the major London terminals, which are managed by Network Rail, and Blackfriars, which is managed by Thameslink.

SET took over from Connex on 9 November 2003, and will transfer to Govia on 1 April 2006 as part of the Integrated Kent Franchise

SET is committed to creating a safe and secure environment for its passengers and we are proud of our record which includes rail industry "firsts" such as the British Transport Police (BTP) special constable scheme and employing railway enforcement officers. This issue has the highest priority within SET, and Managing Director, Michael Holden serves as a member of the BTP Authority.

1.1 *Are stations unsafe?*

It is perhaps worth noting that:

- stations are relatively safe places, with passengers statistically more at risk from crime on the street outside that in the station itself;
- most crimes at stations occur during the day when the majority of stations are staffed;
- "crimes" reported on railway stations includes trespass on the track, graffiti and damage to cars in station car parks. While all are a criminal offence, these activities do not constitute much of a risk to passenger security; and
- any crime on Network Rail-owned land (which may be hundreds of yards away from the station) is recorded as a crime happening at that station. For example a criminal offence committed at a taxi rank or a in a station approach road would be logged as a crime at the station, irrespective of whether the victims were rail users.

Of course, while the fear of crime is worse than the reality, these fears are real and need to be addressed.

¹¹ Railways, Transport and Safety Act 2003, Part 3, *Public Consultation*. London, HMSO.

2. WHAT ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF MAKING RAILWAY AND UNDERGROUND STATIONS SAFE FOR PASSENGERS?

Dealing with crime and disorder is only possible on a partnership basis, by working closely with the British Transport Police, the Metropolitan and county police forces, Network Rail, local authorities and other stakeholders.

The most important task is to create a safe environment, which helps improve the perception of safety and security. However, stations are part of the communities they serve and a reflection of the local area. If that area is littered, covered in graffiti, badly lit and suffers from crime, this will influence passengers' perceptions of the station.

As a result, since taking over the franchise from Connex in November 2003, SET has concentrated on improving standards and has invested some £12.5 million in our stations. We have re-painted over 100 stations as part of a three yearly on-going programme and we have introduced benchmark standards on cleaning. We aim to remove all graffiti from stations within 24 hours and as well as regular cleaning, all stations are now receiving a "deep clean" once a year. Signage and passenger information have been improved, we are controlling station access and egress and we believe that our stations are now cleaner, brighter, welcoming and provide more reassurance to our passengers.

For your information purposes we attach a brief summary of measures designed to improve passenger security implemented by SET over the last two and half years.

3. ARE THE MINIMUM STANDARDS TO PROVIDE A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT HIGH ENOUGH? ARE THE REQUIREMENTS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND SPECIFIC TO BE EFFECTIVE? IF NOT, WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE?

Train operators are required to ensure the safety of their passengers under Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, and in civil law, under the Occupiers' Liability Act. Both require the train operators to take all reasonably practicable steps to reduce the risks to the public and staff.

To help discharge this responsibility, there are a number of processes:

- the train operators' own internal management control processes applicable to stations;
- the Secure Stations Scheme;
- specific requirements for investment included in franchise tender documents or agreements. These may relate to, for example, Secure Station accreditation or CCTV;
- regulating ticket office opening hours; and
- guidance on CCTV systems, produced by ATOC and Network Rail;

Railway Group Standards may also be relevant in some areas.

The majority of improvements to security have come about from proposals from franchisees, rather than from Government specification. In terms of providing a safe and secure environment there are no specific franchise commitments other than giving the train operator a duty of care to its passengers.

Operators would welcome clarity from the Department for Transport (DfT) on this issue. However, raising safety and security standards, particularly increasing front line staff numbers would have cost implications, and have to be reflected in the premium charged for the franchise, a rise in fares, or by a combination of both.

4. ARE THE MINIMUM STANDARDS EFFECTIVELY POLICED? ARE THE PENALTIES FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE A SECURE STATION ENVIRONMENT SUFFICIENTLY SEVERE?

Our own standards are the subject of external and internal audit. Internally, failure to protect passengers and staff would be the focus of attention by the SET board who take this issue as seriously as the committee does. Externally, breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act are dealt with by Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate and carry the risk of prosecution. Where station standards are part of a franchise agreement they are monitored by the DfT and breach will result in action under the terms of that agreement.

5. IS IT SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO PASSENGERS AND OTHERS WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS?

Yes. Responsibility rests with the train operator. At all our stations there is an information display giving contact details for the station manager, and telephone numbers for our customer services unit, Passenger Focus or London Travelwatch, Network Rail and the BTP.

At our smaller stations there are help points which enable passengers to contact our staff direct.

However, in terms of station policing there may be some confusion amongst passengers as to the roles and responsibilities of the BTP and the metropolitan and county forces.

6. WHY ARE SO FEW STATIONS ACCREDITED UNDER THE SECURE STATIONS SCHEME? SHOULD THE SCHEME BE MADE COMPULSORY?

To achieve accreditation under the DfT's secure stations scheme, the design of the station must conform to standards judged by the BTP to prevent and reduce crime and improve passenger safety, crime statistics must have reduced in the 12 months prior to the inspection, a survey of passengers must show that they feel secure and finally, that the management of the station must enable the operator to reduce crime and communicate with passengers.

Of these four criteria, only the last is in our gift. Nearly all our stations are over a century old, have several access points and date from an era where staffing levels were considerably more generous. Some also have listed building status, making it very difficult to effect design changes. As for reducing crime statistics, we now positively encourage passengers and staff to report all crime, including graffiti, vandalism, trespass on the line, and damage to vehicles in car parks. This has the effect of increasing the number of reported incidents. As outlined in 1.1 above, crime statistics also include incidents on Network Rail land outside the station, over which we have no direct ownership or control. It is also extremely difficult to allay passengers' fear or perception of crime,—a situation not helped by alarmist media coverage.

This notwithstanding, SET is applying for secure station accreditation for nine stations on the Hayes Line.

For the reasons outlined above, unless the criteria for accreditation is revised we do not feel the scheme should be made compulsory. Moreover, if there were sanctions against operators for not having secure stations accreditation, there may be a temptation not to report crime for fear of losing it.

7. WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN PASSENGERS' SAFETY AT RAILWAY STATIONS?

We believe that station security will be enhanced by the upgrading of station CCTV systems to include monitoring by staff in our control room, continued high visibility security patrols by our Rail Enforcement Officers, by working closely with the British Transport Police to identify and provide other physical security improvements and partnership working with Network Rail, local authorities and other stakeholders. It is our view that good passenger and staff security comes from the delivery of integrated programmes, including improving the environment and providing training.

Re-deployment of staff may also be part of the solution. Last year, in response to a fall in the number of traditional ticket office transactions, SET submitted proposals to the former Strategic Rail Authority to reduce ticket office opening hours and instead re-deploy staff to customer-facing positions in stations and on trains.

We envisaged no compulsory redundancies and our proposals included recruiting 30 additional members of staff. However, the DfT has deferred any decision until Govia takes over SET on 1st April. We are hopeful of a positive decision, particularly in light of a recent Greater London Assembly report which called on train operators to meet concerns about safety at stations by considering more imaginative staffing deployment at stations.

8. IS THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO PASSENGER SAFETY IN STATIONS EFFECTIVE?

At the heart of this issue has been the lack of any formal Government approach to passenger safety, as when drawing up the first rail franchises, the former Office of Passenger Rail Franchising did not include any commitments to improve security at stations.

We are pleased that the DfT is now addressing this, and we understand that the specification for the South Western franchise will include minimum requirements on visible staffing and the installation of barriers. We are also advised that Transport for London's (TfL) specification for the Silverlink Metro service will incorporate a commitment to staff stations at night. We assume that if such commitments are included in future rail franchises, or the terms of current franchises are varied by mutual agreement, that the cost burdens will be reflected in the level of premiums or by greater flexibility on fares setting.

9. CONCLUSION

We believe that since taking over from Connex, SET has made significant progress in improving passenger safety. While the fear of crime is still there, public perception, as gauged through independently conducted surveys, has slowly improved. Our off-peak passenger loadings, particularly in the evening and at night have also improved, demonstrating that despite alarmist press coverage as to the safety of passengers at stations, the public has not been deterred from using our services.

We accept that there is always more that could be done to improve passenger security, and we welcome debate on this issue. However, we would ask that that debate is balanced, uninfluenced by political considerations and that any recommendations are properly evidenced and costed.

Annex

MEASURES TAKEN BY SET TO IMPROVE PASSENGER SECURITY

STATION STAFFING



When we took over the franchise from Connex in November 2003 we inherited a shortfall of 200 frontline staff. Those vacancies have now been filled and we are able to staff our barriers for longer, increase the presence on the platform, and offer greater assurance to our passengers

APPOINTMENT OF RAILWAY ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

These are a new grade of staff and SET is the first train operating company to employ them. They are accredited by the BTP, are empowered to issue on the spot fines, confiscate alcohol and tobacco, eject persons from trains and stations and are trained to properly utilise their citizen’s powers or arrest where necessary. Their patrolling is intelligence led.

Since the officers commenced duty last year, our latest passenger satisfaction survey showed a significant increase in the number of passengers reporting themselves satisfied with personal security on our network, particularly at night.

The cost to SET is £1.25 million per year.



ENHANCED CCTV

In partnership with TfL, some £3 million is being invested in digital CCTV systems with capability for active monitoring by selection within Greater London. The system has now been rolled out on the Hayes and Dartford Loop lines and will be extended to the majority of our stations in the Greater London area.

NEW TRAINS PROGRAMME

We inherited a £500 million new trains programme from Connex. This included the replacement of Mark 1 slam door stock with Class 375 Electrostar units on our longer distance routes and the introduction of Class 376 Suburban Electrostar units in the metro area. Both are equipped with on-board CCTV, allow through carriage views and represent a considerable improvement in passenger security. Our networker units have also been refurbished, and are cleaner, lighter and more welcoming.

ADDITIONAL SECURITY PATROLS

SET spends £270,000 per year on additional security patrols. As with the Railway Enforcement Officers their work is intelligence led, targeting known problem areas such as late night trains.

PARTICIPATION IN CRIME AND DISORDER REDUCTION PARTNERSHIPS

Throughout our franchise area, we work with those local authorities that have established Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). There are active CDRPs in Bexley, Southwark, Bromley, Dartford, Thanet, Medway, Hastings and Lewisham. Our participation has resulted in a variety of positive outcomes including:

- external finance to upgrade CCTV, lighting and install help points;
- patrols by local authority wardens on trains and stations;
- vegetation, litter and graffiti clearance programmes; and
- working with schools to improve the behaviour of students traveling by train to and from school;

Other measures taken by SET include:

- upgrading lighting at all Metro stations;
- zero tolerance approach to graffiti on stations with target to remove within 24 hours; and
- positive working relationship with BTP, Metropolitan and county police forces.

SET was praised by BTP Chief Constable Ian Johnston who earlier this year said:

South Eastern Trains have been a sterling supporter of BTP in our fight to tackle crime and disorder on the railways; they have successfully encouraged their staff to join the Specials, and released them from work time to undertake those roles. They employed a full time senior member of BTP staff in a security advisor role, and they work with us on a daily basis to reduce crime and to improve the quality of life of their passengers. (BTP press release, January 2006)

Following the return to the BTP of their secondee, SET established a full-time senior management post of Head of Crime and Security. As well as continuing the advisory role he is a key player in assisting in the improved co-ordination of the deployment and tasking of the Railway Enforcement Officers, additional security patrols and joint operations with BTP. This role is currently being carried out by an ex Assistant Chief Constable from that force.

We have also:

- successfully opposed applications for late night drinking licenses in public houses adjacent to our stations;
- in partnership with local authorities, secured Anti Social Behaviour Orders against youths responsible for crime and disorder on our network;
- allowed staff paid time off to train as BTP special constables; and
- in conjunction with the BTP, produced a security information and advice booklet for all staff.

30 March 2006

APPENDIX 8

Memorandum submitted by RMT

INTRODUCTION

RMT welcome the opportunity to contribute to the House of Commons Transport Committee inquiry into passenger safety. The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) are the largest rail union. Overall we represent over 70,000 workers from different transport industries, at least 40,000 of whom work in the railway industry.

It is our view that current arrangements to ensure passenger safety are inadequate. There is no consistent reporting of incidents, lines of responsibility are blurred, the Secure Stations Scheme is entirely voluntary and there are far too many stations with virtually no staff presence. RMT believe that there are a number of initiatives that could be taken to improve passenger safety. However research demonstrates that the single most important factor in making passengers feel secure is a visible staff presence at stations.

SECURE STATIONS SCHEME

The Department for Transport (DoT) currently runs the Secure Stations Scheme which sets out a number of improvements train operating companies can make to improve passenger security. The guidelines are helpful however the committee should be aware that it is a purely voluntary scheme.

Network Rail owns all rail stations and they also operate and manage the ten largest stations in London. All the other stations are leased to Train Operating Companies, (TOCs.) The TOC is generally responsible for the day to day maintenance, cleaning and operation of the station under the franchise agreement. The franchises report to the Department of Transport who now manage the franchises directly, and the British Transport Police also have responsibility. In addition Transport for London and local authorities also co-ordinate crime reduction strategies but this is undertaken on a voluntary basis.

There are a number of improvements to stations that can be made by TOCs to stations set out in the DoT Secure Stations Scheme documentation. Site perimeters, entrances and exits should be clearly marked. Closed circuit TV equipment should be visible with quality images which are regularly monitored.

Lighting throughout the station is important, particularly where important information such as timetables are displayed. The station also needs to be designed in such a way as to minimise possible security concerns so that for example blind corners are minimised and where they are unavoidable additional precautions are put in place. Information needs to be readily accessible in respect of the lay out of the station, the train services and other transport options. There should also be clear directions to and from the station. It is recommended that passengers should have the opportunity to call for assistance if this is required.

There are also useful guidelines for TOCs on how to manage the station and measure crime and monitor passenger perceptions of security. The guidelines also set out the importance of a staff presence and advise TOCs that staff training to deal with passenger security and safety issues should be addressed. The guidance also correctly states that staff security is vital for facilitating passenger security.

RMT would certainly be interested to learn if those stations which have gained accreditation under the scheme have succeeded in attracting additional passengers due to improved security for passengers. If this is the case RMT would endorse the roll out of the scheme across the network on a mandatory basis providing minimum staffing levels were included.

It should also be pointed out that stations need to be designed to facilitate access to all groups in society. As a result of new legislation the Department of Transport is funding a number of improvements to stations that will facilitate greater access for disabled passengers, for example clear passenger announcements and customer information systems, step free stations and increased staffing assistance.

CURRENT STANDARDS

It is unfortunate that industry wide data on assaults and other incidents at stations which could be used to make valid comparisons across the network is not available. If it does exist it is certainly not publicly available and the fragmented nature of the industry makes the collection of the data more difficult than it sensibly should be.

The committee has asked whether the minimum standards are effectively policed and whether penalties are severe enough for non-compliance. These questions are largely academic as the Safe Stations Scheme is run on a voluntary basis.

RMT do not have detailed information on requirements in franchise agreements for stations for each train operating company. However it is apparent that certain companies have very few duties beyond normal requirements under health and safety legislation. In January 2006 the London Assembly commissioned a report on crime and safety at stations in London. The report highlighted the inadequate provisions in place to ensure a station environment conducive to passengers well being.

This is not a situation that should be allowed to continue. Recent newspaper reports have highlighted the situation at many London stations. Passengers have experienced poorly lit stations which are not accessible to all, no staff presence, inadequate ticketing facilities and train information, and a general lack of any facilities, e.g. toilets or waiting rooms. There have been frequent assaults at many stations in the capital and the factors outlined above are likely to exacerbate potential crime problems.

We are pleased that as a result of increasing public concern this issue the Mayor of London has stated that he will insist on staffing at stations for the new Silverlink franchise when he assumes control of the franchise in November 2007. This should be extended to other stations where similar concerns on the lack of staff presence have been raised.

REPORT ON CRIME AND SAFETY FROM THE GREAT LONDON AUTHORITY

The House of Commons transport committee has asked who is responsible for the safety of passengers at stations. Information from the above mentioned report from the London Assembly reveals that certain train operating companies believe they have few responsibilities for the setting of appropriate standards at stations.

South Eastern Trains explicitly stated that their franchise agreement does not specify any obligation to upkeep maintenance or station safety. Therefore the focus is on any applicable health and safety standards as opposed to factors such as passenger security and environmental factors. Thameslink made a similar statement.

The increase in crime at London stations is alarming. The London Assembly report reveals that the number of reported crimes on London's 602 tube and rail stations has increased as follows:

2002–03	22,539
2003–04	26,054
2004–05	30,428

The 2004–05 figures include 18,068 crimes at London Underground stations and 12,360 crimes at rail overground stations.

Earlier we indicated that local authorities did undertake crime reduction strategies. The report from the London Assembly stated that evidence from local boroughs indicated that securing active TOC involvement in borough wide crime and disorder strategies was difficult due to the fragmented nature of public transport in all its forms. The application within TOCs was patchy and inconsistent.

The report from the London Assembly studied the use of closed circuit TV and if any co-ordination exists with local authorities who manage central CCTV rooms. The report described its findings on the overground railway as a microcosm of the problems caused by splintered responsibility across the transport network. This is because there are no common industry standards; no obligation to install CCTV on trains and also no minimum requirements for the equipment that is used on the network.

Sadly there are also no requirements to link CCTV equipment with local authorities or law enforcement agencies. The report stated that there was an insufficient incentive for TOCs to invest in new high quality technology due to the limits of franchises. The report also indicated that the number of BTP officers for dealing with crime in London was insufficient with only 1700 officers to deal with over 600 rail and tube stations. However the transport committee may wish to note that the total across the whole national network is only 2,500. London Underground has recently made an additional payment to the British Transport Police for additional officers to work specifically on the Underground.

STAFFING RAILWAY STATIONS

Whilst noting that there would need to be some consideration of the level of passenger services running through certain rural stations we believe there are clear practical arguments for ensuring robust staffing arrangements at stations right across the UK. In particular many stations within London have potentially far greater usage throughout the day with a visible staff presence. At the current time many stations within the capital are used by work commuters in the morning and evening peak but after this ridership can dramatically drop off. The lack of staffing is a major factor.

More generally Transport 2000 have noted in their report "At the Leading Edge" that almost 75% of women do not feel safe at railway stations in the evening and that "measures to improve personal safety could increase the use of public transport by 10%". Increased station staffing will also improve stations by reducing graffiti, vandalism and the non-payment of fares. Obviously increased revenue will help to generate revenue which can contribute towards or pay for staffing costs.

However it is apparent that there is a lead in time for this and so resources will need to be forthcoming upfront. It is our belief that increased ridership will follow but a period of time will have to pass before potential users from the general public will appreciate that the rail network is a safer place upon which to travel. We also believe that savings can be made by integrating the railway and in particular taking the Train Operating Companies into public ownership.

The policy within London of de-staffing stations outside the peak period can lead to a whole set of problems. These include a rising amount of crime against the person, increased acts of vandalism, (including obstructive objects being placed on track, arson and missiles thrown from trains) and increased trespass where there is no staff presence. If staff are not present to ensure the public have valid tickets for travel the possibility of assault is shifted to staff working on trains. 41% of all attacks on rail staff are related to ticket disputes.

It will probably not come as a surprise to the transport committee that there have been an increasing number of assaults on rail workers. The Rail Safety and Standards Board Report from September 2005 records a total of 2600 assaults on the workforce for the period between January and July 2005, representing an average of twelve on every day of the week.

It is a sad fact that crimes against the person are not recorded by the industry, however these figures are recorded by the British Transport Police and they report that violent crime against the person on the railway has increased every year since 1999.

The union recommends that at stations no lone working should be allowed and staffing levels should be determined upon the basis of a proper risk assessment, including the threat of violence. Risk assessments are sometimes undertaken for particular grades and applied across a number of locations. This is not adequate because the risk of crime depends on so many different factors as illustrated earlier in this submission.

A thorough plan needs to be developed for the whole rail network so that crime against passengers and staff is taken seriously with comprehensive statistics collected throughout the industry. The current fragmentation of the industry leads to a voluntary and piecemeal approach to preventative measures with no overall control.

INFORMATION ON FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS FOR TRAIN OPERATING COMPANIES

RMT would like to advise the transport committee of a very important point regarding disclosure of information that can impact on factors affecting passenger security. During the recent re-tendering process for South Eastern Trains RMT were denied access to the Invitation to Tender (ITT) document. This was subsequently released but only after the completion of the procurement process. The union has since been in communication with the office dealing with Freedom of Information enquiries.

RMT were advised by South Eastern Trains that we had already received a copy of the Stakeholder Briefing Document which gave detail of what the SRA was asking bidders. However the Invitation to Tender document contains important information that was not included in the Stakeholder Briefing Document. The ITT reveals that bidders should consider changes to ticket retailing policies and procedures as part of their submissions. Bidders are also advised that South Eastern Trains are already developing a business case in readiness for the introduction of a more efficient ticket retailing strategy.

In March 2005 South Eastern Trains brought forward proposed changes to schedule 17 of the Ticketing and Settlement Agreement which would have resulted in a cut of around 100 station staff. This was only withdrawn following a campaign by RMT and other passenger groups. Not only was this issue of significant interest to RMT but the proposed cut in station staff was also a matter for wider public debate especially bearing in mind the widespread media and political coverage of the lack of staff at stations and consequent safety concerns.

In addition the ITT document also stated that bidders could bring forward proposals to extend Driver Only Operation, resulting in the removal of guards and therefore the presence of a member of staff who could potentially assist passengers on a train. Again it is our view that RMT and other interested parties should have had access to the ITT at the time as this would have given the opportunity to raise concerns with the SRA and through Parliament. The new franchise will be dependent upon public subsidy of £585 million over eight years and therefore the issues raised within the ITT are very much in the public interest.

FUNDING

RMT believe that a return to public ownership could release significant funds to pay for additional staff at stations on the national rail network.

Research from Professor Jean Shaoul has revealed that considerable savings could be made through returning the train operating companies into public ownership. The cost of each tendering exercise is between £3m and £4m and there are additional costs that TOCs factor in for their costs of preparing bids. In addition far less bureaucracy and monitoring costs relating to the contracts would be needed; this is estimated at £30 million per year. The most significant savings would arise from subsidies and fare revenues which would no longer be paid to private lenders and investors. Dividends paid annually to TOCs to parent companies averaged £170 million in the years 2001–03. Profits increased to £290 million in 2004, an increase of 20%.

Professor Shaoul estimates that £200 million a year could be saved through returning TOCs to public ownership. She has calculated that this could fund an additional 1500 rail staff and a doubling of investment currently being made on station maintenance, operations, renewals and enhancements.

Earlier we referred to improvements being funded by the Department of Transport to improve disabled access to the railway. It is very disappointing that following this investment the number of rail journeys covered with full staffing by 2015 will only increase from 70% to 76%. In addition the number of fully staffed stations will increase from 20% to 23%.

FIRE SAFETY REGULATIONS

RMT would also like to bring to the attention of the transport committee the potential threat to staffing at certain stations covered by the Fire Precautions (Sub-Surface Railway Stations Regulations) 1989.

The 1989 Regulations make up Section 12 of the Fire Precautions Act 1971, and were added on the recommendation of the Fennell Report into the 1987 King's Cross fire. The committee may well be aware of the recent debate surrounding the future of these regulations on London Underground and other "sub-surface stations", however the regulations also cover national rail stations which are "sub-surface", including Birmingham New Street, London's Charing Cross and several in Liverpool. The government's Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, as originally drafted, would have repealed the 1971 Act, and with it the Section 12 regulations.

The regulations stipulate minimum safe staffing levels, means of detecting and warning of fires and means of escape and firefighting, as well as standards of fire-resistant construction, training and various other precautions, which are not specified in the Fire Safety Order the Government wants to replace them with.

The Government government's first move to scrap the 1989 regulations—which lay down minimum staffing levels and other safety standards for sub-surface stations—was opposed by the House of Commons' Regulatory Reform Committee in October 2004, following an intervention by RMT parliamentary group convenor John McDonnell.

The government has subsequently said it would repeal the regulations in April 2007, However, the Fire Safety Order and guidance do not give the same statutory protections as in the 1989 Regulations, specifically on:

- Means of escape.
- Means of fighting fire.
- Means of detection and giving warning.
- Fire-resistant construction.
- Instruction and training.
- Keeping of records.
- Additional precautions including practicable steps to prevent smoking, and staffing levels.

RMT believe that the current regulations should not be repealed when inadequate provisions are being made for their replacement.

CONCLUSION

The union has become increasingly alarmed at the rising number of assaults at stations. We believe that de-staffing of stations has caused additional dangers. In view of the public money being spent on the national rail network passengers have a reasonable expectation that there will be a staff presence at stations.

The Secure Stations Scheme is welcome but it is not mandatory. Train operating companies are in a position where they can ignore best practice as promoted by the scheme. Savings can be made by ending the fragmentation of the industry and restoring train operating companies to public ownership. We are also confident that many more people will use the railway and increased revenue can in future be generated if people believe that stations are safe at night. In any event demand for rail is expected to increase significantly in the years ahead.

Finally in the event of tendering for franchises continuing RMT recommends that the Invitation to Tender documents should be publicly available to industry parties, including the relevant trade unions and passenger groups. This would mean that changes to staffing and security at stations can be publicly scrutinised. Otherwise trade unions and passenger groups are effectively forced into a rearguard action once proposals are published.

RMT would be happy to come and give evidence directly to the transport committee.

30 March 2006

APPENDIX 9

Memorandum submitted by Crime Concern

1. Crime Concern welcomes the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Committee's Inquiry. Crime Concern is a social business which works with national and local statutory partners, local organisations and others to create safer communities. We achieve this through the delivery of local crime prevention projects in over seventy localities across England and Wales and through the provision of a specialist consultancy advisory service to local partnerships, public services and business. We have probably, at some time, worked with most of the 370 plus Crime and Disorder Partnerships (CDRPs) in England and their counterparts in Wales. We are strategically funded through the Home Office.

2. Our consultancy division has been undertaking research, training and consultancy across the public transport sector for the past fifteen years. This experience provides us with a unique understanding of the efficacy of the various policy strategic and operational responses. We have drawn on this experience in our evidence and would be happy to provide further details of any of the work referenced.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3. Crime Concern's experience is that:

- Effective passenger safety strategies incorporate a combination of prevention, environmental and enforcement measures.
- There is a multiplicity of reasons why passengers feel vulnerable. As with most types of crime, women, young people and members of minority groups (race, faith, disability) are likely to feel particularly vulnerable.

4. We support the recommendations made in the National Audit Office report "Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations" (2005)¹² which confirmed findings from our previous research into personal safety issues for both the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB).

5. In addition, we recommend that:

- A "whole journey" approach¹³, to passenger safety is more widely adopted. Passenger safety in railways stations should not be dealt with in isolation.
- Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and transport authorities should become more closely engaged with CDRPs.
- The role of complementary policing, in relation to the rail environment, is expanded and a consistent, national approach is developed.
- A national strategy on personal safety training for rail staff is developed.
- More is done to realise the potential of the Secure Stations Scheme and more research is undertaken into the business case for participation.
- Through collaboration between Network Rail, the rail operating companies and the new National Offender Management Service, offenders sentenced to Unpaid Work should be comprehensively engaged in work to make the rail system safer and cleaner.

BACKGROUND

6. Crime Concern's has provided consultancy support on transport safety issues to the DfT, the RSSB and individual TOCs. Our work, which has been at both a strategic and operational level, has involved identifying crime, disorder and personal safety issues in the railway environment, and developing guidance, strategies and recommendations to reduce these problems and improve actual and perceived public safety.

7. WORK HAS INCLUDED:

- research on complementary policing for the RSSB;
- research into rail passenger and staff perceptions and experiences for the RSSB;
- research on the (former) DETR's Secure Route pilot;
- a safety and security audit for South West Trains, which contributed to their development of company wide passenger safety initiatives and counter-measures; and
- an evaluation of 'Youth on the Move' which was a transport-focused outreach project in Merseyside funded jointly by Merseytravel and the Youth Service.

TRANSPORT CRIME AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

8. Our research for the RSSB on passengers' experiences and perceptions of risks to personal safety confirmed the following factors contribute to passengers' sense of vulnerability:

- Quiet, unstaffed stations.
- Lack of (or off-peak closure) of station facilities eg cafe[acute]s, shops.
- Dirty, poorly maintained stations.

¹² The National Audit Office's report "Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations" (2005) provided a detailed analysis of both the problems facing strategic bodies and train operating companies (TOCs) with the operation and maintenance of railway stations and the measures currently being implemented to address them. The report identified where improvements still need to be made and the barriers to progress.

¹³ This approach was piloted by Crime Concern for the Department for Transport two to three years ago.

- Staff who are unable or unwilling to provide help and information.
- Lack of (or inaccurate) information about services—or information only given in English and/or in a written format.
- Groups of young people using station premises to congregate.
- Street drinkers and aggressive beggars.
- Travelling off-peak and after dark.
- Travelling during major sports and other events when there are large crowds and people have been drinking.

9. These factors deter people from using public transport, reducing footfall and therefore informal surveillance—creating a vicious circle. When passengers feel vulnerable they also look more vulnerable and are, therefore, more likely to be targeted.

10. Women, older passengers, young people, people with mental or physical disabilities and those from minority ethnic communities often feel particularly vulnerable. Many of these passengers do not have the use of a car and may depend on the rail network for access to leisure, work, training and other social contact. Fear of using rail transport may, therefore, impact negatively on their levels of social inclusion and personal well-being.

What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

11. Effective approaches to passenger safety will require a combination of prevention, environmental and enforcement measures, and will be promoted across the crime prevention and reduction field. Moreover, measures outlined in the NAO report and in our own research reports for the RSSB and the DfT confirm that it is essential that stations provide a visibly managed environment. Further details are given below.

12. Although the focus of the Committee's inquiry is on stations, our research for the (former) Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions' pilot Secure Route initiative demonstrated the importance of addressing "whole route" issues ie the station is just one link in a passenger's journey. Security in car parks, the environment immediately outside stations, on-train security, access to and availability of on-going transport options (taxis, buses) and provision of clear, accurate travel information, should also be addressed. Improving stations is very important but if it is done in isolation, passengers' safety in the wider sense will not be secured. In addition, a well-lit, well-maintained station with a "managed environment" ie visible staff, high profile information about what action will be taken against offenders, CCTV etc will help to deter those intending to cause trouble.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

13. Passenger awareness of how TOCs and strategic bodies operate is generally low. Furthermore, passengers do not necessarily differentiate between different TOCs covering different stages of their journey: they will judge the quality of service, including personal safety factors on the whole journey, irrespective of which lines and stations they use whilst in transit. Irregular/leisure travellers and those making long journeys may use several companies' services on one trip and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that differences in approach and/or policy and procedure between companies can lead to confusion and expectations not being met.

14. The RSSB Rail Personal Safety Group provides an industry-wide forum to discuss and help address safety and security issues, and to encourage consistency across the network. However, the RSSB can only recommend, not enforce change. We recommend that national strategies are developed on personal safety training for rail staff and on complementary policing.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the Scheme be made compulsory?

15. Following its review of the Scheme in 2003, the DfT abolished the accreditation fee and established a 'working towards accreditation' category. However, not all TOCs support the Scheme and, given that it is still a voluntary initiative, incentive to increase participation is still insufficient. For accreditation to increase, it would help to be able to demonstrate the business case for participation ie to establish whether accreditation has led to increased footfall.

16. Making the Scheme compulsory would help establish a national baseline for rail companies' approach to improving safety and security. However, there may be issues for companies operating rural and smaller stations in low crime areas with relatively low footfall, as improvements will represent a relatively high investment compared with potential increased revenue.

17. The NAO's report confirmed that public awareness of the Scheme itself is low, but improvements made to achieve accreditation will improve passenger perceptions (and actual experience) of person safety eg higher standards of maintenance, CCTV, Help Points etc. The DfT review also recommended improved marketing and promotion of the Scheme. We support this.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?

Strategic:

18. Transport operators should work proactively with local authorities, police, and CDRPs to analyse and address problems affecting stations in the context of the local crime environment; people causing trouble and committing crimes on the railway are also likely to be offending in the local area and may already be known to the police and other local agencies. Currently, transport is significantly under-represented on CDRPs although the Home Office and the RSSB's Rail Personal Safety Group are actively promoting this approach.

19. Operators should actively encourage both passengers and staff to report crimes and incidents of antisocial and threatening behaviour, make it clear how they can do so and provide feedback where appropriate. Most operators regularly collate and analyse reported incident data to identify hotspots and individuals and key risk factors and this should be central to companies' strategic approach to tackling the problem.

Environment:

20. Lighting and lines of sight should be improved, vegetation should be cut back, vandalised property repaired and graffiti cleaned as soon as possible, waiting areas should be sited where those waiting can see and be seen, and fencing should be adequate, in good repair and reduce unwanted access to station areas.

21. The Committee may be aware that the Government is planning a major expansion in the provision of Unpaid Work in the community. This is where offenders are sentenced to a number of hours of unpaid work for community benefit. This often involves environmental clean up work. We believe there is much greater potential for this major source of labour to be deployed across the rail system, and elsewhere, to increase safety and reduce the fear of crime. We recognise that there are significant health and safety considerations to be addressed in making this a reality, but feel any strategy for enhancing safety in the rail system should include those who are partly responsible for the insecurity paying back something. The rail system should work closely with the National Offender Management Service and its service providers to put a national initiative in place.

22. We are also aware that under the new anti social behaviour legislation, local councils can choose to act to remove graffiti from other organisations' premises and then recoup the cost of this. We are not aware to what extent these powers have been used yet (if at all) or whether they have been used in relation to the rail system. However we would encourage the Committee to explore with bodies like the LGA whether a drive could be introduced. This could do much to improve public perceptions of safety and to reassure the public that action is being taken.

Surveillance/accessing help:

23. Ideally, digital CCTV should be linked to a central control room where cameras are constantly monitored and to platform Help Points which enable operators to zoom in on callers in need of help and / or surveillance. Staffing levels and visibility should be improved, especially when stations are quiet, and police and complementary staff should patrol, particularly in 'hot spot' locations.

Enforcement:

24. Our research for the RSSB into the potential benefits of complementary policing for the rail industry (2005) concluded that there is considerable scope for enhancing and expanding the role of complementary policing staff in the rail environment ie contracted security; dedicated policing units; wardens; specialist transport staff; voluntary sector. These staff:

- deal with low level crime and anti-social behaviour;
- gather intelligence (being the "eyes and ears" of the police);
- build links with local communities; and
- provide a reassuring presence.

25. Our research found that many rail companies are already using a range of complementary policing staff to augment the British Transport Police (BTP) and Home Office (HO) policing role. However, these initiatives have been developed by individual companies and our recommendations stressed the need for a consistent, national approach with complementary policing considered as part—not the whole—of the solution.

Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

Conclusion

26. The evidence from the NAO and our own research suggests that there have been some good improvements made in many areas. However, these improvements are patchy and some passengers are still not confident about using stations in some locations, especially off-peak and after dark.

27. We repeat our recommendation that it is essential to view the station as just one element in the whole journey. Passengers will assess risks to their personal safety in terms of the weakest link in that journey and will choose not to use public transport if they believe those risks are significant.

31 March 2006

APPENDIX 10

Memorandum submitted by Soroptimist International of South East England

OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY

1. This memorandum is based on grassroots research about the views and experiences of women passengers. Soroptimist International is a major women's voluntary organisation serving the community in various ways including investigation of issues and presentation of reports. A Rail Safety Task Force established in 1996 by Soroptimist International of South East England has published three reports on passenger personal safety, based on visits to over 500 stations across Britain, surveys of the views of women and young people and inspection of various types of rolling stock. It did not look at London Underground other than to observe some of its good practice. It has discussed its findings with DfT, ATOC and individual TOC directors, Rail Regulators, BTP, the SRA, Network Rail, RSSB, HSE, the Rail Passengers Council and many figures in the rail industry.

2. On some topics there have been helpful responses to the report recommendations but on others little progress has been made. Some we believe need Government action to correct fundamental weaknesses in the arrangements set up when British Rail disappeared, while others need much closer and more coordinated working between the different parts of the rail industry.

3. Chapter 8 of our report "Safe and Sure: A quick wins agenda for Britain's railways" set out 78 recommendations directly relevant to this inquiry. That report was submitted to the Committee in December 2002. It forms the context for the action now advocated in this memorandum.

1. These observations are directed both to the Committee's specific questions, and to some associated aspects, in the light of our past research on personal security matters on the over-ground railway system throughout Britain.

Q1. *What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?*

Q6. *What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and underground stations?*

2. Passengers want not only to be safe, but to feel safe. That applies throughout their whole journey. In the case of rail travel that means not just within the station itself, but also in the area immediately outside it where they may have parked their car, or have to emerge at night, and within the rolling stock where they will almost certainly at some time have experienced or witnessed unpleasantness and threats of various kinds.

3. They also want:

- a consistent recognisable network they can confidently navigate, not a series of fiefdoms where differing approaches and systems apply to even such fundamental matters as basic signage and safety information;
- immediate access to help and information if they have problems; and to be able to report concerns. That goes for on the train as well as off it;
- clearly visible staff. Even where there are people on the spot, too often they are hidden behind frosted windows and shut doors. Low cost station modification could make more effective use of what is available;
- less reliance on CCTV cameras as a panacea that requires no other action. It is little comfort to a passenger who is attacked or hassled to know it is recorded for court use if meanwhile nobody actively intervenes; and
- clean well-tended surroundings where somebody is plainly in charge.

4. *The Committee might like to ask the Department for Transport (DfT) and the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) if they agree with this analysis. Can these matters be collectively addressed rather than left to the personal preferences of each franchisee?*

Q2. *Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?*

Q5. *Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?*

5. We deal with these questions together because our comments on the Secure Stations scheme are relevant to both.

6. We welcomed the Secure Stations Scheme set up following our 1997 report. However this has become over-specified other than for major stations and neglects the multitude of smaller stations at the “other end” of journeys. We suggested to the Department for Transport two remedial approaches.

- Three levels of improvement required, being set according to their footfall, say Gold, Silver and Bronze, with all stations required to attain at least Bronze, while striving to move up the league table as resources allowed;
- Alternatively a base level of provision and maintenance, every station obliged to conform as a franchise condition, ie required standard of lighting, a well-lit “safe” area with a help point (at least a telephone), taxi access, cleanliness, and information.

7. *The Committee might like to ask why DfT has ignored our suggestions.*

Q3. *Are the minimum standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?*

8. There are two issues here, namely maintaining standards and applying sanctions.

(a) Maintaining standards

9. It is management’s job to secure cleanliness, removal of graffiti and prompt repairs. We saw some sad examples of expensive make-overs which have not been subsequently maintained. A good fault-reporting system is essential. We welcome the BTP scheme to get local people to “adopt” a station and keep an eye on it. Performance standards must be set for response-times eg maximum hours within which a damaged phone will be repaired. Lying behind the maintenance of standards is good design for buildings and equipment.

(b) Sanctions

10. At present none seem to operate. We recall OPRAF (now defunct) telling us the delivery of promises from TOCs about maintenance was something they would spot check. The SRA (also now defunct) seemed to be similarly minded. Three possible concurrent approaches are possible:

- Performance requirements, set by DfT as franchising authority, on maintenance of critical items, with penalties on the TOC if spot checks or the public report failures;
- Conditions imposed by or required of Network Rail as landlords when letting stations to TOCs. We were underwhelmed by what we saw about the present workings of this relationship. There is obscurity about who is responsible for which land and buildings around stations eg disused station buildings, fenced off scraps of land. This leads to disputes over cleaning track litter and no doubt other things;
- Higher priority and tighter management control within TOCs themselves. We were surprised at some of the slack supervision we observed of contracted out services.

Q4. *Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?*

11. No, as regards the overground railway. There is opaqueness over responsibilities as between TOCs, Network Rail and the BTP and confusion among the public. When it comes to knowing to whom to report what, many people simply give up. Not only is there no policy of locating standard information on this and other topics in standard appropriate places and immediately recognisable format, but too often there is no information. LT has useful lessons to teach other operators about all of this.

12. For reporting police matters, we were glad that our Rail Crimewatch suggestion was taken up by BTP some years ago. However initial publicity needs to be refreshed and the number (unfortunately rather long) prominently displayed in more places including the backs of tickets. We note that the Home Office is piloting a “Single Non-Emergency Number” scheme similar to that of BTP, but with a much simpler number. We understand BTP are planning to keep their number and develop it as a more effective single contact point for the public

13. The Committee might like to ask DfT, Network Rail and BTP for their views on this topic and why standard guidance on reporting is not used across the rail system.

Q 7. *Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?*

14. The short answer is no. It has long been DfT practice to sideline personal security issues on railways as entirely the province of the small unit dealing with disabled access and social inclusion. Prior to the critical report by the PAC about public expenditure vis a vis strategy on stations, there seems to have been no allocation of responsibility for the topic anywhere within the many branches of Railway Directorate. A related issue is who has an overview of research needs—DfT? (and if so where?) RSSB? RPC (now PassengerFocus)?

15. The Committee might like to ask why this has been so and where DfT see the strategic responsibility for overseeing the provision of a secure railway to lie.

16. A second issue involving DfT is the failure of successive railway Bills to clarify the statutory definition of health and safety (which over the years has grown incrementally like a coral reef) so as to make explicit that it now includes responsibility for personal security between one passenger and another as well as between staff and passengers. This gap in the legislation has left the topic in limbo.

17. The Committee might like to ask the DfT to explain why they think this statutory gap is acceptable, and their view of its implications for standard setting, information collection, enforcement and accountability.

ADDITIONAL ASPECTS

18. We conclude with three general points touched on in earlier paragraphs.

19. Action by ATOC: We have regularly pressed ATOC to translate their lip-service to a “National Rail Product” into effective action to secure standard signage, pictograms, the LTU standard of content design and location of information boards, identical Help Points etc across the system to help travellers feel more confident and be less vulnerable. Recently there has been added the embarrassment of users faced with each TOC’s individual choice of baffling mechanisms for on-train disabled toilets; and their different designs of high tech fare machines, each of which must be carefully studied before use.

ATOC might be asked why they have given so little leadership on this.

20. Network Rail: Network Rail is a hidden and largely unaccountable hand in the present outcomes.

The Committee might explore how their responsibilities and obligations as owners and landlords of stations might be clarified.

21. Joint action with local authorities and private developers: It seemed to us regrettable that just as schemes were getting off the ground, the SRA when its budget was cut pulled the rug out from under the financing of Rail Passenger Partnerships. This seemed an effective instrument for achieving station betterment through partnerships between TOCs, LAs, community groups and private enterprise—the sort of thing the PAC have suggested.

The Committee might ask DfT their intentions about this scheme.

APPENDIX 11

Memorandum submitted by the National Audit Office

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. The Comptroller and Auditor General reported on maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations in July 2005. The report examined whether rail passengers were satisfied with station facilities and services and whether station requirements were being met, the barriers to station improvement and what was being done to overcome them.¹⁴ On the basis of that report the Committee of Public Accounts took evidence from the Department for Transport, the Strategic Rail Authority, Network Rail, the Office of Rail Regulation and the Association of Train Operating Companies and issued its own report on Britain's railway stations in February 2006.¹⁵

2. This memorandum by the National Audit Office sets out the findings from these reports that concern passenger safety in railway stations and has been prepared with a view to assisting the Transport Committee in its consideration of this subject.

SUMMARY

- Many passengers do not feel safe at railway stations (paragraphs 3 to 7).
- Roles and responsibilities at stations are set out in a variety of contractual agreements. The Committee of Public Accounts concluded that the number of bodies involved in maintaining and improving stations has led to a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership and strategic focus (paragraphs 8 to 11).
- The security requirements at stations set out in franchise agreements are limited to ensuring there is adequate lighting. In 2003, in its Modern Facilities at Stations programme the Strategic Rail Authority established specifications for staffed stations that went beyond those set out in franchise agreements but with adoption dependent on funding. The specifications are highest for medium and large staffed stations. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and Help Points are not included in the specifications for small stations (paragraphs 12 to 16).
- National schemes promote good practice in station security, but few Train Operating Companies are involved and the schemes have had little impact (paragraphs 17 and 18).

MANY PASSENGERS DO NOT FEEL SAFE AT RAILWAY STATIONS

3. Our analysis of the Spring 2004 National Passenger Survey data on station facilities and services showed that passengers are most satisfied with the provision of passenger information, the assistance they receive from station staff, and connections with other forms of public transport. (The most recent National Passenger Survey, carried out in Autumn 2005, confirmed these findings). However, one of the areas where levels of satisfaction are lower is passengers' feelings of personal security while at stations. As with other areas, passenger satisfaction in this area varies greatly between categories of station (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1

PASSENGER SATISFACTION WITH PERSONAL SECURITY WHILST USING STATIONS

<i>Per cent fairly or very satisfied (National Passenger Survey Spring 2004)</i>						
<i>All stations</i>	<i>National hub</i>	<i>Regional hub</i>	<i>Important feeder</i>	<i>Medium staffed</i>	<i>Small staffed</i>	<i>Small unstaffed</i>
55	62	61	53	46	49	38

4. Train Operating Companies have made considerable investments in CCTV surveillance in recent years. A third of stations are now equipped with such systems. The results of the National Passenger Survey show that there has been some improvement in the number of passengers feeling safer (54% in autumn 2002, and 59% in autumn 2005). In the autumn 2005 National Passenger Survey, furthermore, 25% of passengers said that they had had cause to worry about their personal safety on the railway in the preceding six months. More than half of these cited anti-social behaviour by other passengers at stations, 43% a lack of station staff, 37% fear of terrorism and 18% poor station lighting as reasons for their concerns about personal safety.

¹⁴ *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC132 of Session 2005–06.

¹⁵ Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-second Report of Session 2005–06, *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*, HC 535.

5. The reliability of crime figures recorded by the British Transport Police depends on victims reporting offences to the police. The total number of notifiable offences recorded by the British Transport Police on the railways rose by 17% (to 65,051) between 2000–01 and 2003–04. This included a 37% increase in assaults on railway staff, and increases of 25% each in violent crimes and in public disorder and criminal damage. The Strategic Rail Authority pointed out that some of the increase can be attributed to the increase in the number of passengers using the network: passenger journeys increased by six% between 2000–01 and 2003–04. Some of this increase can also be attributed to a change in the National Crime Recording Standard in April 2002, which resulted in more offences being recorded in official figures.

6. Research by Crime Concern¹⁶ for the Department in 1996 and 2002 suggested that measures to improve personal safety would result in 11% more journeys by public transport, including 15% more by train and Underground. Much of the increase would occur outside peak hours. The research also found that the presence of staff, good lighting and CCTV surveillance at stations were the three most important factors reassuring passengers about their personal safety when they waited for a train. Passengers feel more secure at large stations, which are staffed, than at small stations unstaffed for much or all of the day, many of which do not have CCTV security systems. Passengers feel most unsafe after dark, particularly at unstaffed stations.

7. In the Rail Safety and Standards Board's 2003–04 safety plan, the industry set itself a target to reduce crime against passengers and others on railway property by 7.5% by December 2005. It expected to achieve this through, amongst other activities, improved lighting at stations, more CCTV systems and help points, and the further adoption of best practice accreditation schemes.

Roles and responsibilities at stations are set out in a variety of contractual agreements. The Committee of Public Accounts concluded that the number of bodies involved in maintaining and improving stations has led to a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership and strategic focus.

8. Britain's 2,507 railway stations¹⁷ vary greatly in size. Each of the 28 largest stations is used on average by 90,000 passengers a day, and each of the 1,200 small unstaffed stations by just 100 passengers. Seventy% of all rail journeys are made from the busiest 10% of stations. Network Rail owns most stations and is responsible for their structural repair and renewal. It also operates and manages 17 large stations, known as managed stations. It leases the remainder, known as franchised stations, to 22 Train Operating Companies responsible for station maintenance, cleaning and operations. These Train Operating Companies pay rent (including regulated charges) to Network Rail.

9. The Strategic Rail Authority has had a key role to play in stations, since the government established it in February 2001 to deliver strategic leadership to the railway industry. It inherited from its predecessor, the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, minimum standards, including facilities and services required at franchised stations, monitored Train Operating Companies' compliance with requirements and helped fund stations' operation and improvement. Other public and private sector organisations also play a part. The Strategic Rail Authority was abolished under the Railways Act 2005. In June 2005, the Department for Transport took over its strategic, franchising and station roles in England and Wales and in October 2005 the Scottish Executive took over these roles for Scotland. In April 2005, Network Rail took over its responsibility for monitoring Train Operating Companies' operational performance, while in July 2005 the Office of Rail Regulation took over its monitoring of some consumer protection issues. The Department for Transport, Train Operating Companies acting as Station Facility Owners, Network Rail and the British Transport Police share responsibility for improving security at stations, although primary responsibility rests with the Station Facility Owners.

10. A variety of contractual agreements set out Network Rail's and Train Operating Companies' respective roles and responsibilities, and there are various sources of funding for the maintenance, repair and renewal of stations, involving a complicated flow of taxpayer subsidies together with income from passenger fares and from commercial concessions such as shops and cafe[acute]s at stations. None of the organisations involved collected information about the total amount of public and private sector money spent on stations. We estimated that, in 2003–04, over £420 million was spent on day-to-day maintenance, cleaning and operations of stations, including £370 million by Train Operating Companies at franchised stations, and that Network Rail spent over £100 million renewing station assets including £65 million at franchised stations.

11. The Committee of Public Accounts concluded that the number of bodies involved in maintaining and improving stations has led to a fragmented approach, lacking overall leadership and strategic focus. The Committee recommended that the Department should identify investment priorities across the network, set

¹⁶ Crime Concern is an independent, not-for-profit organisation and registered charity that works with local communities and agencies to reduce crime.

¹⁷ These are stations on the "heavy rail" network excluding heritage lines, London Underground and other metropolitan underground stations.

out a coherent approach for attracting in private funding to help fund improvements, and set out clearly the actions needed to address anticipated capacity pressures, particularly at major stations, over the next 10 years.¹⁸

The security requirements at stations set out in franchise agreements are limited to ensuring there is adequate lighting. In its Modern Facilities at Stations programme, the Strategic Rail Authority established specifications that went beyond those of franchise agreements, but with adoption dependent on funding. The specifications are highest for medium and large staffed stations, with CCTV and Help points not included in the specifications for small stations.

12. There is no single, authoritative definition within the rail industry of what passengers want and need from stations, and what value they place on satisfying them. Research carried out for Railtrack in 1999, and more recently by Network Rail, suggested that passengers' core needs at a station were for the station to be secure and for staff and good quality information to be available.

13. The Strategic Rail Authority, and before it the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, set basic obligations for most franchised stations that largely reflected the facilities that existed at the time of privatisation rather than identified passenger needs. Train Operating Companies have generally complied with them, and Network Rail has reported an improvement in stations' structural condition since privatisation.

14. The security requirements set out in the original franchise agreements were limited to ensuring that there is adequate lighting, switched on throughout the hours of darkness when the station is open. The Strategic Rail Authority reviewed its franchising policy in 2002 and concluded that, while the policy of relying on commercial incentives to encourage Train Operating Companies to improve the quality of passenger rail and station services had achieved a number of successes, overall it had not delivered the outcomes envisaged. The Strategic Rail Authority decided that, from spring 2004, it would more clearly specify station standards, facilities and services in new franchise agreements, setting a higher level of requirements in some respects and new requirements where there had previously been none. The new franchise agreements set out more specific requirements for lighting at stations, but do not include any new security requirements.

15. During the awarding of, and any subsequent revisions to, franchises the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising and later the Strategic Rail Authority encouraged Train Operating Companies to commit themselves in their franchise plans to invest in station improvements. Some franchise plans specified the improved facilities and services that Train Operating Companies would provide at particular stations, while others quantified how much would be spent on them. The most common improvements involved installation of CCTV systems and better passenger information systems.

16. In June 2003, in its Modern Facilities at Stations (MFAS) programme, the Strategic Rail Authority established specifications for facilities at staffed stations. These went beyond those set out in franchise agreements, but the specifications were lower for small stations and their adoption has been dependent on available funding. CCTV and Help points were included in the specifications for medium and larger staffed stations but not for small staffed (and unstaffed) stations. In drawing up its specification over the period 2001 to 2003, the Strategic Rail Authority consulted Train Operating Companies, Passenger Transport Executives, the Office of Rail Regulation, the Scottish Executive and the National Assembly for Wales. But there was limited consultation with passengers and representative rail passenger groups. By March 2005, the SRA had funded Network Rail to complete MFAS improvements at 67 stations. Network Rail had completed designs to upgrade facilities at a further 662 stations, but the SRA did not have funding to proceed with these improvements.

National schemes promote good practice in station security, but few Train Operating Companies are involved and the schemes have had little impact

17. The Department for Transport, the Home Office and the police work with other stakeholders in running two accreditation schemes for station and car park security. Take-up remains low, however, and both schemes have had limited impact:

THE SECURE STATIONS SCHEME

- Since 2002, the Strategic Rail Authority has been committed to encouraging Train Operating Companies to seek accreditation under the Secure Stations scheme, which specifies high standards for crime management. An independent review of the scheme in April 2003 found that one of the main weaknesses of the scheme was lack of support from some Train Operating Companies. The cost of the required regular passenger surveys was also a major deterrent to some Train Operating Companies joining the scheme. The review found that many of the stations had low levels of crime

¹⁸ Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-second Report of Session 2005–06, *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*, HC 535, page 5, paragraph 8.

before accreditation, which was therefore achieved without requiring any significant changes; subsequently crime fell only a little from previous levels. The review also found that there was a low level of awareness of the scheme among passengers, and that it had therefore had a limited impact on passengers' fear of crime. The review's recommendations included targeting the scheme at stations with high levels of crime to improve the scheme's effectiveness, and better marketing and promotion of the scheme.

- In response, the Department has reduced the costs of the scheme by allowing Train Operating Companies to draw upon station-specific results from crime questions in the National Passenger Survey and, in March 2005, by abolishing the accreditation fee and introducing a category of 'working towards accreditation', to encourage take-up of the scheme. As at January 2005, there were 118 accredited stations, a fall of 12% from the 134 accredited stations in October 2002. Since 87 of the largest stations are accredited, however, two-thirds of rail journeys involve passengers starting or finishing their journey at a Secure Station.
- The Department has recently begun research on approaches to reducing crime at stations in high crime locations and the British Transport Police has deployed Police Community Support Officers along with police co-ordinators at the main London terminal stations, Leeds, Birmingham New Street, Manchester Piccadilly and Cardiff Central, which have the highest numbers of crimes. At London Victoria, crime fell by a quarter in the first six weeks of these Officers' deployment.

THE SECURED CAR PARK SCHEME

- An independent review of the Secured Car Park scheme in March 2003 found that crime fell sharply after accreditation in car parks with high levels of crime. Passengers' perceptions of their own security at accredited stations improved, although this was due less to the accreditation itself than to the improvements that were made to gain it, such as lighting, CCTV and a visible security presence. Coverage of station car parks, however, is low; in March 2004, the scheme covered just 125 car parks at stations. In October 2004, the scheme was re-launched under the new name of the Safer Parking Award. The scheme's accreditation criteria now focus more on crime risk management and less on the design of the car park itself. In our January 2005 report on *Reducing Vehicle Crime*¹⁹, we recommended that the Home Office encourage Train Operating Companies to participate in the scheme.

18. The Committee of Public Accounts noted that few train operating companies have joined national schemes to reduce crime and improve personal safety at stations even though research in 1996 and 2002 suggests that introducing additional security measures can increase patronage by up to 11%. The Committee recommended that the Department should work with the Association of Train Operating Companies and British Transport Police to promote national schemes with station operators and passengers and that it should also consider making participation a franchise requirement.²⁰

31 March 2006

APPENDIX 12

Memorandum submitted by the Office of Rail Regulation

1. The Office of Rail Regulation is the independent regulator of the rail industry in Great Britain. We are economic regulator for the national railway. From 1 April 2006 we will be the health and safety regulator for all railways in Great Britain, taking over responsibility from HSE, with HSE Rail staff transferring to ORR.

2. Under Section 3 of the Health and Safety and Work etc. Act 1974 it is the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment (such as, in the case of stations, passengers or other members of the public) are not exposed to risks to their health and safety. Under section 2 of the same Act it is the duty of employers to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of their employees.

3. The police, particularly the British Transport Police, have the key responsibility for addressing criminal activity at stations.

4. However every employer, such as a station operator, has a duty to identify and implement measures needed to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him or under the relevant statutory provisions. These measures follow from a suitable and sufficient assessment of:

- (a) the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at work; and

¹⁹ *Reducing Vehicle Crime*, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC183 of Session 2004–05.

²⁰ Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-second Report of Session 2005–06, *Maintaining and improving Britain's railway stations*, HC 535, page 4, paragraph 3.

- (b) the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with his undertaking.

5. In its capacity as safety regulator, HSE Rail's main focus has been on risk in the railway arising from train crashes. HSE has also engaged extensively with the industry on the safety of employees at stations. For instance in 2005 the London Metro Team Railway Inspectorate Contact Officer (RICO) was involved in a group tackling assaults to staff on Docklands Light Railway. Their efforts have seen noteworthy reductions in rates of incidence of such attacks.

6. As far as personal security of passengers and members of the public from criminal activity is concerned, HSE's general approach has been to defer to the British Transport Police, and an assessment of risks to public personal security is not, for instance, required, when an operator's safety case is assessed. This approach is consistent with the government's Enforcement Concordat under which action by different enforcing authorities is coordinated.

7. In our new role we will be developing a strategy for safety regulation of the railway. This will build on the work already done by HSE Rail, based on assessment of the risks arising from railway activities, and prioritised in a way, which reflects the scale of the risks. We will continue to assess whether significant risks at stations are being addressed by the industry, for instance through:

- the collection by the industry of appropriate data, its analysis and use,* commissioning by it of further research where this is needed,
- carrying out by industry companies of suitable risk assessment of stations where there is concern,
- adoption of good practice and taking other necessary action by industry parties.

8. As regulator of the national railway, we are not a funder of the railway. We cannot require and would not be able to support and endorse new standards that specify, for instance, levels of station staffing and facilities unless these were consistent with a robust appraisal of the risks, benefits, costs and savings.

9. We can and will continue to use our powers and influence to facilitate improvements, and help secure better value for money through, for example, ensuring the industry has the contractual tools available to effectively agree and implement enhancements, and to engage all relevant stakeholders (including local authorities and the police), and to facilitate third party investment. It is however for the industry and funders to develop initiatives to meet legitimate public concerns and we welcome such initiatives.

31 March 2006

APPENDIX 13

Memorandum submitted by Merseytravel

INTRODUCTION

1. Merseytravel is the operating name of the Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority (PTA) and the Merseyside Passenger Transport Executive (PTE).

2. The PTA sets the transport policies in the sub region, and the Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) implements those policies. These policies are set out in the Merseyside Local Transport Plan, a statutory document covering the period 2000–01 to 2005–06. The Local Transport Plan 2, due for submission to the Department for Transport on 31 March 2006, will set out the transport priorities for the sub region between 2006–07 and 2010–11.

3. Merseyside's train network is unique. It is virtually 100% separate from the rest of the UK rail network. The Merseyrail Electrics network operates as a self-contained metro railway using an electrified third rail network. In recognition of its uniqueness, the Government gave Merseytravel control of the local train operating franchise, including flexibility over the length of time for the franchise. Merseytravel then let a 25-year concession to Merseyrail Electrics (2002) (known as "Merseyrail") to operate passenger services on the Wirral and Northern lines, which included a requirement to invest in the quality of stations on the network.

4. This paper is submitted to assist the Committee with its inquiry and draws specifically on the experience since Merseytravel took control of responsibility for the concession from the Strategic Rail Authority in July 2003. The SRA's principal responsibilities have since been taken over by the Department for Transport. This move has had an impact on the strength of partnership working between local bodies in order to improve personal security on the railway to a measurable level. Merseytravel and Merseyrail's success has been recognised nationally and that should be disseminated as best practice across the country.

5. If it would assist Members' deliberations further, Merseytravel would be delighted to give oral evidence to the Committee.

CONTEXT

6. Rail has a higher share of the public transport market in Merseyside than other similar areas—this reflects the specific, local purpose of the Merseyrail Network. The rail network plays an important part in Merseyside in terms of providing inclusive access to key employment, residential, leisure and retail destinations.

7. Crime, and the fear of crime is recognised as a major deterrent for people when making the choice to travel by public transport. Nationally, the DfT believe that crime or the fear of crime has a dampening effect on public transport ridership of around 11.5%. Elsewhere in Government, a report by the Social Exclusion Unit into Transport and Social Exclusion identified fear of crime as one of the 5 key factors in increasing “transport poverty”.

8. On Merseyside, in seeking to achieve a “Single integrated transport network, accessible to all”, Merseytravel has had to address these issues of crime to encourage all sectors of society access to transport modes. This is particularly relevant for public transport in some of the most deprived areas of the sub region. For example, all stations on the Merseyside Northern Line from Ormskirk and Kirkby to Kirkdale have got Secure Station Status. Merseytravel believes it a significant achievement that it is in these areas of deprivation that our most prominent achievements have been made.

9. We have sought to share our expertise in this area through membership of the steering group for the ongoing DfT research “Reducing Crime and Fear of Crime at Rail Stations in Socially Excluded or High Crime Areas”.

10. Merseytravel and Merseyrail play a key role in overseeing security on the railways, both on trains and in stations. This investment of time and resources has brought significant results;

- Of the 66 Merseyrail Electrics stations on the network, 27 have been awarded Secure Station status since 2004; 110,895 passengers journeys begin or end at a secure station each day.
- Merseytravel has led the partnership for the “TravelSafe” programme which follows the model of a voluntary sector compact.
- Merseytravel supports the presence on British Transport Police, and has provided for a large team of Community Support Officers dedicated to the rail network and hosts a seconded British Transport Police (BTP) Inspector.
- All of Merseytravel’s stations are staffed from before the first train until after the last train.
- All of the stations have CCTV facilities to evidential standards.
- Merseytravel has also included the comfort of passengers as a key issue for managing the fear of crime on the railways comprehensive information provision and well maintained waiting facilities are examples.

11. In February 2006, the success of Merseyrail’s approach to station security was recognised in the award of the HSBC Rail Business Award for its Personal Security Project.

What are the most effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

12. Merseytravel, with their TravelSafe partners has to date achieved Secure Station Status at 40% of stations on the Merseyrail Network. Crime and the fear of crime has reduced significantly and as a result, passenger figures continue to rise. Since July 2004, the number of assaults on passengers has been reduced by 60%, the number of assaults on staff has been reduced by 10% and incidents of graffiti have reduced by 60%. This achievement is the result of a number of methods set out below.

13. Of those listed, the three that have the most significant impact are: Staffing, CCTV and lighting. The latter two of which are a key element of station design.

- Revenue protection. Ticket gates have been introduced by Merseyrail at the six largest stations on the network as a commitment within the Concession Agreement. This approach has reduced ticket-less travel from approximately 14% to around 3% in just the second year of operation (2004–05) and has been an attractive deterrent for antisocial behaviour.
- Station Design/Standards. Current design of new stations and station refurbishment takes into account security requirements and aims to increase the level of personal security at stations. For instance St Helens Central currently has 5 CCTV cameras which will be increased to 32 when the station refurbishment is complete next year.
All station design is carried with the intention of introducing gating, if not immediately then, at a later date.
- Modern Facilities at Railway Stations (MFAS) Programme. Twenty-one stations in Merseyside have now benefited from the MFAS programme (delivered in partnership with the Train Operating Companies, Strategic Rail Authority and Network Rail), focusing on the provision of real time passenger information and, where appropriate, passenger waiting rooms. All of the stations that were included in the MFAS programme have now been awarded Secure Station Status.

- TravelSafe. Working with partners, Merseytravel's TravelSafe Initiative is designed to combat crime and disorder and perceptions of crime and disorder across all public transport modes in Merseyside. TravelSafe is a cross industry initiative which works towards a safer public transport system for all. The goal of TravelSafe is:

“To work as partners to create a public transport system that offers the opportunity for all members of the community to travel safely and without fear”

TravelSafe follows the principles of a Crime and Disorder Reduction partnership, giving clear lines of responsibility and a multi-organisational strategy. Organisations involved in TravelSafe range from Merseytravel and representatives from the varied advisory panels, the Rail Passengers Council, Merseyside and British Transport Police, Crown Prosecution Service, schools and the Government Office as well as the local authority based Crime and Disorder Reduction partnerships.

As part of TravelSafe, a specialist crime analyst has been recruited to develop the specification, design and implementation of an Incident Reporting System (IRiS) which conforms to the police National Intelligence Model. The IRiS system can identify black spots and make judgements on the effectiveness of measures, such as CCTV, and to identify where the next focus of energy should be. TravelSafe and BTP have also developed an innovative data sharing protocol which allows for a more joined up use of crime data. This excellent cross working has secured prosecutions, the imposition of ASBOs and exclusion of individuals from stations.

An audit of crime is conducted and a strategy produced every three years. Having reciprocal representation on each of the districts Crime and Reduction Partnerships means that public transport crime is included in each of their strategies.

- Community Involvement. Merseytravel in conjunction with Merseyrail and Northern Rail is developing a station adoption programme in line with the Association of Community Rail Partnerships (ACORP) code of practice. The aim is to develop community engagement thus to reduce the level of crime and vandalism around the station and increasing passengers perception of them as safe locations and to encourage the development of new skills such as horticulture and community art.
- British Transport Police. Merseytravel supports the policing of the County's rail network through direct financial support to the BTP. In February 2005, Merseytravel began funding the first Community Support Officers (CSOs) on trains and stations outside London. One year later, the success of the original CSOs led to the recruitment of ten further officers, bringing the total number on the network to sixteen. The CSOs compliment Police Officers by providing highly visible reassurance patrols. They can use a number of powers which include issuing penalty notices for minor offences or detaining a person, for more serious offences, until a police officer can attend and deal with the incident.

The BTP's seconded inspector offers benefits for both organisations; they provide a single point of contact for the wide range of partners involved in community safety and provide a direct link to the current issues and best practice within BTP. Their impact has been measurable including: the authorisation of an Anti-Social Behaviour Dispersal Order (Section 30 Order) being granted for a 6 month period which resulted in a 42% reduction in recorded crime for the period granted, compared to the same period of the previous year.

- Private Contractors. Merseyrail Electrics has also contracted CFS, a private security contractor to support the enforcement work of the BTP and CSOs. CFS work as part of the team providing primarily a CCTV monitoring service from a remote depot that allows real time monitoring on “Hot spot” locations and is backed up by 3 security patrol cars working around the clock and patrol our key risk sites out of normal operational hours. CFS also provide on going reporting and analysis of incident trends.

Are the Minimum Standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough? Are the Requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not, what changes should be made?

14. Merseytravel and Merseyrail Electrics believe that we are well on the way to achieving the minimum standards for safe and secure stations across the network, using the Secure Station Status as the initial measure of achievement.

15. For Merseyrail to have 40% of their network Secure Station-accredited within 18 months took significant time, effort and resources. In cost terms alone, figures are currently averaging between 7k and 10k per station on infrastructure improvements alone. The costs of resources such as management time and security deployment are much more varied between stations and as such are more difficult to quantify.

16. Merseyrail have undoubtedly benefited through having staffed stations when implementing the scheme. However, there is a misconception in the industry that staffed stations are a pre-requisite for achieving the standard. While this is not an issue on the Merseyrail Network, addressing this misnomer may well encourage more applicants.

17. It is clear that measures of security standards, aside from the Secure Station Scheme, are largely agreed at the local level (including via Performance Indicators in the Local Transport Plan). This reduces the potential for comparison in quality of service and the dissemination of best practice across administrative boundaries.

Are the Minimum Standards effectively policed? Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?

18. The principal penalty for Train Operating Companies, such as Merseyrail Electrics, if they do not address anti social behaviour or the fear of anti-social behaviour is inevitably lost ridership and therefore lost revenue. The Secure Stations Scheme is a self- monitoring scheme and evaluation is ongoing and the award can be lost if standards are not met.

19. In Merseyside, CURSER staff monitor facilities at all stations to identify facilities that fall below the required standard, such as a damaged shelter. While the role of the CURSER staff is in relation to the Merseyrail Electrics' concessionary agreement, their monitoring regime provides a degree of oversight which can be used as a tool for monitoring the application of Secure Station Status.

20. Other measures to evaluate security levels include: independent passenger surveys to understand crime as well as the fear of crime; site specific assessments by Merseyrail Electrics and BTP to review measures in place and devise a renewed action plan; design and management assessment including station layout, passenger facilities and staff training/competence.

21. There are presently no national initiatives or implications if transport providers do not set to comply with the requirements of Secure Stations Status.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

22. With staff at each station from before first train until after last, there is always a single point of contact for any passenger to approach for the reporting of security issues. This single point of contact is in addition to on-station help points, a BTP presence and CFS patrols. On Merseyside, the public trust the TravelSafe initiative and are comfortable that the processes in place are sufficient enough that providing they speak to an on-duty officer, regardless of organisation, their incident will be dealt with appropriately and by the most relevant person.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme? Should the scheme be made compulsory?

23. There are presently around 270 stations with Secure Station Status, meaning 10% of all Secure Stations are in the Merseyside sub-region. The very small national take up of the scheme suggests a lack of information and understanding of the measures that can be applied; these may range from small changes to large scale investment. This needs to be addressed at the national level and the scope for learning from others including a strategy for the wider roll out of the standard.

24. 40% of stations on the Merseyrail Network are now accredited under the Secure Station Scheme. Funding prioritisation remains an issue; of those accredited for Secure Station status, 21 were beneficiaries through the MFAS programme. If the scheme were to be made compulsory, it would need to be supported by additional funding that would mean station improvements were progressed without being at the expense of other transport priorities. There is a need for a national position on funding prioritisation for station security, driven by the Government, including leadership at the highest level including large scale improvements in all of Britain's major stations.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passenger's safety in railway and underground stations?

25. Merseytravel and Merseyrail have set out some of the over-riding measures that have led to the success that is being built on in Merseyside. However, the fundamental key to success building on existing knowledge via a strong and focused partnership. A significant level of improvement has been achieved in a relatively short time in reducing security incidents, particularly assaults but the key challenge is now to maintain this success and in particular to manage perception of customers and employees.

26. Merseytravel and Merseyrail's security strategy embeds the concept of zero tolerance to quality of life infringements (anti social behaviour in particular) across the partnership. This has been a significant step change in approach as, previously, resources and initiatives were primarily focused on higher level crimes and on a reactive basis. By reducing the number of lower level issues all aspects of security will improve and with the added benefit of improving customer perception which is at the heart of this challenge.

27. A customer focused plan to improve overall perception of (and continuously strive to improve) on the Merseyrail network is in operation. Managing perception is tackled by maximizing visibility of existing resources and by focusing on those quality of life issues that can be precursors to higher level incidents (eg

feet on seats, smoking and loitering). This is a long term plan to deal with the issues rather than short term measures which have limited effect and become difficult to sustain. The following key long term measures are fundamental:

- Public Education Programmes (“If you see something, say something”).
- Secure stations and safer parking.
- State of the art CCTV.
- Bye Law Enforcement: A legal framework has already been implemented via the law courts to prosecute fare evader/offenders. This will be built on as we now move into a more specific Bye Law enforcement regime. Enforcement of offenders who do not comply with specific railway Bye Laws will continue to gather momentum as we move to a total Zero Tolerance policy.
- Introduction of new operational exercises, based on best practice gained from New York experience, which increase perceived visibility and tackle Quality of Life issues including:
 - Train Order Maintenance Sweeps (TOMS) exercises have now commenced and will take place at high footfall locations to maximize passenger and staff exposure to the process. Their main aim is to show a high profile visible presence to provide passengers and staff with an assurance that the network is safe and secure.
 - Quality of Life teams (dedicated, trained, working with PCSOs and Outreach Workers).

28. The Secure Stations scheme is a key aspect of tackling security incidents and also managing perception of security for passengers, in particular by demonstrating an ongoing commitment to reasonably manage security at station locations. Secure Stations (and indeed Safer Parking) clearly shows that the operator will continue to look at reducing passenger and security related incidents and providing robust, clean and reliable facilities for passenger use.

Is the Government’s approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

29. The approach has been effective for Merseyrail although this success is in response to a number of factors detailed above. It is important that the government’s approach continues to find ways to promote environments for success as has been experienced on Merseyside.

31 March 2006

APPENDIX 14

Memorandum submitted by Arriva

1. ARRIVA

Arriva is one of the leading transport services organisations in Europe. With over 30,000 employees, we operate buses and trains in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Germany and buses in Spain, Portugal and Italy.

In the United Kingdom, Arriva operates the Arriva Trains Wales franchise and has previously operated train franchises in the North of England, including Merseyside. Arriva is shortlisted for the South West Trains franchise bid.

We are pleased to submit this report to the Committee’s enquiry into passenger safety at stations. We will be happy to clarify any points that will assist the Committee with its enquiry.

2. ATOC

Arriva supports the submission provided by the Association of Train Operating Companies to this investigation. In the remainder of this report, we offer observations from our own experience.

3. ARRIVA TRAINS WALES

Since the start of our Arriva Trains Wales (ATW) franchise on 7 December 2003 much has been invested in improving physical and perception of security on trains and at stations.

ATW manages its security work using an overarching strategy referred internally as the 5 “E”s—being:

- Evaluation (data collection and analysis).
- Education (both staff and the community).
- Enforcement (ensuring crime is dedicated and culprits apprehended).

- Enabling (providing resources and policies).
- Engineering (physical and design changes to reduce the problem).

4. EVALUATION

ATW has improved its collection of data from staff by bringing roadshows to depots and mess rooms to emphasise the importance of timely and accurate reporting and with the help of staff redesigning the reporting forms and processes to enable them to report more easily. We have also established improved data exchange processes with the British Transport Police (BTP) and Network Rail to improve intelligence gathering.

5. EDUCATION

We have initiated a staff newsletter to improve communication on assaults and will soon be commencing a schools competition to highlight to children the importance of safety on trains and at stations.

We have also worked with the BTP to improve knowledge of the impact of staff assaults with the Crown Prosecution service.

ATW's Adopt a Station programme now covers 110 stations across its network. Station adopters comprise of individuals, groups and voluntary organisations and no financial commitment is required. Adopters may do as little as complete a weekly survey form that includes reporting on issues such as graffiti and vandalism, which further facilitates ATW's ability to take the necessary remedial action to ensure anti-social behaviour is quickly tackled and discouraged. Adopt a Station has successfully reduced anti-social behaviour at unstaffed stations such as Gowerton where the adoption by the local community has led to a substantial reduction in vandalism and where the car park is now safe to use.

Another good example where further community involvement has been achieved is at Mountain Ash in the South Wales valleys. Mountain Ash has suffered in the past from vandalism and anti-social behaviour caused by local teenagers. As part of ATW's "Adopt a Station" programme, Mountain Ash has been adopted by the local secondary school and a partnership has been put together involving the school, a feeder primary school, ATW, British Transport Police and a private sponsor.

As well as involvement of ATW and BTP in school assemblies and research by the school's Homework Club into the station's past and present, a "Keystart Project" was also set up which has involved school pupils in clearing vegetation and improving the station's physical appearance to make it appear less threatening.

6. ENFORCEMENT

Recently, we have jointly funded with the BTP and the Welsh Assembly Government the recruitment of 21 Police Community Support (PCSOs) officers to work closely with the communities we serve to improve crime detection and prevention and to help staff and passengers feel more safe and secure as they travel around our network. We see this very much as enhancing the work done to date on improving security, helping us to target known 'hot spots' and implement action plans to bring about clear improvements.

Making people feel more secure at stations will never be just about the further extension of technology and the targeted deployment of enforcement officers. Recognising this, ATW has sought to engage with the communities it serves as part of a holistic approach to station security and safety.

Working with the BTP and to support the new PCSO officers new police stations will be opening at Pontypridd and Machynellth with ATW providing the accommodation for free.

In addition to the PCSOs ATW also fund 12 security guards on 2 of the more troublesome valley branch lines to improve actual and the perception of security for staff and passengers. These security guards have been successful in supporting staff and in moving problems off the railway. Security guards have now also been employed at a number of key stations for Friday and Saturday nights.

ATW have also supplied all front line staff with DNA swab kits to help assist in the detection of anti-social behaviour.

7. ENABLING

A key dimension in respect of issues around safety and security at stations is the risks involved for railway staff themselves. During 2005 there were 143 reported physical and verbal assaults on ATW staff, as against just three incidents of reported assaults on passengers. Assaults on staff have been an increasing trend in recent years and ATW have established an Assaults Reduction Team (ART) with staff volunteers and their own budget to reduce this problem and to reverse the trend.

Involvement of railway staff, who are represented on the ART, has played a critical role in the overall process of tackling the problem. Staff suggestions have led to improving appropriate training and briefing at induction and being made better aware of appropriate channels to come forward with information and suggestions

ATW have also worked with managers and staff to extend its Chain of Care services to staff affected by assaults to enable them to feel more supported in the workplace on their return.

Perhaps the most important development occurred in February 2006 when ATW employed a dedicated Security Manager. A senior ex-policeman, he is already having success in coordinating ATW's security efforts both internally and with third parties and is driving forward ATW's 5 E's strategy.

8. ENGINEERING

A jointly funded scheme with the Welsh Assembly Government has seen the extension of CCTV and Help Points to 13 stations in North Wales. In addition, we have commenced the installation of on-train CCTV across our train fleet which will be completed for spring 2007.

We have commenced trial with a "Mosquito" device at Treorchy station. This emits a high frequency signal after 7 pm (audible to only those below 21 years of age) in the shelter area (where drug dealing and other antisocial behaviour has been a persistent problem) to deter loitering. This is proving extremely successful and we intend to trial a further device at another station.

As well as ATW funding a number of station lighting improvements we are working with Network Rail to renew some old brick built shelters with modern shelters that while providing cover present a more open aspect to reduce issues of hiding and criminal activity.

9. CONCLUSION

If the Committee would wish to have further information about any of these initiatives or would wish to inspect any of them, we will be happy to make the necessary arrangements.

3 April 2006

APPENDIX 15

Memorandum submitted by the City of London Corporation's City Remembrancer's Office

BACKGROUND

1. The City of London's function as the world's leading international financial and business centre is heavily dependent upon having an efficient and attractive transport system to move large numbers of people daily. Rail access is vitally important as it is estimated that 82% of the 312,000 commuters who come to work in the City each day travel by train or underground²¹. Jobs in the City attract people who live in outer London and beyond, with approximately 30% of work trips to the City originating outside greater London²². For those people, rail is the only public transport option, apart from a limited number of commuter coaches. This high dependency on rail means that all issues affecting rail travel to, and within, London are of importance to the City of London Corporation.

2. A key objective of the City's Community Strategy²³ is to maximise the safety of all modes of transport, including railway stations, and to work in partnership with the British Transport Police (BTP) and transport operators to achieve improvements where necessary. Personal safety is important at all stations but is a particularly critical issue at many of the suburban and rural stations used by City commuters on their journeys to and from work. The City's Good Transport Group (a forum of businesses, residents and transport operators) has stressed the importance of improving actual and perceived safety at these stations, particularly for workers who may start out early in the morning or return home after dark when many stations are unstaffed. The City has supported bids for improving safety at suburban stations through its membership of the Thames Gateway Partnership.

3. This submission has been drafted in conjunction with the City's railway advisers, Transport Interchange Consultants Ltd (TIC), who have developed a Station Investment Priority System to assist with prioritising the implementation of security measures. As the majority of TIC's relevant experience has been on the smaller, suburban stations on the railway system, the thrust of this response is associated with this type of station. Much of its substance appears, however, equally applicable to many of the stations on the Tube and other railway systems.

²¹ 2001 Census of Population, Office of National Statistics.

²² *ibid.*

²³ The City Together: A Vision for a World Class City.

SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS

- It is necessary to differentiate between actual and perceived threat.
- A Priority Investment System is required to determine how investment in security systems can be implemented in the most cost effective manner.
- CCTV is frequently not efficiently used at present.
- CCTV is best controlled from central points.
- Investment in retail, catering and commercial facilities at and adjacent to stations can increase their use and reduces the cost to the railways of longer staff hours.
- At the smaller and unmanned stations, platform furniture and shelters should be grouped around platform entrances.
- Abandoned, vandalised and derelict structures are seen as threatening and should therefore be removed.
- Where platforms and the serving road are at different levels, safety can be improved by waiting for the train, in purpose built shelters on the street pavement.
- Stations should be better integrated with their hinterland by upgrading the feeder footpath systems and making them more secure.
- Car parks and cycle shelters should be made secure.
- The industry needs to accept that investment in security measures yield real benefits and such benefits need to be better understood.
- In principle, target standards are probably satisfactory. In some areas, however, due to shortage of funds and other factors, it appears that little is being achieved in reaching such standards.
- Due to a lack of investment in systems and police resources there is insufficient policing in many areas.
- The passenger should be able to contact the appropriate organisation from the platform in a crisis.
- A shortage of funds and lack of an effective priority system means that not enough is being done in the creation of secure stations.
- To achieve cost effective investment, there needs to be greater co-ordination between railways and local government.

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

What are the most cost effective methods of making railway and underground stations safer for passengers?

4. Many suburban and rural stations are lonely places, particularly after dark. However, it is important to differentiate between the passenger's perception of danger and the actual real risk of assault or theft. Passenger surveys indicate that passengers feel more secure when they are aware of the full range of operational safety systems and when a member of staff is present. The Station Investment Priority System (SIPS) indicates that the most cost effective measures are electronic security measures and additional staff. The aim must be to give staff the ability to effectively ensure that the station is a safer place, thus they must be able to control and utilise the station security systems in the most efficient manner.

5. Currently many CCTV systems are not monitored and rarely link to the comprehensive town centre systems operated by so many local authorities. This view is echoed by the recent Guidance Note on CCTV²⁴, which quoted from a recent report of the London Assembly's Transport Committee—*"We were disappointed to learn that CCTV systems are often not monitored and do not connect to the comprehensive systems now operated by local authorities. Often the technology does not permit them to work together and glaring holes are left in the security net. We strongly recommend that the rail operators and local councils coordinate their activities more effectively in future"*²⁵.

6. Benefits can be derived from CCTV systems being tied into a comprehensive monitoring network which also includes the provision, Public Address (PA), Help Points (HP) and Computer Information Systems (CIS) at each station. In the longer term, the network would ideally be controlled from one or two central points. In the shorter term, however, there would be merit in 4 or 5 station units being set up, with control of other stations from one of these. This level, whilst quite expensive operationally does allow for a measure of local control. The combined use of CCTV and PA systems by the operative is considered the most effective way of deterring crime and vandalism. Where this approach is used on some stations in south London, it allows the operative to "talk" to mostly young people to deter antisocial behaviour before it occurs. This sense of a controlling presence gives other passengers a feeling of security. If "the controller"

²⁴ ATOC/BTP/Network Rail Guidance Note—'CCTV for Stations—Functional, Technical and Operational Requirements.' Version 1—Issued March 2006.

²⁵ "Crime and Safety at London's Suburban Railway Stations", Transport Committee of the Greater London Assembly, Greater London Authority, January 2006.

can also be identified and is available on the Help Point system, this again inspires confidence in the security system. Such “key” or control stations can also be the recipients of the “focus facilities”, which are discussed further below.

7. Focus facilities are directed at increasing activity at the station. This can be done by a number of methods in creating a “focus station”. In the first instance, the purpose is simply to increase the number of passengers using the system and being around or on the platform. The broader aspect of a focus station is the siting of activities adjacent to the station, such as newsagents, catering activities, small food stores, dry-cleaners, flower shops and a series of facilities which appeal and are useful to the commuter, both male and female. This could also include taxi companies, medical centres, dentists and children’s crèches/nursery schools. This last group offers additional facilities to the commuter, so increasing passenger use. They also appeal to people not using the trains, thus generating more activity around the station.

8. If it is possible to attract additional activities, it could generate commercial pressures for the operators of these services to keep such facilities open whilst passengers are using the station. It would therefore be possible to have staff around at little additional cost to the railway. In such situations, the railway could consider the possible franchising out of ticket sales to the company running the catering facilities or the newsagents or any one of the activities already mentioned. In some cases organisations such as supermarkets or local hotel chains have bought up old goods yards adjacent to stations and it is possible to liaise with such organisations, with a view to increasing facilities for commuters.

9. At its simplest level, which is that appropriate to many of the stations on the railway network, it is suggested that stations should provide integrated booking, waiting and catering facilities perhaps with minimal retail sales. If toilets are to be provided, they should lead off the central area. Clearly visible within this central waiting area should be the various safety systems to which we have referred. Such a facility should remain open and staffed whilst the station is open and there should be clear arrival and departure information that encourages waiting at night to take place in this area. Advice on the PA system should allow time for passengers to move out to either the adjacent platform or to cross to the opposite platform. It is preferable to group the platform facilities around the entrance to the platform, particularly at the smaller and frequently unstaffed stations. This leads to a sense of togetherness and thus security, especially during the night. This area should be particularly well lit and contain the various safety and information features which we recommend at all stations. All shelters should principally be constructed of see through materials.

10. Any form of dereliction, unnecessary and threatening buildings and vandalism immediately create a feeling of danger. Wherever feasible, these should be removed as soon as possible and the platform facilities made as simple and elegant as possible. Good design is a necessary part in the creation of a feeling of security.

11. Many station platforms are either above or below the adjacent road network. Such platforms are often out of sight of the road and the neighbouring properties and are thus particularly threatening at night. This acts as a deterrent for many people, especially women, who will not venture near such stations at night, particularly if the platform has a single entrance at one end. In such cases, if the pavement is wide enough, an “Interchange Lounge” (IL) could be incorporated, which can be located on the main road pavement next to the station entrance(s). This can be for either rail passengers or bus and rail passengers, if there is an adjacent bus stop. The IL is equipped with all the necessary Security and Information systems. Announcements are scheduled to allow time to access the appropriate platform, and the ramp and platform lights are turned up a few minutes before the train arrival time.

12. Better integration of the station into its hinterland, can also improve the safety of walk in passengers. This is best achieved by resurfacing footpaths, cutting back overhanging and threatening undergrowth, providing lighting and if considered necessary, CCTV cameras. Where main walk in routes cross well-used roads, adequate pedestrian facilities should be provided. The concept of tying the station into its hinterland and better involving the local users will increase activity at the station. Reduction of walk in times and improved safety on the walk in route can have as big an impact on patronage as increasing train frequency. Involvement of the local user group in the operation and upgrade of the station also improves the relationship with the local community. It may be the case that if basic designs, such as murals, can be undertaken by local schoolchildren, a sense of local ownership is established, which reduces vandalism considerably. As vandalism is perceived as threatening, this reduction also improves safety, or at least the sense of safety.

13. Finally, it is important to make all parking, both for cars and cycles, secure. Too many stations have available but apparently under-utilised car and cycle parking spaces. Further enquiry yields the reply that cars or bikes are unsafe at that location. However, if the park has the full security measures installed and is registered as secure, car parking and cycle storage is usually taken up.

14. To ensure the use of “the most cost effective methods” requires that there be a system to demonstrate that one investment is more cost effective than another. This develops a Priority Rating (PR) for each measure by combining a social impact factor and an economic factor, which, in turn, is dependent on station flow, elasticity of the particular measure and its cost. The system develops a PR for each investment measure, so allowing a relative priority to be established.

15. The gains from investment in improved security measures are referred to in the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH). There is, however, still some scepticism over the results, as it is difficult to quantify the actual financial and social gains, which such individual investment measures do generate. Hence the relationships need to be more carefully researched in order that government, railway operators and local authorities accept the results. As well as increasing patronage, improved security can act to reduce vandalism and thus the cost of repair. It also has the effect of reducing turnover of station staff. Many booking clerks have been assaulted and the fear of coming to work at a vandalised station is substantial and stressful. It would be preferable if the assessment of investment benefits could include the reduced repair costs and the effect of the improved working conditions for staff.

16. It is stressed that for any investment to be made on a cost effective basis, there must be adequate funding, investments must be sensibly prioritised and all the interested parties must work together for the entire period of development and implementation.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure environment high enough . . . ?

17. On paper the standards are sufficient. There is, however, a shortage of funds and there seems to be no logic in the order in which existing funds are made. Whilst the standards may be sufficient, therefore, little is actually being achieved in some areas, resulting in standards not being met. As noted in response to the first question, a relatively simple system for prioritising investments at stations has been developed and it is suggested that this or any other appropriate system be adopted in an attempt to prioritise investment within and between stations on a logical basis.

Are the minimum standards effectively policed . . . ?

18. Minimum standards are arguably not effectively policed, as there is not yet sufficient investment in staffing at stations, electronic security and information systems, station infrastructure or the BTP. If the approach to prioritise investment outlined above can be implemented, then the travelling public might begin to perceive that railway stations are becoming safer.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others who is responsible for the safety of passengers in stations?

19. It is considered that the passenger is unconcerned about who is responsible for security. What is arguably more important however is the knowledge of how to contact the organisation, which is responsible at the time of an emergency. They also need to know who to contact when they need to follow up on any particular issue. All stations require clearly indicated Help Points and beside the Help Point, a clear set of contact numbers indicating the number to be contacted for information and in an emergency.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme. Should the scheme be made compulsory?

20. There are not enough funds and no priority system. Hence those involved in the upgrade process are frequently overwhelmed and very little is achieved. Until there is a logical process for ranking investment, and funding is made available, little will continue to be achieved. It is suggested that until sufficient funds are made available, the scheme should not be made compulsory.

21. A summary of the main conclusions are included in the Annex.

March 2006

Annex

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

- (i) A useful factor in improving the future safety of passengers and the reduction in their perception of fear is by the integration of stations with a range of catering, retail and commercial activities which increase activity in and around the station area and thereby result in longer manning hours at little cost to the railway. Wherever this is considered to be feasible, the railway and the local authority should work together to achieve this goal.
- (ii) Electronic security systems should be installed at all stations and run from central control points but integrated with local authority systems.
- (iii) Stations should be better integrated into their hinterland by upgrading lighting, opening up new pedestrian links, clearing undergrowth, providing CCTV surveillance and better defining pedestrian crossings on the main feeder walk in routes.
- (iv) All threatening structures, dereliction and vandalism should be removed.
- (v) At smaller and unmanned 'stations, shelters and seats, information and security infrastructure should, whenever feasible, be grouped around the platform entrance/exit, which should be well lit. This provides a focus for waiting passengers, particularly at night.

- (vi) Where platforms are well below or above the local main road and are thus hidden from surrounding properties, it is advised, if feasible, that waiting for trains should take place in purpose built Interchange Lounges at pavement level.
- (vii) Car parks and cycle storage should be made secure.
- (viii) Local user and amenity groups should become involved and local schools could be asked to play a role in designing murals on station approaches.
- (ix) Investment must be formally prioritised.
- (x) Further development is required to understand the quantifiable benefits of investment in security measures. The railway industry and government should adopt the output of this work.
- (xi) The railway industry and local government should work closely together to efficiently implement the security measures in a systematic and prioritised fashion.
- (xii) Sufficient funds need to be available to allow the industry to better meet the existing security standards.

APPENDIX 16

Memorandum submitted by the Mayor of London

SUMMARY

1. Investment in personal safety and security on London's transport network by the Mayor and Transport for London (TfL) has helped create a safer and more secure environment for both passengers and staff. This has been particularly effective on the networks directly controlled by TfL and has helped create a low crime environment which is effectively policed by uniformed staff focussed on the transport network.

2. It is disappointing that the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) are dragging their heels in this area, relying on Transport for London to fund the safety improvements that their passengers require. For example, in 2005-06 TfL contributed to 93% of the total capital investment on infrastructure improvements such as CCTV and help points on the National Rail network. In addition, over the last 18 months TfL has invested over £3 million in enhanced visible policing on the Silverlink network. It is essential that the TOCs take responsibility for the safety of their passengers and provide the necessary resources to deliver the passenger safety measures required.

3. The Mayor and TfL believe that a compulsory standard should be introduced to govern security issues on the rail network and this should replace the current Secure Stations Scheme. Consideration should also be given to integrating this standard with current Transec regulations and the extension of these standards where appropriate to other parts of the transport network such as buses and bus stations. The transport industry will need to be consulted fully on the development of the standards. They would need to take into account the impact of costs on the transport industry and should allow for appropriate local discretion. The emphasis should be on self-assurance/audit, i.e. the operator manages the risk.

4. While the current requirements of the Secure Stations Scheme are not fully appropriate, the scheme provides a useful building block to develop a more appropriate and compulsory standard that will deliver a safer transport system for passengers and staff.

BACKGROUND

5. The Mayor and Transport for London (TfL) have a strategic interest in security on the whole of London's transport network, and a direct operational role in running the London Underground (LU) and Docklands Light Railway (DLR). In addition, from November 2007 TfL will take over responsibility for the North London Railway (NLR), and the Mayor may give instructions or guidance to the Franchising Director in relation to the provision of railway services in Greater London.

6. The Mayor and TfL have actively invested in policing London's transport system and currently pay for over 2,000 uniformed police officers with specific responsibilities for patrolling TfL systems. This investment in visible policing has been supported by further security investment in infrastructure such as CCTV and help points. Working closely with police partners, TfL transport services are places where passengers and staff are both reasonably secure and also perceive themselves to be secure. For example in 2004-05 there was less than one robbery a day on the entire LU system, a system which carries over 3 million passengers a day.

7. In addition, TfL has invested significantly in the national rail network even though it does not have direct responsibility for this. Over the last 18 months TfL has invested over £3m in enhanced visible policing on the Silverlink network and over the past two years £20m in infrastructure improvements such as CCTV and help points on the overground network as a whole, in order to help address security concerns.

What are the most effective methods of making railway and Underground stations safer for passengers?

8. Clear strategic responsibility for safety and security issues on a transport network is a pre-requisite to effective delivery of a safe system for passengers and staff. The Mayor and TfL's role over much of London's transport network has helped deliver consistent safety and security measures that have enhanced safety and security on the network. This ensures delivery of a single and coherent investment programme for the network, which is a situation that has not previously been in place on the overground network, other than for specific investment issues driven by TfL London Rail.

9. TfL consider (drawing on its experience of on LU/DLR) that available and visible staff and uniformed police officers are a key factor in positively influencing the perception of safety and security. In addition, the implementation of integrated security systems including Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles help in creating a feeling of a controlled and managed environment. TfL implements these principles wherever appropriate on its rail networks, including:

- highly visible staff deployed in a manner appropriate to the transport system;
- maintaining low levels of ticketless travel;
- enforcement of byelaws and railway legislation;
- clearly defined delineation between public and semi- public space;
- clear signage;
- passenger Help Points on every platform and at every entrance—this is important to enable urgent/emergency contact with a staff member who can take action required;
- 24/7 CCTV linked to a central control;
- CCTV to Home Office/ATOC CCTV guideline standard;
- on train CCTV;
- good lighting levels;
- clear lines of sight on platforms;
- minimising areas of concealment (people and objects);
- mirrors to see around corners;
- clean stations and trains;
- improved, passenger friendly waiting accommodation;
- removing graffiti as quickly as possible; and
- working in partnership with a responsive and accountable police force.

10. These principles are supported by actively working with the criminal justice agencies to effectively deal with the perpetrators of crime and disorder, full engagement with local boroughs, targeted deployment of police resources and effective use of anti social behaviour orders which will all contribute to making the network more secure for passengers.

11. TfL/LU also operates a very successful Crime Reduction Partnership Unit with the British Transport Police (BTP) who implement a problem solving approach to crime and disorder issues on the network, undertake specific crime reduction projects on the network and liaise closely with local Crime and Disorder partnerships, staff, passengers and the local community.

Are the minimum standards to provide a safe and secure station environment high enough?

12. There are no overarching minimum standards for the transport network in this area and this is a situation that should be rectified. The Secure Stations Scheme is voluntary and should be considered as being a building block for any future compulsory standard rather than meeting the need in this area.

13. There are minimum requirements laid down by DfT Transport Security Division (Transec) for preventative security measures (counter-terrorism) and a number of standards developed by particular parts of the industry. For example, LU has well developed standards built into their design specifications for stations.

14. The Mayor and TfL believe that a compulsory standard should be introduced to govern safety and security issues on the rail network and this should replace the current Secure Stations Scheme. Consideration should also be given to integrating this standard with current Transec regulations and the extension of these standards where appropriate to other parts of the transport network such as buses and bus stations. This standard should cover the types of issues outlined in paragraph nine of our submission above.

Are the requirements sufficiently clear and specific to be effective? If not what changes should be made?

15. As outlined in paragraph 12 above, current requirements are voluntary. A compulsory standard should be introduced to govern safety and security issues on the rail network, which will also need to be clearly communicated.

16. However, communication from the DfT in relation to the Secure Station Scheme and related safety and security issues has improved noticeably over the past few years.

Are the minimum standards effectively policed?

17. TfL considers that the limited minimum standards that are in place are not effectively policed.

Are the penalties for failing to provide a secure station environment sufficiently severe?

18. Given that the Secure Station Scheme is voluntary and is not included as a contractual requirement in many rail franchises there are no consequent direct penalties. In addition, the concept of a 'secure station environment' is not specifically defined in terms that can be applied across the network.

19. However, it would be possible to develop a contractual model that deals with this issue. For the new DLR franchise there is a requirement for the passenger perception of safety and security score to be above a set target or the franchisee is financially penalised.

20. In addition, TfL London Rail, as part of the NLR concession, aims to include an enhanced standard of safety and security incorporating the principles outlined in paragraph nine above.

Is it sufficiently clear to passengers and others whom is responsible for the safety of passengers in railway and underground stations?

21. On the DLR and London Underground, the answer is yes. This results from a combination of the corporate image through the LUL/DLR logo, station design and signage. Where there is clear ownership of a station there is little doubt who is responsible.

22. However, there is some confusion on the overground network due to the number of train operating companies (TOCs) involved and the lack of clarity for the public of the ownership of some rail stations. Clear strategic responsibility for safety and security issues on a transport network is a pre-requisite to effective delivery of a safe system for passengers and staff. TfL is well placed to provide this within London and the current DfT consultation published on the 9 March will look at a change in responsibilities for London's rail network. This consultation requests views on extending the Mayor's powers on specific rail services that run beyond the London boundary, the scope of those powers, and the appropriate governance arrangements. This proposal would allow the development of clear lines of responsibility for policing and personal safety and security on the overground network. Whilst the responsibility (in legal terms) for the personal safety and security of passengers on any franchise that TfL may control will rest with the concession operator, i.e. the TOC chosen to operate the franchise, TfL will insist on higher standards being achieved.

Why are so few stations accredited under the Secure Stations Scheme?

23. The Secure Stations Scheme was a genuine attempt to introduce security guidelines to the rail industry where there were none before.[m2] However, the scheme has a number of flaws:

- It is a voluntary scheme and is not consistently built into contractual requirements.
- Originally the required passenger surveys were too onerous and expensive.
- It is too heavily weighted in regard to the overall perception percentage score. In its current form it does not truly reflect passenger perceptions. For example, the underlying reasons why people feel unsafe.* It does not deal with security issues on rolling stock.
- The crime levels used make no distinction between serious and non-serious crime. This can allow an operator to gain accreditation even when suffering a proportion of serious offences such as rape or robbery if the ratio is still below 1:20,000 offences.
- Generally the weightings within the standard need further consideration. It is possible to be awarded Secure Stations certification when the station may still have significant safety and security issues. More weight must be given to pro-active security measures such as 24 hour CCTV.

24. The most important elements of personal safety are the perceptions of passengers and the presence of high-visible staff at all times. Again, it is our view that no station should be considered for a Safe Station award unless:

- The majority of passengers using that station believe it to be safe.

- The actions of staff on the station are audited. In other words, whilst the scheme recognises that staff presence is important, it does not differentiate between a member of staff located in a ticket office who cannot, or does not, see what is going on at the station, and a member of staff (or police) who is highly visible and on a platform (which is where passengers want them to be).

Should the scheme be made compulsory?

25. Not in its present form.

26. A compulsory standard should be introduced to govern safety and security issues on the rail network and this should replace the current Secure Stations Scheme. The current scheme provides a useful building block in the development of a new scheme. The principles outlined in paragraph nine above should be included in any new scheme. The scheme should encompass the rail system as a whole and incorporate the whole journey, including station infrastructure and rolling stock.

27. In addition, the potential for different levels of certification/accreditation should be considered dependent on the type of network being considered. For example, appropriate safety and security standards for LU stations may be slightly different from those appropriate for a small overground suburban station. It is imperative however, that the standards are integrated and included in a single scheme.

28. Any scheme should be mandatory within any new franchises and should, if possible, be retrospectively applied to all franchises. For example there could be a three-year timeframe of compliance (eg Year 1—50% compliance, Year 2—75% and Year 3—100% compliance).

29. As part of this process, consideration should also be given to integrating this standard with current Transec regulations and the extension of these standards where appropriate to other parts of the transport network such as buses and bus stations. It is important that this process fully engages the bus industry and other key stakeholders.

What measures would be required to ensure significant improvements in passengers' safety in railway and Underground stations?

30. Actual crime levels are relatively low on LU and DLR, which are one of the most managed public spaces in London. Often the perception of safety and security is driven by external factors eg 9/11, Madrid bombings, media coverage.

31. The introduction of a compulsory scheme as described in previous paragraphs and governance arrangement as outlined in paragraphs five to eight would assist in delivering these improvements.

32. Specific standards that should apply as a minimum, can be summarised as:

- 24 hour CCTV linked to a central control.
- Passenger Help Points on every platform and at every entrance—this is important to enable urgent/emergency contact with a staff member who can take action required:
 - enhanced lighting levels;
 - clear Lines of Sight integral to design;
 - improved, passenger friendly waiting accommodation; and
 - high visible staffing appropriate to mode.

33. Overall, all stations should have these and they should be a mandatory requirement for any revised Safer Station Scheme. When TfL assumes responsibility for the North London railway these standards will be mandatory and fully audited.

Is the Government's approach to passenger safety in railway stations effective?

34. As mentioned throughout this document, there is a lack of a clear compulsory standard.

35. The creation of a single responsible body for running London's transport network is a vital element of delivering a safe and secure environment in railway stations. A clearly responsible organisation for security in London (such as TfL) complemented by the creation of a single client function for transport policing in London would fully support the development of a safer and more secure network in the capital. Improving personal security is too important a matter to be left to the choice for operators.

APPENDIX 17

Memorandum submitted by The Evening Standard

1. THE MURDER OF TOM AP RHYS PRYCE

The Evening Standard launched a campaign calling for a radical improvement in passenger safety at stations across London following the murder of Tom ap Rhys Pryce.

The 31-year-old lawyer was stabbed to death shortly after leaving unmanned Kensal Green station on his way home on the evening of 12 January. The two men later arrested and charged with Mr Pryce's murder had earlier been captured on CCTV leaving the deserted station after they had robbed a man on the platform.

Within half an hour they launched a ferocious attack on Mr Pryce as he walked home from the station after a night out. He was apparently selected by the muggers as "rich pickings" because he was wearing a smart suit and overcoat.

2. LONDON'S EMPTY STATIONS

Spurred by this horrific murder our Safer Stations campaign highlighted how at least 229 stations across Greater London are left unstaffed for all or part of the day. This amounts to two-thirds of stations in the London region, the vast majority of them small suburban stations used by hundreds of thousands of commuters every weekday.

More than 30 stations are never manned, dozens more have staff only during the morning peak or until lunchtime.

After dark even stations in some of the most desirable part of London can seem forbidding for lone travellers, especially women and the elderly. Further, those parts of London where you are least likely to meet a train company employee in the evening are often those most notorious for high levels of crime. These include Silverlink stations such as Harlesden and Kensal Green, parts of south London such as Streatham and Eltham and east London crime hotspots including Hackney.

The paper discovered that one stretch of Silverlink's network—through Tottenham, Walthamstow and Leytonstone—had eight unmanned stations in a row. This sorry state of affairs comes despite the £130 million a year profit made by the 10 London rail firms, who have enjoyed a Government subsidy of £2.2 billion since rail privatisation a decade ago.

3. "IT'S NO WAY TO TRAVEL IN THE 21ST CENTURY"—SILVERLINK PASSENGER

As part of our campaign the Standard called for all of London's stations be manned until the last train has left. The call won the enthusiastic support of thousands of readers, many of whom experience the intimidating atmosphere of unmanned and neglected stations every day. We were deluged with e-mails and letters from rail passengers highlighting the often dire condition of their local station and demanding action from the rail companies.

Asif Begum, a postman from Walthamstow, said of Walthamstow Queens Road: "Most of the stations around this part of London are unmanned. It's ridiculous. You hear about muggings all the time, both on the platforms and on the trains. There needs to be more security to protect the passenger." Sian Hickmott, of Bromley, said of Shortlands station: "Crime in the area is rising. There's no way I would feel safe wandering on to this platform alone at night. It's just too dangerous a risk to take."

Birgit Moller, said of Silverlink's Gunnersbury station: "Every week somebody is attacked round here. More staff would make a difference."

4. THE POLITICAL RESPONSE

Public backing for our campaign was echoed by support from politicians at all levels.

More than fifty MPs backed the campaign, including energy minister and Croydon North MP Malcolm Wicks, who said: "In the evenings stations are often desolate and many of my constituents, not just women, are fearful about travelling." Vauxhall MP Kate Hoey said: "CCTV cameras will help, but they will never replace a real person."

On February 14 London Mayor Ken Livingstone announced that all 50 Silverlink stations would be manned from November 2007, once he takes over responsibility for the company's routes. He said his "first priority" will be station safety and security.

Mr Livingstone's pledge meant that for the first time in decades an entire line on the commuter network would have a visible staff presence throughout the hours of the timetable.

The Mayor attacked as "obscene" the failure of the rail companies to provide staff for all their London stations while trains are running.

Mr Livingstone's attack was followed by a promise from Transport Secretary Alistair Darling to improve security on the railways and at stations. In an interview with the *Evening Standard* he said: "I think there has to be a radical change in gear towards improving safety and security at stations. There are stations where people have tolerated things for too long."

Mr Darling said that passengers would begin to feel more secure as measures come in to improve policing, increase staffing levels and deter muggers and pickpockets. The measures, designed to fall into place over the next couple of years as the various franchises come up for renewal or tender, include:

- A review of the British Transport Police (BTP) to "refocus" on a perception of safety.
- Tough new security standards covering staffing, policing and CCTV to be incorporated into contracts every time a franchise is renewed or put out to tender.
- Staff to be encouraged to be more visible at stations and the installation of more entrance barriers at outlying stations to deter muggers from lurking inside.

However, Mr Darling refused to order that all stations be manned while trains are running, saying there were sometimes better ways to make passengers safer.

He said: "I support the *Standard* campaign to make train travel safer but I think there's a variety of ways you can do it. Staffing is important but it isn't the whole answer."

5. RAIL COMPANIES SPLIT OVER STAFFING

In a major victory for London's rail passengers Chiltern Railways became the first of the capital's rail companies to announce it would staff its stations until the last train leaves.

On February 17 it announced security guards would immediately begin to patrol its four London stations: Sudbury Hill in Harrow, Harrow Road, Wembley Stadium and Northolt Park.

In a statement Chiltern said: "We recognise there is considerable public anxiety in London in relation to unstaffed stations after dark.

"We will therefore be reviewing all security features. While this process is ongoing we will ensure a security presence patrolling at these stations during the hours of darkness while trains are in service and we will examine options for permanent staffing as part of this review."

Chiltern's move was followed by a warning from the Department of Transport to South West Trains that it would have to hire more staff or risk losing its franchise, which is up for renewal next year.

In a further significant breakthrough Brent council announced it had secured a ground-breaking agreement with Silverlink over late-night staffing of stations. Following public pressure Brent obtained a commitment from the rail company at the heart of the *Standard*'s campaign that it would work with Network Rail, the Met police and the British Transport Police to ensure a uniformed presence at its stations at night.

Silverlink agreed to train two security guards at Kensal Green in how to use ticket barriers which it says will stop vandals and muggers getting access to the station after ticket office staff have finished their shifts.

The company has also pledged to provide security guards at Queens Park station and as part of the agreement the Met has offered to use Wembley Central as a base for its Safer Neighbourhood team of officers in the area.

However, despite the positive reaction of Chiltern and Silverlink and the strong support of the public, London's other rail companies have so far refused to consider night-time staffing. They are South West Trains, First Great Western, Southern Railway, WAGN and Thameslink. This appeared to fly in the face of evidence to your own committee from the head of British Transport Police, Chief Constable Ian Johnston, who said the public clearly wanted to see stations staffed and that evidence showed crime falls where there are more uniformed staff present. As he stated: "In places where there are no other people around, people are quite frightened. Having other people around helps people feel safer."

April 2006
