House of Commons - Standards and Privileges

Select Committee on Standards and Privileges Sixth Report

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr Byers evidence

49. As we have already pointed out, it is common ground that Mr Byers' answer to Mr Grayling at Question 857 was factually inaccurate, that the Transport Sub-Committee was misled, and Mr Byers has apologised to the House for this. The focus has now switched to the reason why Mr Byers gave factually inaccurate evidence, and in particular whether the reason given in his personal statement—that the unduly narrow interpretation he had placed on the word 'discussions' in this context had inadvertently led him to give the inaccurate answer.

50. Mr Byers should of course have given the Transport Sub-Committee a correct answer.

51. There is general agreement between Mr Rowlands,[75] Mr Corry[76] and Mr Byers[77] that a correct answer to Mr Grayling at Question 857 would have referred to work being commissioned. There is also general agreement[78] amongst our witnesses, with which we concur, that there would have been no difficulty had Mr Byers given such an answer. Indeed, Mr Grayling himself conceded[79] that if Mr Byers had given a correct answer "It would not have changed the course of history".

52. Mr Grayling's case essentially rests on two elements of circumstantial evidence: the difference of view as to precisely what was said at the meeting between Mr Robinson and Mr Byers on 25 July 2001; and Mr Byers' reluctance to be precise as to when the emergency legislation to restrict the powers of the Rail Regulator was drafted. Taken together, these in his view suggested a pre-existing plan.

53. Given the significance placed by Mr Grayling on the exchanges[80] in the Transport Sub-Committee about the emergency legislation, we have asked the Department for details of the timetable for its preparation. It is now clear that, contrary to the impression gained by some from Mr Byers' answers in the Transport Sub-Committee, this legislation was not drafted before Mr Byers' refused further Government financial assistance to Railtrack on 5 October 2001. All Mr Byers had at that time was policy clearance from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor; the drafting process was not completed until 10 October 2001, five days after Mr Byers had refused Railtrack plc further financial assistance.[81]

54. As to precisely what transpired at the meeting between Mr Byers and Mr Robinson on 25 July 2001, there remain a number of unresolved points, despite the Department for Transport putting its partial note of the meeting in the public domain as part of its evidence to the Transport Sub-Committee,[82] and the evidence given in the Railtrack case last year. For our purposes, though, the precise detail is immaterial; it is clear from Mr Byers' note to the Prime Minister of 3 August 2001 that officials' work looking at the options for Railtrack plc, as agreed at the 5 July 2001 Transport Stocktake, had "been given added urgency by Railtrack's deteriorating financial position."[83]

55. More importantly, in all the material we have received, we can see no evidence that the Government had, before 25 July 2001, embarked on an active strategy of restructuring, although there is extensive evidence of officials working on possible options, particularly after the Transport Stocktake of 5 July 2001. All the papers we have seen are consistent with a twin-track strategy as summarised by the Prime Minister at the Transport Stocktake: concentrating first on getting the railways operating normally again, with work on options for possible restructuring being pursued in parallel on a longer timescale. The underlying assumption in Government appears to have been that, although Railtrack plc was widely acknowledged to have serious financial problems, and that these were likely to require attention in due course, until the end of July 2001 it was believed to be financially stable, at least in the short term.

56. Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, Mr Byers appears to have had no obvious motive for deliberately misleading the Transport Sub-Committee in his response to Mr Grayling at Question 857. As he himself put it,[84] "An accurate reply at the time would have caused no problems either politically or legally." Given that we have seen no evidence of an active Government strategy for restructuring Railtrack, as distinct from assessment of options, before 25 July 2001, we do not consider that the case has been made that Mr Byers had a political agenda which he was anxious to conceal from the Transport Sub-Committee.

57. While Mr Byers now accepts his answer was untruthful, we do not find the charge of contempt, as defined by the Clerk of the House,[85] is sustained. We do not believe, on the evidence we have seen, that Mr Byers lied to the Transport Sub-Committee as alleged.

58. We turn now to the explanation that Mr Byers offered to the House in his personal statement as to why he had given a factually inaccurate answer. Ministers are under an obligation, by virtue of the Resolution of the House of 19^th March 1997,[86] subsequently taken into the Ministerial Code, to respect the "paramount importance" of giving accurate and truthful information to Parliament. There can be no circumstances where it can be justified to derogate from this obligation for political reasons. Mr Byers' answer to Mr Grayling was factually inaccurate, and the political context cannot be used to justify this.

59. The Department for Transport has told[87] us that the final output of the joint working group, which appears to have given extensive consideration to various alternatives to Railtrack plc, was the report sent by Mr Byers to the Prime Minister on 3 August 2001 and the covering note prepared by Dr Hackland.[88] Mr Byers must therefore have known when he gave evidence to the Transport Sub-Committee that these matters had been discussed within the Government in the terms of any commonsense interpretation of the expression "discussions theoretical or otherwise" in Mr Grayling's question, as he had himself submitted the final report of the working group to the Prime Minister. Also, the exchanges which we refer to earlier in our report[89] constitute 'discussions' within the terms of Mr Grayling's question.

60. However, it is also clear from the terms of Mr Byers' personal statement that he is in reality unaware of precisely why he gave the answer he did. We do not find it inherently surprising that a witness is unable to remember why he gave a particular answer if challenged on it nearly four years later. What the statement makes clear is that Mr Byers was in fact seeking to extrapolate an explanation from the court papers.

61. We have no doubt, from the factual material we have seen, that as Mr Dismore put it to Mr Byers:[90]

"the answer hangs on a definition of discussion….that most people in the room at the time would not have shared given the nature of the question that was posed to you."

62. We consider that Mr Byers was unwise to try and devise retrospectively an explanation for his inaccurate answer. We also believe that, in his personal statement, he came close to repeating the error for which he had just apologised. Given that Mr Byers could not recall why he gave the answer he did to Question 857, he should have said so to the House in his personal statement on 19 October 2005 and apologised unreservedly. We recommend that he now does so.

Correction of the transcript

63. As we have said earlier, there is a third issue in that the incorrect answer was not corrected by the Department when it saw the transcript. Three factors appear to have played a part in this: a misunderstanding on the part of those examining the transcript over the scope of corrections allowed; a lack of understanding as to where the responsibilities lay;[91] and the relative lack of experience in railways matters of the one policy official to whom the transcript was sent with a specific request for corrections. In this context, it might have been helpful if Mr Rowlands had asked a colleague who had greater personal experience of the events involving Railtrack plc also to check the transcript.

64. We welcome Mr Rowlands' assurance that, normally, all committee appearances are properly checked both by the Private Secretary and by at least one policy official,[92] and note that he has apologised for the failure on this occasion to spot the error. We recommend that all Ministers, whether or not they themselves read over the transcript, recognise that they are nonetheless responsible for the terms of their oral evidence and ensure that they have in place robust arrangements for checking transcripts. Ministers should also remind those responsible of the paramount importance of ensuring that evidence is accurate and truthful, and ensuring the correction of any inadvertent errors as soon as these are spotted. Departments should make sure that staff are fully aware of the rules relating to the correction of transcripts.

65. It is clear in this case that at least one of the officials thought that only essentially verbal corrections were permitted. This view may have been informed by the letter (which was based on a standard letter used by all Committees) which accompanied the transcript, and which indicated that permitted alterations were restricted to the correction of inaccuracies in the printing or report of the written evidence and the correction of matters of fact which do not materially alter the general sense of any answer. It also indicated that explanations or additional information should be given by way of a footnote, or submission of a further memorandum, but did not explain further as to the sort of points that might be covered in this way.

66. In the light of this case, we recommend that Committees consider amending this standard letter in the case of Ministers to make clear their obligations to the House to ensure the accuracy and truthfulness of their evidence. We are confident that Committees will be able to distinguish between genuine clarifications and corrections, on the one hand, and attempts at purely cosmetic improvement of the evidence, on the other.

67. We recommend that the Liaison Committee take forward our recommendations in this section.

75 Q.44. Back

76 Q.86. Back

77 Q.156. Back

78 Q.45 (Mr Rowlands); Q.87 (Mr Corry); and Q.157 (Mr Byers). See also Appendix 5, p. 37. Back

79 Q.12. Back

80 HC 239-II (2001-02) Q. 866-870. Back

81 Appendix 7, p. 45. Back

82 HC 239-II (2001-02), Ev 246. Back

83 See p. 64, Item 5. Back

84 Appendix 5, p. 37. Back

85 See paragraph 30. Back