Select Committee on Science and Technology Fourth Report


Conclusions and recommendations


Sources of advice to the Commission

1.  We conclude that the Commission was right to go to the established international authority, ICNIRP, for advice on which to base its proposals. However, we believe that the Commission did not seek to obtain the maximum benefit from the work undertaken by ICNIRP by exploring the potential impact of the Directive on MRI. Equally, ICNIRP should accept that, if its guidelines are being used as the basis of the Directive, it has some duty to advise, to the best of its knowledge, on those potentially affected by the Directive, to enable the Commission to consult appropriately. This detailed advice does not appear to have been given. (Paragraph 13)

Strength of evidence base

2.  We find it puzzling that static fields were included in the initial proposed Directive when the principal source of scientific advice for the Commission, ICNIRP, was about to review its own guidelines and advised against using existing guidelines as a basis for the Directive. This suggests that communication between the two organisations was not as effective as it could have been, but it does demonstrate that the legislative process was responsive to new scientific advice. (Paragraph 21)

3.  Having advised on the exclusion of static fields from the Directive, it would be inconsistent and slightly disingenuous of ICNIRP to evade all responsibility for advising the Commission on the strength of the evidence base regarding time-varying fields. (Paragraph 24)

4.  We welcome the fact that the scientific advice on which the Directive is based is all published: this transparency has assisted debate. However, officials we met at the Commission misrepresented the level of certainty in the scientific evidence underpinning the Directive. This approach was unhelpful, and can only undermine confidence in the way in which scientific evidence was used by the Commission to support the Directive. (Paragraph 26)

Impact of the Directive

5.  We were alarmed to discover that the European Council was prepared to rely on a ten year old risk assessment to inform legislation in an area of rapidly developing science and technology. We welcome the moves taken to ensure that new proposals are accompanied by new impact assessments, as long as these are taken to include revived Directives such as this one. (Paragraph 29)

6.  We conclude that the HSE did not apply the necessary expertise to its assessment of the impact of the Directive. We recommend that the Health and Safety Executive ensures that regulatory impact assessments on EU proposals are conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a sector by sector basis, with care being taken to address the broader impact, rather than just the costs, of the legislation. (Paragraph 32)

7.  It is deeply regrettable that the impact of the Directive on MRI procedures was not established before the Directive was adopted. This case study illustrates the potential consequences of the failure of policy makers to seek comprehensive scientific advice early in the policy formulation process and to commission the necessary research to inform this process where uncertainty or gaps in knowledge exist. (Paragraph 40)

Justification for a Directive

8.  For MRI at least, we do not believe that there was a strong enough case for enshrining exposure limits in a Directive. We agree with the Government that existing guidelines are sufficient. The Directive will, at best, impose burdens on employers and, at worst, inhibit the use of valuable diagnostic procedures and important research. (Paragraph 42)

Use of the precautionary principle in the Directive

9.  While there should be an obligation to reduce risks to a reasonable level, to actually pursue the "lowest achievable limit" would entail health and safety practices which most would consider unnecessary and economically unviable, if not counter-productive in certain circumstances. Risks need to be balanced against gains, rather than necessarily minimised. (Paragraph 46)

10.  Regardless of the impact on current MRI procedures, any attempt to consider the health of workers in isolation from all other factors would be against the spirit of the precautionary principle, as set out by the Commission. We hope that the agreement of the Commission to undertake further work on the potential impact of the Directive indicates a willingness to accept the need for a wider risk-benefit analysis. (Paragraph 48)

11.  We have found no explanation as to how the precautionary principle was, or was not, applied to the development and agreement of the Directive. The fact that such confusion remains confirms our view that the Commission's guidelines on its application are of limited practical use, even if there were a desire to refer to them. (Paragraph 49)

A precautionary approach

12.  We recommend Government and its agencies desist from using the term "precautionary principle" in order to explain policy decisions or judgments. We also urge Ministers to propose a similar approach in discussions in the EU Council. (Paragraph 51)

Sources of advice

13.  We are surprised that neither the Chief Scientific Adviser at the Department of Health nor the Chief Scientist at the Health and Safety Executive was involved at any stage in providing advice on the Directive, particularly in view of the high levels of expenditure on MRI equipment at DH. If they are not involved in the policy making process on a subject with such a heavy reliance on science, it is difficult to see how they were operating effectively. We recommend that the DH and the HSE take steps to ensure that their respective chief scientists are actively and routinely involved in the provision of advice informing policy. (Paragraph 54)

Engagement with MR community

14.  Given that the concerns raised about the Directive in 2003 coincided with its consideration in the European Council, and that they came from medical practitioners well placed to provide advice, we find the response by the HSE and NRPB/HPA to them highly disappointing. This reaction was characterised by an instinctive and dismissive resistance rather than an attempt to engage and examine. Both organisations acted in contravention of the guidelines laid down by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. (Paragraph 60)

15.  It is extremely worrying that the HSE managed to outline a policy to the MR community in the UK which was the precise opposite of the one it had been pursuing in Brussels during negotiations. That the HSE could be contradicting itself for such a long period suggests some quite astonishing failings in management and internal communications. We recommend that the HSE seeks to discover how this situation could persist for so long, and takes appropriate steps to ensure that there can be no repeat. (Paragraph 61)

16.  We welcome the frank admission of the failings in consultations on the Directive by the Minister and, more pertinently, by the Health and Safety Executive. (Paragraph 62)

17.  The Government was badly let down by the HSE and NRPB, not only by their failure to consult sufficiently widely but also by their failure to advise Ministers on the concerns being raised. When informed of these concerns, Ministers acted with commendable speed to investigate further. We welcome the commitment by the Government to rectifying these earlier failings by working closely with the MR community. (Paragraph 64)

Engagement of MR community

18.  We conclude that the MR community in the UK was very slow to consider the impact of time-varying fields and failed to raise it early enough to influence the negotiations on the Directive. (Paragraph 66)

19.  We conclude that the professional bodies, the Wellcome Trust, and the MRC were insufficiently pro-active in identifying the implications of the Directive and informing their communities, and politically ineffective in communicating these concerns in Westminster and Brussels. We recommend that the professional bodies and research funders re-examine the development of their links with each other and explore ways in which they can work together to improve their political effectiveness. (Paragraph 68)

Horizon scanning

20.  We recommend that the Department of Health and the Medical Research Council review their representation on the Interdepartmental Liaison Group on non-ionising radiation to ensure that the Group is provided with the necessary breadth of expertise and that they give due consideration to the issues raised by the Group. (Paragraph 70)

21.  We recommend that the Office of Science and Innovation reviews its horizon scanning activities in respect of EU legislation, in consultation with the Research Councils. We believe that there is a strong case for the UK Research Office to perform a horizon scanning function on behalf of the Research Councils. (Paragraph 72)

Role of UKREP in using scientific advice

22.  We recommend that UKREP reviews its channels of communication with the scientific community in the UK and considers developing some capability for direct links, on a systematic basis, or at least on an ad hoc basis in response to the introduction of proposals. (Paragraph 75)

Further work on implementation of the Directive

The UK

23.  We welcome the commitment of funds from the HSE and the MRC to a programme of research on the potential impact of the Directive on MRI procedures. In the meantime, we recommend that the Government does not prioritise the Directive for implementation through secondary legislation. (Paragraph 76)

The Commission

24.  We welcome the establishment of the joint working group by the Commission to examine new evidence and hope that it is a genuine attempt to inform the implementation of the Directive rather than simply a device to mollify the critics. We urge the UK Government to ensure that this work is well informed by the further research in the UK, and is completed in time for decisions on the implementation or amendment of the Directive to be taken before April 2008. If new research demonstrates a clear need for the Directive to be amended, for example to exclude MRI from its scope, the UK Government should seek this solution, rather than relying on non-enforcement. At the very least, the Government should press for a full impact assessment when the Directive is reviewed in 2009. (Paragraph 78)



 
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