Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report

The Annan Plan

Genesis of the Plan

15. The United Nations has been directly involved in Cyprus since the early 1960s, when inter-communal violence reached such levels that from 1964 a peacekeeping force of 'blue berets' was deployed between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Nicosia and at other flashpoints on the island. After the events of 1974 and the physical division of the island, successive secretaries-general sought to use their good offices to bring about a solution of the Cyprus problem. The Set of Ideas produced by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992 did not produce a settlement, but they remained on the table and were picked up again by Secretary-General Kofi Annan as his team began work in earnest in 2001.[20]

16. In November 2001, as the strong likelihood of Cyprus's accession to the EU with or without a solution to the Cyprus problem became a near-certainty, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit announced that Ankara could in that event "annex" northern Cyprus.[21] With a new sense of urgency evident, on 4 December President Clerides and Mr Denktash held face-to-face talks in the buffer zone at the latter's instigation and announced the resumption of negotiations from early 2002. We visited the island in March 2002 and held discussions with both men. We formed the impression at that time that Mr Clerides was anxious to secure a settlement, in order that a united Cyprus could join the EU. Our opinion of Mr Denktash was that he understood the opportunities opened up by accession, but that he was not inclined to compromise.

17. The EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 provided a natural deadline for these negotiations, for it was to be at this summit that the question of Cyprus's accession would be determined. The first version of what later became known as the Annan Plan was released in November 2002 and a revised version was made available in December. The final version of this phase, Annan 3, was presented to the parties in February 2003. To no-one's surprise, but to wide disappointment, the negotiations failed once again, finally coming to a halt at The Hague in March.[22]

18. Lord Hannay, who was closely involved in this process, told us that "it was Mr Denktash who prevented the negotiation and acceptance of Annan Two or Three at Copenhagen and then at The Hague," because he once again refused to accept a settlement which did not involve prior recognition of his breakaway state, the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'[23] If Annan 3 had been put to the vote, we were told not only by Lord Hannay but by many Greek Cypriots during our visit in November 2004, it could well have been approved by the electorate in the South under the leadership of President Clerides. It might even have been approved by Turkish Cypriots too, although that is much more doubtful. Of course, if the Plan had been accepted in 2003 by Greek Cypriot voters and rejected by their Turkish counterparts, the situation now would be totally different and the Republic of Cyprus would not have lost the moral high ground from which it fell with such a loud crash a year later.

19. Version three of the Annan Plan was remarkably similar to the later version five, on which the referendums took place, although there were also important differences. The territorial adjustments provided for in both were almost the same; the numbers of people in both communities entitled to citizenship was the same (in practice, this affected the North more than the South); and the provisions relating to the continuing in force of the Treaty of Guarantee were the same.[24] We turn now to version five of the Annan Plan, on which Cypriots were to vote in April 2004.

The process of negotiating the Plan

20. The period from the election of President Papadopoulos to the end of 2003 was described by Mr Annan as "a fallow period in terms of my good offices",[25] but it was a period in which two very important developments took place in Cyprus. In April, to general surprise, the Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally relaxed restrictions at the Green Line in Nicosia, allowing Greek Cypriots to visit the North freely for the first time since 1974. The impact of this move was profound. Greek Cypriots were able to visit their former homes in the North, and in many cases to speak to their new inhabitants. In some cases, personal effects were returned, although not all encounters were so positive. And by visiting shops, restaurants and other facilities in the North, Greek Cypriots came into contact with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, some of them for the first time, and found they were able to relate to them as people. In the first year, Cypriots made more than three million crossings of the Green Line, using the four crossing points then open, with very few incidents reported.[26]

21. The second development on the island was the election, in December 2003, of a pro-solution administration in the North. The new 'prime minister', Mehmet Ali Talat, made it clear that he was committed to taking his people into the European Union; that could happen only if there was a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The election of Mr Talat, following as it did the election of a pragmatic and stable government in Ankara under Prime Minister Erdoðan, created a new, more favourable climate for negotiations. "After weighing the situation",[27] Mr Annan contacted both sides and, following a series of consultations, announced on 13 February 2004 that the parties had agreed to negotiate on the basis of Annan 3, with simultaneous referendums to be held before 1 May, the date of Cyprus's accession to the EU.[28]

22. Faced by that deadline of Cyprus's accession date to the European Union, Mr Annan decided that the negotiations could not continue indefinitely and secured the agreement of the parties "to complete the plan in all respects by 22 March 2004."[29] In our view, given the history of protracted efforts to reach a settlement, he would have been right to work to a deadline, even without the accession date. Although President Papadopoulos later complained of "undue haste and a rush to impose a settlement",[30] and the influential AKEL party called for the referendum to be postponed,[31] we agree with Dr Savvides that "the mistake of the previous efforts [was] that they were open-ended."[32] The issues were well known and so, indeed, were most of the solutions. What was required was a process under which the Plan could be 'sold' to the two communities by their leaders.

23. In this respect, version five of the Annan Plan differed crucially from version three. In earlier versions of the Plan, both communities' political leaders would have been required to endorse the Plan and to have campaigned for it among their respective electorates. Under Annan 5, the Secretary-General's determination to produce a definitive scheme by the deadline meant that he had to drop insistence on support by the leaderships. This step was probably taken in order to cater for the perceived likelihood—which must at the time have seemed a racing certainty—that Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash would refuse to campaign for the Plan, even if he could be prevailed upon to sign it.[33] Ironically, it allowed another intransigent leader, Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos, to withhold his support from the Plan.

24. The curious and, for most observers, surprising reversal of roles between the traditionally rejectionist Turkish Cypriot leadership and the normally more pro-settlement Greek Cypriot leadership was a consequence of two unrelated factors: the election of a pro-Europe government in Turkey under Mr Recip Erdoðan; and the election of a more hard-line President of the Republic of Cyprus, the rejectionist Tassos Papadopoulos. With Mr Erdoðan in power in Ankara, the uncompromising stance of Rauf Denktash ceased to be supported by Turkey. This allowed negotiations on the Annan Plan to move forward,[34] all the time with an expectation that Mr Denktash would at some stage walk out, as he had done so many times before, but eventually reaching the point where a settlement was in sight. By the time Mr Denktash did withdraw from the process, more moderate Turkish Cypriot politicians were able and willing to take his place.

25. This unexpected development forced the Greek Cypriot political leadership, which was previously secure in the knowledge that the other side would once again be seen as the wreckers of a deal, to face up to whether it really supported the terms of the Annan Plan. The answer was "No." In his televised address to the people of Cyprus on 7 April, President Papadopoulos called on them to give the Plan "a resounding No."[35]

26. Mr Annan was later to complain, in unusually blunt terms for an international civil servant and an experienced diplomat, that President Papadopoulos had not "accurately reflected the contents of the plan" when addressing the Greek Cypriot people,[36] and to imply that the President had reneged on earlier commitments to support the Plan.[37] EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen reportedly complained that he was prevented from addressing the Greek Cypriot people on the Plan.[38] Mr Annan also called on the Greek Cypriot side to articulate their concerns "with clarity and finality", thereby suggesting that the concerns had not been so communicated during the negotiating process.[39]

27. This interpretation of the Greek Cypriot Government's negotiating stance is widely shared. We therefore asked the Government of Cyprus to supply us with copies of the documents in which it had articulated its concerns during the negotiating process. We received a large bundle of papers in response to this request.[40] The papers support the contention by President Papadopoulos that he had submitted to the UN "more than 200 pages of comprehensive proposals."[41] Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot proposals were not consolidated until late in the process, on 25th March; they were not prioritised; and they did not provide the "clarity and finality" which the Secretary-General evidently required.[42]

28. There have been suggestions that the government of the Republic of Cyprus did not negotiate in good faith. Lord Hannay has stated as much in his recent book[43] and we were told that EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen "felt betrayed."[44] Neither are we aware of significant third-party support for the way in which the Greek Cypriot representatives conducted the negotiations, although we note that Mr Annan went out of his way to praise the other participants. The backing of Greece was "a credit to that country and her leaders";[45] he "appreciated the strong support of the Turkish government, from the top down";[46] and he placed on record his "appreciation of the efforts of Mr Talat both in the process and in the run-up to the referendum."[47] The absence from the Secretary-General's Report of any such positive reference to President Papadopoulos is surely eloquent evidence of his views.

29. The process of transforming version three of the Annan Plan into what became version five began in February 2004. From 19 February to 22 March, the parties negotiated in Cyprus, without significant progress, although important details were agreed by officials working on the details of implementation. The original deadline having been overshot, from 24 March the Secretary-General convened a meeting in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. In their capacity as the guarantor powers,[48] Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom also participated in this final phase of talks, which ended, as provided for in the originally agreed timetable, on 29 March. Mr Annan has described in his report to the Security Council how at Bürgenstock there were no face-to-face negotiations between the parties, all formal exchanges being made through the UN negotiating team.[49] President Papadopoulos was absent for much of the time and Mr Rauf Denktash failed to attend at all. The Turkish Cypriots were represented by Mr Talat and Mr Serdar Denktash, but President Papadopoulos has consistently refused to deal directly with Mr Talat. Mr Annan clearly found this very frustrating.

30. In accordance with procedures agreed between the parties in February, allowing him "in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock" to use his discretion to finalise the terms of the Plan, Mr Annan then produced a text to submit to the people of Cyprus, for approval by separate referendums in the two communities.[50] In his report to the Security Council of May 2004 he stated that this final text preserved the balanced proposals of the Plan which had been agreed before, "while addressing to the extent possible the key concerns of each side."[51] Dr Denis MacShane told us that "It is difficult to think of a better deal that could have been agreed by all the different parties involved and then put to the vote of the people."[52] However, it was this text which was rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate just over three weeks later.

31. We summarise the Plan's main provisions below, before focusing on four specific areas of contention which, it has been suggested to us, contributed significantly to the decision by more than three quarters of Greek Cypriots voting in the referendum to reject it.

Contents of the Plan

32. Version five of the Annan Plan[53] proposed a "new state of affairs in Cyprus", based on the Swiss cantonal model. A United Cyprus Republic (UCR) would be formed, with a federal government and two constituent states:[54] one predominantly Greek Cypriot, eventually comprising about 71 per cent of the land area of Cyprus; and the other predominantly Turkish Cypriot, comprising about 29 per cent of the land area. Cypriots would be citizens both of the UCR and of the appropriate constituent state.[55]

33. The federal government of the UCR would include not less than one third Turkish Cypriot ministers, with the Presidency and Vice-Presidency alternating between the two communities each ten months. A bicameral federal parliament consisting of a Senate—in which both communities would be represented equally—and a Chamber of Deputies—not less than one quarter of whose members would be elected by Turkish Cypriots—would legislate, through a weighted system of voting.[56] The Supreme Court would be made up of three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot and three non-Cypriot judges.[57]

34. Turkish and Greek military forces would withdraw in phases so that by 2019 at the latest there would be no more than 650 Turkish and 950 Greek troops on the island. All Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces would be dissolved.[58] Territorial adjustments between the two component states would take place in six phases over a 42-month period,[59] and the question of the rights of those who had lost their property would be dealt with under a complex system of reinstatement or compensation.[60]

35. The Plan, containing fourteen Articles and nine Annexes, was supplemented by much detailed draft legislation and subsidiary agreements, which officials of the two communities were able to agree in technical working parties. It is remarkable that so much of the detail was agreed upon and that it remains, apparently, non-contentious.

The contentious issues

36. Our purpose in this section of our Report is to describe four of the main areas of contention, based both on the evidence we have received and on the many discussions which took place during the visit some of us paid to the island. In a later section of the Report we consider how each of these areas of contention could be resolved satisfactorily and we set out our conclusions.[61]

37. The issues on which we focus here are among those identified by Greek Cypriots who voted against the Plan. In preparing this section, we have made extensive use of the survey and statistical analysis of Greek Cypriot public opinion carried out by Mr Alexandros Lordos.[62] We wish to emphasise, however, that where we have cited Mr Lordos's published survey we have done so because it confirms what we were told in evidence and also what we heard directly from many other sources when we visited Cyprus. We are grateful to Mr Lordos for carrying out his survey and for drawing the publication of its results to our attention.

38. It should also be borne in mind that, although most of them voted for the Plan, many Turkish Cypriots also had concerns about aspects of it. The London representative of the 'TRNC', Mr Namik Korhan, told us that "A very long list of why the plan should have been rejected exists in the minds of each and every Turkish Cypriot, let alone the leadership."[63] Some of these are enumerated in the evidence of the largest political party in northern Cyprus, the UBP.[64] Mr Korhan added that "any initiative by the Greek Cypriot side or any other third party to make amendments to the Annan Plan is not acceptable on the part of Turkish Cypriots."[65] Mr Lordos has recently carried out a survey of Turkish Cypriot opinion, in order to identify the issues which most concern them.[66] The key to any successful revival of the Annan Plan will be to meet the objections of Greek Cypriots in ways which do not reduce the attractions of the Plan to Turkish Cypriots. This will be a formidable challenge.

Security guarantees and Turkey's continued military presence

39. Under arrangements which were largely negotiated between Greece and Turkey in the 1950s, the Republic of Cyprus established in 1960 was to allow on its soil a maximum 950 troops from mainland Greece and 650 from mainland Turkey. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, this rule was flouted and in 1974 the Greek military (who were also the civil power in Athens at the time) brought about a coup against the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. They put into power Nicos Sampson, a former terrorist who espoused political union between Cyprus and Greece (enosis). Turkey then intervened militarily. Ironically, both Greece and Turkey, together with the United Kingdom, were obliged to respect and uphold the independence of Cyprus under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.[67]

40. After the coup of 1974 had been reversed, bringing down the Greek colonels' regime in Athens with it, the provisions of the 1960 constitution with regard to troop levels were again flouted by both sides, but most blatantly by Turkey, which has since July 1974 maintained a garrison on Cyprus of approximately 35,000 troops (Greece has about 1,250 troops in the South).[68]

41. It can be seen how for each community on Cyprus, therefore, the presence of forces from the 'motherland' powers has been a source both of fear and of comfort. Turkish Cypriots, who suffered at the hands of Greek and Greek Cypriot forces between 1963 and 1974, feel that they need guarantees of their security, guarantees which historically have been provided only by the Turkish armed forces.[69] Greek Cypriots, who in 1974 were victims, first of the machinations of the Greek military, and then directly at the hands of Turkish forces, continue to regard the latter as the principal threat to their peace and security.

42. Force levels on the island were always bound to be one of the most difficult parts of a settlement to negotiate and on which to reach agreement. In earlier versions of the Annan Plan, all forces would have been withdrawn at the time of Turkey's accession to the EU or after 21 years, whichever came first. In Annan 5, the approach taken appears to have been to persist with the maximum 'motherland' troop levels permitted under the 1960 arrangements and with the status of Greece and Turkey as 'guarantor powers', but to overlay this with a strong guarantee of the status and security of both communities, underpinned by the UN Security Council. As noted above, this meant that by 2019 the Turkish military contingent in Cyprus would have been reduced to no more than 650 personnel.[70] The government of Cyprus suggested to us that, contrary to what the Secretary-General stated in his Report to the Security Council,[71] the earlier provision (in Annan 3) for complete removal of the Turkish troops was changed at the insistence, not of Turkish Cypriots, but of Turkey.[72]

43. In a last-minute attempt to deal with the Greek Cypriots' feelings of insecurity, the United Kingdom and United States brought forward a draft mandatory Resolution[73] in the UN Security Council to give effect under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to the provisions in the Plan calling for international support for its implementation and enforcement.[74] The Resolution was vetoed by Russia. Some observers have suggested that the Russians were exercising a proxy veto for the Republic of Cyprus. The presence in Moscow of the Cyprus Foreign Minister at the time the veto was cast was noted by Lord Hannay, the British Government and others.[75] It has also been suggested that the Russian veto was cast on procedural grounds.[76] However, during a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Erdoðan in January 2005, President Putin said that Russia had used its veto "not to block the taking of this decision but to rule out any possible influence on the outcome of the referendum."[77] The effect nonetheless was to block the taking of a decision. We agree with the United Kingdom's Minister for Europe that this was "an extraordinarily unhelpful veto."[78]

44. President Papadopoulos referred to the 650 troops as a "bridgehead".[79] One of our witnesses described what we suspect was a representative view of Greek Cypriots that "this was legitimising the presence of the invading forces."[80] The Lordos study shows that even moderate Greek Cypriots feel strongly that it would be inappropriate for Turkey to maintain armed forces in Cyprus and to have the right to intervene militarily even following a settlement. According to Lordos, more than three quarters of Greek Cypriots believe it is essential that Turkey should be obliged to reduce its forces to 650 within a much shorter timescale, and about three fifths demand that the troops should leave altogether and want to see an end to the right of unilateral intervention claimed by Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee.[81] A shortening of the timetable for a reduction in troop levels is actually the alteration to the terms of the Annan Plan most strongly sought by Greek Cypriots.[82]

45. Why do Greek Cypriots feel so strongly about the continued presence in the Turkish Cypriot-administered area of the island of 650 Turkish troops? Such a small force is not going to be able directly to threaten the security of over 600,000 Greek Cypriots and, in any case, Cyprus is famously within only a few minutes flying time for the Turkish Air Force's fast jets. The fact that Greek Cypriots apparently seek an accelerated reduction more than they demand a complete withdrawal suggests to us that the fundamental problem with the force level and guarantor power provisions of the Annan Plan was that the Greek Cypriots' experiences of 1974 meant that they did not trust the Turks.[83]

Refugee return and property rights

46. The events of 1974 displaced approximately 50,000 Turkish Cypriots and 180,000 Greek Cypriots, separating them from their homes and property.[84] It has been a long-standing goal of Greek Cypriot refugees to repossess their properties and, in many cases, to return to live or to work in them. Lord Hannay has described the property question as the most complex and most sensitive of the core issues of the Cyprus problem.[85]

47. The Annan Plan provided for the property rights of Greek Cypriots to be balanced against the rights of those now living in the homes or using the land, some of them Turkish Cypriot refugees from the South of the island, who had lost homes of their own, but many others of them Turkish settlers. Most Greek Cypriot property owners would have been able to return to their properties, because they lie in the area to be transferred to Greek Cypriot administration. Of the remainder, under a complex formula set out in the Plan, most of those who had lost a single dwelling standing on a plot of up to approximately a quarter of an acre or, in five specified villages, any property, would be entitled to recover the entire property, and others to recover one third of their property by value or area, receiving compensation for the balance.[86]

48. However, a number of exemptions and exceptions apply, which in practice would have reduced the scope for owners to recover their property, or would at the very least have complicated or protracted the process of recovery. For example, if a property had been substantially improved by its new inhabitants they might be entitled to compensation. It was also suggested to us that most agricultural holdings are too small to be included in the scheme.[87] For a period of five years after the entering into force of the Plan, the great majority of Greek Cypriots with property in the North would be unable to return to live in their homes, and it would be fifteen years before all restrictions were lifted. Also, all proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights for recovery of property in Cyprus would have been struck out.

49. In its submission to our inquiry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus stated that up to 95,000 Greek Cypriots would be likely to return to the areas to be handed over from Turkish control to the Greek Cypriot constituent state, and that by 2023 up to 51,000 Greek Cypriots would be able to take up residency in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.[88] However, in his report to the Security Council, Mr Annan suggested that the Plan "would effectively allow over time some 100,000 Greek Cypriots to take up permanent residence in the Turkish Cypriot State" and an unlimited number to maintain second homes there.[89]

50. The written evidence of the FCO makes no mention of the property issue in its discussion of the reasons for the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriot voters.[90] There has also been a perception in some quarters that Greek Cypriots will not, in fact—whatever their currently expressed views—wish to return to live or work in the areas which, under the Plan, will be part of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. Under this perception, the problem is essentially one of compensation, rather than of the right of return.

51. However, when we were in Cyprus, we heard a great deal about this aspect of the Plan, enough to convince us that when it comes to reaching a final settlement of the Cyprus problem, the right of return and property rights remain close to the heart of the matter. This impression was confirmed by the Lordos Study, which recorded support among Greek Cypriots for an increase in the proportion of property situated in the Turkish Cypriot administered areas to be returned to its Greek Cypriot owners as higher (at 63 per cent) than support for an increase in the proportion of the island to be administered by the Greek Cypriots (50 per cent).[91]

52. The property issue is important to Greek Cypriots not just for economic reasons. Even those born after the events of 1974 feel an emotional tie to their 'home' village in what Greek Cypriots often refer to as "the occupied territories". The right of return is seen by many Greek Cypriots, just as it is seen by the Palestinians, in terms of the principle of just redress for a wrong committed by a militarily superior neighbour, not as a bargaining chip in some wider process of negotiation. Our impression is that most displaced Turkish Cypriots have less of a desire to return to their former homes and prefer to remain in the North, accepting a property in exchange for that which they have given up.

53. The Ayios Ambrosios Association wrote to us on behalf of their members, who in 1974 had to leave their village, 20 miles East of Kyrenia (Girne), in an area which under the Annan Plan would be part of the Turkish Cypriot component state. They pointed out that under the limits which the Plan would place on the numbers of former residents allowed to return, only over-65s could go back to their homes between the second and fifth years; and returnees can amount to no more than six per cent of the population of the village up to the ninth year, 12 per cent up to the fourteenth year and 18 per cent up to the 19th year.[92] When we visited Cyprus, the point was made to us that these small numbers would in many villages be unlikely to be able to sustain facilities such as schools and churches in their communities.

54. For Turkish Cypriots as well, however, the property issue and the right of return for Greek Cypriots are very sensitive areas. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has previously expressed his fear that a right of return and its natural corollary, freedom of movement and of settlement, would rapidly lead to "Hellenisation" of the whole of Cyprus.[93] The principle underlying a bi-zonal solution would of course be undermined if Turkish Cypriots were to be outnumbered or dominated by Greek Cypriots within the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. Those of us who visited the island last November found that this concern was widely shared in the North and our impression is that, if anything, the prospect of cultural and economic domination by Greek Cypriots is a greater concern there than the problem of displacement of Turkish Cypriots and settlers who would have to leave the properties they currently live in, when they are returned to their rightful owners.

55. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, also have concerns about their cultural identity. Under the Annan Plan, the constituent states of the United Cyprus Republic and not the federal authorities would be responsible for many services within their areas, including education, although Article 4 of the Plan declares that cultural, religious and educational rights of members of one community living in the area administered by the other community are "protected". Greek Cypriots fear that returning families would find that their cultural identity would be suppressed by a Turkish Cypriot administration. They therefore seek adjustments to the Annan Plan which would give the federal authorities a greater role in the provision of services such as education.[94]

Turkish 'settlers'

56. When Turkish troops occupied more than 36 per cent of Cyprus in 1974, most Greek Cypriots fled South of the ceasefire line. In 1975, almost all of those who had remained were expelled by the Turkish authorities. The homes, farms and businesses they left behind were more than the Turkish Cypriot population could use and into this partial vacuum were soon sucked thousands of Turkish citizens, mainly from Anatolia. This process was encouraged by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, and it has continued to the present day.[95] There has been much intermarriage between settlers and Turkish Cypriots and of course there are many children who have been born to such couples, who are regarded as being entirely Turkish Cypriot and who may be eligible for citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus. Large numbers of Turkish Cypriots have left their homeland, many of them using their status as Commonwealth citizens to emigrate to the United Kingdom, Australia or Canada. Their places, too, have largely been taken by newcomers from the Turkish mainland.

57. Although many Turkish Cypriots would be able to trace their ancestry to past generations of immigrants from Anatolia, a distinctly Turkish Cypriot identity has developed over the years. Turkish Cypriots generally adopt a more western and secular lifestyle than is followed in rural parts of mainland Turkey.[96] The term which is widely used to refer to mainland Turks who live in northern Cyprus is 'settlers', although many of them are migrant workers or others with no desire or intention of remaining permanently in Cyprus. For convenience, and for want of a more widely-accepted term, in this Report we refer collectively to Turks living in northern Cyprus who do not have citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus as 'settlers'.

58. To Greek Cypriots, the Turkish settlers are illegal immigrants, many of whom have illegally occupied their homes, taken over their businesses, and developed their land, whereas all but a few of the most hard-line Greek Cypriots will now recognise Turkish Cypriots as fellow citizens, with full property and other rights. We consider that the legal logic of this position is undeniable (notwithstanding this, it is of course denied by many Turks and Turkish Cypriots). The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is regarded by all states other than Turkey as the legal embodiment of the state formed in 1960 by international treaty. Only that government has the right to confer, or to remove citizenship. The administration north of the ceasefire line on the island, although it has exercised de facto control over more than one third of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus for more than 30 years, does not have de jure powers. It cannot confer citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus; it can only confer 'citizenship' of a country which no state other than Turkey recognises.

59. As with the troops issue, there is both a practical consideration and a principle at stake here. On the practical side, many settlers are occupying land and buildings which fall to be returned to Greek Cypriots under the Plan. They will have to go somewhere, and Greek Cypriots suggest that they should return to Turkey. Under the Annan Plan, thousands of them would have had to do just that, although the precise numbers are disputed. The Plan caps the number of persons of Turkish origin who can be given citizenship of Cyprus at 45,000 and provides for curbs on immigration from Turkey and Greece for a period up to 19 years.[97] In his Report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General suggested that "about half" of the settlers (a number certainly to be counted in the tens of thousands) would have to leave the island.[98] In his retort to Mr Annan, President Papadopoulos suggested that all but a few thousand would be able to stay,[99] and the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us that "under the 2004 version of the Plan, 111,000 Turkish settlers were either entitled to UCR citizenship or to residence."[100] The difference between the figures may be due partly to differing assumptions about what choice would be made by settlers offered the right of residence without citizenship.

60. The issue of principle is, as ever, more difficult to resolve. The corollary of the assertion by Mr Annan that thousands of settlers should return to Turkey is that thousands of those who remained would become citizens of the new Cyprus. Many Greek Cypriots find this difficult to accept: it alters the demography of the island; and it creates very close ties between a segment of the population and Turkey.[101] They would agree with the conclusion of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in May 2003 that "the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonization."[102]

61. Typical of the submissions we received from Greek Cypriots was that of Lobby for Cyprus, which told us that the settlers "were deliberately and cynically despatched to Cyprus by Turkey to change the demographic composition of the island" and which called for removal of these "colonists."[103] According to the Lordos study, three quarters of Greek Cypriots regard it as essential that as part of a settlement of the Cyprus problem more Turkish settlers should be obliged to leave the island, and well over half (63 per cent) also demand stricter limitations on future Turkish immigration.[104] The settler issue is thus one which appears to have caused many Greek Cypriots to vote against the Plan.

62. The related question, of whether Turkish settlers should have been allowed to vote in the referendum, is considered at paragraphs 73 to 80 below.

Financial and economic costs of implementation

63. When we visited Cyprus, we heard from some of those whom we met in the South that the Annan Plan was unfair in that its implementation would impose a high economic cost on Greek Cypriots. Not only would many Greek Cypriots lose part of the value of their homes, land or businesses in the North, but they would incur almost the whole cost of compensation for such unrecovered property and of rebuilding the infrastructure and reviving the economy in the areas returned to their administration.[105]

64. Further, under the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriot population would have borne 90 per cent of the cost of administering federal services of the United Cyprus Republic, despite constituting about 80 per cent of the population and holding only two thirds of the seats in the lower house of the legislature and half of the seats in the upper house. It is no surprise, therefore, to see in the Lordos study that 73 per cent of Greek Cypriots apparently regard a fairer distribution of costs as essential if they are to support a settlement, and that three quarters of them require Turkey to compensate them for the value of any property which cannot be recovered.[106]

65. Once again, we see an obstacle to acceptance of the Plan which is both practical and principled. No-one wants to dip into their pocket if it can be helped, but neither do Greek Cypriots see why they should pay to put right a wrong which, so far as they are concerned, was created by the Turkish Army and has been exacerbated ever since by poor decisions by those in charge of the North's economy, such as the use of the weak Turkish Lira as the currency, and a lack of investment. The fact that Greek Cypriots are on average three times wealthier than Turkish Cypriots[107] is not seen by them as sufficient reason for asking them to pay the bills for a reunification scheme which in any case delivers only part of what they seek.

The referendums of April 2004

66. Simultaneous referendums took place in both parts of the island on 24 April 2004. In the Turkish Cypriot area, 64.9 per cent of voters supported the Annan Plan; turnout was 87 per cent. In the Greek Cypriot area, 75.8 per cent of voters rejected the Plan, on a turnout of 88 per cent. Under the Plan's own terms, it was from that moment "null and void".[108] In this section, we examine the referendum campaigns in both communities.

The referendum in the South

67. The official referendum campaign lasted just over three weeks, but in the South of the island it effectively began months before. There has always been a strong element in Greek Cypriot political life which has rejected the very concept of a bi-communal (still less a bi-zonal) federation, believing that, as in many other countries, the rights of minorities should be protected in a strong, unified state. This element has never supported the basic premise of the Annan Plan and, as one of our witnesses observed, "the campaign for the 'No' started even before Mr Papadopoulos was President; it started from the very first day we had the first version of the Annan Plan."[109] A seemingly well-prepared and well-resourced 'No' campaign got under way as soon as the Plan was published. However, as Mr Annan noted in his report to the Security Council, supporters of the Plan could only start to sell it once its final shape was known, and "the 'Yes' campaign did not get up and running until the last 10 days before the referendum."[110]

68. In his broadcast to the Greek Cypriot people on 7 April, Mr Papadopoulos said that the Plan would "do away with our internationally recognised state exactly at the moment it strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the European Union" and called on them to give the Plan "a resounding No".[111] Three quarters of them did just that.

69. How did this result come about? Undoubtedly, as we have seen, the Greek Cypriots had (and still have) major and genuinely felt concerns about the terms of the Annan Plan, although those opposing the Plan were by no means in agreement as to why they were voting 'No'.[112] These concerns were shared, and even reinforced, by their political leadership. The President of Cyprus, most of the Greek Cypriot political leaders, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus and many other senior figures in the Greek Cypriot community campaigned openly and strongly for a 'No' vote. Even the political party AKEL, traditionally one of the most pro-settlement parties, after much discussion and a failed attempt to delay the vote, came out against the Plan, calling on the electorate to give it a 'soft No' (rejection now, to allow a better Plan to be accepted later). To former Turkish diplomat Özdem Sanberk, the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph was simple: "The failure of the Annan Plan, in my opinion, is the lack of the political will of the Greek Cypriot leadership, they did not speak up for the Annan Plan."[113]

70. Lord Hannay agreed that there had been a long-standing failure on the part of Greek Cypriot leaders:

I do think that all Greek Cypriot politicians, and that includes President Clerides and his party, have some responsibility for the fact that they did not prepare opinion on their side of the island for the necessary compromises. For many, many years, Greek Cypriot politicians in every election had promised the sky, the moon and the stars to their electorate, that all Greek Cypriots would go back, all Turkish troops would be removed and all the settlers would be sent back to Turkey. If you read their election speeches, that is what they said. Then of course the Annan Plan appeared, and it did not quite say that, and nobody was ready for it.[114]

71. Meanwhile, the international community, accustomed to hearing a loud 'No' from the direction of the 'presidential' palace in north Nicosia, failed to turn its ear to the South. By the time the approaching 'No' was heard in New York, London and elsewhere, the argument was lost. As Dr Savvides put it, "one of the things that I think that the international community can be criticised on is that it focused so much on the Turkish Cypriot community leadership in fact, how to avoid the obstacle named Rauf Denktash, that it ignored developments within the Greek Cypriot community."[115]

72. Whether a more energetic campaign by the international community, especially the countries of the European Union, to market the Plan to Greek Cypriot voters would have succeeded is open to question—it could just as easily have backfired.[116] What seems rather to have been the case is that those putting together the Plan were so aware of the need to avoid a 'No' vote in the North, that they put into it features which, in the context of unrealistically high Greek Cypriot expectations of what was achievable, made a 'No' vote more likely in the South. If this analysis is accepted, the outcome of the vote among Greek Cypriots was effectively already decided when the final text of the Plan was published on 31 March.[117]

The referendum in the North

73. To seasoned Cyprus-watchers, the 'Yes' result in the North was if anything a greater volte-face than the 'No' result on the other side of the Green Line, albeit a more welcome one. The elected leader of the Turkish Cypriot administration, Mr Talat, campaigned vigorously for a 'Yes'; elder statesman Rauf Denktash fought no less strongly for a 'No'. The December 2003 'parliamentary' elections had given Mr Talat and his pro-solution allies a shade over half of the votes, although post-election manoeuvres had robbed him of a majority in the Turkish Cypriot assembly. In the end, the views of the new generation of Turkish Cypriot politicians triumphed over those of the old. Lord Hannay felt that it was the lively political debate in northern Cyprus which was partly responsible for delivering such a strong 'Yes' in the referendum:

… interestingly enough, on the north of the island, they were ready for it, because they had been having a tremendously lively debate for two years about whether or not they could trust Mr Denktash to negotiate in good faith and finally they had come to the conclusion, the majority amongst them and that was reflected in the huge demonstrations in Nicosia at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, that he could not be trusted; and that they wanted to sign up to the Annan Plan and to join the European Union at the same time as the south.[118]

74. Much of the nervousness in advance of the referendum in the North was occasioned by uncertainty over how Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus would vote, given that one consequence of implementation of the Annan Plan was to be that thousands of settlers would have to leave the island. It is instructive, therefore, to look at the distribution of votes in the North.

75. According to figures provided to us by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, Turkish Cypriots (ie, Turkish Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus) were more supportive of the Plan than were Turkish settlers. The 'TRNC' told us that "the Iskele district, which is mostly populated by citizens who have acquired citizenship over the last 30 years, had the lowest percentage of Yes votes" in the North.[119] Even in Iskele (Trikomo), however, well over half of those voting supported the Plan. In areas with relatively few settlers, the 'Yes' vote was higher—in North Nicosia, it was over 70 per cent.[120] The apparent majority 'Yes' vote among settlers can probably be explained in part by the fact that many thousands of them would have gained citizenship under the Plan; for those who had calculated that they would qualify for such citizenship, a 'Yes' vote must have seemed tantamount to a ticket to Europe.

76. To many Greek Cypriots, the question of how many settlers voted for the Plan and whether they swung the vote (clearly, they did not) is irrelevant—the point is that as illegal immigrants they should not have been allowed to vote at all.[121] The Greek Cypriot leadership naturally raised this point with Mr Annan during the negotiating process, pointing out various precedents and legal opinions.[122] In his 'good offices' report, the Secretary-General noted that the Greek Cypriot side had proposed that voting in the referendum should be limited to those who had Cypriot citizenship in 1963 and their descendants.[123] The report refers to the "apparent impracticability" of this proposal and that it would have required the Turkish Cypriots to accept the Greek Cypriot interpretation of the history of their island in the early 1960s. In the event, despite "persistent, repeated calls" by the Greek Cypriot side to disenfranchise the settlers, they were allowed to vote in the referendum.[124] As Lord Hannay put it,

The voting rolls which existed for Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections and Turkish Cypriot presidential elections were in existence and they were what they were. I think it was generally agreed, and indeed the Greek Cypriots knew all about this, that this was a valid basis on which to seek an opinion.[125]

77. The arguments against allowing settlers to vote were undoubtedly strong. We acknowledge the force of the case made by the government of the Republic of Cyprus and we note that the electoral rolls in the North clearly include information on when voters attained 'citizenship'.[126] It would thus have been feasible to restrict the vote in the North to those born on the island, most of whom are Turkish Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Against this, however, it has to be remembered that the fate of the settlers, too, was being determined. Their right to remain on the island was at stake. Most of the settlers also consider themselves to be 'citizens' of the 'TRNC,' to which they pay their taxes and under whose laws they live. Their interests cannot, however, be ignored or dismissed.

78. We note in passing that Greek (or other) immigrants who have been given citizenship by the Republic of Cyprus are able to vote in elections or referendums in the South, but that Turkish Cypriot citizens of Cyprus who live in the South do not have the vote in elections. For this reason, electoral law in the Republic has been found to be discriminatory.[127]

79. One way of dealing with Greek Cypriot objections to the participation of settlers in any future vote in the North might be to require a solution to be approved by a majority of Turkish Cypriots, as well as by an overall majority of those taking part. A referendum carried out on such a basis could be regarded as valid by all parties. Turkish Cypriot objections to releasing information on the origins of voters would have to be overcome, to allow such a referendum process to be observed and validated by outside monitors.[128]

80. After careful consideration, we conclude that it was right that all those on the electoral roll in northern Cyprus were able to participate in the referendum held in April 2004, and we recommend that the same arrangements should apply in respect of any future referendum on a solution to the Cyprus problem.Territorial adjustments under the Annan Plan

(Source: The Annan Plan)

Developments since the referendums

The 'good offices' report of the Secretary-General

81. On 28 May 2004, the Secretary-General of the United Nations published a report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus. Noting that his plan had been accepted by the Turkish Cypriot electorate by a margin of two-to-one, but rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate by a margin of three-to-one, he concluded that the outcome of the referendums "represents another missed opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem. … There is no apparent basis for resuming the good offices effort while the current stalemate continues."[129] The disappointment felt by the Secretary-General and his team is evident both from the content and from the tone of the document, and is entirely understandable.

82. The Secretary-General's report provoked a remarkable response from President Papadopoulos. In a letter to Mr Annan dated 7 June, the President complained that parts of the report were "snide", "offensive", "ironic" and "sarcastic" and lambasted the UN's "misguided negotiating tactics", accusing it of acting with "undue haste".[130] One thing Mr Papadopoulos' letter ensured is that the UN will not be unduly hasty in seeking to revive its mission of good offices. Mr Papadopoulos appears to have replaced Mr Denktash as the man on Cyprus who says 'No'. As Lord Hannay put it to us, "I am afraid to say that his [Mr Papadopoulos'] communications to the Secretary-General that I have seen in the last year bear a striking resemblance to those of Mr Denktash in the previous 30 years."[131]

Political developments in the South

83. Following the referendum, Greek Cypriot politics have been characterised by much disagreement and recrimination, but there has been no fundamental shift in opinion. It must have been galling for Greek Cypriots, victims of an invasion by a militarily far superior foreign power in 1974, to find themselves portrayed as the wreckers of a deal which would have restored to them much—but not all—of their land, many—but not all—of their homes, and all of their international status. As Cyprus's former High Commissioner in London, Michael Attalides, has observed, "The Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriots have lost the moral high ground and the capital of good will accumulated with the international community from repeatedly being the side that had shown political will for solving the Cyprus problem."[132]

84. Most affected by the fallout from the referendum has been the major party on the left in south Cyprus, AKEL. Traditionally pro-settlement and with a history of talking and listening to moderate Turkish Cypriot politicians, AKEL has been undergoing what one of our witnesses described as "almost a crisis."[133] Its decision to call for a "soft No" in the referendum has left it bearing a large part of responsibility for the Plan's failure. We gained a sense when we were in Cyprus of a feeling that AKEL had misjudged the situation in April and was looking for ways of realigning itself, perhaps behind a modified Annan Plan. As the Minister for Europe suggested to us, "there were people [in AKEL] listening perhaps to the tom-toms in the undergrowth and no political party necessarily wants to be on the wrong side of a referendum vote."[134] Such a political party is also likely to wish to be on the right side of a vote, when circumstances change. The challenge for AKEL, it was suggested to us when we visited the island, is to work for and to lead that change.

85. One question which many friends of Cyprus have asked themselves in the wake of the referendum in the South is, does Greek Cyprus really want a settlement? Anticipating that question, the Government of Cyprus told us "in the strongest possible terms, that Greek Cypriots … rejected this particular Plan and not the solution of the Cyprus problem."[135] But what sort of solution would Greek Cypriots have supported? As the real possibility of a bi-zonal federation loomed, many Greek Cypriots must have viewed with alarm the prospect of a formal end to the existence of the Republic of Cyprus as created in 1960. What many Greek Cypriots actually wanted, it was suggested to us, was a return to a strong, central state. They may still want it. In the words of Dr Brewin, "Mr Papadopoulos has been very consistent since his early beginnings as a leader of the struggle in wanting a proper sovereign state with minority rights for Turkish Cypriots, but he has never taken the view that this should mean that they should have an equal power in the state."[136] It is our view that the actions and inactions of the present Greek Cypriot political leadership are entirely consistent with a strategy designed, over time, to achieve a unitary state and to avoid a bi-zonal solution. Such a strategy would be predicated on full membership of the EU (now achieved), continuing the isolation of northern Cyprus and placing the onus on Turkey to reconcile its EU aspirations with its stance on the Cyprus problem, thus achieving for Greek Cypriots a more attractive solution than UN-sponsored negotiations could ever produce.

86. The Lordos study of Greek Cypriot public opinion asked one thousand Greek Cypriots to choose their preferred model for the future of Cyprus. Very slightly fewer than half of the sample opted for a unitary state as their "ideal solution", and only 16 per cent opposed it.[137] If this survey, which we understand was conducted in full conformity with accepted standards for such exercises, is accurate, it suggests a degree of attachment among Greek Cypriots to the unitary state model which the supporters of any revised plan incorporating a bi-zonal solution will have to work hard to overcome.

87. However, the picture may not be so bleak as it appears. The same survey also found that, although only 14.7 per cent of Greek Cypriots would regard a bi-zonal solution as an ideal solution, almost 70 per cent of them would tolerate it.[138] Thus, there appears to be an acceptance on the part of most Greek Cypriots that a bi-zonal solution is the most likely outcome. What is far from certain is whether the present Greek Cypriot political leadership shares that view; we suspect they do not.

Political developments in the North

88. In October 2004, the minority administration of 'prime minister' Mehmet Ali Talat, who had campaigned strongly in favour of the Annan Plan, resigned as it became apparent that there would be no early 'reward' for Turkish Cypriots' support for the Annan Plan and some of his supporters defected.[139] Mr Talat, whom we met during our visit to Cyprus, has remained in office pending elections, which are to be held on 20 February. There have also been suggestions in the press that he will stand for 'president' in further elections, due in April.[140] The current incumbent, Rauf Denktash, has announced that he will not seek re-election, although neither does he intend to retire from politics.[141]

89. Michael Attalides suggested that Rauf Denktash "seems to have been moved to the sidelines",[142] although his voice is surely loud enough to be heard from there. However, his influence on Turkish Cypriot—and, perhaps more significantly—on Turkish public opinion is likely to remain strong. Mr Denktash is the most prominent rejectionist in the North, but he is far from alone. The National Unity Party (UBP), founded by Mr Denktash, is the main right-wing political grouping in northern Cyprus and has been in power for most of the past 30 years. It opposed the Annan Plan on the basis that it would have resulted in economic domination of the North by Greek Cypriots. Echoing comments by rejectionist Greek Cypriots about the Plan's alleged lack of 'functionality', the UBP also told us that the Plan would have been unworkable in practice "even with goodwill and tolerance on both sides."[143]

90. Professor Clement Dodd, who is close to a number of leading Turkish Cypriot politicians, has concluded that "There would seem to be little profit in persisting with the Annan Plan."[144] His view reflects a tendency among influential figures in the North to see a bi-zonal solution of the Cyprus problem as being against the interests of Turkish Cypriots. This tendency supports a Turkish Cypriot state which is either independent or in a very loose confederation with a Greek Cypriot state and which has a continuing close relationship with Turkey. The political resurgence of the UBP since the referendum may be evidence that this view is gaining ground among Turkish Cypriot voters. According to Professor Dodd, "it is now difficult to see an alternative to a two-state solution."[145] If this is so, it underlines the extent of the opportunity missed last April.

91. It is clear that the continued support of Turkish Cypriots for a solution based on the Annan Plan cannot be taken for granted. The results of the 'parliamentary' elections in the North on 20 February will be the best indication of the extent to which Turkish Cypriots remain convinced that a bi-zonal solution is both a realistic and a desirable goal.


92. During our visit to Cyprus, we were warned by almost every Greek Cypriot we met not to support international moves to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The reasoning behind this was that, once Turkish Cypriots have the economic benefits of direct trade with and travel to the rest of Europe, they will cease to have any incentive to support a political settlement on the island. This is the counterpart of the argument used by Turkish Cypriots in the years leading up to Cyprus's accession to the European Union, that Greek Cypriots would have no incentive to resolve the island's problems once they had achieved for themselves the benefits of membership of the EU.

93. We do not believe that either of these theories holds true for the majority of Cypriots. On the contrary, we believe that most people in both communities on Cyprus, well educated and economically literate as they are, realise very well that all Cypriots stand to gain from a politically and economically secure united state of Cyprus which is within the EU. We certainly gained the impression that most Greek Cypriots, although now enjoying the benefits of EU membership, remain convinced of the need for a settlement of their island's problems; and our discussions with Turkish Cypriot politicians and business people persuaded us that they, too, see the bigger picture. Together, both communities can achieve so much more than they can apart.

94. However, there can be no perfect solution, no magic formula which delivers all the demands of both communities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike will need to make concessions if a workable, lasting settlement is to be achieved. Their leaders will have to show qualities of statesmanship which have not been apparent thus far and to demonstrate their commitment to whatever settlement may be agreed, by campaigning for a resounding 'Yes'.

95. Michael Attalides has written that Cyprus now finds itself in the "third space" of the European Union, a place where the atmosphere may be more conducive to a settlement than on Cyprus itself, or even the United Nations.[146] In the next Chapter, we consider the Cyprus problem in relation to the EU and the prospects for agreement on aid to and trade with the North of the island.

20   Q 41 [Lord Hannay] Back

21   Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2001-02, Turkey, HC 606, Ev 3 Back

22   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2003/398 Back

23   Q 46 Back

24   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, paras 58-61 Back

25   Ibid, para 6 Back

26   US State Department background note on Cyprus, December 2004, available at Figures released by the Cyprus government in January 2005 show 2.3 million crossings by Greek Cypriots and 3.6 million by Turkish Cypriots since the Line was opened. Back

27   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 10 Back

28   Ibid, Annex I Back

29   Ibid Back

30   Ev 78 [Cyprus High Commission]. President Papadopoulos blamed the "undue haste" on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side. Back

31   BBC News, 22 April 2004 Back

32   Q 2 Back

33   Q 236 [Mirel] Back

34   Q 3 [Savvides] Back

35   The full text of President Papadopoulos' speech is available at Back

36   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 66 Back

37   Ibid, para 65 Back

38   See Back

39   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 20 and Summary Back

40   Not printed, available in the Records Office Back

41   Ev 73 [Cyprus High Commission] Back

42   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 37 Back

43   Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, p 245 Back

44   Q 24 [Brewin] Back

45   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 77 Back

46   Ibid, para 78 Back

47   Ibid, para 76 Back

48   ie, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee Back

49   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, paras 30-35 Back

50   Ibid, Annex I Back

51   Ibid, summary Back

52   Q 118 Back

53   Available at References in the following paragraphs are to the authenticated text of the Main Articles dated 23 April 2004. Back

54   Article 2 Back

55   Article 3 Back

56   Article 5 Back

57   Article 6. The non-Cypriot judges would participate in decisions of the court only when a majority of the Cypriot judges could not agree. Back

58   Article 8 Back

59   Article 9; see also Map 2 Back

60   Article 10; see also paras 46 to 55 below Back

61   See paras 183 to 216 below Back

62   Can the Cyprus Problem be solved? Understanding the Greek Cypriot response to the UN Peace Plan for Cyprus, Alexandros Lordos, October 2004 Back

63   Ev 135 Back

64   Ev 260 Back

65   Ev 135 Back

66   Preliminary findings available at Back

67   Third Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1986-87, Cyprus, HC 23, para 36 Back

68   See . Turkish PM Erdoðan has claimed the true number of Greek troops in Cyprus is 6,000, see Back

69   Ev 257 [UBP] Back

70   Annan Plan, Article 8 Back

71   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 55 Back

72   Ev 118 Back

73   UN document S/2004/313 Back

74   Annan Plan Version 5, p 170. See also Q 44 [Lord Hannay] Back

75   Qq 44, 213  Back

76   Ev 129 [Claire Palley] Back

77   Cyprus Mail, 12 January 2005 Back

78   Q 213 Back

79   Ev 74 [Cyprus High Commission] Back

80   Ev 227 [Constantis Candounas] Back

81   Lordos study, pp 44-45 Back

82   Lordos study, p 53 Back

83   Qq 19, 27 [Savvides], 26 [Brewin]; Ev 36 [FCO], 101 [Cyprus MFA], 115 [Claire Palley] Back

84   According to the US Committee for Refugees. See Back

85   Cyprus: The search for a solution, David Hannay, I B Tauris, December 2004, p 37 Back

86   Annan Plan, Annex VII Back

87   See Ev 226 [Constantis Candounas] Back

88   Ev 117 Back

89   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 51 Back

90   Ev 36 Back

91   Lordos study, p 46 Back

92   Ev 214 Back

93   For example, in evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1986. Back

94   According to the Lordos study (p46), more than half of Greek Cypriots regard such a change as essential. Back

95   Q 36 [Savvides] Back

96   Ev 174 [Ahmet Djavit An] Back

97   Annan Plan Article 3; see also Ev 59 [FCO] and HC Deb, 14 October 2004, col 366W Back

98   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 60 Back

99   Ev 85 [Cyprus High Commission] Back

100   Ev 116 Back

101   See, e.g., Ev 276 [Lobby for Cyprus] Back

102   CoE Doc 9799, para 6 Back

103   Ev 276 Back

104   Lordos study, p 50 Back

105   Ev 116-7 [Cyprus MFA] Back

106   Lordos study, pp 48 & 49 Back

107   CIA world factbook Back

108   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 80 Back

109   Q 5 [Savvides] Back

110   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 67 Back

111   See Back

112   Cyprus Review, vol 16 No 1, Spring 2004 [Michael Attalides] Back

113   Q 81 Back

114   Q 46 Back

115   Q 5 Back

116   See Q 36 [Savvides] Back

117   See Ev 224 [Constantis Candounas] Back

118   Q 46 Back

119   Ev 170 Back

120   Ev 171 Back

121   See paras 56 to 61 Back

122   Ev 85 [Cyprus MFA] Back

123   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, para 62 Back

124   Ev 75 [Cyprus High Commission] Back

125   Q 60 Back

126   Ev 170 [TRNC] Back

127   European Court of Human Rights judgment, Aziz v Cyprus, quoted in Ev 133 [Dr Claire Palley] Back

128   Ev 170 [TRNC] Back

129   Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, UNSC document S/2004/437, summary Back

130   Ev 76, 78, 80 [Cyprus High Commission] Back

131   Q 47 Back

132   Cyprus Review, vol 16 No 1, Spring 2004 Back

133   Q 7 [Savvides] Back

134   Q 191 Back

135   Ev 89 [Cyprus MFA] Back

136   Q 5 Back

137   Lordos study, p 15 Back

138   Ibid Back

139   Ev 222 [Professor Dodd] Back

140   For example, in Milliyet on 22 January 2005. Back

141   In an interview with the Turkish News Agency TAK on 14 May 2004. Back

142   Cyprus Review, vol 16 No 1, Spring 2004 Back

143   Ev 263 Back

144   Ev 220 Back

145   Ev 221 Back

146   Cyprus Review, vol 16 No 1, Spring 2004 Back

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