|The UK e-University project was effectively wound up last year by HEFCE, having spent £50 million of public money but having succeeded only in attracting 900 students. We inquired into the issue to find out why this had happened, what lessons could be learnt from the failure of the project, and to consider the future for e-learning and e-Universities in the UK.
Our findings are that the UKeU failed largely because it took a supply-driven rather than demand led approach. This supply-driven approach, combined with the very ambitious nature of the venture in an emerging market that did not sustain the high expectations of demand, and an inability to work in effective partnership with the private sector, led to the failure of UKeU to meet its targets, aims, and objectives. The launch of the first UKeU courses was delayed until September 2003. When launched, they attracted just 900 students against a target of 5,600. Furthermore, despite it being a condition of grant, UKeU failed to attract significant private investment.
We have also concluded that there was insufficient market research. There was no formal market research undertaken to assess either the level of demand or the nature of the demand and the type of e-learning required. There was no systematic evaluation of the markets, no thorough and robust market research, and no understanding of consumer demand.
UKeU also focused too much on providing an integrated e-learning platform. UKeU allowed the development of the technology platform to drive its strategy and the development of programmes. It had a skewed focus on the platform, based on an assumption that once this was right, the original projections of very high student numbers would be easy to realise. Unfortunately this assumption was not based on research evidence, but on an over-confident presumption about the scale of the demand for wholly internet based e-learning.
The project failed to form effective partnerships with, or gain significant investment from, the private sector. UKeU's attempt to form genuine partnerships with the private sector was a commendable aim and could have helped it to stay competitive and market-orientated. Instead, UKeU became another example of how difficult the public sector finds it to form successful partnerships with the private sector. The failure to find private sector partners or investors should, however, have caused the holding company, HEFCE and the DfES to have concerns sooner rather than later about the viability of the project.
One issue which provoked public comment was the awarding of bonuses to senior executives of UK e-U. The bonus scheme and potential share packages are examples of the anomalies that were caused by the fact that the structure and systems were set up under the assumption that private investment would be part of the project. When little investment was forthcoming, the structure and systems were not changed to reflect the circumstances in which UKeU was operating. Systems and structures that may have been considered appropriate when set against the original plan became inappropriate for a venture that was almost entirely publicly funded. We consider that for either the private sector or the public sector the bonuses paid to senior staff were wholly unacceptable and morally indefensible. The argument that they reflect private sector practice does not stand up to scrutiny. Any company which paid bonuses of this kind having underperformed in the way that UK e-U did would face severe criticism from its shareholders.
We do not want the Government to become increasingly risk-averse as a result of what happened with UKeU experience. Instead it should learn from this experience and, in the future, take a more experimental approach to such high risk ventures. This would involve focussing more on testing various models and prototypes; taking an evidence-based approach; involving the private sector as partners in a more organic process; undertaking effective risk-assessment procedures; and setting open and transparent success criteria for such projects.
We recognise the important role the Government has to play in providing support, information and guidance for e-learning to develop within HEIs. The Government's role in providing an overarching national strategy for e-learning is vital to ensure consistency, coherence, and clarity of purpose in developments across the sector. The Government must clarify its national strategy for developing e-learning in the UK and how it intends to invest in and support e-learning across the HE sector in a way that provides coherent progress.