Civil Contingencies Bill

---

[back to previous text]

Mr. Evans: I was concerned with activities that utility companies are not normally involved with from day to day—if there were something exceptional, for example, an act of terrorism, where they were instructed to do certain things that they would not normally be doing.

Mr. Alexander: I am sure that we can find common ground in Committee in recognising that the utilities already carry out a wide range of civil protection work as part of their standard work. The additional duties for utility companies described in the Bill are minimal. I would pray in aid the case study identified in the regulatory impact assessment concerning the position of the united utilities. I understand that the figure in question there was about £2,000. It is important to have a sense of proportion in recognising both the mainstream responsibilities and other potential burdens or other duties under which utilities would find themselves operating.

The key element underpinning the whole of this clause stand part debate, however, is the question of funding for local authorities. The first thing to place on record is the fact that Government funding is not the only source of investment in local authority emergency planning. Local authorities have for many years made additional funding available to support the function of such planning, which boosts the resources for local civil protection in each community throughout the country, and we know that local authorities have concerns about the level of funding. Consistent with the collaborative and discursive approach we have taken, we have been in discussion with representatives of the London Government Association. Indeed I have met LGA representative to discuss a range of matters related to the Bill. We are working closely with the LGA to resolve this issue and establish what burdens if any the Bill might add.

Any additional pressures will be considered as part of the established public expenditure processes, which will be addressed in due course. Local authorities have received a substantial injection of new funding for emergency planning since 2001—an increase of 35 per cent. Significant new investment has also been made since 11 September 2001, particularly into front-line local civil protection activities such as those of the fire service or of the police. Local authorities have been able to build agreement with the authorities into their plans and improve their capacity to respond in those circumstances.

On the point about the LGA survey and estimated spending of £36 million, the civil defence grant is a contribution to the cost of civil protection at a local level. Local authorities have always supplemented the

Column Number: 75

level of grant, which again I clarify is provided for emergency planning rather than being in any way broader than that. We are working closely with the LGA to resolve the issue and it will ultimately reach its conclusion in the 2004 spending review process.

I must emphasise that the essence of the Bill is a framework of civil protection. Funding is a separate matter to be considered as part of the spending review process. In that regard, the Bill is largely organisational.

Mr. Carmichael: Can the Minister offer any explanation as to why local authorities in Northern Ireland do not seem to be category 1 responders? That is on the principle.

Mr. Alexander: I shall be happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on the specific point of Northern Ireland because I am keen to move on and, in the limited time remaining, to cover the question of warning and informing the public.

The Bill will effectively reinforce arrangements at a local level to provide information about risks and planning preparation. The Government are committed to giving the public as much information as they can about threats and risks. Our guiding principle is that whatever, whenever and wherever information is available that will help to protect the public, we will give detailed advice in advance about how to handle every threat. We heard about several threats in the course of our discussion that could be misleading and unhelpful and could lead to confusion in an incident where members of the public, shorn of the local responsibility that I will describe in a minute, could misinterpret the circumstances that they were encountering.

It was suggested that a better system operates in Australia. Certainly, the Government are considering—and keep under review—the need to communicate directly with the public about what is an appropriate and sensible way forward in sharing information with them. Before any incident, it is appropriate and right to assure the public that measures are in place for their protection, but it is not always appropriate to specify in each and every circumstance the precise nature of those measures that are being taken.

We have heard compliments paid to the UK Resilience website, operated by the Government. Far from being overly secretive, such sites are designed to address the public's information demands. The Government, however, keep under review how we communicate with the public and how they should respond in the event of a major incident. We take that responsibility seriously. We have a long track record of having been able to work effectively with local responders—not least, the experience of Irish terrorism for more than 30 years has meant that the British public are well used to taking direction in circumstances of an incident, particularly from the emergency services. The public have a great deal of common sense that has been brought to bear in particular circumstances such as those we have experienced over the past 30 years.

Column Number: 76

Part 1 of the Bill is about making information available during the response phase. Local responders need to be able to issue warnings to make sure that the public stay out of harm's way or seek appropriate help. The Bill refers to arrangements and it is our intention to use the regulations to ensure that local responders work together to develop common warning arrangements based on jointly owned resources or protocols for who will take the lead in certain circumstances. That is more appropriately dealt with in the regulations.

By and large, those organisations with responsibility for warning the public, will retain those obligations under the Bill. The question of the range of exercises that have been run past government was raised, and the suggestion was made that no preparatory work was being undertaken, or at least questions were raised as to whether emergency exercises were being undertaken. I hope that I can offer the Committee some assurance on that point. It is simply not the case to suggest that exercises have not been undertaken. Indeed, the hon. Member for Ribble Valley recognised Operation Osiris on the London tube, which I attended last September.

5 pm

The Government and emergency services train regularly and practise their responses to all kinds of major incidents, including natural disasters and accidents. In addition, the Home Office runs a programme of major exercises that specifically deal with terrorist scenarios. The proportion of live to simulated elements in each exercise varies according to the exercise scenario. The type of exercises that have taken place include table-top exercises, command-post exercises and full-scale live exercises. Depending on the various scenarios that have been undertaken in this work, they can involve any or all of the following: Government Departments, the emergency services, the military, local authorities, scientists and technical experts, utility companies and the security services.

In July 2000, Exercise Trump Card simulated a release of chemicals in London without any warning, which would have led to casualties and deaths among members of the public and the emergency services. Throughout the exercise, other dangerous devices were located and disrupted around the city, including on the underground. This was one of at least three full-scale live terrorist attacks and approximately 12 to 15 table-top exercises that take place each year. Other recent live exercises have included a hijacked aircraft, terrorist occupation of an offshore oil well and ships, the release or threatened release of chemical and biological agents, and nuclear devices. Of course, all exercises are fully evaluated and participants given detailed feedback, as was the case with Operation Osiris. I believe I have covered the funding points raised.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Column Number: 77

Clause 3

Section 2: supplemental

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Evans: We have not tabled any amendments to this clause, which is fairly short. It deals with a Minister of the Crown issuing guidance to a person or body listed in part 1 or 3 of schedule 1 about the matters specified in clause 2(3) and (5), the same applying in Scotland. However, I wish to press the Minister a little further on guidance. Exactly when will the general guidance become available, so that proper evaluations as to the cost and the likelihood can be made? I heard what he said earlier about the grand settlement for next year not yet being made, and this will not come into force until then. Today, we are giving best guidance. We are updating the Emergency Powers Act 1920, and various Acts that have come since. I assume that bodies are not waiting in splendid isolation before they start to update their plans, but are actually doing so. I am sure that the Minister is approaching the bodies mentioned in the Bill and that they are making representations to him. I hope he can give us some assurance that they have already begun to ensure that the plans they have in place are up to date in connection with every eventuality.

I am also seeking information as to when this guidance will come about. We have praised UK Resilience to the hilt and the Minister could, under clause 3(1) regarding issuing guidance, ensure that bodies mention that website somewhere in the literature they put out to members of the public. I found the website useful, but had it not been for the Bill's supplementary guidance notes, I would never have heard of it. We should encourage members of the public to visit the website now, as it is pointless to do so once an emergency happens, then nip down to the shop to get candles and all the other things needed, because there will be pressure on those items. Once it is rumoured that there will be a shortage of something, members of the public will go out and buy it, creating a shortage. Any manufacturer who has a stockpile of something should let it be known that there will be a shortage, and it will soon get rid of the excess.

 

---

Prepared 27 January 2004