|
Malcolm Bruce: I think in a way that the hon. Gentleman makes my point, which is why we should terminate the debate. Otherwise, it is in danger of becoming a large sledgehammer to crack a possibly non-existent nut.
Mr. Sutcliffe: In solidarity with the hon. Member for Gordon, he has hit the nail on the head—or the nut with the sledgehammer.
All the points about small businesses are well made, and I am grateful to my hon. Friends the hon. Members for Hastings and Rye and for West Renfrewshire for their explanations. As I said, small businesses are the lifeblood of the UK and the Government are clear about the impact of
Column Number: 59
employment regulations. That is why we have introduced an annual statement on those regulations and why the Department of Trade and Industry leads across government in terms of the Better Regulation Task Force, which considers unnecessary legislation that is no longer appropriate to small businesses and other organisations.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Renfrewshire makes a point about trade union involvement. I, like him, was involved in a previous life in negotiating downsizing. That was one of the unfortunate effects of the stewardship of the last Conservative Government. There was downsizing in a range of companies in the printing industry. Companies of that size have nothing to fear. Ninety-five of the top 100 companies listed on the stock market have trade union agreements and are trade union organised. Trade unions can be a force for good. I know that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk says that he believes that trade unions are not bad; I am not sure that that view is shared by the hon. Member for Huntingdon, after the way in which he has outlined his position today. The hon. Member for Gordon is right that this amendment is unnecessary. It would add further burdens to business. It is also technically deficient as it refers to companies rather than employers. On the matter of technicalities alone, we should not be able to accept it, because the term ''company'' is not used elsewhere in the statutory procedure. That is a trivial point concerning the drafting of the amendment but, returning to the theme of derecognition, we do not think that it is a tool that needs to be used. The statutory procedures give people the opportunity to derecognise where appropriate, so I ask the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk to withdraw the amendment.
Mr. Bellingham: The Minister has again been courteous and logical in his argument. We shall come back to the issue later because we feel strongly about it. I accept that there are some technical deficiencies in the amendment, but the principle is important. If the hon. Member for Gordon had read the representations from people such as the Engineering Employers Federation, the CBI, the Institute of Directors and British Chambers of Commerce, he would be aware of their concerns about the matter.
Mr. Sutcliffe: On that point, I must correct the hon. Gentleman. I do not think that those organisations mention companies with fewer than 10 staff. Their point concerns the Government's position on companies with fewer than 21 staff. I have not seen in any correspondence or heard in meetings with the organisations that the hon. Gentleman mentions any reference to companies of fewer than 10 staff.
Mr. Bellingham: I do not want to betray any confidences, but we have talked to those organisations and have gone through the Bill clause by clause with
Column Number: 60
them. They expressed various concerns to us, but we shall return to this later. Bearing that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Appeals against demands for costs
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Bellingham: I want to raise a point that is more of a question. On page 10 of the Bill, new paragraph 165A(3) reads:
''An appeal under this paragraph lies to an employment tribunal.''
I know that the Minister is an expert on employment tribunals, so I should like to ask him about how the system is getting over-loaded. I understand that, last calendar year, there were more than 130,000 employment tribunal cases. Recent legislation, such as the right to flexible contracts, will burden them further. It appears that we are moving further towards a conversation culture, in which people jump at any turn to make appeals to tribunals.
Does the Minister feel that the employment tribunal is the right forum in which to hear appeals against demands for costs? Presumably, the Government's logic is that using such tribunals is tidier, more focused and more expeditive than using the county court system or another tribunal. Will he elaborate on that?
Mr. Sutcliffe: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising the issue. Through dispute resolution and the legislation that we have introduced to deal with problems in the workplace rather than a tribunal, the number of tribunals has decreased. Long may that continue because people resolving their differences around a table is the best remedy.
When a ballot is held under the statutory procedure, a qualified independent person, as described earlier, is appointed by the CAC to conduct the ballot. Those same appointed persons send information to workers on behalf of the union during balloting. Clause 5 seeks to extend that role to earlier parts of the process. The costs of the QIP's services in holding the ballot are paid for equally by the union and the employer. When the QIP distributes information on behalf of the union, the costs are borne solely by the union.
The evidence so far is that the arrangement works well. However, the law provides for the QIP to recover the costs by court order if one or more of the parties fail to pay their share. As the law stands, there is no formal means of appealing against a QIP's demand for costs. Unions and employers should have the right to put their case before a court if they believe that they have been wrongly charged. Indeed, it is not clear whether the current situation complies with the European convention on human rights, and we are anxious to remove any uncertainty.
Column Number: 61
The clause establishes a right for unions and/or employers to appeal against the cost of the services of a QIP or appointed person. Such appeals would be heard by an employment tribunal, which provides a cheap and accessible means of remedying breaches of employment law.
We expect the clause to be used infrequently, and hope that parties would be able to resolve any disagreements without recourse to an employment tribunal. We are not aware of any cases in which a QIP has had to seek a court order for the recovery of costs. However, the Government take seriously their commitment to human rights and we therefore wish to ensure that any party that believes that they have been incorrectly billed should be able to seek a court verdict before being required to pay.
Mr. Bellingham: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Power to amend Schedule A1 to the 1992 Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
4 pm
Mr. Bellingham: Clause 11 refers to the
''power of the Secretary of State to amend that Schedule''.
Will the Minister confirm how the power will be exercised? Will it be by Order in Council? Presumably, it will be done through regulations appearing before both Houses.
Mr. Sutcliffe: The Government aim to ensure that the recognition procedure works smoothly, effectively and fairly. Our review of the Employment Relations Act 1999 found that the procedure worked well overall. However, considerable parts of what is a lengthy procedure are still untested. Inconsistencies or operational difficulties with the process could come to light as the body of cases grows. Therefore, the Government may want to make technical amendments to the procedure without using valuable parliamentary time in amending the schedule through primary legislation.
When the 1999 Act was drafted, a power to amend the schedule was not included to avoid constant pressure for operational changes during the settling-in period. The procedure has now operated for more than three and a half years and has been broadly accepted as a reasonable settlement. There is much less uncertainty about the effects of the legislation.
The clause provides a new power for the Secretary of State to amend any provision in the schedule by order. He or she may do so only if the CAC informs them that the provision in question has an unsatisfactory effect. However, the Secretary of State is not obliged to amend the schedule in the way proposed by the CAC. The CAC is an independent and
Column Number: 62
highly regarded body with much specialist knowledge. Allowing the CAC that role will ensure that the power to amend the schedule will be used for sensible or technical amendments.
The new power does not interfere with the Secretary of State's discretion to exercise existing powers to amend particular parts of schedule A1 on her own initiative. The powers include, for example, paragraph (7) of the schedule, which allows the Secretary of State to change the 21-worker threshold. The power will not prevent the Secretary of State from independently exercising other specific powers in the Bill.
The power is limited. Orders under the power will be made only by the affirmative resolution procedure. Parliament will therefore have adequate opportunity to scrutinise orders. As a general rule, we will consult interested parties on draft orders before they are tabled in Parliament, as we usually do. The power will allow the Government to respond promptly and effectively to any operational difficulties with the procedure that may arise. We believe that it is a sensible measure.
Mr. Bellingham: The Minister said that parties would be consulted as a general rule. Would it not make sense to consult interested parties at all times?
| 
