Standing Committee B
Tuesday 19 October 2004
(Morning)
[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]
Clause 7
Co-operation to improve well-being
8.55 am
Mr. Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight): I beg to move amendment No. 210, in
clause 7, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
'(3A) In making arrangements under subsection (3) a children's services authority shall (where parents each have responsibility for a child but are separated) have regard to the rights and wishes of both parents.'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Amendment No. 221, in
clause 7, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
'(3A) In making arrangements under this section a children's services authority shall, where persons with parental responsibility of a child are separated, take all reasonable steps to facilitate the implementation of any court order relating to access or in the absence of such an order the child's access to each parent.'.
Amendment No. 222, in
New clause 42—Presumption of equal parenting—
'(1) The Children Act 1989 (c.41) is amended as follows:
(2) After section 1(1) after ''the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration'', add—
''(1A) In respect of subsection (1)(a) above the court shall, unless a contrary reason be shown, act on the presumption that a child's welfare is best served through residence with its parents and if its parents are not living together, through residence with one of them and through both of them being as fully and equally involved in his parenting as possible.''.'.
New clause 44—Judicial responsibility for child welfare—
'(1) In all proceedings affecting access to children, the courts shall have regard to the desirability of a child having appropriate access to parents, siblings and grandparents.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect—
(a) a court's power to impose a custodial sentence where appropriate; or
(b) the Home Secretary's power to deport an alien.'.
Mr. Turner: As the sun peeps through the steely south London sky, it is a great pleasure to welcome you once again to the Chair, Mr. Benton. I intend to gallop through these amendments, but if I leave anything to the imagination, I am happy to take interventions.
Amendment No. 210 would ensure that when parents separated, children's services authorities would take account of the wishes of both parents in relation to any decisions taken about the children. I
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shall give two examples of how that would have made my life, and those of some of my constituents, easier in recent months.
The first example relates to school choice. There is no guidance to local authorities about whose choice of the child's schooling they should take account of when parents are separated. In my constituency, there was a family whose parents did not live too far apart, and the child shared access to both parents. One school was conveniently situated between their homes and another was well away to one side of the home of one parent and so much less convenient for the other parent. If the child had been educated at the second school, it would have been more difficult for them to have access to the second parent.
The form for the parent to indicate a choice of school went home with the child when they were staying with the first parent, who chose the school further away from the home of the second parent. That made it difficult for the second parent to be involved in the schooling of the child to the extent that they would have wished. The local authority could say only that, because it got the form from the first parent, it could not take account of the choice of the second parent, because only one choice could be exercised for each child. I would like to amend the clause to require public authorities to take account of the wishes of both parents in such circumstances.
The second example is of a child living hundreds of miles away from my constituency with a parent who is separated from her spouse. In that case, the second parent is unable to obtain information about the child's schooling, because the school has been told that he has no parental rights—it has not inquired of him whether he has any parental rights—and it has refused, for example, to pass on letters from the second parent to the child, and to pass on reports to the second parent.
I see the Minister of State shaking her head as if to say that those things should not happen. I accept that they should not, but sadly they do. It may be unnecessary to amend the Bill in the way that I propose to take account of the second case, but it is helpful to underline the issues. On the first example, there must be an explicit requirement for the local authority to take account of the wishes not only of the parent who happens to reply first, but of both parents.
Amendment No. 221 would place a similar requirement on children's services authorities in respect of parents having access. The placing by one parent of impediments to the other parent's access to the child is one of the gravest concerns surrounding separation. The amendment would require a children's services authority to
''take all reasonable steps to facilitate the implementation of any court order . . . or in the absence of such an order the child's access to each parent.''
Of course, that would apply not where parental access and responsibility had been denied by the court but where it had been permitted.
Amendment No. 222 would require the judiciary to have regard to the needs of children. It includes the judiciary in the bodies with responsibility for making
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arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. That relates in particular to my new clause 44, which simply says that the courts should have regard to the desirability of a child having appropriate access not only to parents but to siblings and grandparents. I say ''appropriate'' access because clearly the extent of access to siblings and, in particular, grandparents may be less than that which is appropriate for parents. None the less, it is now recognised as important that children should have access to their grandparents where that is reasonably practicable.
I tabled the new clause because in recent adoption proceedings the interests of the child who was up for adoption were, rightly, paramount, but the courts appeared to have no regard to the needs of his sister, who remained with the original family. I have read the judgment—which I understand I should not have done—and it is clear that it did not refer to the needs of the sibling. That is wrong and something that we should take account of in the Bill.
New clause 42, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), would establish
''the presumption that a child's welfare is best served through residence with its parents''
and the presumption—it is a presumption only, but it is a starting point—that a child should have equal access to each parent. That is not unreasonable. The new clause does not in any way insist that a child be divided between each parent, but it says that a child's interests are well served if he has access to both parents.
The Minister for Children, Young People and Families (Margaret Hodge): We are coming to the nub of a very important issue. Which principle does the hon. Gentleman believe should have paramountcy? I ask because we cannot have two paramount principles. Should the paramount principle be the interests of the child or the rights of parents to equal time with each child?
Mr. Turner: New clause 42 is clear about that. It states:
''In respect of subsection (1)(a) . . . the court shall, unless a contrary reason be shown, act on the presumption that a child's welfare is best served through residence with its parents''.
Margaret Hodge: We cannot have two paramount principles: one must be more important than the other. Clearly, there will be sub-interests, but I am simply trying to establish with the hon. Gentleman, as I shall with the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, which principle is paramount: the interests of the child or the rights of parents to access. It is important that the public be clear about what the Conservative party is saying.
Mr. Turner: The new clause says nothing about the rights of the parents to access. It speaks of the child's right to have access to its parents, which is an entirely different position from that proposed by the right hon. Lady. However, I will answer her question. The need
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of the child is paramount, not the need of any parent. Too many children are deprived of access to one of their parents, and the courts should therefore take account of the natural need of children generally to have access to, and residence with, each parent. There is no doubt about which is paramount, but the presumption should be that there is equality of access by the child to each parent.
Margaret Hodge: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that in more than 99 per cent. of cases that go to court an order for contact with both parents is made? In those circumstances, how can he allege that the courts are not working in a way that assumes that the interests of the child are best met by maintaining contact with both parents?
Mr. Turner: I make no allegation against the courts at the point of issuing contact and access orders, but I do in respect of the enforcement of those orders.
Margaret Hodge: If the hon. Gentleman says that the paramount consideration must be the interests of the child and then goes on to accept that in most cases it is in the child's interests to maintain contact with both parents—which is why in over 99 per cent. of cases the courts decide to grant access—what does he suggest we do to ensure that parents comply with the court order above and beyond what is currently in law and what we suggest in our Green Paper?
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