Pensions Bill

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Malcolm Wicks: A major issue would be that of contributions to stakeholder pensions. The regulator must ensure that the contributions of the employer and the employee, when collected by an employer, are paid into a scheme. That is one way in which the stakeholder would be relevant. If the hon. Gentleman wants more detail in writing, I shall consider his question to see whether I have fully answered it.

It is true that the board of OPRA consists of specified representatives of different groups within the pension community. However, we take the view that such a mechanistic approach is out of step with what is required for a modern and proactive regulatory body. I am confident that sufficient consultation procedures are built into the pension protection fund to make the amendment unnecessary.

Amendment No. 107 would remove the express provision in the Bill that allows a person to serve more

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than one term as a member of the regulator. That would be undesirable as it would limit the pool of people who could be called on to serve as ordinary members of the regulator. It would also prevent someone who had previously served as a member from being promoted to chairman. Amendment No. 110 would remove the Secretary of State's discretionary power to authorise compensation to members whose term of office is cut short for any reason. The provision replicates existing powers in the 95 Act. In a changing environment, where the need for knowledge and skills may shift over time, it may be appropriate to appoint a new member and remove an existing one at short notice. It would be inappropriate to rule out even the possibility of compensating a member whose expectation of serving a full term is not met.

Amendments Nos. 111 and 112 would remove the possibility for the Secretary of State to make staff available to the regulator in the way that he currently does for OPRA. The 1995 Act enables the Secretary of State to make additional staff available to OPRA. That power to enable secondments of staff from my Department has proven useful for both OPRA and the Department. OPRA has benefited from the availability of experienced pensions officials, and the Department has gained invaluable experience of the realities at the front line of pensions regulation. I know from dealing with colleagues in OPRA who are working on these measures just how useful such cross-fertilisation can be.

The effect of amendments Nos. 108 and 109 would be to remove from the Secretary of State the power to authorise the regulator to make payments for pensions, allowances or gratuities to, or in respect of, non-executive members of the regulator. The power would be transferred instead to the regulator.

Amendment No. 113 would remove a provision for the Secretary of State to approve the terms, conditions and remuneration of regulator staff. The effect of that would be to remove Government control over those matters, including those relating to the members of the regulator.

Amendments Nos. 114 to 118 would remove the Secretary of State's right to determine the scale and nature of pay, allowances, pensions and compensation payments to members of the determinations panel of the regulator. They would leave those matters to the discretion of the regulator.

We wish to put in place sensible and appropriate working arrangements that help to ensure that the chairman and chief executive can operate effectively and at arm's length from the Government, while being supported by the Department. That is why pay, terms, conditions and so on are for the regulator to determine and the Secretary of State to approve. That is in line with Cabinet Office guidance to Departments on setting up non-departmental public bodies, which recommends that key decisions such as the remuneration, allowances and pensions of chairs and senior members are matters for Departments, not the body itself. Furthermore, I do not believe that those who will be funding the regulator through the general levy would want to see the regulator itself controlling

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the level of salaries and wider terms and conditions without reference to external scrutiny.

Amendment No. 120 is designed to remove the statement that the regulator's accounts must comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State with the approval of the Treasury. That covers issues such as accounting methods and the detail of the information to be provided in the accounts when they are presented to Parliament. The provision in clause 2 is common to the accounts of non-departmental public bodies. It allows the Treasury, which leads both on accounting matters in general, and on the presentation of accounts of public or quasi-public bodies to Parliament in particular, to provide input to the Secretary of State of the relevant sponsoring Department, in this case the DWP. That provision replicates the provision for OPRA in paragraph 16(2) of schedule 1 to the Pensions Act 1995.

I hear the suspicion of the hon. Member for Eastbourne, but I hope that I have assured him that what we are proposing is routine practice, which has been practised by previous Administrations. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Mr. Waterson: I am grateful to the Minister for that comprehensive explanation of most of the points that I raised. I remain deeply suspicious of the Treasury, but he has reassured me that this particular provision relating to Treasury approval is common and routine.

I accept the Minister's arguments about the role of the Secretary of State and keeping the regulator at arm's length. It is just that we do not agree philosophically on the meaning of keeping the regulator at arm's length. However, for the moment I shall not press those amendments.

I see the point about flexibility regarding the membership of the board, but I think that the industry would be surprised if—other things being equal—there would not normally be at least one representative of an active pension scheme on the board giving their day-to-day experience from that perspective. I can put it no higher.

I thought that I was careful in moving the amendment to say that it was not necessarily a bad thing for people to be reappointed. I was trying to puzzle out, through the Minister, what provision said that they could not be appointed again and what provision we were trying to tackle. I am neutral on whether reappointment is a good thing. It depends entirely on the individual.

I was slightly puzzled about compensation and the removal of existing members at short notice when their skills are no longer required. I should like to draw an assurance from the Minister—a nod of the head would do—that we are not talking about people being removed for incompetence, inability or non-attendance; that we are talking about those who had a legitimate expectation of continuing for a period; that people would be appointed in the first instance for a set period that would possibly be renewable and then, for reasons that were outwith their own

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inadequacy or incompetence, would be compensated. There is nodding of heads, so I shall quit while I am ahead.

On the secondment of staff, I was just trying to ascertain that there would not be great shoals of double agents, as it were, coming in from the DWP or the Treasury, trying to subvert the independence and rigour of the new regulator. The Minister assures us that that practice has produced value on both sides when used in respect of OPRA and I am happy to accept that. On the basis of those explanations I am happy not to press these amendments to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Further provision about the Regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Malcolm Wicks: Clause 3 should be read in conjunction with schedule 1, and with clause 1, which establishes the new regulatory body. The regulator will be in place, subject to the passage of the Bill, from April 2005. Clause 3 and schedule 1 make provision about the terms of appointment and remuneration of members, the appointment of the chief executive and other staff, the proceedings of the regulator and its funding and accounts, and its status, liability, members and staff.

I shall deal with each part of schedule 1 in turn. Part 1 allows that the Secretary of State will determine the terms and conditions, and remuneration, of the members of the board. No member of the pension protection fund staff is eligible for appointment as a member of the regulator. References in the relevant clauses to executive members of the regulator's board mean the chief executive and those members appointed from the staff of the regulator. Accordingly, any reference to non-executive members is to the remaining members, including the chairman. We shall discuss the purpose and function of the non-executive members later.

It is worth pointing out that we chose this structure for the regulator to ensure consistency with the recommendation of the Higgs report on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. It is worth emphasising that Higgs's recommendation applies to corporate bodies of publicly listed companies, but we believe that his principles of good governance extend equally to Government bodies, such as the pensions regulator. Therefore, we propose to adopt the recommendations where they are appropriate.

Part 2 of schedule 1 defines the staff of the regulator and makes detailed provisions for the proper appointment of the chief executive by the Secretary of State. Part 3 covers the details of the membership of the determinations panel of the regulator. We shall discuss that in more detail when we consider clauses 10 and 11, which relate to the panel.

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11 am

Part 4 is concerned with the regulator's ability to set up committees and sub-committees for any purpose connected with its functions. In most cases, those sub-committees may include individuals who are not members of the committee, but that does not apply to either the non-executive committee or the determinations panel. The regulator can also authorise any member of its staff or any committee to carry out any of its functions; part 4 of schedule 1 covers that. Again, that provision does not extend to the determinations panel or to the functions of either the panel or the non-executive committee.

The ability to form sub-committees and to delegate functions will ensure that tasks can be carried out at the appropriate level. That will ensure the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the regulator. The regulator's power to delegate can be altered by regulations if necessary; again, part 4 covers that. Part 5 is concerned with the regulator's funding and accounts and the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General as auditor. Part 6 establishes the status and liability of the new body.

Each of these provisions is an important building block, forming part of a sound administrative and financial structure for the regulator, and establishing the appropriate relationship to a non-departmental public body between the regulator and the Secretary of State. I beg to move that clause 3 and the associated schedule 1 stand part of the Bill.

 
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