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Mr. Garnier: I beg to move amendment No. 21, in
clause 4, page 4, line 19, leave out '14' and insert 'ten'.
In the unavoidable absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Woking, I have been asked to move the amendment. It is a probing amendment, and need not test the patience of the Committee for too long. However, it is important for us to find out why the Government have chosen a maximum sentence of 14 years as opposed to any other penalty for the clearly heinous crime of trafficking people for exploitation.
In the canon of criminal law, the maximum sentences on indictment range from life for murder down to far lesser penalties for lesser offences. I am brought in mind of offences such as kidnapping or false, unlawful or malicious imprisonment, manslaughter, grievous bodily harm, burglary, robbery, theft and sexual offences committed against not just adults but children and young persons. Can the Minister enlighten us about the thinking of the Government in relation to the maximum penalty of 14 years in subsection (5)(a)? I do not attach any magic to the figure of 10 years. The amendment is designed to establish why the Government think that 14 years is the sensible maximum.
Beverley Hughes: The answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman's question is twofold. First, we have taken a clear view that tough penalties are required throughout the law relating to trafficking, because it is a particularly heinous offence involving, in many cases, the most degrading exploitation of people. Secondly, it is to do with consistency. Let me give the hon. Gentleman some brief background. An EU framework decision on trafficking has recently been adopted and the UK, in line with other EU member states, has to implement it. It commits
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countries that are signatories to it to introducing a minimum maximum sentence of either eight years or 10—I shall obtain clarification. Therefore, we have to have at least that sentence.
Building on the 1971 legislation, which introduces a maximum penalty of 14 years for facilitation, we have taken a consistent view in introducing new trafficking offences, first in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and now in this legislation covering exploitation for non-sexual purposes. A sentence similar to that is required here, because trafficking is facilitation with the objective of exploiting for sexual or non-sexual purposes the person who has been brought in. The legislation covers domestic labour, which, in most cases that have come to light, is tantamount to modern-day slavery.
For those reasons, we need the same maximum sentence of 14 years for those offences. When courts consider the detail of individual cases, they will decide which sentence in that range up to the maximum sentence they want to give someone who is convicted. Courts should have at their disposal the same full range of sentences up to the maximum sentence below life imprisonment for these offences as they have for similar offences. I should add that officials have informed me that the EU framework decision requires a minimum maximum sentence of eight years.
I hope that my explanation satisfies the hon. and learned Gentleman and that he will withdraw the amendment.
Mr. Garnier: That was a helpful little canter around the Home Office's thinking. Although this is not strictly germane to the amendment or to subsection (5)(a), I am slightly puzzled by the Minister's remarks. She may or may not think it appropriate to respond to my concern that it is thought appropriate that it should be possible to deal summarily with the offences. I assume that there may be very minor cases of trafficking, which it is thought sensible for magistrates to deal with, for which the maximum sentence is six months or a fine. It is difficult to imagine what those might be, and I do not expect the Minister to produce an answer right now because she might want to take advice. Clearly, we are talking about serious and nasty offences, but—
Beverley Hughes rose—
Mr. Garnier: She has already thought about it.
Beverley Hughes: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way, because we may be able to deal with his question here. These are all serious offences, but he will understand that the range of people involved in the chain—there usually is a chain—to traffick and to exploit people is very varied. Some people in the chain may be apprehended as a result of an operation to disrupt the gang, but their involvement in what is a very serious offence may be peripheral. They may have provided shelter for a night, not necessarily fully understanding the purpose for which the movement of that person was intended. The measure will allow the prosecution to deal with those more peripheral people in a way that is commensurate with their involvement, but still gives them the ability to prosecute through the Crown court the people who are heavily involved in
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orchestrating the trafficking and to give them the maximum sentence available.
Mr. Garnier: Right now is probably not the time to have a discussion about the mental element and the state of knowledge of those who are to be charged, whether they are right at the heart of the crime or peripheral to it. However, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining her Department's thinking to some extent. I trust that the Crown Prosecution Service will study with great care what she has said, so that it will know what she means when it is framing charges against individuals. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Section 4: supplemental
Angela Watkinson: I beg to move amendment No. 22, in
clause 5, page 4, line 35, leave out 'and'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 23, in
Angela Watkinson: These appear to be technical amendments. Amendment No. 22 seeks to delete ''and'' from the end of subsection (2)(e). Subsection (2)(e) and (f) say that
''a person who is a British subject under the British Nationality Act 1981 . . . and . . . a British protected person within the meaning of that Act.''
I am not a lawyer, and I assume that there is a technical distinction between those two descriptions. I assume that the reason for deleting the word ''and'' is that one person need not necessarily comply with both descriptions. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough will be able to elucidate that point.
Amendment No. 23 would insert the phrase,
''any other person entitled to reside in the United Kingdom.''
I assume that it is necessary to add that to the list of definitions, once subsection (2)(f) and (e) have been separated. I apologise for the fact that I cannot provide further legal interpretation, but those are my assumptions of what the proposals would do.
Mr. Garnier: My hon. Friend need not be embarrassed. For once, common sense and statutory interpretation coincide. Amendment No. 22 is dependent on amendment No. 23. If amendment No. 23 is made, the word ''and'' at the end of subsection (2)(e) will become redundant and move to the end of the next subsection. Therefore, the meat of the amendments is to be found in amendment No. 23, which is designed to cover all people who are British citizens, or their equivalents, or those entitled to live in the United Kingdom. There is nothing magic about
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the amendments; it is a belt and braces exercise, and my hon. Friend explained it properly and clearly.
Beverley Hughes: Perhaps I can help both the hon. Lady and the hon. and learned Gentleman. Amendments Nos. 22 and 23 would give the UK jurisdiction to prosecute anyone entitled to reside in the UK for offences committed inside or outside the UK. If such a person, who would by definition be a foreign national with permission to reside in the UK, committed an offence inside the UK, they would already be covered. If such a person committed an offence outside the UK, the amendments would set a precedent for how we define our jurisdiction for all criminal offences. They seek to give us power to prosecute a foreign national who commits offences abroad.
Although I understand some of the thinking behind the amendments, I respectfully suggest that it would be more appropriate to act as we already do in cases of foreign nationals with permission to stay in the UK committing offences abroad. The prosecution would more appropriately take place in the country in which the offence took place. That is a more appropriate and feasible course of action for offences involving immigration. We work closely with other countries, particularly in Europe, on the identification and investigation of such offences, and the feasibility of prosecution in a foreign country can be readily understood.
Similarly, if a person entitled to reside in the UK, who is not covered by the categories listed in clause 5(2), committed an offence in the UK and left the country, normal extradition laws would apply and it would be appropriate to bring them back. The amendments are therefore unnecessary.
In summary, the amendment would introduce a completely new precedent, for this offence only, in the way in which we treat foreign nationals who commit offences abroad.
It being fifteen minutes past Five o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [28 June 2001 and 6 November 2003] and the Order of the Committee [6 and 13 January 2004], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.
Amendment negatived.
The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Claimant's credibility
Amendments made: No. 98, in
clause 6, page 6, line 2, at end insert—
'( ) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the fact that a person did not make an asylum claim or human rights claim before being notified of an immigration decision shall be treated as behaviour that damages his credibility, unless the claim relies wholly on matters arising after the notification.
( ) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the fact that a person did not make an asylum claim or human rights claim before being arrested under an immigration provision shall be treated as behaviour that damages his credibility, unless—
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(a) the person had no reasonable opportunity to make the claim before the arrest, or
(b) the claim relies wholly on matters arising after the arrest.'.
No. 99, in
clause 6, page 6, line 14, at end insert—
' ''immigration decision'' means—
(a) refusal of leave to enter the United Kingdom,
(b) refusal to vary a person's leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,
(c) grant of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,
(d) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under section 10(1)(a), (b), (ba) or (c) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c.33) (removal of persons unlawfully in United Kingdom),
(e) a decision that a person is to be removed from the United Kingdom by way of directions under paragraphs 8 to 12 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77) (control of entry: removal), and
(f) a decision to make a deportation order under section 5(1) of that Act,
(f) , ''immigration provision'' means—
(a) sections 28A, 28AA, 28B, 28C and 28CA of the Immigration Act 1971 (c.77) (immigration offences: enforcement),
(b) paragraph 17 of Schedule 2 to that Act (control of entry), and
(c) section 8 of this Act,
(c) , ''notified'' means notified in such manner as may be specified by regulations made by the Secretary of State,'.
No. 100, in
clause 6, page 6, line 30, at end insert—
'( ) Regulations under subsection (4) specifying a manner of notification may, in particular—
(a) apply or refer to regulations under section 105 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c.41) (notice of immigration decisions);
(b) make provision similar to provision that is or could be made by regulations under that section;
(c) modify a provision of regulations under that section in its effect for the purpose of regulations under this section;
(d) provide for notice to be treated as received at a specified time if sent to a specified class of place in a specified manner.
( ) Regulations under subsection (4) specifying a manner of notification—
(a) may make incidental, consequential or transitional provision,
(b) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(c) shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'.—[Beverley Hughes.]
Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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