Conclusions and recommendations
1. It
is extraordinary that, after such an extensive period of consultation
on aviation policy, the DfT was unable to publish the documents
supporting the White Paper until nearly two months later. This
raises questions about the extent to which such analyses were
fully available during the autumn at the time when the key decisions
contained in the White Paper were being made. (Paragraph 6)
2. Despite protestations
to the contrary, it is abundantly clear that the aviation White
Paper adopts a "predict and provide" approach. The
DfT has forecast future demand and then provided the framework
to meet practically all of it. It is actively promoting growth
on the scale envisaged, and indeed the urgency with which it is
requiring airport operators to implement expansion plans bears
this out. (Paragraph 12)
3. We do not know
to what extent future growth in air travel will be fuelled by
existing passengers travelling more frequently rather than by
the 50% of the population who do not currently fly at all. The
DfT has failed to carry out any detailed studies to explore the
social and behavioural impacts of the proposed growth in aviation,
and the manner in which these impacts may vary for different rates
of growth. It must do so as soon as possible and publish the
results. (Paragraph 16)
4. The DfT must publish
a formal statement of what it understands by sustainable consumption
in the context of air travel. As part of this statement, it should
explain how the projected growth from 180 mppa to 476 mppa by
2030 can be reconciled with the commitment made by the UK Government
in Johannesburg to encourage more sustainable approaches to consumption;
and it should also set out what policies it is pursuing to discourage
unnecessary air travel. (Paragraph 18)
5. The Integrated
Policy Appraisal which supports the White Paper offers a particularly
weak assessment of climate change impacts. The entries are not
only very slim compared to other parts of the IPA, but they entirely
fail to reflect the scale of aviation emissions by 2030 in relation
to UK domestic emissions or to give any hint of the difficulties
which will face the UK in meeting its carbon reduction targets.
(Paragraph 21)
6. We agree with the
Chief Scientist that climate change is a profoundly serious threat
to mankind. The Government has in principle accepted our recommendation
that specific consideration must be given in policy appraisals
to the impact on carbon targets. It must ensure that this priority
is in future fully reflected in appraisals conducted by all departments.
(Paragraph 24)
7. We welcome the
fact that the Government will consider including the possibility
of catastrophic or sudden climate changes in its estimate of the
price of carbon—notwithstanding our conviction that the
value of our climate is literally priceless. (Paragraph 26)
8. The DfT has implicitly
admitted that it failed to include the environmental costs of
aviation emissions in its appraisals and has sought to rectify
this omission in the supporting document Aviation and Global Warming.
(Paragraph 27)
9. As far as we can
identify, the DfT has nowhere calculated a figure for the net
consumer and producer surplus arising from the overall increase
in aviation forecast in the White Paper from 180 mppa to 476 mppa.
In other words, we have no net benefit figure with which to compare
our figure of minus £42 billion NPV for the increase in environmental
costs. In this sense, the DfT has failed to evaluate the impact
of new terminals, runway extensions, and operational improvements
aimed at maximising the use of existing runways. (Paragraph 28)
10. The quality of
the economic appraisal of options carried out by the DfT is poor
and the supporting analysis contained in Aviation and Global Warming
is opaque and unhelpful. The DfT should address this by publishing
a new and fully documented appraisal which takes account of the
overall forecast increase in air traffic. (Paragraph 0.?)
11. On the key issue
of the impact of aviation on global warming, the White Paper contains
no specific proposals apart from the commitment to work towards
the inclusion of aviation in the second phase of the European
Emissions Trading System from 2008. We are disappointed at the
failure of the Government to show leadership in this area. (Paragraph
30)
12. It is regrettable
that the Government did not take the initiative in promoting an
interim emissions charge in view of the difficulties and timescales
involved in developing an ETS to cover aviation. We believe that
such an approach could offer the scope for flexible adoption by
like-minded member states and could therefore be a more practical
option than emissions trading which requires an all or nothing
approach. (Paragraph 33)
13. We are astonished
at the lack of essential research to underpin the incorporation
of aviation in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). In view
of the timescales involved in developing and ratifying EU directives,
we suspect it may soon be too late to achieve the Government's
professed intention of incorporating aviation in the second phase
of the EU ETS from 2008. The DfT must set out, in response to
this report, what needs to be done and by when to achieve this
goal. (Paragraph 36)
14. It is unclear
if any consensus exists among EU member states on incorporating
aviation within the EU Emissions Trading System; and whether the
political will exists to resolve the complex and contentious issues
which need to be addressed for this to be achieved. It is not
even clear to what extent, and at what level, any of these issues
are even being discussed. (Paragraph 38)
15. in commenting
on the recent ICAO meeting, the DfT official referred to the UK
as 'ploughing a pretty lonely furrow' in its advocacy of emissions
trading, and—given the opposition of some important players—we
conclude that the likelihood of any significant progress being
made is remote. (Paragraph 39)
16. We welcome the
fact that the DfT has accepted our figures for the relative impact
of aviation emissions compared to UK domestic emissions. We
trust that the Treasury will do so too, and will in future provide
figures on a consistent basis which take account of the radiative
forcing effect. (Paragraph 43)
17. It is inconceivable
that any emissions trading system could generate sufficient credits
to allow aviation to expand as forecast, while at the same time
delivering carbon reductions of the order needed. The price
of carbon could, in such circumstances, go through the roof—provided
there was sufficient political will to maintain targets and enforce
penalties. (Paragraph 45)
18. If aviation emissions
increase on the scale predicted by the DfT, the UK's 60% carbon
emission reduction target which the Government set last year will
become meaningless and unachievable. The most we could hope to
attain would be about 35%. The DfT admitted that the target would
need to be looked at should international emissions be allocated
to national inventories—and this can only mean with a view
to watering it down. (Paragraph 50)
19. The Government
should recognise the difficulties it faces in meeting its long-term
carbon targets. If it did so, it would be forced to take more
action now and develop an adequate policy response. It should
not continue to hope that the solution lies in technological advances
as the weight of evidence suggests that the scope for these is
limited. (Paragraph 51)
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