Further memorandum from the Ministry of
Defence on questions arising from First Reflections (September
2003)
First Reflections (page 19) stated that though
the operation confirmed the soundness of a manoeuvre-based doctrine,
the doctrine was capable of further refinement. What particular
aspects of that war-fighting doctrine are susceptible to possible
refinement?
We are constantly seeking to review and adjust
our doctrine in the light of changing circumstances, and by learning
from our experiences. It is sensible to take note of our recent
experiences in Iraq and to consider refining our doctrine accordingly
if necessary. For example, our Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
is currently reviewing and restructuring our operational level
joint doctrine and is preparing guidance to be published during
2004. It would be unhelpful to pre-judge their conclusions at
this stage, but they are likely to include such issues as operational
agility, both intellectual and structural; improved interoperability
with coalition partners, especially in planning; and better ways
of co-ordinating military activities with those of a wide range
of civil actors.
What "established readiness profiles and
resourcing assumptions" (First Reflections, page 19) had
to be by-passed?
***
We aim to hold only that stock which cannot
be procured within the readiness profile for each unit. For example
under SDR planning assumptions the department plans to hold sufficient
personal equipment to equip both the Joint Rapid Reaction Force
and Spearhead Battalion (a total of 9,000 personnel) for desert
operations. We chose to deploy significantly more personnel than
this, and so additional equipment was purchased by UOR to meet
the requirement.
The unique characteristics of each crisis require
a flexible approach to operational planning in order to respond
appropriately. This will on occasion necessitate the readiness
posture of some units being altered from that envisaged in the
broad strategic planning guidelines, in order to generate the
right military capabilities in theatre at the right moment to
achieve the required military effect.
First reflections states that "the Government
sought to provide a balanced, flexible and potent contribution
to coalition forces, capable of playing a major role in any operation."
How did the Government arrive at the figure of a land division-sized
force and a total of 45,000 troops?
The Chiefs of Staff recommended the size and
composition of the force packages that were deployed to the Gulf,
based on an assessment of the mission and sustainability requirements.
The size of the total force was not in itself the focus of a decision:
the figure of about 45,000 was simply the sum of decisions on
the various components of the force.
In the land component, the decision to fight
at divisional level was taken for a variety of reasons, and not
simply because this is the level at which the Armed Forces train
to fight. Most importantly, the military estimate based on the
mission analysis for both northern (attack from Turkey) and southern
(attack from Kuwait) options demanded a divisional sized force
in order to be successful. Furthermore, a divisional approach
allowed the UK to have significant influence over the planning
and the execution of operations in Iraq.
The composition of the UK division was influenced
by the decision to deploy to the south rather than the north,
as originally envisaged. The UK role was not now to manoeuvre
with a single UK brigade operating within a UK divisional framework
(with much of the rear area held by the US), but to hold ground
for a considerable period and potentially conduct operations in
an urban environment. This required an additional brigade.
Initial plans envisaged significant UK and US
land and air forces operating from the north and deploying through
Turkey as well as from Kuwait in the south. It became increasingly
apparent that it would be difficult for the Turkish Government
to secure parliamentary approval for such deployments. We therefore
developed alternative plans, under which UK ground forces would
play a key role in southern Iraq and enable US forces to advance
more rapidly from south to north.[1]
Did the Northern Option envisage fewer or greater numbers of troops?
***
RESERVES CALL-OUT
How much notice was given to reservists of their
call-up?
In principle we aimed to give 14 days' formal
notice to reservists of their call-out. This is an aspiration
and not a statutory requirement and many reservists will have
been aware of the likelihood of call-out in advance of notification.
On this occasion, operational requirements meant that some "early
enablers" had to be called out at shorter notice. Where possible,
this was achieved by negotiation: for example, of the 57 Royal
Navy Reserve Amphibious Warfare officers available, 14 were able
to meet a three-day timescale (to sail with the Amphibious Task
Group), of whom 12 were selected. Similarly, the first tranche
of the Territorial Army 165 Port Regiment called out were given
seven days' notice, as they were required to operate Marchwood
Military Port, releasing regulars to deploy to receive shipping
in theatre.
Nevertheless, for the bulk of the call-out,
14 days was the intended notice time. That this was not always
achieved was often due to reservists' absence from home, postal
time, how soon the reservist could tell his employer, and some
incorrect addresses held on computer. Given these problems, the
desired notice has now been revised to 21 days (an aim that has
been achieved in subsequent mobilisations), but we cannot exclude
the possibility that operational requirements may still require
shorter notice periods on occasion.
How many reservists were sent home from Chilwell
for failing medical or other tests?
Medical failure rates of reservists (excluding
Army Regular Reserves) were broadly similar to those of regulars.
In total 1,299 reservists were sent home for failing medical or
other tests (14.6% of the total called out for the operational
phase). Of those that attended Chilwell, the mobilisation centre
that dealt with Royal Marine Reserves, Territorial Army (TA) reservists
and Regular Reserves, 1,173 (16%) were sent home. The ratio of
those called out to those finally accepted into service was within
the expected parameters, taking into account all factors including
applications for exemptions.
TARGET SELECTION
Coherent target selection (para 2.6) was achieved
through close co-operation between PJHQ and the National Contingent
Command in-theatre. As UK Special Forces operated outside the
National Contingent Command, but were supported by RAF aircraft,
also operating outside this command structure, how was targeting
approval granted in practice for operations by such forces?
***
***
Were there occasions when UK advice on target
selection was not followed by the US?
We believe there were no occasions when the
UK advice on targeting was not followed. Indeed at all levels
in the military targeting process the US were very receptive to
UK views.
THE CAMPAIGN
Box on asymmetric operations (p.12) states that
the value of agile and light forces in such campaigns has been
highlighted. Can you give specific examples of this?
Two examples of the employment of agile and
light forces during the operation are: securing oil wells on the
Al Faw peninsula using airlifted troops from 3 Commando Brigade;
and the clearance of Basra Old Town by 3 Para. The first operation
was aimed at denying the enemy an asymmetric course of action,
ie destruction of the oilfields. The second highlights the use
of light forces to clear an area known to have been in the control
of irregular forces. In the case of specific asymmetric attacks
on UK forces, the decision on force composition (ie whether to
use heavy or light forces) was made by the commander on the ground
in response to the threat.
THE AIR
CAMPAIGN
First Reflections states that the RAF flew 6%
of the sorties by the coalition.[2]
What percentage of total PGMs delivered by the coalition did the
RAF deliver?
***
What notice of the coalition's air strikes on
the night of 20 March was the British Government given?
The planning for the operation in Iraq, whilst
led by the US, fully involved UK personnel, including through
embedded staff in Centcom and elsewhere. This planning included
possible reactions to specific emerging situations in Iraq. The
air strikes in the early hours of 20 March were conducted in response
to emerging intelligence data and were time-sensitive. PJHQ were
informed by Centcom of this intelligence and the proposed response
a few hours prior to the air strikes taking place. The Prime Minister
and the Defence Secretary were then informed in the appropriate
manner.
To what extent was the RAF able to utilise US-sourced
intelligence for its operational deployments? Did the RAF have
to provide its own recce information using national resources
to fill any gaps?
Co-operation with the US over intelligence exchange
in support of air operations was already at an advanced stage
at the start of the campaign, following years of experience of
operating with the US in patrolling the No Fly Zones. This experience
provided a firm foundation on which to build the arrangements
that were put in hand for this operation. The main change was
to "pool" UK and US air assets to allow optimum co-ordination
for their employment. This arrangement allowed the product of
UK assets to be used by the US and vice versa as required. Day-to-day
management of the "pooling" arrangement was effected
through a Joint Collection Management Board at the Centcom Forward
Headquarters, on which the National Contingent Commander was represented.
How many Iraqi scud or other missile launchers
did RAF aircraft destroy during the major combat phase?
***
MARITIME OPERATIONS
Why did the operation[3]
to de-mine the Khawr Abd Allah waterway take until 28 March?
Reopening of Umm Qasr port was a key early objective
in the campaign, as this would allow humanitarian aid to be delivered
and later allow the Oil for Food programme to recommence. It was
originally estimated that it would take three days to confirm
that a channel 200 yards wide for the 38 miles along the Khawr
Abd Allah waterway to Umm Qasr was free from mines. This could
not commence until the north bank of the waterway was cleared
of Iraqi forces, which was achieved late on 23 March. Mine Counter
Measure operations commenced immediately and the channel was cleared
by dusk on 26 March. However, two mines were discovered just outside
the cleared channel as operations began to widen the channel beyond
200 yards. For safety reasons the channel was closed until these
two mines were cleared. This was achieved by late 27 March and
the channel declared open for Sir GALAHAD at dawn 28 March. The
speed with which this task was carried out is a credit to the
capability that the Royal Navy has in this specialist area.
MILITARY CAMPAIGN—FIRST
REFLECTIONS
What are the implications of the Iraq operation
for the SDR's assumptions of one large or two medium operations
being sustainable?
The recent operation in Iraq has demonstrated
that we were not only able to meet and sustain a large scale intervention
operation, but that we were also able to sustain additional concurrent
commitments elsewhere, although this was demanding. This demonstrates
the robustness and utility of the SDR force structure. The New
Chapter to the SDR identified a trend for our forces to meet an
increasingly varied pattern of concurrent and sequential operational
commitments, at small and medium scale. Experience suggests that
for many assets, such as deployed headquarters and logistic support,
conducting several smaller scale operations is more demanding
than one or two larger scale operations. Therefore, in addition
to retaining the capacity to undertake the most demanding, but
less frequent, large scale operations, it has become clear that
we should structure our forces with a focus on the demands of
concurrent medium and small scale operations. Any resulting changes
to our force structures will be announced in the forthcoming Defence
White Paper.
How far is close air support practised by land
and air forces through normal training activities? Do significant
RAF forces participate in BATUS exercises? How long have they
done so?
Close Air Support (CAS) is included in the Harrier
annual training syllabus. This includes a minimum of 10 sorties
required per pilot during the work-up to Combat Ready status,
and a minimum of 14 sorties per pilot per year required to maintain
currency. Many aircrew exceed this figure. Neither the Jaguar
GR3 nor the Tornado GR4 has mandatory CAS in their annual training
syllabus. However, both aircraft types train in CAS on a regular
basis. Both the RAF and the Army generate CAS training exercises.
Other training activity is undertaken as part of Forward Air Controllers'
training at RAF Leeming, where approximately eight four-week courses
are run each year.
RAF forces first participated in BATUS training
in October 2002 with four Tornado GR4 aircraft and elements of
the Joint Force Air Component Headquarters. This year, the event
will be supported by six Jaguar GR3 aircraft. The intention is
to increase the joint RAF/Army training conducted in BATUS exercises
in the future. Work on scoping this training is underway. Recognising
that the command and control process of CAS is as important as
the tactical training provided to ground Forward Air Controllers
and aircrew, Strike Command and Land Command have initiated a
project to improve the Land/Air interface.
First Reflections notes that both 3 Commando Brigade
and 16 Air Mobile Brigade requested support from heavy armour.[4]
How practised is the use of heavy armour in support of such light
forces? Were any lessons learned about future co-operation by
such forces?
Sub-unit commanders from combat (including Royal
Marine), combat support and some combat service support sub-units
routinely attend the Combined Arms Tactics Course at the Land
Warfare Centre for pre-employment training. The course includes
tuition on the capabilities and handling of armour and practical
exercises using armour. Furthermore, commanding officers from
combat and combat support units, including Royal Marines, routinely
attend the Battlegroup Commanders Course at the Land Warfare Centre
before taking up command. This course includes instruction on
the use of armour and practical training on simulators. Consequently,
commanders of all light forces have been taught the tactics, techniques
and procedures for employing armour relevant to their level of
command and have some, albeit limited, practical experience.
There are also collective training opportunities
for units in 3 Commando and 16 Air Assault Brigades to train with
armour. The two brigades are allocated a total of three exercise
periods at the Land Warfare Centre's Battlegroup Training Unit
each year. These exercises are fully instrumented and all weapon
effects and equipment and personnel vulnerability are accurately
simulated. During this training the units are invariably opposed
by armour, and usually have some opportunity to work with armour.
For example, a squadron of the Queen's Royal Lancers will take
part in Exercise Wessex Warrior with 40 Commando on Salisbury
Plain in November 2003. However, training objectives are set by
the relevant formation commanders and depending on what they wish
to achieve, armour may not always be involved. The Iraq operation
has highlighted the importance of continuing such exercises utilising
armour with lighter forces such as 3 Commando.
Whilst in future our preferred expeditionary
armoured capability will remain based on the deployment of armoured
and mechanised forces to counter enemy armoured threats, the requirement
for close co-operation and integration of heavy armour with light
forces is likely to remain. Work continues to develop appropriate
military doctrine and low-level tactics, techniques and procedures
for such co-operation and integration.
How many British UAVs were deployed and for how
many missions? How many were lost? What were the causes of any
such losses?
During Operation Telic there were 138 missions
flown using 89 deployed Phoenix Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The capability that the UAVs afforded was greatly appreciated
by UK land forces who benefited from the real time targeting information
that was available, cueing air and artillery assets. During the
operation some 23 Phoenix UAVs were lost or damaged beyond repair.
The majority of the losses were due to technical problems within
the air vehicle linked to the extreme operating conditions encountered.
A small number were due to enemy action. A further 13 suffered
damage which was reparable either in theatre or back in the UK.
However, the attrition rate was in line with what could be expected
for an operation of this scale. UAV concepts and capabilities
have moved on significantly since Phoenix entered service and
for this reason, Phoenix will be phased out and its roles subsumed
by the broader Watchkeeper UAV capability which we aim to introduce
in 2006.[5]
To what extent are air and land command and control
systems able to integrate? Do land forces use computer-based systems
to the same extent as the air side does?
Command and control is exercised through a wide
range of communications and information systems and equipment
from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical level
of warfare. These range from networked computer systems which
support office automation in major HQs to the combat radios used
by troops and in aircraft. These systems are generally integrated
between environments where such a requirement is identified during
the acquisition process, or where the technology allows for the
simple interconnection of systems. During this operation there
was considerable integration between the air and land forces,
including the interconnection of voice and data systems at the
operational level of command, and the exchange of real time data
link information at many levels, down to the use of interoperable
tactical radio systems. We are continuing to work to improve the
integration of a wide variety of these systems where this provides
operational benefit.
Both the air and land environments make extensive
use of computer systems, but in ways that reflect the differences
between those environments. At operational HQs the Land and Air
Components make use of computer systems for all applications from
personnel and administration through to intelligence and targeting,
although field conditions may sometimes limit the extent of their
use by land forces. The extension of computer systems into the
tactical environment is less widespread for land forces than it
is in the air. Modern combat aircraft are computer-based platforms,
relying on computer systems for many aspects of their operation.
They are able to relay real-time combat information back to headquarters
more easily than ground forces. However, computer systems also
form an integral part of land equipment, particularly for intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as the targeting and
guidance of weapon systems. This operation saw some ground forces
making use of new systems to relay combat position information
in a similar manner to air forces. Land forces also made far greater
use of computer-based information systems below the divisional
level of command than in previous operations of this scale. Computer
systems are essential in both environments.
First Reflections emphasises the advantages of
multi-role aircraft.[6]
What modifications would be needed to make the Typhoon such a
platform? Does the MoD intend to alter the capabilities of the
first or second tranche of the Typhoon procurement?
When Typhoon becomes available for operational
deployment in the second half of this decade, it will be equipped
with an initial ground attack capability, although its primary
role will be to carry out air defence sorties. On existing plans,
the aircraft will benefit from progressive enhancements to its
ground attack capability as part of the aircraft's Enhanced Operational
Capability upgrade programme. These incremental operational enhancements
will develop Typhoon into a very capable multi-role weapon system.
The content and timing of these enhancements are the subject of
ongoing negotiations with industry and partner nations. Our aim,
however, is for a fully enhanced multi-role Typhoon to become
available for operations early in the next decade.
LOGISTICS AND
EQUIPMENT
When was the requirement for Expeditionary Campaign
Infrastructure identified; when were orders for it placed; and
when was it introduced into service? In the Iraq campaign, on
what dates were Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure and Temporary
Deployable Accommodation deployed into theatre, and when were
they fully operational in-theatre; and in each case how many bed-spaces
were provided by each system?
The requirement for Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure
(ECI) was identified during operations in Bosnia and a procurement
programme formally initiated in 1997. This programme was then
overtaken by the Kosovo campaign and 5,250 troops' worth of Improved
Tented Camp was procured by UOR in 1999; this equipment was formally
retained in service as "Interim ECI Tier 1" in June
2000 and funding identified for it to be used in desert conditions
(with air conditioning, solar shading etc) in 2002. The ECI project
was reinitiated in August 2000 with aspiration for a more complete
ECI Tier One system (also known as Temporary Deployable Accommodation
(TDA)) to be in service in 2004. This was also overtaken by events
in Iraq, and consequently the accelerated procurement of TDA was
approved in January 2003 for the deployment to the Gulf.
For the operation in Iraq, the Interim ECI Tier
One camps were deployed to theatre between December 2002 and February
2003. The construction of these camps however did not commence
until after the end of major combat operations. By July, four
camps with air conditioning and solar shading (procured by UOR)
and three without were declared fully operational. The remaining
air conditioning is due to be in place by September 2003. The
ECI in Iraq is designed to accommodate 3,500 troops.
TDA was first ordered as a UOR in January 2003
and deployment to Iraq began in May. The last camps are due to
be delivered shortly. Although four 500-man camps are occupied,
they are not yet fully operational. This is anticipated by the
end of October 2003, when the remaining TDA camps are expected
to be complete. Once finished, this accommodation is planned to
hold 4,250 troops.
What specific procurement decisions were influenced
by experience in Afghanistan (First Reflections, para 4.2)?
The campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were both
US-led coalition operations so UK experience of working with US
forces in Afghanistan was relevant to Iraq in a number of areas.
For example, operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the importance
of Link 16-based tactical data links to enable coalition ships
and aircraft to operate safely and efficiently together. The value
of secure communications for aircraft and of secure and flexible
tactical communications for land forces was also emphasised. In
general, the need for interoperability with US planning, and communication
and information systems was highlighted. For Iraq, proposals for
equipment procurement were judged on their merits against the
operational requirement identified, but the experiences from Afghanistan,
such as those outlined above, were obviously taken into account.
We would normally expect the key lessons from
Afghanistan to have been taken into our equipment programme to
prepare for future operations; that we needed to use the UOR process
to address some of these lessons for Iraq reflects in part the
minimal time interval between the two.
When was the need for better asset-tracking for
deployable forces first identified? What studies and trials have
taken place since then aimed at improving asset-tracking, and
what options are now open to the MoD to secure such systems? What
scope is there to use asset-tracking systems operated by commercial
distribution businesses?
The desire to improve means of tracking assets
both to theatre and in theatre has been noted in post operation
reports and lessons exercises since the Gulf Conflict in 1991.
It has also been highlighted by the NAO during their reports into
Kosovo and Exercise Saif Sareea II. Since then, the MoD has been
working towards finding affordable improvements to the capability
we already have in this area.
As a result of the lessons identified in 1991,
two tracking systems were procured: VITAL (Army) and RIDELS (Navy).
These are MoD-developed, bespoke systems, optimised for the Service
environment in which they were originally deployed. Both systems
have been progressively improved and expanded over the years,
although they have been limited by their dependency upon other
IT systems which were never designed to be part of a "joined
up" supply chain system.
On its formation, the DLO launched a number
of programmes aimed at delivering better stores and asset tracking
capabilities in a tri-Service expeditionary environment. Asset
tracking was a key component of the programme in the form of the
In Transit Visibility (ITV) project. Following a review in 2002,
ITV has since been descoped and is now being pursued as a new
project MMiT (Management of Material in Transit). An internal
study on the whole issue of consignment tracking is also currently
underway. This will take account of lessons emerging from the
recent operation.
The environment in which commercial business
operates has some very distinct characteristics some of which
differ from the environment in which defence operates its own
supply chains. These differences are most stark in a hostile operational
environment where high tempo warfare is being prosecuted. Notwithstanding
this there is some scope to utilise asset-tracking systems operated
by commercial distribution businesses providing that there is
adequate infrastructure and communications in place from front
to rear.
What additional procurements were required because
of weaknesses in asset-tracking? In particular, what additional
procurements were required because logisticians could not give
sufficiently accurate and timely estimates of when stores or equipment
would be delivered in theatre, and what additional procurements
were required because logistics systems could not sufficiently
monitor stores usage or equipment unservicability rates?
It is difficult to determine whether any additional
procurements were required because of weaknesses in asset tracking.
Lack of consignment visibility may have resulted in duplicate
ordering or over-prioritisation of the requirement due to lack
of confidence in the system. However, there are specific examples
of how visibility in some areas did prevent duplicate ordering
by determining the location of certain supplies. In the cases
of spare armoured vehicle road wheels and malarial prophylaxis,
theatre logistic staffs sought confirmation that the consignments
concerned had been despatched. By using the Total Asset Visibility
(TAV) and VITAL systems, it was ascertained by date/time stamp
that both had arrived in theatre, and this information enabled
the items concerned to be located.
When was the decision made to order the US Total
Asset Visibility system, and when was it delivered? When operational,
what visibility coverage did it provide? What alternative systems
were available from foreign countries or from the commercial sector?
The decision to procure elements of the US Total
Asset Visibility (TAV) system for UK use was made at the end of
November 2002. The contract was let on 23 January 2003 following
discussions with US Joint Chiefs of Staffs' logisticians, to ensure
cohesion with their own procurement. Equipment began to arrive
in the UK on 25 January and was progressively installed at nominated
sites in the UK, Germany, Cyprus and in the Gulf. A second phase
procurement of the system has extended the coverage within UK
and Germany to an increased number of sites, to widen the use
of the system to the deployment and recovery phases of the operation.
This was completed on 31 July.
TAV offers a significant improvement over existing
systems, both in capability and in reducing the manpower burden.
It allows the tracking of consignments (ie containers and pallets
rather than individual equipment) through the use of a radio frequency
identity tag. Locations of such consignments can then be determined
remotely via secure internet access. The contents of each container
or pallet are known by cross-reference with the existing VITAL
system. In this way, equipment was tracked as far forward as the
divisional rear areas in Kuwait during the operation. The utility
of the system ended once the consignments were broken down, and
the contents transported to separate forward areas. The last known
location of individual equipment were however still available.
The procurement of elements of the US TAV system,
as opposed to any other similar tracking system, had some major
advantages. No other system could have provided interoperability
with the US chain, or enabled UK use of the existing US infrastructure
(for example radio frequency transponders) in certain locations.
In addition TAV was a mature system, operated by the US Army for
some eight years. It had been adapted for military use by the
US Department of Defense (DOD) and thus offered immediately useable
capability. The significant US DOD support was a critical success
factor in meeting the taut timelines.
To what extent did the "end of 2002"
(First Reflections, para 4.15) timing of the US decision on what
combat ID system to deploy affect the UK's ability to field similar
or compatible systems?
A coalition Combat Identification concept of
operations drawing from NATO standards for all coalition ground
forces, both vehicles and dismounted troops, was promulgated in
late December 2002. This allowed equipment, which either complied
with, or exceeded, the mandated standard, to be acquired and supplied
into theatre. The December 2002 decision did not affect our ability
to procure or deploy the Combat Identification equipment to the
Gulf.
When was it decided to fit extra IFF systems to
UK aircraft/ships, and when did the necessary modifications begin
and when were they completed?
For ships, approval was given in late November
2002 to fit additional IFF systems. The first fit to a UK-based
unit was achieved on 31 January 2003 and the first fit to a deployed
unit was completed on 20 February 2003. The final despatch to
all nominated units was on 3 March 2003.
The First Reflections report was wrong to state
that extra IFF had been procured for RAF aircraft. We apologise
for this error. For aircraft, no extra IFF systems were required,
as aircraft deployed were already compliant with the existing
IFF standard. However, situational awareness of aircraft, and
therefore their Combat ID capability, was improved in a number
of cases by the fitting of Link 16 tactical data link equipment.
How much did it cost to acquire (i) Blue Force
Tracking and (ii) the extra IFF systems?
For the eight month lease of blue force tracking
equipment, some £2.5 Million was set aside. This included
costs of contractor support and provision against damage or loss
of equipment. The final costings of this system have not yet been
calculated.
About £2.5 million was spent procuring
extra IFF systems for ships, which was fitted to existing IFF
equipment held onboard. Fitting costs were minimal as the work
was carried out by the ships' staff.
What was the cost of chartered sealift and airlift,
respectively, to support the war in Iraq, up to the point at which
combat operations ceased?
| Chartered sealift: |
£70.0 million |
| Chartered airlift: | £53.5 million
|
What changes are envisaged, or are under consideration, concerning
the demarcation of responsibilities or physical and procedural
measures to ensure that key logistic nodes in the UK (such as
Marchwood and Brize Norton) remain secure and able to operate
unhindered?
Notwithstanding the well-publicised actions by protest groups,
for example at the Sea Mounting Centre Marchwood, where protestors
attempted to disrupt the deployment of equipment to the Gulf,
the "key logistic nodes" in the UK were able to carry
out their roles without significant interruption and operations
were not affected.
The demarcation of responsibilities for security at these
establishments is clear. Physical security measures focus on the
protection of critical assets and rely on the principle of multi-layer
defence (eg perimeter fencing, guard patrols, swipecard entry).
Given the extent of the perimeters of the majority of MoD establishments,
it is not possible, within realistic resource allocations, to
give a guarantee that they will not be breached by individuals
or small groups of protestors. Some previous lessons were implemented
in the command and control aspects of deploying and redeploying
MoD personnel to where they were required most. An effective system
for prioritising this effort was established during the operation,
and this is being refined for future use.
In the case of Marchwood, the protest activity was successfully
dealt with in a proportionate manner, that took careful account
of the safety of both guard-force and protestors. Operational
activity was not disrupted. Nonetheless, some enhancements to
protective security equipment and guard-force capability are being
put in place, as are procedures for the improved sharing of intelligence
on protest activity. In the case of RAF Brize Norton, protestors
breached the airfield perimeter and accessed the runway before
they could be apprehended. This did postpone flying operations
for a few hours, but the minor interruption to operations was
easily recovered. The protestors were removed by Thames Valley
Police using minimum force. As with Marchwood, some additional
measures have been taken to enhance security at Brize Norton and
across a range of other airfield sites.
As part of the continuous review of MoD protective security
measures an internal review is currently underway into the security
of RN ships alongside at Naval Bases in UK. This will complement
the enhancements made to the security of logistic facilities at
Marchwood and elsewhere. The MoD takes the security of its people
and assets very seriously. The threat to the Department's facilities
and bases, along with the security measures in force at them,
is kept under constant review. Guard-forces are bound by UK law
and by the principle of proportionality in their responses to
protestors.
PEACE SUPPORT
AND HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS
What formal training was given to British forces to undertake
the transition from a war-fighting to a peace support role?
All combat units that deployed to Iraq had recent operational
peace support experience, preceded by specialist training delivered
by the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG). As an
example, 3 Commando Brigade (3 Cdo Bde)'s recent peace support
operational deployments are outlined below. These levels of residual
experience were mirrored within 16 Air Assault Brigade and to
a slightly lesser extent within Seven Armoured Brigade.
Table 1
RECENT PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF 3 CDO
BDE
| (1) | HQ 3 Cdo Bde: | Op AGRICOLA (Kosovo), June 2000-January 2001.
|
| | Op JACANA[7] (Afghanistan), March-July 2002.
|
| (2) | 40 Cdo: | Northern Ireland, June-December 2000.
|
| | Op JACANA7 (Afghanistan), March-July 2002.
|
| (3) | 42 Cdo: | Op SILKMAN, Sierra Leone, May-October 2000.
|
| | Northern Ireland, March-September 02.
|
| (4) | 45 Cdo: | Op AGRICOLA (Kosovo), June 2000-January 2001.
|
| | Op JACANA7 (Afghanistan), March-July 2002
|
In addition to the high level of residual peace support experience,
conceptual peace support training was conducted by Headquarters
One (UK) Armoured Division staff immediately prior to deployment,
and OPTAG delivered an Internal Security training package for
frontline battlegroups in theatre on the transition to peace support
operations.
Paragraph 7.4 mentions "the secondment of two specialists
from the Department for International Development (DfID)"
to One (UK) Division, while paragraph 7.10 states that "By
mid June the number of UK personnel in CPA offices in Baghdad,
Basrah and northern Iraq had risen to over 70, including secondees
from MoD, FCO, DfID and the Treasury and experts in policing,
customs, finance, law, health and education". It would be
useful to have a breakdown of staff based in theatre from Government
Departments other than the MoD from the beginning of the conflict
to the present, showing when these staff arrived, when they departed
(if they have), which part of Government they came from, where
they were based in Iraq (both which organisation they were working
in and where they were located) and, if they have a particular
specialisation, what this specialisation is.
The number of UK personnel in theatre from other government
departments is constantly changing and is being monitored by the
FCO. The initial deployments began in mid-May, and since then
some 80 personnel have returned to the UK. The FCO have kindly
supplied the most recent roll-call of UK personnel in theatre.
We attach this (removing personal details), at the appendix and
we hope will be of some use to the Committee. This list excludes
those organisations in Iraq that are exclusively staffed by the
MoD. However, for clarity, the list includes all those personnel
working in the other units, and this include MoD personnel and
contractors.
What planning was undertaken to ensure that British forces
had the ability to communicate with Iraqis they encountered? Specifically,
how was it ensured that forces had access to adequate interpretation
resources?
During offensive operations, it was planned that interpreters
would largely be provided by UK military sources and would, in
the main, be military personnel. Once the major offensive was
over, it was planned that local civilian interpreters would be
used for low level work that required no security clearance. A
pool of military personnel who had wide knowledge and experience
of Arabic was identified by Land Command, and the process of putting
available personnel through refresher courses was begun in January
2003. The aim was to confirm their working knowledge and then
assign them to appropriate formations. In addition, on 10 March,
authority was given to use Kuwaiti military personnel as interpreters
should the requirement arise, and the required co-ordination and
administration for this was put in place.
In the event, the pool of interpreters used in Iraq after
UK forces first crossed the border comprised mainly UK military
personnel. Troops on the ground found that local Iraqis quickly
came forward and made themselves available to take on the task.
This assistance was later formalised and the Iraqis were paid
by the Coalition.
Troops on the ground would always have a qualified interpreter
with them for operations that might require them to explain their
intentions to the local population. This was invariably the case
where searches of property were being conducted. The requirement
for interpreters continues whilst our forces are helping to reconstruct
Iraq. Clearly, resources are finite and therefore both MoD and
FCO have work in hand to supplement military interpreters with
UK civilian assistance as well as possible Kuwait-based contractor
support. Of a total requirement of approx 200 interpreters, some
170 will be found from the local population. The balance will
be made up from UK military, contractor and UK civilian sources.
Paragraph 7.5 mentions that "responsibility for water
distribution has been transferred to UNICEF". What other
aspects of humanitarian assistance have been handed over to civilian
bodies, when did this occur, and which are the bodies now responsible?
Ultimately the Coalition has overall responsibility for the
welfare of Iraqis under its legal obligations as an occupying
power. However UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483, was
passed unanimously on 22 May 2003, which set out the UN's role
in Iraq. Since then, day to day responsibility for the provision
of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people has been assumed
by the UN, and other civilian agencies (such as those mentioned
in Q39) as appropriate to their skills, as soon as it was practicable
for them to do so. The UN is now engaged across the humanitarian
sector. For example, since June, the World Food Programme has
been delivering almost 500,000 tonnes of food a month; and UNICEF
and WHO are providing essential support to Iraq's health system.
Paragraph 7.5 mentions that "On 28 April, UK forces delivered
30 World Health Organisation health kits provided by DfID to the
Central Drugs Supply Depot in Basrah: sufficient drugs and medical
equipment to provide primary care for 300,000 people for three
months". What subsequent measures have been taken to ensure
adequate supply of drugs and medical equipment not only to Basra
but to the British area of operations as a whole?
Since the passing of UNSCR 1483, UN agencies such as UNICEF
and WHO have been working with the Iraqi Ministry of Health on
projects such as the immunisation of Iraq's 4.2 million children
under the age of five against preventable diseases such as polio,
tetanus and tuberculosis. DfID is providing significant support
to those UN agencies and NGOs such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent.
£12.5 million has been allocated specifically to health and
nutrition activities; a further £35 million has been allocated
to humanitarian agencies without being earmarked to specific sectors,
a proportion of which is being spent in the health sector. In
addition, UK forces, where they have the capacity to assist, have
addressed some critical shortfalls, including the provision of
oxygen cylinders in Basrah.
Paragraph 7.6 states "Initially, calls for coalition forces
to do more to protect Iraqi civilians, keep order and prevent
looting had to be weighed against the demands of continuing operations
to overcome resistance by Iraqi forces, both regular and irregular."
This implies that British forces were unable to do more to protect
civilians, keep order and prevent looting because of other ongoing
responsibilities. More detail of how forces sought to balance
these responsibilities, and of any orders that they were given
in this context, would be useful to the Committee.
British troops are deployed to establish a secure environment
to allow the reconstruction of Iraq to continue. Operations are
tailored on a daily basis to deal with threats to that environment.
Activity is prioritised and sequenced to ensure that the most
dangerous threats receive the greatest attention. These are decisions
for the local commander on the ground.
Paragraph 7.7 states that "many NGOs and UN agencies,
including the World Food Programme and the World Health Organisation,
are now permanently located in Basrah". Which other NGOs
and UN agencies are now permanently located in Basra?
As of the middle of August there are over 20 UN agencies
and NGOs based in Basrah, covering the full spectrum of humanitarian
and reconstruction activity. They include: UNICEF; UNESCO; the
UN Development Programme; Médécins Sans Frontiéres;
The Mine Action Group; the International Committee of the Red
Cross; The Salvation Army; CARITAS; Oxfam; and Save The Children.
Following the bombing of the UN on 19 August we are aware that
a number of NGOs are reconsidering their position in Iraq. MoD,
DfID and FCO are working with these organisations to mitigate
any impact that this may have.
Paragraph 7.8 notes that "More than 1,700 hostile irregular
forces have been detained". Are these forces being treated
as prisoners of war? If not, how are they being treated with respect
to the Geneva Conventions? How many are still being detained?
Paragraph 7.8 of "First Reflections" specifically
refers to personnel detained by the US. The treatment of regular
and irregular forces detained by the US is a matter for them,
and we do not hold details of their current numbers.
Legal obligations under the Third Geneva Convention (for
military personnel) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (for civilian
internees) still stand. Everyone who is detained by the UK in
military operations is held until their status can be established.
Detainees later identified as civilians who had not been involved
in hostilities are released following examination of their cases.
The UK has released all its prisoners of war, except one who has
been retained pending criminal proceedings.
Paragraph 7.10 notes the "vital role for the UN in the
reconstruction of Iraq" established by UNSCR 1483, but does
not explain in any depth what this role is. Could more be said
about the British Government's understanding of the UN's role
in post-conflict Iraq?
As the Secretary General stated in his report to the Security
Council on 17 July 2003, the UN role in Iraq includes the following:
— delivering humanitarian assistance;
— assisting in the return of refugees and displaced
persons;
— facilitating national dialogue and consensus-building;
— assisting in the establishment of electoral processes;
— promoting the protection of human rights;
— supporting the development of civil society, including
a free and independent media;
— contributing, through the UN Development Programme
and the international financial institutions, to assessing the
needs for economic reconstruction and sustainable development;
— sharing UN experience of post-conflict processes
with Iraqis and the CPA; and
— helping the Iraqi interim administration to rejoin
the international community.
Social and economic needs assessments are currently being
carried out by the UN, IMF and World Bank. The findings will be
addressed at the UN Donors Conference planned for 23-24 October
in Madrid.
Paragraph 7.16 discusses a "drawdown of forces" which
"reflects the change from combat operations to those focussed
upon stabilisation and increased security". Have any capabilities
been moved into theatre which are particularly tailored to stabilisation
and security operations, as opposed to combat operations?
A wide variety of capabilities have been moved into Iraq
that are specifically tailored to stabilisation and security operations
as opposed to combat operations. These include:
— The Divisional Engineer Group, which was designed
from its inception to provide reconstruction and stabilisation
capabilities, with only a limited war fighting function. In particular,
the 62 Commander Royal Engineers (Works) organisation has been
deployed to provide specialist infrastructure and construction
advice, and design and project/contract management expertise.
They are undertaking a wide range of tasks, notably with the assistance
of the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps and Specialist Teams
Royal Engineers who are providing highly technical information.
Projects include the water system, where they have established
a Pipeline Repair Coordination Cell that they are handing over
to the UN, and an assessment of the power generation and distribution
system that is assisting the targeting of contractor-sourced reconstruction
efforts.
— 10 Field Squadron (Air Support), which is a capable
construction organisation that would normally be dedicated to
the support of the deployed Air Component. It has undertaken significant
works on living accommodation.
— 38 Engineer Regiment, normally a Close Support
unit, which has been reconfigured to provide General Support that
is much more appropriate for reconstruction tasks. The unit has
been reorganised around the artisan tradesmen's capabilities.
It is currently undertaking construction and maintenance tasks
in support of British forces' living accommodation and air conditioning,
and tasks in support of Iraqi essential services (oil, power,
water) such as rebuilding pylon lines and providing generators
for the oil refinery, as well as road and bridge reconstruction.
— The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group, which is
undertaking the clearance of explosive hazards near centres of
population where they pose a threat to Coalition forces or the
local population as well as assisting and co-ordinating those
efforts.
— Public Order equipment (eg riot equipment) that
has been deployed to Iraq to be used by UK troops should they
require it to maintain law and order.
The other participating nations operating in southern Iraq
in the UK area, which of course have deployed since the conclusion
of major combat operations, are also configured for Peace Support
Operation tasks.
The conclusions box at the end of chapter seven states that
"The success of the humanitarian operation should at least
partly be attributed to the extensive planning and pre-positioning
of supplies that took place before the conflict began, including
the secondment of Department for International Development advisers
to HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division in theatre". Could more be
said about this planning and pre-positioning? What aspects of
this planning and pre-positioning related to the maintenance,
renewal and reconstruction of essential infrastructure, as opposed
to the provision of humanitarian aid?
Supplies of food, water, medicines and other emergency supplies
were stockpiled in the Gulf before the conflict began, with a
view to addressing any humanitarian needs that might arise as
a result of coalition action. In addition, careful targeting of
precision weapons during the conflict itself minimised damage
to the civilian infrastructure. As a result, as the Committee
will have seen during its recent visit, there was no humanitarian
crisis in Iraq. Localised shortages of essentials were quickly
addressed by UK forces, and soon after the collapse of the regime,
food and water was readily available across the UK Area of Operations.
Whilst much of the UK's pre-conflict preparation was aimed
at averting a humanitarian crisis in southern Iraq, the underlying
need to improve the civilian infrastructure was also central to
the planning process. Military forces deployed to the region brought
with them a range of engineering and reconstruction capabilities.
For example, UK forces played a key role in restoring power and
water supplies immediately after the conflict, and constructed
a water pipe from Kuwait to Umm Qasr that allowed urgent water
needs to be addressed. The military have continued to do all that
they can to repair oil, water and power facilities, and have reopened
both Umm Qasr port and the railway to Baghdad. However, it is
clear that a decade of neglect by the former regime, and the looting
that took place after the conflict ended, have left much of the
civilian infrastructure in a parlous state that will require a
great deal of work and investment to put right.
The conclusions to chapter 7 also state that "In terms
of planning for the post-conflict phase, we must learn from the
difficulties faced in the provision of security in the UK area
of operations". Has the Government drawn any initial lessons
that are applicable to planning for future operations?
The process of identifying lessons from the operation in
Iraq is still ongoing, with a full report covering all aspects
of the operation due to be published by the end of the year. Any
lessons regarding the provision of post-conflict security that
are applicable to planning for future operations will be detailed
in that report.
What is the nature of the UK's involvement in and assistance
to the Iraq Survey Group?
The United Kingdom is currently providing some 47 Service
personnel and 20 civilian staff to the Iraq Survey Group, although
the number will vary according to local circumstances; this includes
specialists, generalists, subject matter experts and former UNSCOM
inspectors. Brigadier John Deverell, a serving British officer,
is the Group's second-in-command, based in Baghdad. The UK is
represented throughout the Group, including in the Analytical
Centre and Media Processing Centre.
Estimate of progress in UXO clearance, including clearance
of munitions delivered by the coalition during the recent conflict.
The extent of UXO and exploded ordnance contamination in
Iraq is vast and is a legacy of many years of war and a highly
militarised society. Much of this contamination predates the recent
conflict and much has never been fired. Where Coalition forces
are aware of particular sub-munition strike areas resulting from
Operation TELIC, a programme of identifying and marking is underway
to protect the civilian population and to allow follow-up teams
to carry out the clearance. Looting since the end of major combat
operations has also left many Iraqi ammunition storage areas in
complete disarray, with large amounts of munitions often left
in an unstable condition. The clearance of these areas is beyond
the scope or capability of currently deployed assets.
Clearance efforts to date have focused on dealing with direct
threats to the civilian community and support for Coalition forces.
UN-sponsored teams have also been carrying out clearance work
as part of their on-going humanitarian work. To date, tens of
thousands of items have been cleared, predominantly from infrastructure,
population centres and industrial areas. This however represents
an unknown percentage of the total amount in the country; as new
areas are explored and developed items will continue to be discovered
for many years.
What is the assessed accuracy of the artillery-delivered L20A1
Enhanced Range Bomblet Shell? Are any of these shells known or
suspected to have missed their target when used in urban areas
in Iraq? What progress has been made in the clearance of unexploded
L20 bomblet shells in the Basra urban area?
Analysis of the accuracy of our weapons systems during the
recent operation in Iraq is still ongoing. However it should be
recognised that the L20A1 by its nature is an area weapon designed
to scatter to cover an area of 125 metres by 125 metres and is
generally used against groups of targets, such as concentrations
of enemy vehicles. As such, the concept of accuracy is somewhat
different from that of precision-guided munitions.
A program of identifying and marking sub-munition strike
areas including in the wider Basrah area has been underway for
some months, using targeting data and site surveys. Following
the survey work, UN-led activity has cleared substantial numbers
of sub-munitions of all types. The emphasis has firstly been on
areas where the presence of sub-munitions represents a direct
threat; clearance of items preventing the reoccupation of buildings
and land has been a secondary priority.
GENERAL
The Committee understands that Commanding Officers involved
in Operation Telic have been asked to provide "lessons learnt"
reports for the areas of their responsibility. The Committee would
be grateful for copies of any such reports from one* officers
and above.
Any "lessons learnt reports" written by Commanding
Officers are commissioned for, and used in, the internal lessons
process of the department. The disclosure of these reports would
harm the frankness and candour of internal discussion, both on
this operation and for future operations. The department is exempt
from releasing such information under the "Code of Practice
on Access to Government Information" Part 2. Regretfully
we therefore will not be providing these particular reports to
the Committee. However, the results of the lessons process within
the department will be the subject of a publication due by the
end of the year, and this should contain all relevant information.
Copies of the Rules of Engagement for the combat phase; and
of the new RoE which recently replaced them.
The Rules of Engagement that have been requested cannot be
released due to the sensitive nature of the information contained
within them. However, the department will consider answering,
on a case by case basis, any specific questions that the Committee
has on these documents.
The Committee understands that directives were given to Commanding
Officers setting out the limits of their delegated authority and
the tasks they were expected to accomplish. The Committee would
be grateful for copies of these.
The directives that have been requested cannot be released
due to the sensitive nature of the information contained within
them. However, the department will consider answering, on a case
by case basis, any specific questions that the Committee has on
these documents.
1
First Reflections, para 2.5. Back
2
First Reflections, para 3.12. Back
3
First Reflections, para 3.13. Back
4
First Reflections, p. 20. Back
5
Updated December 2003. Back
6
First Reflections, p. 21. Back
7
Units deployed on Op JACANA initially took part in a warfighting
operation. However, this became a transitional operation before
finally becoming a peace support operation. Back
| 
