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Fleet Air Defence
18. Angela Watkinson (Upminster) (Con): If he will make a statement on fleet air defence. [150171]
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr. Adam Ingram): All naval task groups include defensive assets matched to the size of and risk to the task group, which provide air, surface and underwater protection. For multinational operations such as Operation Telic, protection is provided jointly across coalition forces. The effectiveness of these complementing layers and the benefits of operating with allies has been successfully demonstrated in many recent national, NATO and allied exercises and proven in the Gulf and Adriatic operations.
Angela Watkinson: The air defence Sea Harrier is being withdrawn before the new joint strike fighter becomes available, and we also hear that the number of destroyers and frigates is being reduced. How does the
Minister assess the Navy's capability to defend itself should it come up against an enemy that has an air force at full strength?
Mr. Ingram: I do not think the hon. Lady listened to my earlier answer. We have said consistently that there will be combined and joint operations with allies, and if we find ourselves in theatre of conflict, mutual protection is afforded to all. The decision was taken to dispense with the Sea Harrier. It was an old aircraft and to upgrade it would have cost a considerable sum of money, was technically complicated and might not have produced the necessary result. The Type 45 destroyers will come on stream later in the decade and they will afford an immense level of protection to the Navy.
John Robertson (Glasgow, Anniesland) (Lab): I am glad that my hon. Friend mentioned the aircraft carriers, because that is the matter that I want to address. He will be aware that the size of the aircraft carrier will determine the response time for landing and take-off, in that that will be much quicker on the larger ships than on the smaller ships. Exactly where are we with these aircraft carriers?
Mr. Ingram: We are still going ahead with building them, which I know my hon. Friend welcomes. Because of his sophisticated knowledge of these matters, he will appreciate that the design aspect has to be properly defined, not only in relation to what the aircraft carriers can carry but in relation to a range of other matters associated with the ships' overall size. Progress has been made and the Navy is very much looking forward to getting the vessels.
International Terrorism
19. Mr. Tom Harris (Glasgow, Cathcart) (Lab): If he will make a statement on his plans for the future involvement of British forces in combating international terrorism. [150172]
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): The new chapter to the strategic defence review and the defence White Paper "Delivering Security in a Changing World" set out the significant contributions that the armed forces can make to the Government's responses to international terrorism. These range from the role of defence diplomacy and stabilisation operations in tackling the conditions that promote terrorism, to large-scale combat operations, such as those in Afghanistan, which destroyed al-Qaeda's training camps and disrupted its leadership.
Mr. Harris : Given that at least some of the activities that my right hon. Friend mentioned do not involve the use of force, can he explain to the House how the Ministry of Defence is co-ordinating the activities of other Departments as they meet their obligations in the Government's fight against international terrorism?
Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend is quite right that there is no single military solution to international terrorism
and the Ministry of Defence must work closely with other Departments in ensuring that we use all effective means to tackle terrorism. For example, the Treasury may well have a significant role to play, as does the Ministry of Defence, in cutting off sources of finance. But I can assure my hon. Friend, as I assure the House, that we work closely right across this Government and in co-operation with other Governments in dealing with the threat of international terrorism.
Michael Fabricant (Lichfield) (Con): The Secretary of State will be aware that the United States Department of Homeland Security takes the risk of cyber-terrorism very seriously indeed, and that the United States army and other armed forces within the United States have in place blocks to stop cyber-terrorist attacks breaking down its computer control systems. Is the Secretary of State satisfied that the British armed forces have similar protection in place?
Mr. Hoon: We take seriously the threat to computers and computer networks—I shall try to avoid using the phrase that the hon. Gentleman uses—and we discuss it jointly with our friends in the United States.
Reserve Forces (Gulf Region)
21. Mr. Kevin Hughes (Doncaster, North) (Lab): How many members of reserve forces are serving in the Gulf region; and if he will make a statement. [150174]
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Ivor Caplin): As at last Wednesday, 21 January, 1,042 reservists were serving in the Gulf region supporting Op Telic. Broken down by service they are as follows: Royal Naval Reserve, 18; Royal Marine Reserve, 14; Territorial Army, 991; Royal Auxiliary Air Force, 19.
Mr. Hughes : And is it not the case that despite certain stories circulated in the media, most reservists were proud to be deployed and to serve their country during the conflict in Iraq, and are proud to be out there now helping with the rebuilding of Iraq?
Can the Minister tell the House whether he has received any feedback from industry about the additional skills that reservists have picked up while they have been out in Iraq?
Mr. Caplin: I know that my hon. Friend has a personal interest, because his son Martyn was a valuable member of our armed forces during the conflict.
We continually work with employers to consider all the issues involved in call-out and mobilisation, in particular the skills that our reserve forces can bring when they return to work. It is worth pointing out that our reserves made a very important contribution to operations in 2003, and I am confident that they will continue to do so in future.
Constitutional Reform
3.30 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs (Mr. Christopher Leslie): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to repeat a statement made in the other place by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs on the judiciary-related functions of the office of Lord Chancellor.
On 14 July, the Government published consultation papers on the establishment of a new way of appointing judges, the creation of a new supreme court and the future of silk. In September, we published a paper on the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor; and we are grateful to those who responded to our consultation process. The Government are today publishing summaries of these responses. As set out in the Queen's Speech, we intend to bring forward legislation to enact these changes. It is for Parliament to consider that legislation, and the proposals today are conditional upon parliamentary approval.
Today I wish to set out our proposals for the future handling of those functions of the office of Lord Chancellor which relate to the judiciary. The Secretary of State has had detailed discussions with the Lord Chief Justice, who has been speaking on behalf of the judges on these issues. I am pleased to be able to tell the House that the terms of today's statement have been agreed with the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice's agreement is of course conditional on Parliament's approval of our proposals. It is right, though, that Parliament should be told first of the results of the discussions.
In making changes, we must secure embedded, enduring judicial independence, good working relationships between the judiciary and the Executive, high-quality judges, and high public confidence in the judiciary. I believe that, taken together, our reforms and the proposals in this statement will help to secure those aims.
The reforms seek to clarify and embed in statute the principle of judicial independence. Judges must enforce impartially the law made by Parliament. The Executive must continue to guarantee security of judicial tenure and remuneration and ensure that the judiciary is supported by an efficient and effective system of court administration. We propose, then, that there should be a general statutory duty on the Government, all those involved in the administration of justice, and all those involved in the appointment of judges to respect and maintain judicial independence. In addition, there should be a separate, specific duty falling on the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs to defend and uphold the continuing independence of the judiciary.
However, the judiciary does not operate in a vacuum—it is part of a constitutional framework in which Parliament is the supreme law-making body. The Government, through Parliament, must ensure that the needs of the public are fully served by our legal system. Parliament must be able to hold the Government to account for the operation of the justice system and the resources provided for it. That clearly requires a partnership, and the Secretary of State is determined—
as is the Lord Chief Justice—that the successful partnership between his Department and the judiciary should be sustained and entrenched for future generations.But to maintain that partnership without blurring the boundaries of responsibilities requires clarity and transparency. To that end, we intend to define in the forthcoming Bill the respective responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and those of the Lord Chief Justice, as the most senior judge in England and Wales. The Bill will make it clear that the Secretary of State is responsible for the administration of the courts, that he is accountable to Parliament for the efficient and effective running of the courts system, and that he is responsible for supporting the judiciary in enabling it to fulfil its functions. The Lord Chief Justice will lead the judges with the authority that comes from being appointed as chief judge. He will be responsible for ensuring that the views of the judiciary are effectively represented; he will be responsible for the education and training of judges; and he will be responsible for decisions on the deployment of individual members of the judiciary. The Lord Chief Justice should therefore be given the additional title of President of the Courts in England and Wales. He should also no longer be President of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court—that should become a new post in its own right. We propose that responsibility for setting the overall framework for the organisation of the court system should be exercised by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice. But when it comes to the posting of individual members of the judiciary within that framework, responsibility should fall to the Lord Chief Justice.
We announced in July the Government's proposals for a Judicial Appointments Commission and consulted over the summer on the detail. Central to the appointments process will be a new, clearly independent Judicial Appointments Commission. The commission will have full responsibility for the process of advertising vacancies and evaluating candidates for judicial appointment. No candidate will be appointed to the judicial posts for which the commission will be responsible unless recommended by the commission.
The sole criterion for the commission in making its recommendations will remain that appointments must be made on merit. To ensure proper accountability to Parliament, the final decision on who to appoint or who to recommend to the Queen for appointment should remain with the Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of State's discretion must be severely circumscribed. He should only be able to appoint candidates recommended by the commission and should have strict, limited powers to challenge those recommendations. It is not right that a political appointee, albeit one always acting in good faith, should be able to cut across the system to appoint who he or she thinks is right.
Magistrates are a very important part of the judicial family and we propose that equivalent arrangements should apply to magistrates appointments. On the advice of the local advisory committees, the Judicial Appointments Commission will make recommendations to the Secretary of State, who will have the same limited powers to reject as he does in relation to the professional judiciary. For
administrative reasons, the commission will not be able to begin dealing with the appointment of professional judges and magistrates at the same time, and we propose, therefore, that for an interim period the Lord Chief Justice will fulfil the role of the commission for magistrates appointments.It is vital that the commission itself should incorporate the expertise of the judiciary and of the legal professions but also the demonstrable impartiality and wider experience of those who are not from the legal world. We propose, therefore, that the chair of the commission should be neither a lawyer nor a judge and the largest single group on the commission should be of members who are neither lawyers nor full-time judges. The commission will include members from each level of the judiciary up to the Court of Appeal and be required to consult the Lord Chief Justice during the recruitment process. The Lord Chief Justice will be able to engage judicial colleagues, and that will ensure that the commission is able to benefit from the views of the judges about potential candidates and about any particular requirements for a vacancy.
In order to ensure that the system is as open and accountable as it can be and that it is independent of Government, we propose that the commission should be fully responsible for the appointments process itself. It should recruit its staff and submit an annual report detailing its activities over the year. To provide a further guarantee of the system's impartiality, the commission should establish a system for handling complaints from candidates who are unhappy with the way in which their application has been handled. We shall further provide for an ombudsman to deal with those instances where a candidate remains dissatisfied.
I want to make it clear that appointments will continue to be made strictly on merit. However, our proposals will greatly improve the transparency, openness and fairness of the appointments system. By doing so, they will help to ensure that the judiciary of the future fully reflects the diversity of the community that it serves—a goal that both the Government and the judiciary seek.
I am pleased to announce that Dame Rennie Fritchie, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, has agreed to chair the appointing panel for the commissioners. The Lord Chief Justice will also sit on the panel, as will one other member, who will neither be a member of the Government nor a civil servant, to be nominated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Once appointed, the chair will be on the panel for the appointment of the other commissioners.
The education and training of the judiciary is the responsibility of the Judicial Studies Board, which is chaired by a senior member of the judiciary and, although staffed by members of my Department, is under the control of the judiciary. The Lord Chief Justice will be responsible for the provision and sponsorship of judicial training within the resources provided by the Secretary of State, with a continuing role for the Judicial Studies Board. We shall further propose that the Lord Chief Justice should in future appoint both the chair and members of the board after consultation with the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State—the Lord Chancellor—and the Lord Chief Justice will both continue to have a role to play in relation to judicial discipline and conduct. That partnership reflects the importance of respecting the independence of the judiciary, providing assurance to the public that complaints about judges are subject to proper scrutiny, and of providing accountability to Parliament for the complaints system. In the most serious cases, in which it falls to be considered whether a judge should be removed from office for incapacity or misbehaviour, removal will be by the Secretary of State with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. It will not be possible unless they both agree.
For the higher judiciary, removal will continue to be by Her Majesty the Queen on an Address from both Houses of Parliament. Such cases will first be investigated by a judge of appropriate seniority, and will be able to be referred to a review body. In less serious cases, the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of State will need to agree on any penalties short of dismissal to be applied to a judge. They will be supported in that work by a complaints secretariat, and will both be consulted about all complaints of any substance, as well as receiving regular reports about all other complaints dealt with. For all cases involving magistrates, local input will continue. The Secretary of State will be accountable to Parliament for the efficient and effective operation of the complaints system as a whole and will continue to deal with correspondence from peers and Members of Parliament on this subject.
To provide greater certainty and transparency about the process for handling such complaints, the Bill will provide for a complaints procedure to be agreed by the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of State and set out in secondary legislation. As a further guarantee of the openness and fairness of the new complaints process, we propose that the complainant or the judge concerned should be able to refer the handling of a complaint to the ombudsman.
A number of posts, such as the senior presiding judge and the presiding judges, do not involve formal promotion to a more senior judicial level. These roles, which are held for a relatively short term by different judges in succession, entail a degree of judicial leadership and a range of administrative functions. We propose that, in future, such appointments should be made by the Lord Chief Justice, either in consultation with or with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
The making of the rules of court is a key means of giving effect to the policy decisions approved by Parliament. Responsibility for the making of rules will remain with the relevant rule committee. The Secretary of State will allow or disallow rules. We propose, however, that the power to alter rules should be repealed. Instead, we propose a new power to allow the Secretary of State to require a rule committee to make new rules or to change existing rules to achieve a particular desired outcome. It will then be for the committee to consider how best to frame the rules to meet such a requirement, and to submit or re-submit them to the Secretary of State.
The policy that I have announced today covers the position in respect of England and Wales. The Secretary of State's responsibilities also extend to Northern Ireland, and consideration will also be given to the future handling of his functions that relate to the
Northern Ireland judiciary. That process, which is currently under way, will include consultation with the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, and will be based on the same guiding principles that apply in England and Wales, taking into account any provision already made for Northern Ireland to give effect to the recommendations of the Northern Ireland criminal justice review.The Lord Chief Justice, the Secretary of State and I will listen carefully to all the views expressed today in the House and elsewhere. The House will have a further opportunity to consider these issues in more detail when legislation is introduced. To assist in such consideration, we have today placed in the Libraries of both Houses an explanatory document—which I know that the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Mr. Duncan) is dying to see—that sets out these proposals in even more detail. With parliamentary approval, the reforms that I have set out will guarantee for future generations that the independence of the judiciary is protected. They will clarify the relationship between the Executive and judicial arms of the state, improving each arm's accountability, and will promote and strengthen partnership so as to serve the public better.
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