| Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill
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Sir Sydney Chapman (Chipping Barnet): I support my hon. Friend on these three eminently reasonable amendments. We have talked a lot about terminology and whether we should have ''may'' or ''must'', but I believe that ''reasonable'' is in line with the terminology of much town and country planning legislation and regulations. If it is not used universally throughout those Acts and regulations, it should be. The only additional point that I would, with the greatest respect, put to the Minister is that in trying to speed up our planning system—whether we will succeed is another matter—it is crucial that we are seen to be fair and that we strike a balance between the interests of promoters and developers of schemes and those who will be affected by them. It would be to the Government's credit if they accepted these seemingly minor, but significant, amendments. Column Number: 361 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Tony McNulty): It is nice to have a reasonable opening debate. Amendments Nos. 356, 357 and 377 are entirely unnecessary. The addition of the word ''reasonably'' in the position suggested in amendments Nos. 356 and 357 adds nothing to the clause, and nor does the insertion of the words ''must be reasonable'' in amendment No. 377. In law, ''necessary'' implies ''reasonable''. Furthermore, the court could review an authority's decision on the basis of ordinary judicial review principles if that authority were to impose requirements that it could not reasonably think were necessary, or which another party thought were unreasonable. In general, and whatever the intention may be, we have no reason to suppose that local authorities will act unreasonably in requiring information to enable them to determine planning applications. The current regulations enable them to direct an applicant to supply further information necessary to enable them to determine the application, and we do not envisage that they will act differently under the new provisions. I accept the spirit of the suggestions made by Opposition Members, but the words that the amendments would add are entirely unnecessary. That has proved to be the case under the regime with the current regulations in place, and will be so under the new system. This is not a recipe for clogging up the system any more than it has been under the current system. I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment. Mr. Clifton-Brown: To use the Minister's analogy, we believe that the amendments are reasonably necessary. They are necessary, therefore they must be reasonable, and the Minister should be reasonable in accepting them. However, he has not done so. We have much to get through today, and I have much to say about the clause, which is important. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill. Mr. Clifton-Brown: I have a lot to say about the clause that is fairly technical and refers to many different Acts. I hope that the Committee will bear with me; I will try to take things slowly. The clause is in five parts, which deal with the forms that local authorities require in relation to applications for planning permission, tree preservation orders, advertisements, universities and listed buildings. I have examined section 62 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990—the principal Act—which from now on I shall refer to as the TCPA. In those days, Bills received proper scrutiny. They were drafted in a highly professional and considered manner, amendments were made, and they emerged as very good legislation. I do not blame the draftsmen of the Bill, but it seems that clause 41 replaces good, well considered legislation in the TCPA with something Column Number: 362 that is much more nefarious and difficult to get to grips with, and much less clear.Section 62 of the TCPA could not be simpler. It states:
In other words, the Secretary of State may prescribe any regulations that he wishes, so he has more than adequate powers to deal with the whole of clause 41. Section 62 continues:
So the local authority has all the powers that it needs to vary the legislation. I therefore contend that the clause is unnecessary. However, we must consider it. Clause 41(2) deletes section 73(3) of the principal Act, which deals with applications for varying or revoking reservations in planning permissions, and states:
Again, that it is simple stuff, yet we are tinkering with it and deleting it. It was clear under existing legislation, so I am unsure why we need to vary it in the Bill. Section 198(3) of the TCPA deals with tree preservation orders. Subsection (3) of clause 41 refers to it and adds to it additional subsections (8) and (9). Section 197 of the principal Act is also clear about how tree preservation orders are made, and the Secretary of State is given all the powers needed to deal with them.
9.15 amI shall read out the relevant provision in the TCPA. Part VIII starts with the word ''Trees''—nothing could be clearer than that—and section 197(b) says that the local planning authority has
That is all pretty clear, simple and straightforward stuff, yet again the Bill tinkers with the existing legislation, which has been tried and tested in the courts and everyone understands. The clause is tinkering for the sake of tinkering. Section 328 of the Town and Country Planning Act deals with universities. In comparison, subsection (5) of the clause must have taken the draftsmen many hours of midnight oil. Section 328 of the TCPA refers to—I have been through them all—the Settled Land Act 1925, the Law of Property Act 1925 and the Universities and College Estates Act 1925. That is all old and well established legislation. Section 26 of the Universities and College Estates Act 1925 has no less than 22 subsections. However, I have to say that all the subsections in the Acts that I have looked at have very Column Number: 363 little relationship to planning. Tangentially, sections 26, 111, 112, 133 and 327 of the principal Act make small mentions of development, but it is unnecessary for the Bill to alter all those provisions. It achieves nothing, because most of the sections are irrelevant to planning, being concerned with how universities should dispose of and buy assets, deal with moneys, mortgage their moneys and so forth. That has little to do with the Bill. I repeat that it is tinkering at its worst.Finally, subsection (6) of the clause deals with listed buildings. Again, unnecessary tinkering is going on. Section 10(2) of the listed buildings Act 1990 is simple:
It will not have escaped the Committee's notice that the wording in that Act is almost identical to the wording in the Bill, but we are tinkering again. More than adequate powers are already provided for in existing legislation. What problem out there in the country is the clause supposed to remedy? I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against clause stand part. If Labour Members had any determination— Mr. McNulty: Gumption. Mr. Clifton-Brown: Yes, if they had enough gumption—and, indeed, if the Minister had any gumption—they would all have looked at what the civil servants had produced and said, ''This is a load of garbage; chuck it out. It is not needed in the Bill; it clutters everything up.'' With that explanation I hope for a little common sense. We should not be tinkering with Bills for the sake of it and cluttering up the courts with the inevitable applications for judicial review, because whenever an Act is altered, lawyers find one word that is different and say that it changes the meaning of the whole section. The clause, like many others in the Bill, will simply make more work for lawyers, and that is unproductive for the wealth-creating sector. Sir Sydney Chapman: The amendments that we discussed in the previous debate included the word ''reasonable'' because clause 41 needs clarification. What exactly can a local planning authority stipulate that a planning application should include? Many people are worried because the clause rewrites sections of the principal Act. The extra requirements that local planning authorities will be able to impose on applicants, whether they do so or not, could be onerous. I am always suspicious when blanket authority is given to the Government, or an agency of Government, to impose extra demands on the people of our country. That is putting it rather grandly, but simply, and I hope that it makes the point. I shall ask the Minister some questions now, so that he has plenty of time to deal with them before we vote Column Number: 364 on clause stand part. First, how does clause 41 make a difference to the principal Act? What changes does it make to that Act? Does it add anything? The Minister might reasonably argue that I should have done my research and found out myself, but the clause is complicated as it refers to many parts of the principal Act—sections 62, 73, 198, 220 and 328, among others. It is therefore not unreasonable to ask him to spell out what effect clause 41 will have on the principal Act.Clause 41(3) refers to tree preservation orders. My friends in politics—or perhaps I should say my friend—tells me that my only useful accomplishment in 32 years in the House is that I was the instigator of national tree year in 1973, before you were born, Mr. Amess. It was a successful campaign, which led to the creation of the Tree Council, which highlights its work by having a national tree week every year. All in all, the initiative has been quite successful. Tree preservation orders are important, and they are used sparingly. The owner of a tree that has an amenity value in a particular area must get permission before he can do anything to it apart from light pruning, and certainly if he wants to lop, top or chop it. The orders were extended to include all trees in conservation areas. If someone wanted materially to alter a tree in such an area, unless it had a tree preservation order on it, they had to give notice of intention—six weeks, I think—to the local authority, and the local authority could then impose conditions. If the tree was in a conservation area and had a tree preservation order on it, the requirements of that order would come first and foremost. I would be interested to hear comments on that. As for controlling the display of advertisements, I need not say anything more. Clause 41(5) states:
I will not read that out, but I am interested to know why it does not include schools, for example. It seems reasonable that it should, given that there is a reference to universities and colleges. Perhaps they have special historic legal requirements or privileges, but again it would be helpful if the Minister would deal with that point. My last material point—this is one of my longer contributions in this Committee, Mr. Amess—concerns subsection (6), which refers to
I am not aware of any such Act. I hope that the Minister does not think that I am being pedantic, but I am just wondering whether that subsection should refer to the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. I should quite seriously be grateful for confirmation of that. If I am right, why has the full title of the Act not been used, as is the case elsewhere in the legislation? Perhaps I am wrong and there is a Listed Buildings Act, but I do not think so, because ''listed'' has a small ''l''. In any case, the year of the Act should be given in the text of clause 41. Column Number: 365
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| ©Parliamentary copyright 2003 | Prepared 23 January 2003 |
