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Mr. Luff: After hearing the last two contributions, we can be fairly sure that the lawyers are saying, ''Whoopee-doo.'' I am very grateful for the concluding remarks of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. I share his concern about the implications of clause 45(2) for the clause that we are now debating. The Minister would do well to reflect on whether his definition is as watertight as he wants it to be, because I do not believe that it is. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough made a powerful point when he said that the Bill is rather like saying that one can be a thief without stealing anything. We have not properly defined the offence, and that is a real problem. The hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West is right. Some hunts have created problems of the kind set out in the licence. An assistant chief constable in my constituency told me that my local hunts would not be caught by the provisions of the Middle Way Group's licence, but that new hunts in the countryside might be. We have read in the papers about problems that occur. A major failing of the Bill is that it does not deal with the important issues that cause real concern in the countryside. Finally, the Minister's comments about the intent and moral purpose of those who hunt were very significant. He has taken the debate into an entirely new area. We agreed at the Portcullis house hearings that what mattered was the welfare of the animal in question, not intent and moral purpose. Today the Minister threw over all those conclusionsI am sure that I shall be debating the matter with him later, outside the Committeeand said that the intent of the human being is now what matters. The issue will be explored at great length in another place. Mr. Gray: I shall briefly sum up the two ways in which the debate this morning has been extraordinarily interesting. First, we forced the Minister to admit something that he had not previously admitted, which is that he believes that the pursuit of any mammal using dogs is cruel by definition, unless it can be proved under the utility and cruelty tests that it is not, or unless it is exempt Column Number: 744 hunting, which we shall discuss later today. That is the first time that he has admitted that that is what stands behind the Bill.Flying in the face of all the evidence given to Lord Burns and at Portcullis house and elsewhere, the Minister is starting from his presumption, which goes back many years, that hunting is by definition cruel unless it can be justified by some reason. That is a clear admittance, but it is the first time that he has actually got around to admitting that. We, of course, do not agree. The second point that I find interesting is the way in which clause 45(2) applies to the offences defined in clause 1. The Minister has been unable to answer the question of whether it is necessarily an offence to have a pack of hounds chasing a fox but failing to kill it. [Interruption.] I beg his pardon; that is incorrect. He said that that would be an offence. What he has failed to be clear is on whether a hunt that spends the day looking for a fox but finds nothing commits an offence. I understand that it would not because clause 45(2) refers to the ''pursuit'' of a mammal. If it could be demonstrated that there had been no pursuit of any such mammal, there would not be an offence. Equally, the Minister has not answered my question as to a situation where there is no pursuit by dogs or people because the animal is killed instantly. Would that be an offence or not? My understanding of clause 45(2) is that it would not be because no pursuit was involved. More importantly, the Minister plainly exposed his thinking in an answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire, when he said that the question was not whether the animal was killed or pursued but whether there was the intent to do that. That seems an extraordinary admission because the word ''intent'' does not appear in the Bill. It is a very important word legally. Whether there is an intention to pursue or kill an animal is very different from whether that is actually done. The word ''intention'' does not appear in the Bill. The Minister now seems to be sayingif he means this, he will have to amend the Billthat if I put on a red coat, get on a horse, follow some hounds around all day but never see a single fox, I none the less had the intention of pursuing a fox, so I am guilty. Equally, he is saying that if I am in my red coat, galloping around on my horse, and the hounds find the fox and chop it instantlythat happens about one time in threethat would be an offence, even though under the Bill there is an offence only if the fox is actually pursued. I agree with the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West that the definition of hunting in clause 45(2) is a complete muddlea lawyer's charterthat will allow the courts to ponder the matter for many years to come. That is why we believe that clause 1 should be deleted and replaced by clauses that would lead to a proper licensing system. That is not licensing cruelty, as the Minister put it; it is licensing cruelty only if one believes beforehand that, by definition, hunting with dogs is cruel. If one does not believe that, one should lay down the precise ways in which a hunt can carry out its legitimate activities. In answer to the hon. Column Number: 745 Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, it is absurd to say that if we make a law banning, restricting or regulating certain practices, that demonstrates by definition that those things happen. There are all kinds of regulations that do not do that.Judy Mallaber: Will the hon. Gentleman give way? Mr. Gray: If I may anticipate the hon. Lady, she may be about to say that there are allegations that those things happen. My experience is that they do not, but if she alleges that there is trespass and that people do all kinds of things that they should not, no doubt she will welcome my registration scheme. It would outlaw the things that she describes, and that she believes take place. Judy Mallaber: If the hon. Gentleman is including all those provisions as a safeguard, why has he not included in his licensing scheme provision to refuse or revoke a licence where there is proven or alleged cruelty? Mr. Gray: The revocation exists in the licence; the hon. Lady has not read it very carefully. I will readily discuss precisely how the licence should read, if she will accept the principle that a licence should be issued to hunts. We could then have a sensible discussion on what should be in the licence and how it should work. That is what we do when we discuss driving, shotgun or other licences issued by the Government. Let us do that; it would be a matter for the Committee. However, if the hon. Lady suggests merely that because we seek to control practices under the licence it demonstrates that hunts are a bad thing, she is arguing against herself. If she believes that hunts trespass, or do not mend gates and fencesthe hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West seemed to suggest thatfine; I do not agree with her, but I will accept the accusation. We should therefore lay down in the licence a means of requiring hunts not to do those things. That is fine by me. The hon. Lady and I are in agreement that bringing in some form of licence in order to control those activities is a good thing. That does not happen under the Bill.
10.45 amIt would be much more sensible for the Government to put on paper precisely what they want a hunt or individuals to do. If the hunt or individuals do not do it, they lose the right to hunt. That is what the Government do with regard to car, gun, alcohol and dancing licences. The principle behind licensing is to say what must be done and what trouble one will be in if it is not. That is a liberal, sensible and straightforward approach. The Bill does not do that. Column Number: 746 Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill: The Committee divided: Ayes 20, Noes 9.
Division No. 22]
AYES
NOES
Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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