| European Parliamentary and
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Sir Teddy Taylor: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Can he think of any way in which one could provide evidence that someone had personated another voter through electronic voting? It is possible Column Number: 181 to get evidence in other cases, but how could one provide evidence with electronic voting?Mr. Heath: The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point. First, there are deterrent means to prevent personation by issuing a verifiable identification system, including a password known only to the recipient. Sir Teddy Taylor: There is nothing in the Bill about that. Mr. Heath: Indeed, that is one of my major criticisms. Even if one had such a system, to provide the evidence of personation one has to witness someone using that password, incorrectly, on behalf of another person. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that that is difficult. It is a little easier if one has an effective electronic audit system; at least then one can establish the place and time that the vote was cast. If one can prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person who claimed to be voting at that place at that time was elsewhere, it is clear that an offence of personation has taken place. In the absence of verification or audit, providing the evidence for a successful prosecution will be extremely difficult. I want to allow the Minister enough time to respond to one of the most important points in the Bill. Sadly, debate has been compressed and the points will not be fully considered in the context of the later clauses. How will he advise the House on the measures that will be taken to prevent personation in postal and particularly in electronic ballots? Those who wish these pilot schemes well want to ensure that the integrity of the British voting system is not in any way impaired by what is suggested. Mr. Leslie: The clause is important because it represents a significant improvement in the antifraud measures that should help to allay worries about malpractice and fraud occurring. There is not significant evidence that postal voting at a local level or in general is more prone to fraud. The Electoral Commission has carried out studies and reports on this, and it has not concluded that it is any more prone to fraud than conventional voting. We should defer to its judgment on that issue. The clause extends the power of arrest without warrant beyond the polling station. That is clearly helpful where remote voting is widely in use. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome questioned the system for verifying that a ballot paper had been received. While there is nothing to stop an elector checking with the returning officer that their ballot has been received, we do not have a system of receipts at present although I understand that that has been investigated in some local pilots. While we should keep an open mind on the issue, I am also conscious that we need to strike a balance between ensuring that fraud is deterred and having an efficient and cost-effective means of running elections. There is no evidence of a need for a receipt system, which would be extremely costly to operate, but I shall Column Number: 182 keep an open mind and listen to what the Electoral Commission says about that issue.Mr. Heath: One of my small criticisms of the Electoral Commission—I do not have many—is that it has not been asked to, or certainly has not implemented, a system of review of postal votes other than on the basis of complaints received. That is one of the problems. Of course one does not find evidence of fraud if one does not go looking for it. If one concludes from the fact that there is a relatively low number of complaints that everything is hunky-dory, one might be deluding oneself. Mr. Leslie: In the debate earlier, when the hon. Gentleman was not here, I rebutted at some length the misapprehension that somehow the Government did not undertake proactive checks to consider whether the electoral systems were prone to infiltration or fraud. We do not rely on reports or wait for allegations to surface. I said that the ability exists to contact a sample of people who appear to have voted on a marked register to ask them whether they actually did so. We can also compare a sample of signatures on declarations of identity, and review logs produced by electronic voting arrangements. I do not want to rehearse my explanation, as I felt I dealt with that comprehensively this morning. I also dealt with the idea that there was no auditing of electronic voting. Government information security specialists, who are credit expert assessors, undertake rigorous quality assurance of the software used in electronic voting, and of the wider electoral processes involved in the pilots. Sufficient powers are available to the Government and to the courts so that prosecutions for personation can successfully take place, and that is a deterrent. Extending those arrangements in clause 6 is important, and I hope that the clause stands part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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| Prepared 4 November 2003 | |
