Sexual Offences Bill [Lords]

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Sandra Gidley (Romsey): The hon. Gentleman attended the briefing by the paedophile unit at Scotland Yard. One of the points raised there—I am not sure how it is covered by this amendment or the Bill—was that sometimes there is an initial period of deception before the truth is revealed. How would the amendment deal with a situation where a 15-year-old is attracted by someone over the internet?

Mr. Grieve: Looking at the amendment, if it were a question of starting with innocent communications that became gradually sexual in nature, it would clearly still be an offence. The second possibility is that an individual might start by saying, ''I'm John, aged 14'' on an internet chat line, and thereafter, prior to the meeting, admit that he is in fact Peter, aged 28, but say that everything is still all right. The hon. Lady raises an interesting point concerning such circumstances. As I read it, the amendment would still make that a criminal offence because the process of arranging the meeting involved an element of deception in order to soften up the child. That said, and arguing against the amendment, it may be argued by the Minister that sufficient safeguard exists in subsection (1)(b) because intent must be proved in order to make out the offence. All the surrounding circumstances will be considered.

If there were a situation where all that someone had done was to enter into what appeared to be completely innocent communications of a non-sexual nature and organise a meeting, and there was no other evidence to suggest that sexual activity was intended to take place, it would be a bold jury that would convict. Effectively, there would be no evidence to show or prove the intent. Doubtless the anxiety that the proposers and those who asked me to table the amendment have is that, in this era, we rightly have great fears about predatory paedophiles. It is also possible to react hysterically to innocent matters. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence that could justify the intent, people would still be convicted because juries might consider that anyone who engages in such e-mail communications must be up to no good. That is the

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issue before the Committee, and the amendment provides the opportunity to consider it. It is the one possible objection to clause 17, which otherwise I welcome entirely. I am making a legitimate point. Even if I am not persuaded by the amendment, it is a proper proposal to put before the Committee.

Mr. Malins: I agree that the clause is entirely admirable. Does my hon. Friend know whether there is a particular reason why the clause specifies

    ''on at least two earlier occasions''?

Could not a serious matter have taken place had there been only one previous lengthy contact? I make just a small point.

Mr. Grieve: My hon. Friend is right. The Government are attempting in difficult circumstances to strike a balance to prevent people from being wrongly prosecuted or prosecuted in circumstances where a conviction would leave the Government and the Court of Appeal uneasy about whether justice had been done. That is the reasoning behind two shows of conduct rather than a one-off communication. Equally, if it were really internet grooming, it could be argued whether contact should have been made on three or four occasions. Such issues are difficult. Having sought to tackle the problem, I considered that two occasions were probably appropriate. I know that the Government have consulted widely on such matters with individuals who have more expertise than we do. I hope that the Minister can provide the Committee with a little background to the Government's reasoning, although having attended the briefing by the paedophile unit, I am aware of some of the approaches taken to such matters. However, that does not mean that we should rubber-stamp the clause. Clearly, we must consider its implications carefully.

Sandra Gidley: I too have some trouble with the amendment, although I thank the hon. Member for Beaconsfield for tabling it. It raises an interesting debate. Were this any other Bill, we would all be up in arms because I am not sure whether it will create a precedent of intent to commit a relevant offence, in that the planned offence does not have to take place. I seek reassurance about how intent will be proved and what guidelines will be given to the police so that the clause is not used in a vexatious way by someone who has a grievance against a neighbour, for example.

The clause does not just cover the internet; it deals with contact of any nature. Let us suppose that a lonely, elderly gent chats to children on their way to school and that, in an atmosphere of suspicion, someone brings a complaint against that gentleman because they see him talking to children. In reality, the gentleman is not a paedophile. Perhaps talking to children is the only contact he has during the day when he is out in the garden. I have seen such innocent activity in my neighbourhood, but I am not aware of any complaints about it. However, in an era in which there is a certain tabloid frenzy about such matters, such complaints could be made. I seek reassurances about how the problem could be delicately handled.

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Vera Baird: I rise briefly to ask whether the measure is necessary or whether attempting to have a completed meeting, which would involve an offence under clause 17(2)(b), would meet the real mischief of the occasion.

11 am

Paul Goggins: I begin my remarks by paying tribute to the Government taskforce on child protection on the internet for its work, and in particular to sub-group A, which formulated the thinking behind the clause. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) and to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Mr. Burstow), who are members. The taskforce membership is wide, including the Metropolitan police paedophile unit, the Crown Prosecution Service and a wide range of children's charities, academics and others with an interest. It is an exemplary form of modern governance to bring together experience of that kind to get our minds around such key issues and come forward with proposals that will work in practice.

Sir Paul Beresford: If I recall correctly, Liberty is a member of the taskforce and, possibly, of that sub-group, so has had an opportunity to put its case.

Paul Goggins: Indeed it has had such an opportunity, but we would not deny it the opportunity to press some of its thoughts further through the representations made by hon. Members.

I emphasise to the Committee that the Government do not want to criminalise activity that is absolutely innocent. I agree with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that in our increasingly sexualised and dangerous world, relationships that might once have been seen as innocent are less easy to sustain in the modern day. For all our need to protect children, such relationships can be important and the legislation is certainly not intended to criminalise people involved in them. The sexual intent must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, so the measure does not intend to capture innocent behaviour such as buying a neighbour's child an ice-cream, about which there has been some discussion in the media.

The hon. Member for Woking asked why the clause specifies two occasions. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, we are seeking to establish a course of action. We do not want to capture here one foolish moment that never goes beyond that. We want to capture people who are engaged in a course of action, but to do so at an early stage. Two occasions suggests a course of action, and we want to ensure that that and any subsequent contact is captured.

I want to impress on the Committee the need for the provisions and the reasons why the amendment would not help. I shall do so through an example, which I hope that Committee members will find persuasive. Let us say that a man in his 20s communicates with a girl of 13 or 14. He does so using the internet and talks through the internet about his favourite pop group and television programme, and the things that he likes and does not like, and in that way befriends the child. He then makes an arrangement to travel to meet her with the intention—with the intention—of committing

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a sexual offence against her. He may even communicate his intention to commit the sexual offence to another adult friend, perhaps someone with similar sexual interests. But in that case, he has neither tried to impersonate someone else nor been remotely sexual in anything in his communication or the way in which it has been undertaken. If we amended the offence in this clause in the way suggested in the amendment, that gentleman would walk away scot free. I believe that all hon. Members would agree that we are trying to catch precisely that type of individual with the offence. I hope that the Committee will accept my reassurance and explanation and that the amendment will be withdrawn.

Mr. Grieve: I am grateful to the Under-Secretary, who has given us a good and compelling example. I wholly accept that, if surrounding circumstances make it clear that a sexual offence was intended against the child, it would completely negate the purpose of the legislation to say that no prosecution can lie just because the criteria laid down in the amendment have not been met. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for putting the matter in clear and succinct terms and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 40, in

    clause 17, page 7, line 21, leave out '7' and insert '14'.

This amendment deals with a much more difficult area, one in which what I believe to be my general reputation in Committees on criminal justice Bills for trying to temper the fierceness of the criminal law will be reversed. Therefore, I should try to explain why I have come up with the suggestion that the maximum penalty should be raised from seven to 14 years.

I accept the argument that, normally, we must make a clear differentiation between a merely preparatory offence and a full offence. Generally speaking, if it was the defendant's good fortune that he was stopped from doing something before he actually did it, even though the intention that he wished to do it is clear, the courts recognise in sentencing that he benefits from not having been able to carry out the full details of his criminal intention.

That said, we face particular problems in respect of sexual offences. The most obvious, which was brought home to us at the briefing, is that paedophile behaviour is particularly intractable, despite punishment. Unless some of the psychological causes of the behaviour can be addressed—that is not always easy or possible—the dreadful truth, according to the evidence, is that individuals who have a propensity to commit paedophile offences will continue to do so over and over again. Indeed, it appears to be something that is almost beyond their control. That is a serious problem.

Increasingly, when I visit prisons—I have no doubt that the Minister who will reply to the debate has had the same experience—I come across paedophile offenders who are subject to life sentences. The sentences are discretionary; nevertheless, the prisoner may be in prison for a very long time. In some cases, the prison governor takes one aside and says that the

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prisoner has been in prison for X number of years and probably will never be released, which, if one wishes to temper the criminal law, is a terrible thing to happen to an individual. However, we recognise that the safety of children must come first.

Let us think for a moment of likely examples of an offence of the kind that we are creating in clause 17. At one end of the scale will be someone who has no previous track record of paedophile behaviour. I dare say that the sentence will be relatively short in such circumstances, although the court may be worried that the defendant will go on to offend again unless the underlying causes of the behaviour are addressed. Indeed, one of the most telling things said by the officer was that what mattered was not so much the length of the sentence but whether something could be done with the defendant during the course of his incarceration. As I said, very often that is not possible.

Another situation that I can easily foresee may involve an individual who has committed two serious paedophile offences but, because of past changes in the rules, may on each occasion have received a determinate sentence of considerable length. However, determinate sentences come to an end. He may have spent a large part of the previous 20 years in prison. Nevertheless, he is out. He may be on the sex offenders register. He is a great worry to the police. He is found to be communicating by e-mail and there is no doubt, from the surrounding circumstances, about the criminality of his intention. He has impersonated someone else and groomed the child. When he is arrested on his way to the rendezvous with the child, all the apparatus and paraphernalia for committing an appalling child sex offence is found in the back of his car. It is all there. He is charged, and can only be charged, with meeting a child following sexual grooming. The reports produced by the probation service and the Court Service clearly show his propensity, his long history of committing such offences and the fact that he has been unamenable to treatment. It is clear that he intended to commit a very serious offence. The court says, ''Well, the maximum sentence that we can pass is one of seven years' imprisonment, which means, in practice, that he will be released three and a half years later.'' The public will consider that we have provided them with insufficient protection.

 
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