Criminal Justice Bill

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Mr. Heath: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, which moves us forward. However, it is not entirely satisfactory to remedy a potential breach of the convention on human rights if that introduces a breach of the convention on the rights of the child. There is still a degree of creative tension. My remarks and those of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield were about the provisions that deal with children rather than adults, for whom the issues are more clear cut. However, I think that the Minister's reply was helpful in indicating the circumstances in which he expects the conditions to apply.

Mr. Grieve: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman would agree that the question is whether the purpose is to maintain welfare, pending the determination of the trial, or something wider. The Minister made a point about welfare in terms of locking somebody up. The purpose in those circumstances is to prevent that person from being lynched by a mob outside, committing suicide prior to trial, or another reason that requires their protection pending the trial, rather than to provide a device aimed at administrative convenience in the long term.

Mr. Heath: The hon. Gentleman has made an important and interesting point, and I agree with him.

A lot of the potential difficulties could be avoided if there were sufficient clarity in the guidelines produced

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by either the Home Office or the Association of Chief Police Officers on how to interpret the provision and how officers will use it. I still have reservations about whether a custody sergeant—the person responsible—will have sufficient information to make a proper assessment of the welfare needs of a child who is brought in suspected of a crime, though not at that stage convicted, without the assistance of the relevant welfare authorities. In almost every circumstance that I can imagine, if there are serious concerns about the child's welfare, it would be far better for those authorities to be involved at that stage than for arbitrary conditions on bail to be imposed.

However, I am partially reassured by what the Minister said. He may like to reflect further on the guidance that can be issued on the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the provision. Those outside bodies that have concerns on the issue and understand the situation may also wish to reflect on his words. We may return to the matter later.

Hilary Benn: I would be very happy to reflect on the points that the hon. Gentleman has made in response to what I said, and to write to him if that would be helpful.

Mr. Heath: I am grateful, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Allen: I beg to move amendment No. 249, in

clause 11, page 8, line 6, at end insert

', or

(e) for the purpose of contributing to a national DNA profile providing evidence of identity and kinship of each resident of England and Wales.'.

Before the Minister says it, I appreciate that the amendment is drafted extremely clumsily. Its purpose is to enable the police to obtain DNA samples from all suspects held in custody, and it is intended to be the first step towards the establishment of an independent, national DNA database, on which the DNA fingerprints of all individuals in the UK could eventually be stored. As well as crime suspects, other members of the public could be invited to contribute their details voluntarily, and the end result would be a national resource, the uses of which would extend beyond the obvious example of assisting criminal detection. For example, accident victims could be more easily identified and with far less trauma to relatives. DNA fingerprinting can also be used to clear those wrongly accused of crimes.

The process might take many years to complete, but a start must be made. People are already talking about the subject in scientific and academic circles. In my view, it is a process of some inevitability. The technology now exists—there is no question about that—and I hope that this will be the beginning of a serious and sensible debate that could be viewed in an ethical framework, rather than one that makes commercial profit its main concern. I am sure that the Minister will help to initiate that debate. Once the Minister has given a response, I shall be happy to withdraw the amendment if necessary, and will perhaps table a new clause later on.

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Hilary Benn: As I think my hon. Friend acknowledged in his opening words—I am trying to phrase this with appropriate delicacy—the amendment is not, perhaps, in the most appropriate place, although I understand entirely its central point. He has touched on a very important issue. As he rightly says, technology is making possible what was not possible. In the interests of time and of making progress, I shall say that I will be happy to write to him on those points. As he says, we may return to the issue later in the Bill.

Mr. Allen: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Offences committed on bail

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 37, in

clause 12, page 8, line 39, leave out from 'offence' to end of line 44.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take the following: Government amendment No. 38.

Amendment No. 139, in

clause 12, page 9, line 3, after 'bail', insert

'when considering the imposition of conditions on bail or remand in custody'.

Hilary Benn: Government amendments Nos. 37 and 38 correct an error in new paragraph 9AA. That paragraph provides that if a defendant is on bail in criminal proceedings on the date an offence was committed, the court is to give particular weight to that fact in deciding whether he or she would be likely to reoffend if released on bail.

As drafted, the paragraph requires that either the instant offence or that for which the defendant is already on bail should be imprisonable. However, as the schedule applies only to imprisonable offences, it is clear that the paragraph can apply only if the instant offence is imprisonable, so paragraph 9AA(1)(b) is redundant. The amendment simplifies and clarifies the new paragraph.

Amendment No. 139 was tabled by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. I confess that I am not entirely clear as to its purpose, although we will no doubt hear about that in a moment. However, if the intention is to remind people of the context in which the decision is being taken, I understand the helpful intent. I hope that, from the framework within which those decisions have been taken, it will be clear that regard has been paid to whether to take a decision about remanding in custody or granting bail with conditions. Our view is that it is not necessary to add the amendment for those reasons. I hope that that is helpful.

Mr. Heath: I am grateful to the Minister for his pre-emptive strike at amendment No. 139. I speak on this issue with some difficulty, because I was one of those who campaigned quite vociferously a few years ago for adequate measures to deal with the so-called bail bandits. That was in a different life, when I was very conscious of the difficulties that they imposed on the

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police force for which I had some responsibility in Avon and Somerset. I understand the arguments for provisions of that kind, and recognise that what is proposed is an attempt to ensure that there is no question about the present terms complying with the convention on human rights. That was drawn to our attention by the Law Commission.

Nevertheless, I fear that there is a danger of the balance going askew as a result of the wording of the provision—albeit improved by the Government amendments—in that, although there is not quite a reversal of the presumption of bail, it comes close to steering in that direction. It is questionable whether that would form the basis of a justiciable complaint under the Human Rights Act 1998. We are at pains to avoid that happening.

By expressly setting into the terms of the clause the option of conditions of bail, which the Minister has astutely identified as being the purpose of the amendment, we would make clear the context in which the decision is taken. There is no presumption of a refusal of bail. That was our sole intent, and I believe that it strengthens the provision. However, I understand his reluctance to accept added words that he feels are unnecessary. I do not agree, as there is still an element of doubt and it would be unfortunate if what was meant to be an improving amendment were interpreted as being a presumption against bail, rather than being a presumption of bail, which is the current situation. Unless he indicates that he would like to speak again, I am prepared to take what he said earlier as his response to amendment No. 139. Under those circumstances, I would be equally happy not to press the amendment to a vote, in the belief that we shall have the opportunity to discuss the matter at a later date.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 38, in

clause 12, page 8, line 39, leave out from 'defendant' to end of line 3 and insert

'was on bail in criminal proceedings on the date of the offence.' ''.—[Hilary Benn.]

Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill

Clause 13

Appeal to Crown Court

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 39, in

clause 13, page 9, line 11, at end insert—

'(ca) section 24C of that Act (intention as to plea by child or young person: adjournment),'.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 45 and 46.

Hilary Benn: These are technical amendments to tidy up the clause. Subsection (1) defines the circumstances under which an appeal will lie to the Crown court against a condition of bail imposed by a magistrates court. It does so by reference to bail granted on the adjournment of a case and lists the provisions under which a case may be so adjourned. Amendment No. 39 adds to that list a reference to an adjournment under a new provision, section 24C,

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which appears in schedule 3, which we shall debate later. The amendment is a tidying up amendment in that it makes the clause consistent with what is already in schedule 3. Amendments Nos. 45 and 46 do the same in respect of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

Amendment agreed to.

9.45 pm

 

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Prepared 7 January 2003