Select Committee on Work and Pensions Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 480-499)

WEDNESDAY 22 JANUARY 2003

PROFESSOR EDWARD PALMER

  480. You paint a picture of people in thousands of houses up and down Sweden discussing whether to invest in Japan, in South-East Asia or in America. Was that the order of the day? It was as broadly spread as you describe?  (Professor Palmer) Yes, it must have been like that, and the fact that people apparently had discussions like this can be considered a positive externality of the reform. The evidence that they deliberated on their decisions is that they chose on average more than three funds per person. Also, two-thirds chose actively, which I think surprised many people. People in the north chose more actively than people in the south, which surprised especially the experts. Also, the percentage of women who made active choices was slightly higher than that for men.

  481. That is wonderful testimony to the spread of people's capital in your country?  (Professor Palmer) Yes.

  482. I was looking at the charges that were allowed to be levied. I reckon they turn out at just under 1%, about 0.95%, in total. In this country, we are having quite a debate at the moment over our stakeholder pensions and whether the capping of fees at 1% means that the promoters of these stakeholder funds have not got enough resources to market them and sell them in an individual way. What is your reaction to that? We are worried that the 1% may curtail opportunities and some people may be worried that it is still too high at 1%. What is your advice on that point?  (Professor Palmer) What Sweden has done is interesting in this sense. If you manage a fund with a relatively small number of participants, administration can cost more as a percentage of assets than if you manage a fund with a relatively large number of participants, and where new contributions are flowing in all the time. If you have a large fund with a lot of participants, and with money flowing into your fund because people have already chosen it you do not have costs involved with the individual customers. First, the public clearinghouse—the PPM—keeps all of the individual accounts, takes care of customer questions and sends out statements. Fund share information is published on a daily basis in the newspapers and is available from the PPM. Large funds have only very marginal cost increases as their asset base grows. In addition, they have only minor costs for general advertising to solicit new customers. For all these reasons funds should be able to charge less for administration as they grow with new injections of public funds. Eventually, many of the more popular funds will become very large since assets for participants in their funds are augmented by new contributions every year, and without any effort on the part of the fund. The PPM has considered these facts and has constructed a rebate system that says: the more money you get from us, the public system, the less you can charge for administration of that money, expressed as a percentage of assets held on behalf of participants in the system. This means a fund can charge any cost to private clients outside the public system, but must provide a rebate on this fee to the PPM clients if their normal fee is too high compared to the general rate schedule, based on their PPM asset holdings. They had to agree to accept this schedule in order to participate in the public system. In the paper I submitted there is a chart that shows how this works.

  483. Your paper makes clear, I think, that 0.65% is the normal amount.  (Professor Palmer) Yes, and as the system gets bigger, the figures will have to go down; they will be forced down because funds will have much more money from the public system. This will cause charges to decline in accordance with the PPM schedule. The public administration is also projected to fall from 0.3% to 0.1% in the future within 10 to 20 years.

  484. The final point I wanted to raise with you is about regulation and the regulator. Could you say a word or two about how the regulator deals with all these different funds? Secondly, one thing we worry about here is that excessive regulation may not protect the interests of the consumer but may make it more difficult for the funds to be properly and most effectively run. Can you give us a feel for how you ensure that regulation is light and effective and not heavy and deadening?  (Professor Palmer) The regulation of these funds is no different than the regulation of any other investment funds in Sweden. Even though they may be owned and run by insurance companies, as many are, they are still separate funds with their own fund management, et cetera. There are no specific regulations other than the fact that they have to report daily and electronically the value of fund shares to the PPM, the public clearinghouse. Otherwise, there is no more regulation of funds registered with the PPM than there is for any other fund. Regulation is easier since the investment phase is clearly separated from the annuity phase in the overall system. For example, in a traditional insurance scheme, both the investment and the pension phase are put together in a package for the individual, often in the form of a defined benefit. These schemes are not transparent. They require sophisticated actuarial calculations and enough regulation and monitoring to be sure that assets cover liabilities, given risks and using reasonable assumptions for projections. In other words, regulation in this traditional insurance environment requires more sophisticated regulatory procedures. In a system where the investment and annuity phases are separated and become two businesses you have an investment piggy bank, with fund values at the end of the day, and then, when it is time to become a pensioner, you cash in and you buy a pension annuity. Monitoring the funds that invest participant money during the accumulation phase occurs within a transparent environment, and an environment in which funds have daily communication with the public clearinghouse, which also provides a sort of monitoring. Note that there is only a limited scope in designing the annuity as long as we're talking about a mandatory scheme that is a part of a country's social insurance system. In Sweden variable and fixed rate individual or joint life annuities are possible. These are provided by a public annuity provider, the PPM. If the annuity products provided are the same, in principle, the difference between private and public administration is only in the cost of administration. Even though it isn't so today, it is conceivable that in the future annuities will be provided privately in Sweden, in this case through a bidding mechanism.

Andrew Selous

  485. In the United Kingdom there has been a lot of comment recently in our press about the number of employers which have changed their pension schemes from defined benefit to defined contribution, and most people have been concerned and unhappy about that switch, not least our own trades union movement here in this country. We were particularly interested to note that the main Swedish blue-collar union actually supported your switch to a defined contribution scheme. Was this a typical response in your country and was it anything to do with the particular type of defined contribution scheme which you have in Sweden?  (Professor Palmer) The group schemes for, first, all blue-collar employees, second, civil servants and other state employees and, third, municipal and county council employees—persons working largely in health care, education and other care of children, the elderly and the handicapped, and other municipal services—were all converted to financial defined contribution schemes following the reform of the public system in this direction. The blue-collar union was the first to convert to defined contribution. I think they wanted to get a financial rate of return, under the assumption that is likely to be greater than the rate of return based on the growth of the economy. This assumption is in line with historical data for the period from 1950. The only group that has been reluctant to change from defined benefit to defined contribution are the white-collar, private sector business employees. The reason for this I believe is because there are many employees who have benefits that are not revealed to anyone, and that this is perceived as being an advantage by both parties. Assume these benefits do not come at the expense of business profits, and note that even this group scheme has a ceiling that excludes from coverage the higher earnings of top executives. Then implicitly, there is some redistribution within these schemes from persons with lower career earnings and longer careers to persons with higher earnings over a shorter period of time, everything else equal. A change from defined benefit with generous rules for full coverage and final salary benefit rules to defined contribution makes everything explicit, including who the winners are in the present defined benefit scheme. Of course, with a conversion to DC, there is a clear option open for employers to improve the take-home pay of so-called losers, if it is the objective of employers to use remuneration to attract and keep good employees, and these are for some reason among the losers. The alternative, defined benefit schemes, with liabilities on the books of companies also increases the risk that commitments will not be met when liabilities have to be converted to annuities in the future, and certainly creates a need for reinsurance where pension capital is kept is only on the books within the company.

  486. Stock markets have fallen very considerably around the world in the last three years, particularly severely here in the UK. We have had a 4% fall from the peak values in 2000. Do you think such volatile stock markets pose a serious risk to the sustainability of an equity-based contribution system like you have in Sweden?  (Professor Palmer) This is a very difficult question to answer. You would think that if it did pose a risk, awareness would be high right now. So, in principle, there should be a lot of backlash in Sweden today because the Swedish markets, like the British markets, have gone down dramatically, and the majority of assets in the system are in Swedish funds. But, there isn't. Perhaps because the system is just getting started and the level is so small to begin with, it has not been considered by people to constitute such a great problem. Also, for persons retiring now, the account values are so small anyway that it makes no real difference for pensions what happened with the stock market in the recent two years. It will be different in the future when account values are higher. In addition, people have a substantial part of their total public benefit coming from the NDC part of the system, which is only related to the financial market through the rate of return on its reserve fund. There has, in fact, been a lot of discussion in the newspapers about how much people have lost in the past year in the financial account system. It makes good headline news in the financial section. So there has been no absence of information, yet this has not caused much political debate. This may be due to a feeling among the general public, but even the financial experts including those writing for mass media, that in the long run there will be positive growth.

Mrs Humble

  487. Can I turn to the issue of pension forecasts? Can you tell us if in the Swedish system there is a combined private and state pension forecast and how reliable it is?  (Professor Palmer) There is not yet a combined forecast, although this has been an objective of the National Social Insurance Board, which is responsible for combined information on projections for the NDC and public financial account schemes. There is a projection for the public scheme based on assumed rates of growth of the economy and the financial market return. I guess if you think the assumptions are good, then the projection can be considered a reliable enough forecast, in the sense that it provides a pretty good picture of what the individual can expect, given these assumptions. I should stress that you have to make assumptions to make these personal forecasts, and that the assumptions have been a topic of discussion in the newspapers. You can assume 2% real economic growth for the NDC system and 4 or 5% for the financial system, and these will be claimed to be both too high and too low by experts with varying points of view. The closer you get to taking your pension, of course the better the forecast is. If you are relatively young, the information you receive on a yearly basis provides a chance to get a picture of how each year's contributions and capital growth enhance the outcome in the future. So it is informative in this incremental sense. If you are, say, 55 or 60 years old, with a relatively predictable earnings career then the information in the statement can give you a picture that can help you plan when you may want to retire. In fact, a major point of this exercise is to illustrate for older workers the effect of postponing a pension claim. Of course, there is no exact forecast, and you have to take the responsibility yourself to evaluate what the information means in your case. The new system has shifted more responsibility explicitly to the participant in this respect.

  488. Are you also hoping, by giving this information, that people will look at those projections and think, "Oh, dear, I must pay a little bit more"?  (Professor Palmer) Yes, some people will discover that they must make additional provisions privately for themselves, depending on the standard they may want as retirees. At the start of this system, account values were created from information on contributions to the old system. I think many people were surprised to see how small their pensions would be, even though for older workers there was little difference from the old system. Generally, the yearly information contributes to the educational process.

  489. Have you encountered any practical problems in detailing all the different private pension schemes that people have and then adding on the state pension, or have I misunderstood you? My first question is: do you produce a combined forecast? Does it actually list everything or not?  (Professor Palmer) No, there is still no combined forecast. This has been a goal and is under discussion. The two public pensions are reported together, as I've just mentioned. The idea was to put the occupational group schemes on top in the same annual letter to the participant, but this fell apart when some of the occupational schemes did not want to communicate their results. Perhaps it will work in the future. On top of the public system and occupational supplement, you might have insurance purchased on the private market. There's been no discussion to include this in the overall projection. As it stands today, you get information of course from your private provider, and your occupational group provider.

  490. You might have several pieces of paper but then you are trying to collate the information.  (Professor Palmer) You are still going to have three pieces of paper. The idea was that you would have two, but the negotiations recently fell through in Sweden to put the occupational results in with the public results.

  491. Are you also using the internet for people to access that same information?  (Professor Palmer) Yes. I log into the internet and make my own personal calculations if I want them, either for the NDC scheme or the financial account scheme. My account includes my own history. Also, I can go into the internet and look at my funds' performance in the financial account scheme. I actually do this in practice. I have my personal code, and can execute a transaction that moves my money from fund X to fund Y.

  492. Going back to your answer to my earlier question about how difficult it is to project into the future, especially for younger workers, are these forecasts guaranteed or underwritten in any way?  (Professor Palmer) No. They are just information to help people to think about their own future pensions. There is no guaranteed return. It is not like in traditional insurance where you have a guaranteed X%, usually 3 or 4% nominal return, and at least at present, after the fall in equity prices, some Swedish insurance companies are having trouble with this so-called guarantee. In the public system, the internet information is to be interpreted as an example: "If the rate of return is—" and we have a rate of return that we use, say 5%, "then this is what the outcome looks like", but there are other rates of return. It is just an exercise to help the understanding of the participant of the economic and financial risks involved.

  493. Is that a projection of a cash amount that you are going to get at the end of the day or is it a percentage of earnings?  (Professor Palmer) My yearly statement tells me how much I will receive in kronor per month at the ages of 61, 65 and 70 with zero and 2% real growth, and a 3.5% rate of return on my financial account in the case with zero economic growth and a 6% rate of financial growth in the projection with 2% real economic growth. The statement does not give me my replacement rate, but since I know my income and can calculate with the same rate of growth as in the example, zero or 2%, I can calculate my replacement rate. The reason for showing zero growth in the statements is so that people can understand this in terms of today's values. We think that people have trouble understanding what 2% growth is and what it will mean in 35 or 40 years.

  494. Is there any chance that you could let the Committee have an example of what one of these forecasts looks like? You are talking about a lot of information being given here.  (Professor Palmer) Yes. As a few years have passed, we have been simplifying the information. To begin with, there was too much. I can send an example of a statement, yes.

  495. That would be very useful.  (Professor Palmer) I should add that in the beginning there was an attempt to educate people with a lot of information and that was a mistake. People just need a basic amount of information. You can send out a separate supplement with considerable additional information that they can read at their leisure.

Mr Stewart

  496. Professor, could you describe the mandatory reinsurance scheme and assess how successful it has been todate?  (Professor Palmer) There is no reinsurance for the financial account system because it is not designed as traditional insurance. As I've mentioned earlier, the financial account scheme is really just a savings scheme until you decide to retire and then you convert the capital balance into an annuity. You are forced to have a life annuity, and cannot convert your account balance into a lump sum or, for example, into a five year phased withdrawal.

  497. How does the guarantee benefit work for low-income pensioners?  (Professor Palmer) The guarantee is provided outside the NDC and financial account schemes. It is financed through general tax revenues. As I have discussed earlier, it provides a certain amount which is price-indexed. It is not enough to live on, I should say, and this is part of the design of things. In order to get enough to live on, to get up to what the social welfare board says you need to live on as an old-age pensioner you have to have more, maybe about an additional third more after tax. You get this through the housing supplement, which as I have already mention is mildly means-tested.

  498. Is means testing perceived as an issue in Sweden? Secondly, what is the take-up rate like for means testing?  (Professor Palmer) I think that the general goal has been to avoid means testing for the elderly. This is the purpose of the default guarantee pension, which used to be the flat rate benefit. The question is where you put the ceiling for the guarantee. If you put it too high, then you are giving away some money to some people who do not really need it. In principle the idea is to set the ceiling lower than what people generally need and then to top it up, if they need it, but this top up is something that they have to claim, and in Sweden this is the housing supplement for old-age pensioners. Since it is only mildly means-tested, you do not have to have reached a financial rock bottom to claim this benefit, which you have to do if you collect social assistance.

  499. It is a gentler slope of means testing?  (Professor Palmer) Yes, it is a gentler slope. The real problem is, of course, for people who immigrate from poorer economies to Sweden when they are older. To qualify for a full guarantee you have to have been in the country for 40 years. For example, with 10 years you get 10/40 of a guarantee, and this means that if you have no other financial resources you are going to end up with social assistance. Because of this a new benefit has also been introduced to deal with older immigrants who have no financial resources, so that they do not have to go to the social assistance office every month for the rest of their life.


 
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