House of Commons - Transport

Select Committee on Transport Sixth Report

8 THE WAY FORWARD

206. The White Paper must set out a coherent aviation policy for the future. It should not just be a statement about if and where any new runways are required but a document setting out the regional, national and international policies that the Government will pursue. This report has set out many of the issues it should cover.

207. We believe that the Government's underlying forecasts for the growth of the industry are as robust as such long term forecasts can be. This does not mean that the Government has adopted or should adopt a predict and provide approach. Environmental constraints will continue to limit airport capacity near busy cities. There are many uncertainties to deal with. The expected Aviation White Paper will only be the beginning of a process. The Department for Transport must establish a delivery unit to ensure its policies have real results and that policy evolves to meet changing market conditions and expectations.

208. Other European countries appear to plan airports on a rolling 10 to 15 year basis. Whilst working within similar environmental constraints, they can define, consult on and construct new terminal or runway capacity in around 10 years. We must match that here. If the new procedures in the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill do not speed up the planning process sufficiently, the Government will need to look at this again. The Department's delivery unit must ensure this. It would be absurd if the planning system effectively meant that we were having to decide now what we would need in 2030.

SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS

209. It is clear that there are capacity issues that need to be addressed now. Heathrow and Gatwick are already operating at or near capacity. Even assuming that all available slots can be used, then, based on the current modest growth rate of 2.2% per annum[256] and the assessed full capacity of the four BAA London area airport runways, all these runways will be fully utilised within 3 years. The spare capacity at Luton could theoretically provide capacity for a further 5 years. We support the provision of new capacity at the earliest opportunity. There is no prospect of getting planning permission for a new runway within this period; the Department for Transport consultations assume that the earliest any new runway capacity could be made available is 2011. This is optimistic. Constrained capacity in the South East will lead to further reductions in regional access to London airports which we believe will have serious detrimental impacts on their economies. It will also increase some services in the regions creating pressure for runways outside the South East. Doing nothing is not an option.

210. There are hard choices to be made. The immediate options for increasing capacity are:

To increase the use of other South East airports and appropriate regional airports;
To operate Heathrow mixed mode;
To consider the use of feeder airports and/or a new runway

INCREASED USE OF SOUTH EAST AIRPORTS

211. Luton is eager to expand its use to some 30million ppa, although it suggests this is best done by runway extension rather than realignment or replacement as suggested in the consultation document. It noted that this would also increase competition with BAA.[257] Long-term, there is some concern that the full potential from the development of London Luton might be compromised if either a third runway were developed at London Heathrow or there were additional development at London Stansted. However, the planned expansion of Luton could be achieved long before either of these two other options.

212. Many of the other airports in the South East gave evidence to suggest that their use could be expanded, for scheduled or general aviation or freight — we received submissions from the operators of Southend, Biggin Hill, Farnborough, Lydd and Manston airports.[258] We are not in a position to evaluate their claims, but it is likely that there will be some scope for expansion here.

MIXED MODE AT HEATHROW

213. Heathrow's runways are operated in "segregated" mode, that is with aircraft taking-off from one runway with landings on the other. This is to provide local residents some relief from noise and overflight. The landing and take-off runways are switched each day under the terms of the amelioration policy known as the "Cranford Agreement".

214. If Heathrow's runways were operated in "mixed mode", that is both runways used for take-off and landing (as on the single runway at Gatwick), then it is understood that a further 50,000 ATMs could be handled. This would give about an additional 8 movements per hour. The main technical problems are the need to reconfigure airspace and the possibility of a shortage of facilities to handle the extra movements until Terminal 5 is delivered. There will also be a need to re-examine the problems that could result from any increase in noise pollution.

FEEDER AIRPORTS

215. Whilst both of the measures above could offer some relief, we are firmly of the opinion that they will be insufficient, in themselves, to solve the short-term capacity problem. One alternative is the use of feeder airports. In 1998, a predecessor committee recommended that the use of Northolt and Redhill as feeder airports for Heathrow and Gatwick should be seriously considered. These recommendations were rejected by Government.

216. In the course of this inquiry, Redhill has once again put itself forward as a complementary feeder airport for Gatwick.[259] It is understood that all the land required to develop Redhill as London's regional airport, with a capacity of some 20 million passengers per annum and 200,000 ATMs, is already in the ownership of the airport company or its associates, and that the proposed development is not subject to the restriction of the BAA / West Sussex County Council 2019 legal agreement.[260]The airport company told the Committee that the new facility could be operational within 4 years of receiving planning permission.

217. The physical separation of Redhill from Gatwick would, as with Northolt and Heathrow, reduce operational flexibility for airlines, but its more ready availability and the resulting ability to increase activity at or for Gatwick, and reductions in delay and programme disruption could offset this inconvenience.

218. The private sector operators of Northholt agreed it would be possible to have some scheduled services there, although they considered great expansion in use would not be compatible with the need to maintain it as a secure facility for the MoD and VIP flights. Northolt is some 6 miles north of Heathrow. It has an existing 1684 metre runway with an alignment which currently conflicts with those of Heathrow. To maximise its potential alternative use the runway would need to be realigned, parallel with those of Heathrow and lengthened to 2000 metres. As such, 70 per cent of the aircraft that currently use Heathrow could be handled at Northolt. It therefore offers a similar potential to the proposed short runway at Sipson. It also has excellent public transport potential with five rail and underground lines bordering the site.

219. The development of Northolt aerodrome, as a potential reliever airport for Heathrow, was proposed by our predecessor Committee in its 1998 report on Regional Air Services as a means of providing a rapid availability of additional runway capacity to serve the United Kingdom's premier network airport. The Government replied that it did "not propose to consider any proposals to develop Northolt as a major civil airport, since it is clear that the environmental consequences would be unacceptable".[261]

220. Despite this firm response, the Government has included as one of its options the development of a new third Heathrow runway. Its own assessment of this option is:

262

This is confusing and contradictory. The development of Sipson would entail the closure of RAF Northolt.[263] The Government's planning policy guidance states clearly:

"The environmental impacts of aviation proposals will always need to be very carefully considered. Existing sites with established aviation uses, including redundant military airfields, will often provide the best opportunities for aviation facilities"

KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SOUTH EAST

221. None of the options canvassed is without drawbacks. Those living near lightly used airports are likely to oppose their increased use. Operating Heathrow mixed mode would end the significant relief that runway alternation under the "Cranford Agreement" gives local residents. Feeder reliever operations could only be introduced if ATC and other environmental issues were resolved - although this is true of all the runway development options proposed.

222. It must be sensible to use available capacity to the environmentally acceptable limit, before new build is imposed. The most pressing question for the Government is how important is Heathrow for national prosperity? If the Government believes that Heathrow must expand to maintain its position as a prime European hub then expansion is needed there as a matter of urgency. In the short term it could be done by "mixed mode"; in the longer term by an additional runway. Providing extra capacity at Heathrow would also have significant environmental impacts. Although it may be possible to align any third runway in such a way as to "secure" important buildings, it will severely affect them. A third runway at Heathrow would mean the destruction and relocation of a number of existing communities. Such a decision cannot be taken lightly.

223. The Department has acknowledged that a third runway at Heathrow would also mean Northolt had to be closed due to conflicting air traffic patterns.[264] If Northolt is closed, there will be a large, redundant airfield 6 miles from Heathrow. If capacity near Heathrow is felt to be necessary, the Department should be prepared to consider ways in which Northolt could be used to provide a "regional runway" for Heathrow. Such use would have impacts on the local population, but they could be far less than the impacts of further development at Heathrow. There would be a need for surface links from Northolt to Central London and between Northolt and Heathrow itself. Such an option may prove cheaper, faster and less environmentally damaging than a third runway next to the existing site.

224. The use of feeder-reliever airports is not supported by the major scheduled airlines. This is perhaps surprising given the strength of their lobbying for extra capacity at both Heathrow and Gatwick. BAA opposes their use which is perhaps less surprising as it currently does not own either airport. We note that the two Frankfurt airports part-fund a bus link between them even though they are over 100km apart.[265] Co-operation between feeder-reliever and major airports in the United Kingdom, whilst different in nature, should be possible. Many airlines, users and regional representatives told us that demand for a feeder reliever airport does exist. We strongly recommend the establishment of such an airport. Its most important function would be to act as "London's regional airport". A failure to adopt such recommendations would require the Government to advocate the development of a runway on a new site, although this might be next to an existing airport. It could take as long as 15 years to build any such runway. This would fail to address the very real problems that exist now and leave the Government with a policy vacuum.

Regional Airports

225. The evidence suggests that the demand for point-to-point travel from regional airports will continue to rise. Targeted improvements to runways, taxiways, aprons and terminal facilities should be enough to ensure demand is, for the most part, met. However, if the policy is to constrain aviation growth in the South East, further runways may be required in the Midlands and Scotland between 2020 and 2030.

226. The biggest concern remains regional access to the main airports of Heathrow and Gatwick. In the absence of Government intervention, regional services will continue to be cut. The Government must address the regional access issue by agreeing a minimum level of access of at least three return services per day. The most effective way to do this would be through some form of slot reservation.

Medium to long term

227. We have set out our belief that the case for action in the short-term is clear. The scale and timing of future expansion will follow from other decisions taken, including the location of the first runway and a number of external factors. However, we think it is extremely likely that some further increases in capacity in the South East will be necessary between 2015 and 2030.

228. The Government needs to be extremely clear about where such development is likely and about where it would be considered acceptable. PPG 13 already requires that local authorities should "avoid development at or close to an airport or airfield which is incompatible with any existing or potential aviation operations". We believe the Government should ensure that this guidance is followed, particularly at any sites where potential future expansion is identified in the White Paper. We believe safeguarding should be kept to a minimum, but that the options for development should be clearly set out so that those who choose to live near a major airport scheduled for expansion have no grounds for complaint. Given the market driven nature of aviation infrastructure provision in the United Kingdom, it is possible that unforeseen development may be put forward and approved. All parties must recognise that the Government can only reduce uncertainty; it cannot eliminate it.

229. We see the future of airport development in the United Kingdom being centred on targeted expansion of existing sites. We have not seen any off-shore or green field developments that would provide a solution to the capacity problems. The new sites and extensive new land access infrastructure required to service them would have high environmental costs. The only way to ensure that a newly built hub airport would be successful would be to close down existing ones. This would be neither cheap nor easy; airport operators and airlines would expect compensation for their losses and local communities would lose the employment that established airports provide.

230. The only certainty in the White Paper is that it whatever it says it will not be universally popular. Balancing the considerable economic and social benefits of aviation with the environmental consequences is difficult. Such trade offs cannot be solved in one document but will require perseverance and skill in negotiating agreements at a European and International level over many years. The decisions on expansion and policy are amongst the most difficult to face a Secretary of State for Transport. By engaging in a full and open consultation, he has at least provided everyone with the opportunity to air their views and influence the debate.

256 Year to May 2003 Back

258 AVN 08; AVN 65; AVN 67 Back

259 AVN 46 Back

260 Ibid Back