Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Further supplementary memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office


  1.  The statement in the Government's published Assessment on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that Iraq sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa was based on intelligence information received in 2002 from more than one source. We did not have intelligence that Iraq had actually acquired uranium: the dossier was clear on this point.

  2.  We asked the originators of our intelligence information to discuss this issue with the IAEA. We understand that this was done shortly before the IAEA report of 7 March 2003.

  3.  We understand that the IAEA acquired documents on this subject—not originating from the UK—in February 2003. Some of these turned out to be forgeries. Prior to the publication of the September dossier we had not seen copies of these documents, and did not do so until March 2003. We understand that the documents first came into circulation in October 2002: after the publication of the dossier.

  4.  We have now seen the documents passed to the IAEA and agree that some are forgeries. But others are still under consideration. We do not know the precise origin or history of these documents.

  5.  Our information post-dated the visit of a former US diplomat to Niger, reported in the media. In addition, as our dossier demonstrated, there was other evidence of Iraqi efforts to revive their covert nuclear programme, such as the recall of specialists to work on Iraq's nuclear programme and the procurement of dual use equipment.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

July 2003

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