Select Committee on Transport, Local Government and the Regions Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum by Railfuture (TYP 39)

  Railfuture, the Railway Development Society, welcomed the 10 Year Plan as an initiative to bring long term strategic thinking to transport planning, and promote and also develop rail and other public transport services.


The viability of the Plan and validity of its assumptions

  The Committee asks if the assumptions in the 10 Year Plan are still valid[3] and whether some objectives or assumptions should be modified or challenged?

    —  Railfuture believes they must be changed, not only due to Railtrack being in Railway Administration, but also the poor performance of many private sector operators which are failing to deliver the outputs required to significantly improve rail and bus services.

    —  Also Local Authorities (LAs) are either not receiving adequate funding to develop their Local Transport Plans LTPs, or allocated funding is not spent due to problems with partnership funding. This effectively reduces Government expenditure but also fails to deliver improvements to transport services.

  If the assumptions in the 10 Year Plan are viable, the issue is whether the Plan embraces appropriate mechanisms to achieve the outcomes. In this paper we outline our concerns, with some suggestions for "remedial action"; changes to assumptions or targets necessary to deliver certain core elements of the plan.

    —  Railfuture is concerned that the underlying assumptions of the extent of private sector finance initiatives set out in the plan, and still expected by the current Ministerial team, may not be so readily forthcoming as the weaknesses and shortcomings of the privatised transport industries have been so clearly exposed.

    —  Further Government funding, with policy changes, will be needed to overcome the entrenched Treasury determination to minimise public sector investment in railways and public transport generally.

Skills and capacity

  Both the physical capacity of the transport system, and the skills, expertise and human capacity to reconstruct, operate and deliver the improvements set out in the 10 Year Plan are lacking.

    —  Railtrack and the train and bus operators have made experienced staff redundant, and then cited "staff shortages" for a failure to run services or to provide engineering improvements! According to the Railway Industry Association there is a serious shortage of about 800 signalling engineers in a sector needing 3,000.

  The railways must be led by competent and experienced railway managers and engineers who can again inject a culture that the railway and related transport industries, offer a career structure with good rewards and job security. The present contract culture does not. With fuller employment, recruitment is becoming increasingly difficult for jobs which involve working antisocial hours. Although some specialist recruitment is being pursued abroad, the industry needs to establish training centres for the relevant skills, also offer suitable packages to recruit staff who took early requirement, perhaps with part-time or job-share arrangements.

The need for Public versus Private finance

  Implementation depends on a mix of public and private sector finance but the current situation in the railway industry will adversely affect this aspiration. The private sector does not have the incentives to invest in certain basic elements of our public transport networks, and may not have access to sufficient funds in commercial markets to procure the finance required. The belief that the private sector will lever in the vast sums required into transport infrastructure is not entirely credible.

  The private sector will only invest if either an income stream is guaranteed or the return on investment is quickly recovered. Of the projected £34 billion from the private secter, only about £10 billion has as yet been identified. The industry typically has sought around a 15 per cent return annually, much of this flowing from subsidy. Former Government administrations required an eight per cent return when in fact cash returns will be less and other economic or environmental benefits are more complex to value. Pollution and congestion costs are often undervalued or disregarded entirely.

  Railtrack has required a vast influx of public funds due to its failure to estimate and manage costs. The 10 Year Plan envisaged annual Public Resource Expenditure on rail at a minimum of £1.3 billion with a peak at £1.6 billion on rail alone, prior to the current debacle. No separate figure is identified in Local Transport Plan expenditure on bus subsidy. This should be identified and will need to be increased. Of the Governments projected £14.7 billion for capital projects, only half—about £7 billion—remains available due to the cost escalation of the West Coast Route and placing Railtrack into receivership so removing access to the bond markets for funds for current capital rail investment projects. Significant further Government funding for capital investment is thus essential.

Developing the Plan's Objectives

    —  The 10 Year Plan should focus on the requirements and expectations of people's need to travel, how to ease congestion on all networks and promoting the most sustainable modes.

  The Plan's aim of increasing public transport use and reducing road congestion does not seem to have been directed at management of privatised rail and bus operators. If they have a role, it is surely to make it easier for passengers to use trains and buses. Many however seem primarily concerned with what happens to their company's operations and ultimately the parent company's profitability—the "bottom line".

Balance and phasing investment in the plan

    —  A balance must first be achieved to ensure existing networks are operated as effectively, efficiently and reliably as possible, while developing new investment projects.

    —  Railfuture is concerned that the need for major capital expenditure in London and the South East may severely limit investment in regional networks, particularly in provincial cities where full integration of improved rail with other public transport services could achieve significant modal switch to reduce road traffic congestion.

  "Balance and phasing . . . across funding areas" is a vexing question. What is "correct" will be a value judgement, differ nationally and regionally, and also between regions. There is considerable pressure for major investment in Greater London, with two Crossrail mega projects, as well relatively smaller schemes: Thameslink 2000, Orbirail, bus priority and light rail; all planned to provide more capacity and relieve severe congestion on existing routes. The various rail schemes would give the capital new major sub-regional links, comparable with Paris' RER system.

  But, and a big BUT, Birmingham also wants a new deep level Crossrail style link, albeit on a rather smaller scale; nevertheless for similar reasons. Planners and local politicians want to relieve the congested approaches to New Street Station, provide metro style operation on many of the existing rail routes to promote and achieve modal switch away from car use, and relieve the congested road network which dominates the city. All our major cities suffer severe congestion problems. Which should central Government prioritise and why?

  More flexible arrangements are required to plan, finance and deliver local transport projects. This is a problem for both major and minor schemes, particularly relating to rail operations. The control "mechanisms" of the national rail network have frustrated many local authorities and the regional PTEs for the last 30 years, hence rail projects that primarily support local transport objectives have experienced delays, such as the Croxley Link project in Watford or the Bidston to Woodchurch and Prenton extension for Merseyrail Electrics.

The outcomes from Multi-Modal Studies and their effect on the 10 Year Plan

    —  The Multi-Modal Studies (MMSs) should not affect the core principle of the 10 Year Plan, but outcomes so far have not included any significant proposals that achieve modal shift. Instead pressures may emerge for specific schemes to be promoted to satisfy some particular local or sectional interest, such as constructing a busway on a disused railway link that, if reopened, could offer many benefits for the regional rail network.

  The lack of participation by transport operators in MMSs is a problem. The SRA, Railtrack and Train Operating Companies (TOCs) are failing to provide sufficient evidence to the studies of how rail services can expand to prevent the need for new roads both for freight and passenger movements. We are very concerned about two identified cases where the SRA and Railtrack have worked with the Government Office and consultants actively promoting busways on rail alignments, where restoration of rail services could achieve significant user and operating benefits both locally and regionally.[4]

    —  Many commentators argue that the Multi-Modal Studies have provided a mechanism for promoting further road building and are failing to take full consideration of potential rail schemes other than those endorsed by the SRA or Railtrack.

  Railfuture believes some of these studies may have undermined arguments promoting rail projects put forward by some Local Authorities, voluntary sector bodies and independent transport user groups.[5]

Achieving a balance between large and small schemes

  The plan notes a number of major rail and road infrastructure projects but clearly there is an urgent need to achieve a better balance between large and small schemes, as many small incremental schemes can achieve significant gains to the rail network. Similarly some very large and costly road projects could be abandoned beneficially in favour of local schemes which encourage greater integration between modes.

The impact of Congestion Charging or Workplace Parking Levies

  Congestion Charging, effectively road pricing to access a particular area or tolls for infrastructure (bridges or tunnels), should both provide a revenue stream for transport investment, and act as a constraint on demand.[6] Whether "the expected number of congestion charging and workplace parking levy schemes" are eventually implemented will depend on both political will and commitment to funds being injected to improve public transport access to areas subject to controls and levies. Some pilot schemes in smaller centres should be encouraged, but these will have to be accompanied by policy changes to ensure local authorities have funds and stronger powers to specify standards for local rail and bus services.

  Railfuture's London region has concerns about the Congestion Charge, as the road network is still congested and not always able to deliver significantly improved bus services[7]. The lack of investment in the rail network means that optimal use of existing capacity is not possible at present to provide extra passenger capacity. This concern applies equally to other regional centres that have considered but balked at road pricing usually due to criticisms of the lack of acceptable alternatives to using the car.

  Workplace Parking Levies could be a successful mechanism to control use of the road network and was initially a preferred option in Birmingham. This is a more versatile system which could be targeted at specific locations where car commuting should be discouraged, and could be applied to different locations on a sliding scale taking into account the number of spaces, distance from railway stations, bus routes, etc. Again, we urge small scale trials.

Local rail strategies

    —  Many planners and economists fail to recognise rail can be a very effective mode for urban, suburban and rural journeys, as experience with developing successful local rail services has shown. Buses are not as successful as trains or trams in tempting motorists out of cars. Even relatively low-cost rail upgrades like Dublin's DART[8] Metro amply demonstrate how passengers will transfer to rail.

Local Transport Plans and public transport initiatives

    —  The Government seeks to promote greater use of buses and has set a target of a 10 per cent increase in bus use over 10 years[9]. If bus passenger losses of up to 25 per cent since 1986 are to be recovered, then more pro-active measures are required beyond the loose and often ineffective Bus (Quality) Partnerships.

    —  Services on all urban and most inter-urban bus routes should operate from at least 05.30 to 00.30 hours to accommodate not only journeys to work, school and shopping but also shift-work and leisure journeys. Bus services should integrate with rail and timetables harmonised wherever possible.

  Railfuture recognises that buses are a fundamental element of the public transport system and that deregulation has failed. Buses should integrate wherever possible with rail services to provide "seamless" public transport journeys. Bus and coach stations, bus interchanges or stops should be conveniently located next to railway stations. Where possible bus services should be able to use effective on-street bus priority measures.

  The Tyne and Wear PTE (Nexus) promoted this approach between 1980 and 1986, integrating Metro with Bus and Rail very effectively. When LAs are developing their LTPs, bus operators should be obliged to co-operate in the provision of appropriate service levels and convenient passenger interchange facilities with other modes.

  Bus Quality Partnerships have only shown limited growth in passengers transferring from car use. Birmingham's Line 33 (Kingstanding and Pheasey via Perry Barr) route has only achieved a three per cent transfer from car. It has no effective rail alternative, and with higher on-street priority on mainly dual-carriageway roads, better modal shift could be achieved, particularly if service standards were regulated to provide adequate evening and Sunday services. Light rail would however achieve far greater transfer from cars. Bus services should not be substituted for rail as part of any planning or management policy as this will not help achieve modal switch targets.

  The most successful bus priority scheme in the British Isles is not in the UK but Eire; Dublin's EU funded Stillorgan Road scheme. In its first year over 15 per cent modal switch was achieved in a major urban "corridor"[10]


    —  The SRA has failed to "provide a focus for strategic planning"[11] and give consistent rational guidance firstly on exploiting capacity within the existing rail network or increasing capacity through many possible modest "Incremental Output" investment schemes and then prioritising investment in new capacity.

  Incremental Outputs range from reinstating tracks or local passing loops which were removed over the last 40 years to effect cost savings or other operating economies.


  The SRA has not highlighted the importance of improving secondary lines to provide additional capacity within a transport corridor or to feed traffic into main lines. Some secondary route services have deteriorated suffering cancellations and bus substitution. These routes can offer additional capacity to relieve existing congested routes, particularly if some short missing links, such as from Uckfield to Lewes, were reinstated.

    —  The East-West Rail Link to provide an urgently needed route from East Anglia and the Haven ports, around the north of London linking with routes to the Midlands and the West is an urgent priority, on transport corridors where demand for road capacity is increasing.

  The SRA should be more proactive and allocated further funds from DTLR to implement both strategic and local route reopening schemes and promote investment projects such as electrification to expand and link existing electric train networks through the proposed SPVs. These can then be handed over to Railtrack (Newtrack) and the train operators to operate at clearly defined standards.

    —  Whilst endorsing the main line upgrade schemes in the Plan, there are no plans for main line electrification, not even extensions and infills to enhance and increase operating flexibility of existing electrified routes.

    —  A package of small electrification schemes should be promoted by the SRA. Infill routes such as Walsall to Rugeley, Crewe to Kidsgrove and Manchester to Preston and Blackpool would provide both diversionary lines for the West Coast route during engineering works as well as new links for electric passenger services.

    —  Other electrification schemes should extend existing urban networks to encourage greater use of local rail as part of regional road traffic reduction strategies around Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow.


Growth of Public Transport

    —  The Plan's basic targets for rail, to achieve "a 50 per cent growth in passenger journeys overall"[12] with "an 80 per cent increase on inter-city lines", as well as an 80 per cent increase in freight, are laudable. But these depend on sufficient operating capacity on the network becoming available; on many routes capacity is now insufficient.

    —  Targets must be set regionally, otherwise national targets may be achieved if most investment were focussed on two sectors, London and the South East and Inter—City/Cross Country networks. This could lead to distortions in the decision making process, bringing the effectiveness of national policies into question.[13]

    —  If targets for growth in both rail and bus travel were achieved, this should lead to reductions in both road traffic congestion and vehicle emissions. Current policies are not achieving these objectives effectively.

  The Plan acknowledged that 17 per cent more people were travelling by rail in the three years to July 2000, on some routes use is up 30 per cent. The network capacity has not expanded to cope with the additional demand, despite the desire to upgrade a number of major routes.[14] Progress has been erratic with major schemes like the West Coast Modernisation and developing capacity at regional centres; simply trying to put a "Quart in a Pint Pot" remains a serious concern. On some former Southern Region routes, full length trains are still not operating at the peaks. This could be resolved through reviewing timetables along with rolling stock requirements and availability.[15] This problem is also leading to disputes between operators within the industry.

Promoting Interchanges and Safer Access

    —  An Interchange Strategy with targets for both developing interchange projects and increasing their use must be set out, particularly for rail to rail and rail to bus, as well as park and ride. Good design and practice standards are essential, with guidelines on pedestrian access and cycle facilities as well as service integration.

  The 10 Year Plan mentions developing interchanges in London. Well-designed transport interchanges are an essential element in promoting "seamless" public transport. Government must actively promote high integration and clear signing standards and targets, encourage new interchange developments and improvements to existing arrangements wherever possible. Bus stops must be conveniently located near to a station entrance, and secure cycle racks provided etc. We wish to see standards and targets set for cycle storage at stations and adequate provision for carriage of cycles on all trains.

  Many bus routes still do not call at or close to rail stations to integrate modes, and this will continue while the deregulated bus regime allows operators such freedom. There are some notable exceptions outside London, such as Clitheroe. One major city example demonstrates the point. How many bus routes in the centre of Birmingham pass within 50 metres of any entrance to New Street station, or either Snow Hill or Moor Street stations? What attempts have been made by operators, the PTE or the City council to resolve this dilemma or at least give clear information displays showing where buses stop, where they go and how often they run?

  The DTLR is still considering establishing a working group setting out guidelines for interchange standards at interchange stations though a joint working group with the Institute of Logistics and Transport and other organisations.[16] The Commission for Integrated Transport and LAs must play an active part in this issue.

    —  A safe walking environment, particularly to and from transport facilities, as well as safe stations with lighting, PA facilities, help points for when un-staffed etc., are fundamental to promoting greater public transport use. Similarly all bus stops should ideally incorporate an illuminated shelter with timetable displays and a working payphone nearby.

  There have been relatively few initiatives to make access conditions easier for people walking to local rail stations or bus stops at many locations. These matters can often be covered by LTP funding in partnership with the operator, and at a modest cost. Targets should be set so all urban bus stops meet this basic standard within four years.[17] Station standards are more complex but minimum levels of shelter need to be specified and provided. Similarly access must be improved, not merely for meeting Disability Discrimination Act standards.

  Railfuture endorses initiatives to make walking and cycling safer and more convenient. In particular we endorse a balanced approach to all modes, including walking and cycling, while arguing that rail must play a greater role.

  Fares, Service Standards and Information

    —  Fares must fall in real terms to change the perception that bus and train fares are generally expensive for a poor service. The SRA must have further clear direction from Government to regulate fare levels and set out improved minimum standards for different service categories.

  The SRA was expected, in the absence of adequate controls in the Railways Act, to "ensure that fares are value for money in new franchises".[18] The Government must ensure the SRA remit is clear to control "walk on" fares. The SRA must investigate standard and off peak saver fares and ensure these are affordable, tied to inflation levels (RPI) and relate to other alternative transport costs, such as petrol and car maintenance, and bus fares.

    —  Operators must be required to provide early morning, late night, Sunday and Bank Holiday services to provide for the needs of all potential customers whether early morning shift workers or late evening leisure users.

    —  The DTLR must establish mechanisms to ensure that PTEs and LAs require the provision of feeder bus services to connect with rail, or over core routes where rail is not available, for at least 18 hours per day, if not "round the clock" as in London, with fully integrated ticketing. Without such guarantees, motorists simply will not consider public transport.

    —  Railfuture considers the importance of providing good information cannot be underestimated. Standards must be set for comprehensive public transport information, with local and regional network maps[19] including requirements to provide information at the point of use, stations and bus stops, as well as at libraries, town halls and other public places, including shopping malls and supermarkets.

    —  All timetable displays and pamphlets should show all operators' services over a route. Real time information displays should be provided on all rail and urban bus routes.

The Bottleneck problem

  A few specific improvement projects like Birmingham's Proof House Junction and the first phase of restoring double track on the Chiltern route have been successfully completed. Other projects at Manchester and Leeds are proceeding but there have been delays. The next phase of the Chiltern Line upgrade is to proceed in the near future, as this route will perform the role of the contingency railway later this year, carrying diverted traffic during the period when the West Coast route will be blockaded in the Rugby area.[20]

    —  The SRA must identify where rail capacity has been removed over the last 40 years, which can be reinstated by relaying track and renewing other minor elements of infrastructure such as passing loops, junctions, signalling and bridges to maximise the capacity of the existing network.

Reopening rail routes to expand network capacity

  Many rail reopening schemes, even those that represent good value for money, have stalled. Some LAs have found it difficult to deal with Railtrack, the Strategic Rail Authority and the DTLR.

    —  The SRA should prepare a list of potential rail reopening schemes for both strategic and local routes, liasing with the RPCs and using the research undertaken by local authorities and independent organisations such as ourselves, TR&IN etc, to enhance network capacity and promote modal switch to public transport.

  There has been a failure of the various parties to agree financial packages, notwithstanding obfuscation by both the SRA and DTLR, requiring "more information" about projects which have been carefully evaluated and costed. These delays and prevarications are unacceptable, for it seems certain schemes have met with disinterest and occasionally even hostility in some regional Government Offices, LAs and the SRA.

  Examples where inordinate delays in obtaining approvals to start construction of relatively simple rail links, which partly involve reopening an abandoned route but with little complex new construction include:

    —  Hamilton to Larkhall (Strathclyde Region, Railtrack and Scotrail).

    —  Croxley to Watford (Hertfordshire, Transport for London, Railtrack and London Underground).

    —  Longbridge to Frankley (Centro and Railtrack).

  The SRA still states that rail schemes need a train operator to promote a new rail service or project. However, privatised rail companies see no financial advantage in promoting a scheme that does not offer a return without revenue guarantees. The Anglia Railways Crosslink service is one notable exception, but a major review and expansion of the Rail Passenger Partnership scheme is urgently needed to encompass rail reopening schemes as well as providing welcome improvements to existing services.

Other Targets and Objectives

  Targets must be realistic and achievable—but achieving the targets will cost money. Therefore some targets, such as rail route and station re-openings, must be set against realistic costings—some have been (absurdly) over inflated post privatisation. The costing of major and minor projects needs scrutiny, perhaps by the NAO.

  "Reducing congestion" is a desirable objective, but this must be linked to implementing policies that will actually achieve modal shift, providing sufficient capacity to handle the new traffic; otherwise rail simply becomes more overcrowded. Thus in the South East and some other areas, congestion has shifted to the railway.

    —  New targets must be set for improving delivery of both rail and bus services. This relates not merely to frequency and reliability, but also to hours of operation to ensure adequate services provide a cohesive transport service. Targets must be set for achieving modal shift, particularly from car use to public transport.

Regional Strategies and Targets

  If the 10 Year Plan to deliver the Government's integrated transport policy is to be successful, it must also achieve a balance between social and environmental policy by ensuring investment is evenly distributed throughout the regions. Principles should be set out nationally, but specific policies, objectives and targets should be set locally and regionally, particularly for investment levels to promote increased public transport use and achieving modal switch.

  Further targets and guidance on land use policy are needed to ensure major developments are located close to existing transport corridors with a rail service. Public transport links must be a condition of any planning approval for new green-field or edge of town sites, which should be actively discouraged. Government must ensure that the social and environment costs of road building and congestion are fully evaluated so that efficient regional investment solutions in future focus on sustainable transport strategies.

  Railfuture has set out in Appendix 1 some summary outline upgrade strategies for several regional centres including Cambridge and parts of Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester. These principles, promoting local initiatives focus on "Delivering the Deliverable" and can be applied to many other regional centres.

  We also annex a copy of our most recent policy strategy statement A Railfuture for Britain (Appendix 2) which has been passed to both the Secretary of State, Stephen Byers, and the Chairman of the SRA, Richard Bowker.

European White Paper

  We have not identified any fundamental conflicts between the 10 Year Plan and the European White Paper, and we will respond to the Department in the near future.


  Lastly while this paper is not the occasion for further lengthy discourse on the future structure of Railtrack and the rail Industry, we note (at 7 January 2002) progress with the Minister's preferred "Company Limited by Guarantee" option is fraught with problems[21]. Whilst Railfuture welcomed the principle of establishing the "not for profit" company, we are increasingly concerned as to the viability of the proposal in the context of delivering the 10 Year Plan, which involves public private partnerships. This matter must be resolved speedily to stabilise the industry, but Railfuture does not support an outright sale to a third party private sector bidder as this would simply perpetuate the present unsatisfactory situation.

  In retrospect an alternative, and possibly a more viable solution suggested previously by the Committee, might have been for the Government to receive equity in return for its direct investment in the company, either as debenture stock or bonds, or ordinary shares. The latter would have restored a "Golden Share" but maintained the company in the private sector and free of Treasury control, if full re-nationalisation were not an option. While this cannot now happen with Railtrack, the re-establishment of a Government "Golden Share" in the major transport operating companies should also now be carefully considered.


  Railfuture recognises the calls on Government funds are vast but neither the DTLR nor the SRA are acting as the much needed advocate for rail. Some critics have argued their role is to do a "hatchet job" on rail investment.

  The fundamental issue focuses on the lack of funding which has left the UK's public transport way behind our European counterparts, and probably the worst equipped railway network in Western Europe. Government must accept the urgent need for a massive injection of public funds to consolidate the network we have and develop the railway in a practical, sensible way. The plan must focus first on "Delivering the Deliverable".

3   Transport 2010-the 10 Year Plan. July 2000. The Assumptions are set out in Appendix 3 to the Government's report. Back

4   Busways from Cambridge (Chesterton) to St Ives and Luton to Dunstable are proposed, effectively "concreting over" railways. Back

5   We have even identified cases of an anti-public transport position taken by more than one voluntary sector body. Back

6   This can be a very blunt instrument and impinge heavily on some social groups least able to afford payment. Back

7   The London Bus sector has shown important passenger growth of about 4 per cent over the last year, against national trends. Back

8   Dublin Area Rapid Transit now operates on the CIE/IR main line routes from Howth and Malahide to Dublin, Dun Laoghaire, Bray and Greystones. Services on the core section from Howth Junction to Bray operate approximately every 15 minutes but some intervals are a little erratic! All stations have real time information displays and the average waiting time is seven to eight minutes. Back

9   Transport 2010-the 10 Year Plan. S 6.62. Back

10   Alternatives like DART Metro also carry through journeys from Dun Laoghaire and Light Rail is also under construction. (EU Objective 1 funding has also been available to assist these projects.) Back

11   New Deal for Transport-Better for Everyone July 2000 S 4.14. Back

12   The 10 Year Plan. S 6.22 and Chart 6c. Back

13   This criticism has been applied to targets and statistics for "reducing" health service waiting lists. Back

14   Ibid. S 6.21. Back

15   The present conundrum of peak rolling stock demand could be resolved in the short to medium term by reinstating a programme called the Networker Classic conversion. This took certain elements from an existing sound carriage and rebuilt the vehicle with a new body meeting current standards fro crash-worthiness etc. Up to 50 10-coach trains could be introduced in the next two years using this specialist upgrade conversion. Back

16   The ILT still awaits a decision from DTLR on funding this project, even though the pilot working group was held in April 2001. Back

17   Commercial opportunities exist as advertising can be sold at these sites with a contractor providing and maintaining shelters. Back

18   New Deal for Transport-Better for Everyone July 2000 S 4.18. Back

19   On train and station information must be improved. One example of poor practice was the deliberate removal of network maps from many trains after 1994 to be replaced by maps showing only that operator's services. Back

20   Modern Railways Editorial January 2002. Railfuture welcomes this approach and re-establishes a principle that existed thirty years ago to accommodate services, for example, following the Roade Junction rail crash on 31 December 1969. Back

21   Railfuture wishes to declare an interest in that we hold 200 Railtrack shares as an ethical shareholder to give our organisation a "voice" at the company's AGM and about 100 of our members are, similarly small shareholders. Back

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