Memorandum by Railfuture (TYP 39)
Railfuture, the Railway Development Society,
welcomed the 10 Year Plan as an initiative to bring long term
strategic thinking to transport planning, and promote and also
develop rail and other public transport services.
THE 10 YEAR
The viability of the Plan and validity of its
The Committee asks if the assumptions in the
10 Year Plan are still valid
and whether some objectives or assumptions should be modified
Railfuture believes they must be
changed, not only due to Railtrack being in Railway Administration,
but also the poor performance of many private sector operators
which are failing to deliver the outputs required to significantly
improve rail and bus services.
Also Local Authorities (LAs) are
either not receiving adequate funding to develop their Local Transport
Plans LTPs, or allocated funding is not spent due to problems
with partnership funding. This effectively reduces Government
expenditure but also fails to deliver improvements to transport
If the assumptions in the 10 Year Plan are viable,
the issue is whether the Plan embraces appropriate mechanisms
to achieve the outcomes. In this paper we outline our concerns,
with some suggestions for "remedial action"; changes
to assumptions or targets necessary to deliver certain core elements
of the plan.
Railfuture is concerned that the
underlying assumptions of the extent of private sector finance
initiatives set out in the plan, and still expected by the current
Ministerial team, may not be so readily forthcoming as the weaknesses
and shortcomings of the privatised transport industries have been
so clearly exposed.
Further Government funding, with
policy changes, will be needed to overcome the entrenched Treasury
determination to minimise public sector investment in railways
and public transport generally.
Skills and capacity
Both the physical capacity of the transport
system, and the skills, expertise and human capacity to reconstruct,
operate and deliver the improvements set out in the 10 Year Plan
Railtrack and the train and bus operators
have made experienced staff redundant, and then cited "staff
shortages" for a failure to run services or to provide engineering
improvements! According to the Railway Industry Association there
is a serious shortage of about 800 signalling engineers in a sector
The railways must be led by competent and experienced
railway managers and engineers who can again inject a culture
that the railway and related transport industries, offer a career
structure with good rewards and job security. The present contract
culture does not. With fuller employment, recruitment is becoming
increasingly difficult for jobs which involve working antisocial
hours. Although some specialist recruitment is being pursued
abroad, the industry needs to establish training centres for the
relevant skills, also offer suitable packages to recruit staff
who took early requirement, perhaps with part-time or job-share
The need for Public versus Private finance
Implementation depends on a mix of public and
private sector finance but the current situation in the railway
industry will adversely affect this aspiration. The private sector
does not have the incentives to invest in certain basic elements
of our public transport networks, and may not have access to sufficient
funds in commercial markets to procure the finance required. The
belief that the private sector will lever in the vast sums required
into transport infrastructure is not entirely credible.
The private sector will only invest if either
an income stream is guaranteed or the return on investment is
quickly recovered. Of the projected £34 billion from the
private secter, only about £10 billion has as yet been identified.
The industry typically has sought around a 15 per cent return
annually, much of this flowing from subsidy. Former Government
administrations required an eight per cent return when in fact
cash returns will be less and other economic or environmental
benefits are more complex to value. Pollution and congestion costs
are often undervalued or disregarded entirely.
Railtrack has required a vast influx of public
funds due to its failure to estimate and manage costs. The 10
Year Plan envisaged annual Public Resource Expenditure on rail
at a minimum of £1.3 billion with a peak at £1.6 billion
on rail alone, prior to the current debacle. No separate figure
is identified in Local Transport Plan expenditure on bus subsidy.
This should be identified and will need to be increased. Of the
Governments projected £14.7 billion for capital projects,
only halfabout £7 billionremains available
due to the cost escalation of the West Coast Route and placing
Railtrack into receivership so removing access to the bond markets
for funds for current capital rail investment projects. Significant
further Government funding for capital investment is thus essential.
Developing the Plan's Objectives
The 10 Year Plan should focus on
the requirements and expectations of people's need to travel,
how to ease congestion on all networks and promoting the most
The Plan's aim of increasing public transport
use and reducing road congestion does not seem to have been directed
at management of privatised rail and bus operators. If they have
a role, it is surely to make it easier for passengers to use trains
and buses. Many however seem primarily concerned with what happens
to their company's operations and ultimately the parent company's
profitabilitythe "bottom line".
Balance and phasing investment in the plan
A balance must first be achieved
to ensure existing networks are operated as effectively, efficiently
and reliably as possible, while developing new investment projects.
Railfuture is concerned that the
need for major capital expenditure in London and the South East
may severely limit investment in regional networks, particularly
in provincial cities where full integration of improved rail with
other public transport services could achieve significant modal
switch to reduce road traffic congestion.
"Balance and phasing . . . across funding
areas" is a vexing question. What is "correct"
will be a value judgement, differ nationally and regionally, and
also between regions. There is considerable pressure for major
investment in Greater London, with two Crossrail mega projects,
as well relatively smaller schemes: Thameslink 2000, Orbirail,
bus priority and light rail; all planned to provide more capacity
and relieve severe congestion on existing routes. The various
rail schemes would give the capital new major sub-regional links,
comparable with Paris' RER system.
But, and a big BUT, Birmingham also wants a
new deep level Crossrail style link, albeit on a rather smaller
scale; nevertheless for similar reasons. Planners and local politicians
want to relieve the congested approaches to New Street Station,
provide metro style operation on many of the existing rail routes
to promote and achieve modal switch away from car use, and relieve
the congested road network which dominates the city. All our major
cities suffer severe congestion problems. Which should central
Government prioritise and why?
More flexible arrangements are required to plan,
finance and deliver local transport projects. This is a problem
for both major and minor schemes, particularly relating to rail
operations. The control "mechanisms" of the national
rail network have frustrated many local authorities and the regional
PTEs for the last 30 years, hence rail projects that primarily
support local transport objectives have experienced delays, such
as the Croxley Link project in Watford or the Bidston to Woodchurch
and Prenton extension for Merseyrail Electrics.
The outcomes from Multi-Modal Studies and their
effect on the 10 Year Plan
The Multi-Modal Studies (MMSs) should
not affect the core principle of the 10 Year Plan, but outcomes
so far have not included any significant proposals that achieve
modal shift. Instead pressures may emerge for specific schemes
to be promoted to satisfy some particular local or sectional interest,
such as constructing a busway on a disused railway link that,
if reopened, could offer many benefits for the regional rail network.
The lack of participation by transport operators
in MMSs is a problem. The SRA, Railtrack and Train Operating
Companies (TOCs) are failing to provide sufficient evidence to
the studies of how rail services can expand to prevent the need
for new roads both for freight and passenger movements. We are
very concerned about two identified cases where the SRA and Railtrack
have worked with the Government Office and consultants actively
promoting busways on rail alignments, where restoration of rail
services could achieve significant user and operating benefits
both locally and regionally.
Many commentators argue that the
Multi-Modal Studies have provided a mechanism for promoting further
road building and are failing to take full consideration of potential
rail schemes other than those endorsed by the SRA or Railtrack.
Railfuture believes some of these studies may
have undermined arguments promoting rail projects put forward
by some Local Authorities, voluntary sector bodies and independent
transport user groups.
Achieving a balance between large and small schemes
The plan notes a number of major rail and road
infrastructure projects but clearly there is an urgent need to
achieve a better balance between large and small schemes, as many
small incremental schemes can achieve significant gains to the
rail network. Similarly some very large and costly road projects
could be abandoned beneficially in favour of local schemes which
encourage greater integration between modes.
The impact of Congestion Charging or Workplace
Congestion Charging, effectively road pricing
to access a particular area or tolls for infrastructure (bridges
or tunnels), should both provide a revenue stream for transport
investment, and act as a constraint on demand.
Whether "the expected number of congestion charging and workplace
parking levy schemes" are eventually implemented will depend
on both political will and commitment to funds being injected
to improve public transport access to areas subject to controls
and levies. Some pilot schemes in smaller centres should be encouraged,
but these will have to be accompanied by policy changes to ensure
local authorities have funds and stronger powers to specify standards
for local rail and bus services.
Railfuture's London region has concerns about
the Congestion Charge, as the road network is still congested
and not always able to deliver significantly improved bus services.
The lack of investment in the rail network means that optimal
use of existing capacity is not possible at present to provide
extra passenger capacity. This concern applies equally to other
regional centres that have considered but balked at road pricing
usually due to criticisms of the lack of acceptable alternatives
to using the car.
Workplace Parking Levies could be a successful
mechanism to control use of the road network and was initially
a preferred option in Birmingham. This is a more versatile system
which could be targeted at specific locations where car commuting
should be discouraged, and could be applied to different locations
on a sliding scale taking into account the number of spaces, distance
from railway stations, bus routes, etc. Again, we urge small scale
Local rail strategies
Many planners and economists fail
to recognise rail can be a very effective mode for urban, suburban
and rural journeys, as experience with developing successful local
rail services has shown. Buses are not as successful as trains
or trams in tempting motorists out of cars. Even relatively low-cost
rail upgrades like Dublin's DART
Metro amply demonstrate how passengers will transfer to rail.
Local Transport Plans and public transport initiatives
The Government seeks to promote greater
use of buses and has set a target of a 10 per cent increase in
bus use over 10 years.
If bus passenger losses of up to 25 per cent since 1986 are
to be recovered, then more pro-active measures are required beyond
the loose and often ineffective Bus (Quality) Partnerships.
Services on all urban and most inter-urban
bus routes should operate from at least 05.30 to 00.30 hours to
accommodate not only journeys to work, school and shopping but
also shift-work and leisure journeys. Bus services should integrate
with rail and timetables harmonised wherever possible.
Railfuture recognises that buses are a fundamental
element of the public transport system and that deregulation has
failed. Buses should integrate wherever possible with rail services
to provide "seamless" public transport journeys. Bus
and coach stations, bus interchanges or stops should be conveniently
located next to railway stations. Where possible bus services
should be able to use effective on-street bus priority measures.
The Tyne and Wear PTE (Nexus) promoted this
approach between 1980 and 1986, integrating Metro with Bus and
Rail very effectively. When LAs are developing their LTPs, bus
operators should be obliged to co-operate in the provision of
appropriate service levels and convenient passenger interchange
facilities with other modes.
Bus Quality Partnerships have only shown limited
growth in passengers transferring from car use. Birmingham's Line
33 (Kingstanding and Pheasey via Perry Barr) route has only achieved
a three per cent transfer from car. It has no effective rail alternative,
and with higher on-street priority on mainly dual-carriageway
roads, better modal shift could be achieved, particularly if service
standards were regulated to provide adequate evening and Sunday
services. Light rail would however achieve far greater transfer
from cars. Bus services should not be substituted for rail as
part of any planning or management policy as this will not help
achieve modal switch targets.
The most successful bus priority scheme in the
British Isles is not in the UK but Eire; Dublin's EU funded Stillorgan
Road scheme. In its first year over 15 per cent modal switch was
achieved in a major urban "corridor"
The SRA has failed to "provide
a focus for strategic planning"
and give consistent rational guidance firstly on exploiting capacity
within the existing rail network or increasing capacity through
many possible modest "Incremental Output" investment
schemes and then prioritising investment in new capacity.
Incremental Outputs range from reinstating tracks
or local passing loops which were removed over the last 40 years
to effect cost savings or other operating economies.
The SRA has not highlighted the importance of
improving secondary lines to provide additional capacity within
a transport corridor or to feed traffic into main lines. Some
secondary route services have deteriorated suffering cancellations
and bus substitution. These routes can offer additional capacity
to relieve existing congested routes, particularly if some short
missing links, such as from Uckfield to Lewes, were reinstated.
The East-West Rail Link to provide
an urgently needed route from East Anglia and the Haven ports,
around the north of London linking with routes to the Midlands
and the West is an urgent priority, on transport corridors where
demand for road capacity is increasing.
The SRA should be more proactive and allocated
further funds from DTLR to implement both strategic and local
route reopening schemes and promote investment projects such as
electrification to expand and link existing electric train networks
through the proposed SPVs. These can then be handed over to Railtrack
(Newtrack) and the train operators to operate at clearly defined
Whilst endorsing the main line upgrade
schemes in the Plan, there are no plans for main line electrification,
not even extensions and infills to enhance and increase operating
flexibility of existing electrified routes.
A package of small electrification
schemes should be promoted by the SRA. Infill routes such as Walsall
to Rugeley, Crewe to Kidsgrove and Manchester to Preston and Blackpool
would provide both diversionary lines for the West Coast route
during engineering works as well as new links for electric passenger
Other electrification schemes should
extend existing urban networks to encourage greater use of local
rail as part of regional road traffic reduction strategies around
Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow.
Growth of Public Transport
The Plan's basic targets for rail,
to achieve "a 50 per cent growth in passenger journeys overall"
with "an 80 per cent increase on inter-city lines",
as well as an 80 per cent increase in freight, are laudable. But
these depend on sufficient operating capacity on the network becoming
available; on many routes capacity is now insufficient.
Targets must be set regionally, otherwise
national targets may be achieved if most investment were focussed
on two sectors, London and the South East and InterCity/Cross
Country networks. This could lead to distortions in the decision
making process, bringing the effectiveness of national policies
If targets for growth in both rail
and bus travel were achieved, this should lead to reductions in
both road traffic congestion and vehicle emissions. Current policies
are not achieving these objectives effectively.
The Plan acknowledged that 17 per cent more
people were travelling by rail in the three years to July 2000,
on some routes use is up 30 per cent. The network capacity has
not expanded to cope with the additional demand, despite the desire
to upgrade a number of major routes.
Progress has been erratic with major schemes like the West Coast
Modernisation and developing capacity at regional centres; simply
trying to put a "Quart in a Pint Pot" remains a serious
concern. On some former Southern Region routes, full length trains
are still not operating at the peaks. This could be resolved through
reviewing timetables along with rolling stock requirements and
This problem is also leading to disputes between operators within
Promoting Interchanges and Safer Access
An Interchange Strategy with targets
for both developing interchange projects and increasing their
use must be set out, particularly for rail to rail and rail to
bus, as well as park and ride. Good design and practice standards
are essential, with guidelines on pedestrian access and cycle
facilities as well as service integration.
The 10 Year Plan mentions developing interchanges
in London. Well-designed transport interchanges are an essential
element in promoting "seamless" public transport. Government
must actively promote high integration and clear signing standards
and targets, encourage new interchange developments and improvements
to existing arrangements wherever possible. Bus stops must be
conveniently located near to a station entrance, and secure cycle
racks provided etc. We wish to see standards and targets set for
cycle storage at stations and adequate provision for carriage
of cycles on all trains.
Many bus routes still do not call at or close
to rail stations to integrate modes, and this will continue while
the deregulated bus regime allows operators such freedom. There
are some notable exceptions outside London, such as Clitheroe.
One major city example demonstrates the point. How many bus routes
in the centre of Birmingham pass within 50 metres of any entrance
to New Street station, or either Snow Hill or Moor Street stations?
What attempts have been made by operators, the PTE or the City
council to resolve this dilemma or at least give clear information
displays showing where buses stop, where they go and how often
The DTLR is still considering establishing a
working group setting out guidelines for interchange standards
at interchange stations though a joint working group with the
Institute of Logistics and Transport and other organisations.
The Commission for Integrated Transport and LAs must play an active
part in this issue.
A safe walking environment, particularly
to and from transport facilities, as well as safe stations with
lighting, PA facilities, help points for when un-staffed etc.,
are fundamental to promoting greater public transport use. Similarly
all bus stops should ideally incorporate an illuminated shelter
with timetable displays and a working payphone nearby.
There have been relatively few initiatives to
make access conditions easier for people walking to local rail
stations or bus stops at many locations. These matters can often
be covered by LTP funding in partnership with the operator, and
at a modest cost. Targets should be set so all urban bus stops
meet this basic standard within four years.
Station standards are more complex but minimum levels of shelter
need to be specified and provided. Similarly access must be improved,
not merely for meeting Disability Discrimination Act standards.
Railfuture endorses initiatives to make walking
and cycling safer and more convenient. In particular we endorse
a balanced approach to all modes, including walking and cycling,
while arguing that rail must play a greater role.
Fares, Service Standards and Information
Fares must fall in real terms to
change the perception that bus and train fares are generally expensive
for a poor service. The SRA must have further clear direction
from Government to regulate fare levels and set out improved minimum
standards for different service categories.
The SRA was expected, in the absence of adequate
controls in the Railways Act, to "ensure that fares are value
for money in new franchises".
The Government must ensure the SRA remit is clear to control "walk
on" fares. The SRA must investigate standard and off peak
saver fares and ensure these are affordable, tied to inflation
levels (RPI) and relate to other alternative transport costs,
such as petrol and car maintenance, and bus fares.
Operators must be required to provide
early morning, late night, Sunday and Bank Holiday services to
provide for the needs of all potential customers whether early
morning shift workers or late evening leisure users.
The DTLR must establish mechanisms
to ensure that PTEs and LAs require the provision of feeder bus
services to connect with rail, or over core routes where rail
is not available, for at least 18 hours per day, if not "round
the clock" as in London, with fully integrated ticketing.
Without such guarantees, motorists simply will not consider public
Railfuture considers the importance
of providing good information cannot be underestimated. Standards
must be set for comprehensive public transport information, with
local and regional network maps
including requirements to provide information at the point of
use, stations and bus stops, as well as at libraries, town halls
and other public places, including shopping malls and supermarkets.
All timetable displays and pamphlets
should show all operators' services over a route. Real time information
displays should be provided on all rail and urban bus routes.
The Bottleneck problem
A few specific improvement projects like Birmingham's
Proof House Junction and the first phase of restoring double track
on the Chiltern route have been successfully completed. Other
projects at Manchester and Leeds are proceeding but there have
been delays. The next phase of the Chiltern Line upgrade is to
proceed in the near future, as this route will perform the role
of the contingency railway later this year, carrying diverted
traffic during the period when the West Coast route will be blockaded
in the Rugby area.
The SRA must identify where rail
capacity has been removed over the last 40 years, which can be
reinstated by relaying track and renewing other minor elements
of infrastructure such as passing loops, junctions, signalling
and bridges to maximise the capacity of the existing network.
Reopening rail routes to expand network capacity
Many rail reopening schemes, even those that
represent good value for money, have stalled. Some LAs have found
it difficult to deal with Railtrack, the Strategic Rail Authority
and the DTLR.
The SRA should prepare a list of
potential rail reopening schemes for both strategic and local
routes, liasing with the RPCs and using the research undertaken
by local authorities and independent organisations such as ourselves,
TR&IN etc, to enhance network capacity and promote modal switch
to public transport.
There has been a failure of the various parties
to agree financial packages, notwithstanding obfuscation by both
the SRA and DTLR, requiring "more information" about
projects which have been carefully evaluated and costed. These
delays and prevarications are unacceptable, for it seems certain
schemes have met with disinterest and occasionally even hostility
in some regional Government Offices, LAs and the SRA.
Examples where inordinate delays in obtaining
approvals to start construction of relatively simple rail links,
which partly involve reopening an abandoned route but with little
complex new construction include:
Hamilton to Larkhall (Strathclyde
Region, Railtrack and Scotrail).
Croxley to Watford (Hertfordshire,
Transport for London, Railtrack and London Underground).
Longbridge to Frankley (Centro and
The SRA still states that rail schemes need
a train operator to promote a new rail service or project. However,
privatised rail companies see no financial advantage in promoting
a scheme that does not offer a return without revenue guarantees.
The Anglia Railways Crosslink service is one notable exception,
but a major review and expansion of the Rail Passenger Partnership
scheme is urgently needed to encompass rail reopening schemes
as well as providing welcome improvements to existing services.
Other Targets and Objectives
Targets must be realistic and achievablebut
achieving the targets will cost money. Therefore some targets,
such as rail route and station re-openings, must be set against
realistic costingssome have been (absurdly) over inflated
post privatisation. The costing of major and minor projects needs
scrutiny, perhaps by the NAO.
"Reducing congestion" is a desirable
objective, but this must be linked to implementing policies that
will actually achieve modal shift, providing sufficient capacity
to handle the new traffic; otherwise rail simply becomes more
overcrowded. Thus in the South East and some other areas, congestion
has shifted to the railway.
New targets must be set for improving
delivery of both rail and bus services. This relates not merely
to frequency and reliability, but also to hours of operation to
ensure adequate services provide a cohesive transport service.
Targets must be set for achieving modal shift, particularly from
car use to public transport.
Regional Strategies and Targets
If the 10 Year Plan to deliver the Government's
integrated transport policy is to be successful, it must also
achieve a balance between social and environmental policy by ensuring
investment is evenly distributed throughout the regions. Principles
should be set out nationally, but specific policies, objectives
and targets should be set locally and regionally, particularly
for investment levels to promote increased public transport use
and achieving modal switch.
Further targets and guidance on land use policy
are needed to ensure major developments are located close to existing
transport corridors with a rail service. Public transport links
must be a condition of any planning approval for new green-field
or edge of town sites, which should be actively discouraged. Government
must ensure that the social and environment costs of road building
and congestion are fully evaluated so that efficient regional
investment solutions in future focus on sustainable transport
Railfuture has set out in Appendix 1 some summary
outline upgrade strategies for several regional centres including
Cambridge and parts of Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester. These
principles, promoting local initiatives focus on "Delivering
the Deliverable" and can be applied to many other regional
We also annex a copy of our most recent policy
strategy statement A Railfuture for Britain (Appendix 2) which
has been passed to both the Secretary of State, Stephen Byers,
and the Chairman of the SRA, Richard Bowker.
European White Paper
We have not identified any fundamental conflicts
between the 10 Year Plan and the European White Paper, and we
will respond to the Department in the near future.
Lastly while this paper is not the occasion
for further lengthy discourse on the future structure of Railtrack
and the rail Industry, we note (at 7 January 2002) progress with
the Minister's preferred "Company Limited by Guarantee"
option is fraught with problems.
Whilst Railfuture welcomed the principle of establishing the "not
for profit" company, we are increasingly concerned as to
the viability of the proposal in the context of delivering the
10 Year Plan, which involves public private partnerships. This
matter must be resolved speedily to stabilise the industry, but
Railfuture does not support an outright sale to a third party
private sector bidder as this would simply perpetuate the present
In retrospect an alternative, and possibly a
more viable solution suggested previously by the Committee, might
have been for the Government to receive equity in return for its
direct investment in the company, either as debenture stock or
bonds, or ordinary shares. The latter would have restored a "Golden
Share" but maintained the company in the private sector and
free of Treasury control, if full re-nationalisation were not
an option. While this cannot now happen with Railtrack, the re-establishment
of a Government "Golden Share" in the major transport
operating companies should also now be carefully considered.
Railfuture recognises the calls on Government
funds are vast but neither the DTLR nor the SRA are acting as
the much needed advocate for rail. Some critics have argued their
role is to do a "hatchet job" on rail investment.
The fundamental issue focuses on the lack of
funding which has left the UK's public transport way behind our
European counterparts, and probably the worst equipped railway
network in Western Europe. Government must accept the urgent need
for a massive injection of public funds to consolidate the network
we have and develop the railway in a practical, sensible way.
The plan must focus first on "Delivering the Deliverable".
3 Transport 2010-the 10 Year Plan. July 2000. The
Assumptions are set out in Appendix 3 to the Government's report. Back
Busways from Cambridge (Chesterton) to St Ives and Luton to Dunstable
are proposed, effectively "concreting over" railways. Back
We have even identified cases of an anti-public transport position
taken by more than one voluntary sector body. Back
This can be a very blunt instrument and impinge heavily on some
social groups least able to afford payment. Back
The London Bus sector has shown important passenger growth of
about 4 per cent over the last year, against national trends. Back
Dublin Area Rapid Transit now operates on the CIE/IR main line
routes from Howth and Malahide to Dublin, Dun Laoghaire, Bray
and Greystones. Services on the core section from Howth Junction
to Bray operate approximately every 15 minutes but some intervals
are a little erratic! All stations have real time information
displays and the average waiting time is seven to eight minutes. Back
Transport 2010-the 10 Year Plan. S 6.62. Back
Alternatives like DART Metro also carry through journeys from
Dun Laoghaire and Light Rail is also under construction. (EU Objective
1 funding has also been available to assist these projects.) Back
New Deal for Transport-Better for Everyone July 2000 S 4.14. Back
The 10 Year Plan. S 6.22 and Chart 6c. Back
This criticism has been applied to targets and statistics for
"reducing" health service waiting lists. Back
Ibid. S 6.21. Back
The present conundrum of peak rolling stock demand could be resolved
in the short to medium term by reinstating a programme called
the Networker Classic conversion. This took certain elements from
an existing sound carriage and rebuilt the vehicle with a new
body meeting current standards fro crash-worthiness etc. Up to
50 10-coach trains could be introduced in the next two years using
this specialist upgrade conversion. Back
The ILT still awaits a decision from DTLR on funding this project,
even though the pilot working group was held in April 2001. Back
Commercial opportunities exist as advertising can be sold at
these sites with a contractor providing and maintaining shelters. Back
New Deal for Transport-Better for Everyone July 2000 S 4.18. Back
On train and station information must be improved. One example
of poor practice was the deliberate removal of network maps from
many trains after 1994 to be replaced by maps showing only that
operator's services. Back
Modern Railways Editorial January 2002. Railfuture welcomes this
approach and re-establishes a principle that existed thirty years
ago to accommodate services, for example, following the Roade
Junction rail crash on 31 December 1969. Back
Railfuture wishes to declare an interest in that we hold 200
Railtrack shares as an ethical shareholder to give our organisation
a "voice" at the company's AGM and about 100 of our
members are, similarly small shareholders. Back