Select Committee on Transport, Local Government and the Regions Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum by The Society of British Aerospace Companies Ltd (AT 03)



  In 2000, the UK Aerospace industry generated a domestic turnover of £18.25 billion, of which 60 per cent was exported. 56 per cent of turnover is in the commercial sector and, given the slow growth of defence sales, the civil market was viewed as the most important over the next decade. Over the last 10 years, UK Aerospace made on average a £2.5 billion annual contribution to the UK balance of trade—last year this was £3.8 billion. The industry employs directly over 150,000 people, with a further 300,000 employed indirectly; of these, some 11 per cent are involved in R&D. In total, the industry spends 10 per cent of its turnover on R&D, of which 40 per cent is funded by companies.

  The benefits of this success are spread widely throughout the UK. SBAC estimates suggest that there are over 2,000 companies comprising the UK Aerospace industry. There are obvious local concentrations of aerospace activity in the North West, South West, South East and Midlands, but there are few regions of the UK that do not have some aerospace presence.


  The UK Aerospace industry comprises a number of core companies (systems integrators and Original Equipment Manufacturers) who undertake the bulk of design and development work either independently or part of international consortia. These firms act as "routes to market" to extensive supply chains of smaller firms, including a large number of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Not all of these are defined as aerospace companies, but many are dependent on aerospace business for a significant part of their turnover. An SBAC survey of the supply chains of four leading UK aerospace companies (BAE SYSTEMS military aircraft, Airbus UK, Agusta-Westland, Rolls-Royce) revealed that 82.5 per cent (2,125) of the total number of companies were UK based, responsible for 71.1 per cent of value of contracts allocated in the sample years (1999-2000). While this level does include some large original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), by far the majority of surveyed companies recorded an aerospace turnover of less than £40 million and over half, less than £10 million per annum.

  Total employment of firms selling directly to the four platform companies at tier one level was estimated at over 93,000. Scaling up to the industry at large suggests some 397,700 jobs are linked to business undertaken with all aerospace primary purchasers and domestic public authorities. This suggests that over 1,600 companies depend upon aerospace for more than 25 per cent of turnover, although only 2 per cent of suppliers were dependent on the four platform companies for more than 50 per cent of sales. Each of the four companies has a discrete supply chain, with varying regional distributional characteristics. However, there is a significant overlap between BAe military tier one suppliers and Airbus (16.2 per cent) and Westland and Airbus (16.9 per cent). The overlap between the Rolls-Royce chain and the three others' is much less marked, indicative of the more specialised nature of the propulsion supply chain.

  The overall degree of dependence on civil business cannot be derived from the data, but in general UK Aerospace turnover recorded a 55/45 civil military split in 2000. Clearly, at all levels of the supply chain, from platform downward, exposure to civil risk varies markedly from company to company. Similarly, the degree of substitutability between defence and civil activity and between aerospace and other business sectors will also vary—intuitively this will be higher in aerostructures and propulsion and for companies further down the supplier chain delivering less technologically specific goods and services. Inter sectoral substitutability will also depend upon general economic factors and the buoyancy of other markets.


  Before 11 September, the civil aerospace industry was expecting a period of reduced demand in line with deteriorating world economic conditions. Adjustments to production levels were likely. It was also evident that forces likely to effect a major restructuring of the world airline industry (especially in Europe) were already apparent. Set against these pessimistic conditions was the view that the underlying demand for commercial aircraft would be boosted by the retirement of older types, especially those unable to meet increasingly stringent environmental requirements.

  The full impact of 11 September on the demand for commercial aerospace products cannot yet be quantified with accuracy. In the short term (from first quarter 2002 until at least third quarter 2003) these are likely to be grave. The sharp fall in passenger traffic has already had an impact on airline revenues and has catalysed a number of airline bankruptcies. So far, the response from aerospace manufacturers has been mixed. Boeing and Bombardier have announced what were probably cyclically driven reductions. Airbus has frozen production schedules, but is expected to reduce planned levels for 2002 and 2003. Revenue from spares and maintenance activity has already begun to decline as aircraft are either retired or placed in storage and has an immediate effect on the aero-engine and repair and maintenance sectors.

  Following the Gulf War of 1991, there was also a sharp fall in immediate demand, particularly in the trans-Atlantic market. Traffic took a year to recover, with general economic impacts even longer to dissipate. Until we have seen the exact scope of the US-allied response, we cannot realistically "begin the clock" on the recovery phase. This crisis also centres unequivocally on the use of commercial aviation as a weapon of terror in the world's core commercial aviation market. While we can be confident that technological and operational solutions can be found to the security questions raised by the hi-jack and the suicidal actions, there could be a long term residual impact on confidence. More important, world perceptions and the future cost and general experience of air travel may have changed permanently.

  Unlike the Gulf War crisis, the responses and subsequent effects could be open-ended and not contained to the immediate arena. However, the key drivers for the demand for air transport are still the usual combination of world (and especially US) economic growth, security, safety and affordability. An additional factor may now be the speed with which the airline industry rationalises to create more robust and resilient carriers.

  Along with the rest of the air transport community, the SBAC argues strongly that confidence will return once the public can be assured that advances in technology and improved procedures are in hand to counter the threat of terrorism. In many parts of the world, there is no viable alternative to air transport and generally other modes of communication offer only partial solutions to business and social needs. IATA is confident that long term growth rates should at least match those of its provisional 2001-2005 forecasts. The UK Aerospace industry, as a major player in the world civil aerospace market, will continue to benefit from this growth. It is imperative, however, that all of the stakeholders in UK Aerospace (public and private), remain committed to long term solutions to the industry's technological and commercial challenges.


  While it is too early to quantify the impact, UK Aerospace will not escape either the short or long term consequences of these events. The industry was expecting a reduction in the demand for commercial aerospace products due to cyclical factors, this will now be deeper and more prolonged than predicted. As noted above, around 55 per cent of UK Aerospace turnover is in the civil sector, but some individual companies are more or less dependent on commercial business. Although the immediate effects will be felt by companies at the top of the industry, problems will cascade throughout an extended supply chain, affecting smaller firms throughout the UK, but especially in the North West, South West, South East and the East and West Midlands. To date, several UK companies have announced redundancies totalling over 7,000 (with an estimated 11,000 jobs lost in the supply chain). Again, some of these may have been part of planned responses to the cyclical down turn, but the rapid deterioration of the civil aerospace market has contributed greatly to the severity of the losses.

  Defence-related activities are likely to be less affected, indeed, several companies are likely to benefit from increases in the defence and aviation security businesses. However, the civil sector was seen as the most important source of long term market growth for the industry as a whole. Although the engine of commercial growth will return, we cannot assume that the future will reflect the past in terms of demand. Similarly, companies further down the supply chain are less likely to make a sharp distinction between civil and military business and the impact of a sharp down turn in the civil sector will depress demand generally throughout the aerospace supply chain with a commensurate effect on capacity and employment.


  The impact will flow down the supply chain immediately, with a real risk that the sudden changes in demand will be amplified by two factors:

    —  the drive by all companies to reduce inventory when faced by a sudden drop in demand;

    —  the unfortunate tendency for procurement systems to amplify pessimistic signals as they are passed from one tier of suppliers to another.

  The risk of turmoil in the supply chain and its consequent costs and the adverse impact on cash-flow are extremely high for lower tier suppliers. In some cases, some US OEMs have already unilaterally extended payment terms to their suppliers (by 15 days in one case) and have put their current delivery schedules on hold. Any shipment now needs explicit approval and those made against current schedules may be returned.

  Falling demand will inevitably affect the supply chain, with a commensurate impact on employment. Again, it is impossible to predict with confidence these effects, based on the SBAC supply chain study, well over 900 UK tier one companies are especially sensitive to down turn, with a minimum of 9,000 jobs in the supply chain directly vulnerable to a 10 per cent fall in business from four major UK aerospace customers. If this estimate is applied to all of UK Aerospace business, this could be as high as 40,000 jobs in the supply chain. These figures exclude employment effects of further capacity reductions amongst UK civil aerospace primes.


  The current crisis in the civil aerospace market is having an immediate and severe impact on UK Aerospace. However, the SBAC confidently expects the market to recover, albeit slowly over the next three years. UK companies are fundamentally sound with a deep and extensive set of world class technologies. In the short term, the UK civil aerospace depends upon regained confidence in air travel and airline liquidity and stability. In this respect, HMG should ensure that agencies such as the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) are fully able to support sales of aircraft and engines.

  In the longer term, investment in technology remains the key to recovery and future growth—especially in meeting new demands for aircraft and airport security and increasingly stringent environmental regulation (which remains the most important long term issue for civil aviation). UK firms will continue to invest in new technology, but if UK aerospace is to come through this crisis in a healthy state and to be able to face its longer term consequences, HMG must respond to the UK need for an expanded programme of R&D activity in both the civil and military sectors. Moreover, the civil and military aspects of this programme should be well co-ordinated and directed with the full participation of industry and academia.

19 November 2001

Memorandum by the Boeing Company (AT 04)


  Q.  How is Boeing responding to the new US government requirements for airplane security (ie cockpit doors), and what are the implications of those requirements?

  R.  Immediately following the September 11 tragedy, Boeing began working with the U.S. Government, airline customers, pilots and others in the aviation industry—including Airbus—to identify the best solutions for improving aviation security, with a particular emphasis on flight deck security.

  Boeing hosted several meetings that brought together industry and government officials to discuss security issues and played a leadership role in the airplane security "rapid response team" established by the US Secretary of Transportation.

  Following the release of recommendations by that team to the Secretary, Boeing established a new organisation headed by Charles R Higgins to help the airlines implement the recommendations and to identify and develop new security products and services for the aviation industry.

  By the end of November Boeing expects to have design proposals ready for cockpit doors and adjacent structure that will improve the security of flight decks and meet all other safety criteria for rapid decompression and emergency access and egress. Boeing also is working on designs for passenger cabin cameras to give pilots a view of what's happening in the cabin during an emergency.

  A third near-term programme is addressing the US government's desire to ensure that transponders, which enable ground controllers to identify and track airplanes, cannot be turned off during flight. Longer-term, Boeing is vigorously pursuing air traffic management and broadband communication technologies that can enhance the security of the worldwide air transportation system. Implementation of the near-term changes is expected to have financial implications for the airlines. However, the aviation industry recognises that improved airplane and airport security is essential to restoring traveller confidence and thus the financial health of the industry. Unlike some of the changes taking place at airports, none of the aforementioned airplane changes will adversely impact the processing of passengers and their baggage.

  Q.  What impact is the September 11 tragedy having on aircraft orders and aerospace jobs?

  R.  The terrorist attack on the United States is having a major impact on air travel and, by extension, the aerospace industry.

  US airlines are operating at roughly 80 per cent of their normal capacity, which means they have parked airplanes and will not need many of the airplanes they had on order for delivery over the next two years. Boeing has readjusted its projected deliveries to approximately 522 airplanes this year (down from 538) and 350-400 airplanes next year (down from 510). A further decline in deliveries is expected for 2003, although Boeing is not yet prepared to release numbers that far into the future. These declines necessitate sharp reductions in employment. Boeing has announced that its commercial airplane workforce will decline by 20,000 to 30,000 positions over the next two years. The downturn also will force Boeing to place fewer orders with its suppliers. However, Boeing has no intention of pulling back into the company work currently done by its suppliers. Boeing is concerned about the health of its partner companies as we work together through this downturn.

14 November 2001

Memorandum by the British Cargo Airline Alliance (AT 05)


  This is a short response to the Committee's inquiry into the immediate implications of the current situation on the air transport industry from the British Cargo Airline Alliance.

  The BCAA was formed in 1998 to advance the interests of the UK's all-cargo airline industry to Government. This was principally to present a coherent voice to officials and Ministers during their bilateral air service negotiations with the US—the largest air-freight market in the world. Through its secretariat, the BCAA also works with Ministers and officials on other key issues that affect our industry.


  Like the rest of the aviation sector, the UK's cargo airline industry has been adversely affected by the events of September 11. Although not yet facing job losses, we have seen levels of cargo on board aircraft operated by our members declining significantly. The level of cargo aircraft charters has also fallen, particularly as much of this business relies on computer companies and other hi-tech industries who are facing their own economic difficulties.

  So far our members have weathered the storm, in large part because much of their business involves the provision of whole aircraft to other airlines. However, as air cargo volumes shrink, it is inevitable that some airlines will decide, in due course, to cut back on the number of outsourced freighter operations they offer to their customers. When that happens, our members will inevitably suffer and there may well be direct job losses. Obviously, matters are not helped at the moment by the massive increases in insurance premiums and security measures, which have imposed significant cost additions at the very time when revenues are weaker.


  The Committee is familiar with the BCAA's position on any potential UK—US "open skies" deal, a subject that has again been discussed in light of the events of 11 September.

  In these difficult times, the BCAA believes it is the role of Government to provide wholehearted backing to its domestic carriers. The last thing we would wish to see at this time is any "open skies" agreement with the US which is likely to disadvantage our members' interests or further undermine their competitive position.

  The Committee will note that the US Government has already committed a sum of $500 million in state aid to cargo-only airlines. US cargo airlines have also benefited from short term US Government contracts for additional airlift in support of events in the Middle East. These contracts were not placed out on a competitive tender basis, and foreign airlines were not invited to submit details of their available capacity.


  The BCAA looks to its Government to ensure that any new Air Services Agreement with the US establishes equal access to equal markets for carriers from both countries;

  This means:

    (a)  that the US Government-financed commercial distortions (ie Fly America and CRAF) should be removed from the equation by giving carriers from both countries equal access to public sector contracts;

    (b)  that wetleasing opportunities, which are already heavily exploited by US carriers in the UK and Europe, should be extended to UK carriers in the US;

    (c)  as far as is possible and with due regard to security considerations, the nationality of shareholders in an airline should be immaterial given that the regulatory regime applied to an airline is effectively determined by its principal place of business;

    (d)  only granting fifth freedom rights to US carriers from the UK into the rest of the EEA (our domestic market) if British airlines are granted reciprocal access to operate within the US domestic market. This needs to extend beyond codesharing or alliances, as ad hoc charter airlines and freight carriers are unable to utilise such devices. It must mean real domestic access in exchange for real domestic access. Should a deal be struck which grants such access to US airlines in Europe without giving our carriers equivalent access to the US market, our members would inevitable lose contracts as US carriers moved their own aircraft into Europe to fly routes currently contracted out to British and European airlines. They would do this on the back of a protected position in their own home markets, effectively establishing themselves as quasi-European operators without having to comply with any of Europe's more onerous labour, maintenance and working time practices.

  It is our firm belief that any deal secured now for political reasons or to benefit one particular passenger airline which does not address these fundamental issues of principle would be a mistake.

  Such a deal would be contrary to the long term interests of the UK's aviation sector (which goes beyond airlines into maintenance companies, engineering organisations, research and development and significant job provision) and would throw away the opportunity of securing a truly liberalised regime. It would also be contrary to the interests of the customers of airlines, passengers and shippers alike, who would see long term choice reduce as airlines fail, unable to compete in a Government-created distorted market.

  Finally, we believe that it would be inappropriate, and quite possibly unlawful, for the UK to rush into a new Air Services Agreement with the US at this time and that it should await the ruling of the European Court of Justice case brought by the European Commission in respect of the legality of existing "Open Skies" deals.

Steve Guynan

Group Secretary

16 November 2001

Memorandum by Friends of the Earth (AT 06)


    "The Sub-Committee wishes to consider the implications of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and the responses to those events by the industry, regulators and governments. In particular the Sub-Committee will consider the economic and political implications of the downturn in passenger numbers, security, the role of international subsidies and the proposals for Government assistance for the industry, and the effect of the rules of ownership on the United Kingdom air transport industry".

  1.  Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FOE) has worked on aviation issues for the past decade, including as part of the Europe-wide "right price for air travel" campaign. We work on the economic and environmental consequences of aviation, and with local communities on its impacts. FOE fully understands the wish of the Sub-Committee to consider the consequences of the tragic incidents in the United States on 11 September 2001, and hopes that this contribution will inform those considerations.

  2.  FOE believes that the impact of the September events has not been uniform, or in parts even negative, on the UK aviation industry. The events have affected routes and sectors differently. Thus transatlantic routes and those "flag carrier" airlines providing them have suffered substantial losses, whereas European routes have suffered less. Meanwhile the low-cost carriers that provide some of the latter routes have in fact continued to grow.

  3.  The Sub-Committee is considering the implications of "the downturn in passenger numbers" but, for eg the UK/Irish low-cost carriers, there has not been a downturn at all. [1](The same buoyant position applies to the American low-cost carrier, South West Airlines). Any actual downturns may be limited, or short-term, and need to be set against the very high growth rates achieved over recent decades, and forecast equally to continue to be achieved in the future[2]. There are also other, balancing, effects of the downturn, such as the continuing drop in oil prices, reducing the cost of aviation kerosene (which is also untaxed—see paragraph 13 below). In a longer term perspective, the immediate downturn such as it is may just be a "blip" in the continuous and rapid growth in air traffic.

  4.  The events have merely accelerated the restructuring of the airline industry that was developing before September 2001; that is:

    —  collaboration between large and small airlines within the three developing global alliances; and

    —  a general restructuring in favour of the low-cost carriers and against some of the "flag carrier" airlines.

  This longer term restructuring is based on the application of increased competition following deregulation, and the removal of costs in the airlines and at airports. Smaller airlines, with a weaker balance sheet, or those that had already made commercial mistakes, are likely to be the early "victims" of this process (Sabena, Aerlingus, Swissair); airlines with a stronger asset base or greater ability to restructure are more likely to survive (BA, which was in case restructuring before September). The low-cost carriers are the clear beneficiaries in terms of long-term competitiveness, market share (whether overall, or on individual routes) and market valuation.

  5.  This view is supported by both the traditional and low-cost UK airlines[3]. The low-cost carriers have very quickly identified the scale of the problem confronting their "traditional" competitors, and the scale of the commercial opportunity open to themselves, and to some others, including BA[4]. The restructuring also extends to progress on the "Open Skies" negotiations between the US and UK governments[5].

  6.  The restructuring will probably be particularly favourable to the UK airline industry (compared say to European rivals): two of the top three European low-cost carriers (easyJet and Go) are based in the UK, and the third is based in Ireland but operates also out of the UK (Ryanair). Meanwhile, BA is better placed to successfully restructure, and also take advantage of the opportunities for mergers and acquisitions amongst the other European airlines (eg negotiations with KLM). This view is supported by commentators[6].

  7.  The restructuring will have at least one very important consequence: a further reduction in the price of air travel, particularly in Europe and possibly more widely. This has been pronounced since September eg "Go offers flights for just £10" announcement 12 November (London-Newcastle £10 single,—Venice £17.50,—Prague £25). Again this is a continuation of longer term trends, but airline restructuring will accelerate it further. (It should be noted, also, that the UK government does not apparently have indices of air fares that would allow it to monitor this price movement, and its potential consequences.) There will also be downward pressures on airport charges. The environmental consequences of restructuring and further air fare reductions are considered in the next section.


  8.  The environmental impacts of aviation are already well established; for example by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in the UK (Energy: the changing climate 2000, paragraph 6.129), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Aviation and the Global Atmosphere 1999).

  9.  It is noted that the Sub-Committee intends to consider the "economic and political implications" of the downturn, but that the environmental implications have not been specifically identified; and also that they will consider "the role of international subsidies and the proposals for Government assistance for the industry". As an environmental transport and sustainable development organisation, FOE's concern is about the longer term sustainability and environmental impacts that the events might cause, and then about the social, economic and political problems that would follow these.

  10.  The responsiveness of the market—that is to say, airlines and consumers—to lower prices and air fares, and the ability of the low-cost carriers to immediately capitalise upon the September events, has been graphically illustrated. In the long run this will represent itself as a further acceleration of aviation growth trends, which we regard as already unsustainable. This particularly concerns the issue of global climate change, which of course will affect the UK as well, but applies also to all the other adverse environmental and social impacts of aviation growth—including airport capacity increases, pollution (air and noise) and surface access problems—as they affect the UK regions and local communities.

  11.  This situation needs also to be understood in the context of (i) the failure to include emissions from international aviation within the Kyoto protocol, and (ii) the absence of any decision to limit or reduce climate change emissions from aircraft at the 33rd Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation in late September 2001 (instead, to engage in a further three year period of investigation into potential measures and targets, reporting in 2004), and not take any action on proposals submitted by the EU requesting more urgent consideration of this issue. The UK government has not identified any significant response outside these international and EU actions (UK Climate Change Strategy, 2000 Part 2, paragraphs 79-82, 89).

  12.  The market response to the September events, and its climate change impacts, will therefore not be restrained by any measures of demand management. Indeed, it is quite possible that the market response will, over time, actually worsen the impact of aviation on the environment, local to global, with little or no immediate prospect of that negative impact being mitigated.

  13.  In relation to subsidies our general position is that aviation already receives substantial subsidies, in a number of forms, which are usually more hidden from view. These include tax free fuel, no VAT on aircraft purchase, purchase of goods free of duty outside the EU zone, subsidy of airport related infrastructure, etc.; the arguments are set out at greater length in the paper Tax Free Aviation by Brendon Sewill, former Treasury Advisor on Economic Policy (AEF/FOE).

  14.  In relation to the differential between the substantial subsidies offered to American airlines by the US government, and the approach taken by the EU Commission; whilst the response of the Commission may appear to have been both restrained (compensation only for the four days' closure of North American airspace; help in meeting security and insurance costs) and even rigorous (ban on further state aid for Sabena), other assistance has been permitted (freezing rights for take-off and landing slots at European airports until spring 2003; and a payout to Alitalia of an existing state aid package, even though it had earlier ruled that previous conditions had not been met).


  15.  Our conclusions are fourfold:

    —  that any aviation "downturn" in the UK is affecting different sectors differently, and some favourably; and may just be short term, to be followed by a continuation, even an acceleration, of high growth;

    —  that the UK low-cost airlines, and in a different way BA, are best placed to capitalise on this opportunity compared to other European competitors;

    —  that the environmental implications of this airline response, as a result of still lower air fares against a historic downward trend, should be considered by the Sub-Committee (alongside the "economic and the political"), and will be substantial and negative;

    —  that no assistance or additional subsidy at all is justified but that, when the short-term nature of the downturn is revealed, a process of demand management including by price should be applied—globally, in the EU and the UK—in order to respond to these environmental problems, at present ignored by both industry and government.

  16.  Consequently, we ask that the Sub-Committee, in reviewing the shorter term impacts of the September events, particularly in relation to individual airlines, should also give consideration to the potential longer term environmental impacts and the continued absence of governmental or inter-governmental mechanisms to respond to the continuing market driven growth of the aviation industry.

  17.  We would also welcome the "wider-ranging inquiry into the state of the industry" which the notice indicated may be considered in the future.

Paul de Zylva

Friends of the Earth

1   "... news from easyJet is that passenger numbers in October surged by a third. The low-cost operator carried 716,017 passengers last month, up from 538,508 in October 2000. It meant that 7.3 million passengers flew on the airline for the year to the end of October." Independent 8 November. Back

2   BAA have reported a drop of just 12 per cent in passenger numbers in October, and "this trend has remained stable since the second half of September" Evening Standard 12 November. "The growth of low cost airlines has cushioned the blow" for BAA, Investors Chronicle 2 November. For forecast growth rates, see DETR 2000 Forecasts. Back

3   "The pace of European consolidation `remains uncertain' but with the support of governments `the timetable may well compress in these difficult times'" Rod Eddington, chief executive of British Airways FT 7 November. Back

4   "Webster [Ray Webster, Chief Executive of easyJet] envisages a new world order of international branded airlines serving long haul routes, with short haul regional travel being dominated by low-cost operators. ...The traditional airlines ... just can't keep making losses on their European operations. There is an opportunity for us to replace and displace them and we are well positioned". Guardian 10 November. "Not long ago, Webster was saying that his fleet would peak at 30 aircraft. Now he talks of expanding today's 26 jets to 250, making the carrier nearly as big as Southwest. He argues that low-cost carriers could have over half the intra-European market within five years. At the moment they have just 5 per cent". Economist 1 November. Back

5   "In written testimony presented to the US Senate UK government officials state Two allies, united in so much else, should be able to reach agreement on something [the BA/AA alliance proposal] that would be greatly to their mutual benefit. ...The events of September 11 have reinforced the case for this, not weakened it." Times 10 November (The article also notes that the UK airline bmi is supporting the Government's initiative because it is backing the airline's application for antitrust immunity with United Airlines in the rival Star Alliance). Back

6   eg Economist "No frills, plenty of promise-Low-cost carriers hope to dominate short-haul air travel in Europe" 1 November; Financial Times "Flying closer" 7 November "In the short term the big winners will be the leading low-cost carriers Ryanair and EasyJet and possibly Go, the former BA low-cost subsidiary". Back

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