LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) We recommend that in its response
to this Report the Government state whether or not the British
intelligence agencies on which the security of the United Kingdom
depends have the human, financial and other resources they require
to offer the best possible protection against terrorist attacks
on the United Kingdom or on British posts and facilities overseas
(b) We conclude that the Government was
right to publish the coalition "Campaign Objectives"
and the document outlining "Responsibility for the terrorist
atrocities." These publications went some way towards reassuring
Parliament, the British public and Britain's coalition partners
of why military action against Afghanistan was necessary (paragraph
(c) We conclude that the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Secretary were right to invest substantial time
and effort overseas in helping the United States to mobilise the
international coalition against terrorism (paragraph 46).
(d) We conclude that NATO was entirely
right to invoke Article V, and commend the Secretary General on
his initiative in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks (paragraph
(e) We commend the Government's efforts
to include other countries' military contributions in the war
against terrorism, and recommend that it continue to press for
similar coalitions where appropriate in any future military operations
(f) We recommend that the FCO clarify
how it sees the role of NATO in the conduct of US-led military
operations against terrorists or the states that sponsor them.
We further recommend that the FCO clarify NATO's role in providing
and co-ordinating intelligence in the war against terrorism (paragraph
(g) We recommend that in its response
to this Report the Foreign and Commonwealth Office provide a full
statement on EU-wide co-operation and progress in countering terrorism
(h) We congratulate Sir Jeremy Greenstock
on his appointment as Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.
We conclude that the Government was right to push for a prominent
UN role in the war against terrorism, and commend its work towards
this end in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks
(i) We commend the efforts of British
diplomats to persuade the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden
after 11 September. We conclude that this was the right course
of action, which helped to hold together the international coalition
during the subsequent military campaign in Afghanistan (paragraph
(j) We conclude that the British and American
governments were vindicated in their judgments that the Taliban
could be removed speedily, and with loss of life that appears
to have been far lower than was predicted early in the military
campaign (paragraph 81).
(k) We recommend that the Government investigate
the circumstances which led to the dangerous misunderstanding
with Britain's allies at Bagram. We trust that measures will be
taken to ensure that British personnel will not be endangered
unnecessarily through such misunderstandings in future operations
(l) We also recommend that the Government
investigate the extent to which the confusion and blurred lines
of communication arose from the fact that Mr Bergne was appointed
by the Prime Minister rather than by the FCO. Lessons need to
be learned about relations between the Foreign Office and the
Prime Minister's personal appointees in such circumstances (paragraph
(m) We commend the Government for the
speed with which it deployed a sizeable contingent of UK personnel
to CENTCOM, and conclude that this deployment made an important
contribution to close co-operation with the United States in the
campaign in Afghanistan (paragraph 91).
(n) We commend the Government for realising,
early in the Afghanistan campaign, the necessity to look beyond
its military aspects. We conclude that the Government's planning
in this area contributed to the rapid and successful establishment
of an interim authority after the fall of the Taliban (paragraph
(o) We recommend that the Government consider
carefully, with the United States and other coalition partners,
the options for maintaining and increasing security in Afghanistan,
both during and for a significant period after the June 2002 Loya
Jirga. This should include consideration of the extension
of ISAF beyond Kabul and its immediate area (paragraph 117).
(p) We commend the British Government
for being amongst the first to have both signed and ratified all
12 Conventions related to terrorism and recommend that the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office makes full use of its posts overseas to
try to ensure that other UN member states do likewise (paragraph
(q) We recommend that, given the additional
demands being placed on the UN Secretariat by the work of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Government do all it can to ensure
that the CTC has adequate resources to fulfil its functions (paragraph
(r) We recommend that the Government continue
to do its utmost to ensure that adequate provision is made for
the safety and security of prisoners in military operations in
which British forces are engaged (paragraph 136).
(s) We conclude in relation to the detention
of Taliban and al Qaeda suspects, as we do in relation to other
matters, that the Government must strive to uphold standards of
international law, and, to the greatest extent possible, to ensure
that prisoners are tried in full accordance with internationally
accepted norms of justice (paragraph 144).
(t) We recommend that the Government consider
whether the Geneva Conventions remain wholly appropriate in the
modern conduct of warfare. If they do not, there may be a need
to work towards a new international consensus to amend the Conventions,
to ensure that the protection that they provide to civilians and
combatants is maintained (paragraph 145).
(u) We recommend that the Government seek
to allay the concerns of the US Administration about the International
Criminal Court, with a view to persuading it to reconsider its
renunciation of the ICC Treaty (paragraph 151).
(v) We conclude that a linkage between
the conflict in the Middle East and the war against terrorism
is widely perceived among populations and governments in the region.
Both the US and British governments appear to accept that the
conflict is a factor which severely complicates their conduct
of the war, although it does not weaken their resolve. While the
conflict in the Middle East requires swift and fair resolution
on its own merits, this perceived linkage lends added urgency
to the search for peace (paragraph 161).
(w) We recommend that the Government consider
carefully how to help allies in the Islamic world to address the
social, economic and political conditions that have led to the
growth of Islamic extremism among their populations (paragraph
(x) We recommend that in its response
to this Report the Government state clearly what is its policy
on first use of nuclear weapons, with particular reference to
dealing with the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons
of mass destruction (paragraph 171).
(y) We recommend that in its response
to this Report the Government set out its policy on the development
of new tactical nuclear weapons (paragraph 173).
(z) We conclude that the Government was
right to highlight in grave but measured terms the threat of weapons
of mass destruction attack by terrorists, including the threat
to the United Kingdom (paragraph 176).
(aa) We recommend that the Government
continue to urge the international community to do its utmost
to prevent nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials
getting into the hands of terrorists (paragraph 181).
(bb) We recommend that the Government
do its utmost to ensure that the new director of the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is able to act independently,
and for the benefit of all member states of the Organisation (paragraph
(cc) We commend the Government for publishing
its Green Paper on strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and recommend that it continue its efforts to persuade
the United States to agree an effective verification regime (paragraph
(dd) We recommend that the FCO set out
clearly and fully in its response to this Report its specific
responsibilities for preventing weapons of mass destruction attacks
against the United Kingdom, its citizens and its interests overseas
(ee) Government Communications Head Quarters
(GCHQ) and the Secret Intelligence Service are agencies for which
the FCO is responsible. We recommend that the FCO, through these
agencies, ensure that the highest priority is given to identification
and prevention of attack on the United Kingdom or on British interests
overseas by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (paragraph
(ff) We conclude that the Government is
right to maintain its constructive andwhenever necessarycritical
engagement with Iran (paragraph 201).
(gg) We recommend that in its response
to this Report the Government clarify whether its policy is to
bring about 'regime change' in Iraq (paragraph 209).
(hh) We recommend that the Government
propose a deadline for Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council
Resolutions requiring Iraq to allow inspection of its nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons programmes (paragraph 212).
(ii) The Committee recommends that the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its response to this report
sets out the British Government's view as to the circumstances
in which a pre-emptive military strike would be legally justified
(jj) We recommend that the Government
work with the United States to ensure that any action taken against
Iraq, or against any other state in the war against terrorism,
conforms with international law (paragraph 227).
(kk) We recommend that the Government
follow the precedent which it set in the period leading up to
military action in Afghanistan, and publish the fullest possible
documentation on the need for any further military action, before
such action is seriously contemplated. While nothing should be
published which might compromise sources or methods of intelligence,
the Government must try to secure the widest possible support
in Parliament and among the British people if it is proposing
to risk the lives of British servicemen and women as part of a
further phase of the war against terrorism (paragraph 233).
(ll) We commend Ministers for what they
have already done to build and maintain the international coalition
against terrorism. We recommend that the Government continue to
give a high priority to maintaining the coalition; to achieving
the full commitment of its members; and in particular to persuading
the United States of the value of continuing to operate through
it (paragraph 237).
(mm) The war against terrorism is an unplanned
and unsought conflict. But when the first hijacked airliner struck
the World Trade Center, war became necessary and, once entered
upon, war must be pursued vigorously and with all appropriate
means (paragraph ?).
(nn) We believe that the international
coalition leadership, especially that of the United States and
the United Kingdom, has performed remarkably well. Resolve and
determination have been tempered with restraint and sensitivity.
The political leaderships of both countries deserve support and
understanding (paragraph 239).
(oo) The military campaign is likely to
be long and may spread beyond Afghanistan. Coalition forces directly
engaged in or supporting the campaign are performing a difficult
and dangerous task with the skill and dedication which has come
to be expected of them, but which is greatly appreciated and admired
(pp) We concede that the great advantage
of hindsight is that it allows us 20/20 vision of the precursors
of war which were previously unseen, misinterpreted, or ignored.
If one lesson comes out of our consideration of why the attacks
of 11 September 2001 were able to succeed, it is that priority
must be given to the gathering, assessment and use of high-grade
intelligence information. Without that information, this country
and its allies are appallingly vulnerable (paragraph 241).
(qq) But to 'know thine enemy' is not
enough. We also need to determine how the conditions that have
contributed to the development of terrorism can be removed, or
at least reduced. The answers to those questions will provide
a far safer world than even the best intelligence and preparedness
can provide. As the war against terrorism proceeds, this country
and its coalition allies must seek out those answers, and must
learn about and deal sensitively with the causes of terrorism
The Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed
to the following Report: