SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. We conclude that the establishment
of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council
is an important development in the work of the United Nations
and in the war against terrorism. We recommend that the Government
ensure that the Counter-Terrorism Committee receives whatever
support it may require in order for it to be effective in its
work of holding states to account for their compliance with the
terms of UN Security Council Resolutions on terrorism (paragraph
2. We note with satisfaction the deservedly
very high reputation of the United Kingdom Mission to the United
Nations and its excellent working relationship with the Missions
of other countries, notably that of the United States. We recommend
that the Government ensure that the provision of human, financial
and other resources appropriate to the vital role of the Mission
continues to be given the highest priority (paragraph 37).
3. We were presented with a strong case
for the emerging US proposals on missile defence. We recommend
that these proposals are most carefully considered by the Government
and that it should have due regard for the concerns expressed
in the United Kingdom and among our European partners before coming
to a final decision on any definitive proposals (paragraph 66).
4. While it is certainly possible that
China may expand its nuclear capability in any event, we recommend
that the Government use its influence with the US to ensure that
the effects of any missile defence programme on China and on other
nuclear powers are carefully assessed (paragraph 72).
5. We recommend that the Government seek
to ensure that if either party to the ABM Treaty exercises its
right to withdraw, the United States and Russia establish an alternative
mutually satisfactory and legally binding agreement on the development
of missile defence systems, which might include other states (paragraph
6. We note the importance of ensuring
a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, and believe that unilateral
cuts in the US nuclear arsenal do not substitute for the establishment
and maintenance of global non-proliferation agreements. We recommend
that the Government renew its efforts to press the United States
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (paragraph 85).
7. The Committee supports the Government
in its determination to review the Treaty on Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is currently 'leaking', and we
recommend that the Government works in the closest conjunction
with the US Administration to devise further specific and effective
measures to enforce this crucial arms control agreement. The Committee
expects to receive from the Government details of such measures
9. We conclude that the only way to establish
whether states are developing biological and toxin weapons is
to establish a mandatory, on the ground challenge inspection system
to verify compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
We recommend that the Government work with the US and other allies
to agree such a verification regime, by which states' compliance
with the BTWC can be established (paragraph 99).
10. In view of the US Administration's proposal
to cut the Department of Energy's funding for Co-operative Threat
Reduction programmes, we recommend that the Government continues
to stress to the US the utmost importance it attaches to such
programmes and reports to the Committee on progress to establish
an international financing plan for them (paragraph 103).
11. We recommend that the FCO continues to
maintain close scrutiny of the arms control implications of the
militarisation of outer space (paragraph 107).
12. We conclude that the argument that UN
efforts to control small arms has been influenced by those seeking
to change US domestic gun policy is unconvincing. We recommend
that the Government urge the US to support fully the UN Programme
of Action on preventing the flow of small arms to developing countries.
We fully support the Government's efforts to tighten the supply
of arms to non-state parties (paragraph 111).
13. We recommend that the Government work
with the United States for a responsible approach to strengthening
the police and security forces of Central and South Asian states
affected by the campaign against terrorism (paragraph 113).
14. We recommend that the Government continue
in its efforts to encourage the United States to ratify the Ottawa
Convention, and to phase out the use of anti-personnel land mines
before 2006 (paragraph 118).
15. We recommend that the Government highlight
to the US Government the value and importance of securing legally-binding
multilateral agreements to control the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. We welcome efforts made by the Government
to curb the flow of small arms to developing countries through
the UN system, and to ban the use of anti-personnel land mines,
and endorse its efforts to persuade the US to support such initiatives
16. We recommend that the Government continue
its dialogue with the US Administration on the Treaty establishing
the International Criminal Court (paragraph 128).
17. We recognise the value that NATO has provided
to British security as both a military and political institution
over the past fifty years. We support the Government's efforts
to work with the US and Russia to ensure that the Alliance evolves
to reflect the new security environment. We recommend that the
Government ensure, in its policies towards NATO, that the Alliance's
cohesion and effectiveness as a military organisation with full
US engagement is maintained (paragraph 141).
18. We recommend that during the ongoing war
against terrorism, the Government act to avoid any loss of momentum
for reconstruction in the Balkans, by working for the continued
full involvement and active participation of the United States
in the region (paragraph 158).
19. We recommend that the Government lend
its full support to renewed efforts by the United States to achieve
success in the Middle East peace process on the basis of the Mitchell
Committee proposals, by bringing pressure to bear on the Israeli
Government and the Palestinian Authority and by standing ready
to contribute towards such diplomatic, practical and economic
assistance as may be required (paragraph 166).
20. We conclude that the Government's and
European Union's policies of constructive engagement with Iran
deserve full support. We recommend that the Government should
continue to be bold in developing these contacts, extending them
as appropriate to other countries in the Middle East, in the interests
of long-term peace and stability in the region, and that it should
seek to persuade the United States of their value. At the same
time, the problems and pressures faced by countries with which
the United Kingdom and the United States already have friendly
relations must not be downplayed or underestimated (paragraph
21. We recommend that the Government ensure
that the United States is fully seized of the importance of achieving
a solution to the Kashmir problem, and of the need for it to use
its influence to help bring about such a solution (paragraph 174).
22. We recommend that BBC World Service consider
broadcasting to the United States in languages other than English,
especially in Spanish and Arabic (paragraph 178).
23. We recommend that the Government, with
the United States Government, do all it can to resolve outstanding
trade issues between our countries, and to encourage US citizens
not to be deterred from travelling to the United Kingdom for their
vacations (paragraph 190).
24. We recommend that, when assessing the
value of the diplomatic estate to United Kingdom taxpayers, the
FCO and Treasury ensure that the 'diplomatic balance sheet' of
the contribution made by properties to promoting the United Kingdom's
interests is regarded as being no less important than the financial
balance sheet (paragraph 196).
25. We commend the performance of the British
Embassy in Washington, and express our appreciation of the excellent
work done by its staff at every level (paragraph 199).
26. We congratulate the entire staff of the
Consulate-General and other posts in New York for their exemplary
action on behalf of British victims of the attack on the World
Trade Center, and on the consistently high standard of their representation
of British interests (paragraph 202).
27. We sensed in New York and Washington,
if we did not know it already, that now is an extraordinary time
in British-US relations. The United Kingdom and the United States
are working as closely together as they have ever done. Indeed,
on 11 September the immediate outpouring of sympathy by the British
people and the immediate expressions of solidarity and practical
co-operation by the British Government had a remarkable and positive
effect on US public and official opinion. Neither side pretends
that there are no differences between them, but both sides know
that the relationship is sufficiently mature and enduring to accommodate
them. The foundations of British-US relations are broad, deep
and substantial (paragraph 203).
28. This country's status as a leading member
of the European Union adds to rather than detracts from its role
as the premier ally of the United States. The United Kingdom is
in a position to represent the United States to Europe, and Europe
to the United States. Because of its historical experience, and
particularly through its Commonwealth links, it offers the United
States a depth of knowledge of parts of the globe where America
has not traditionally met with understanding. The excellent working
relationship at the United Nations is evidence, if needed, of
the two countries' closeness (paragraph 204).
29. The response of the British Government
to September 11 has demonstrated once again that the relationship
between the United Kingdom and the United States remains special.
It is the firm view of the Foreign Affairs Committee that it is
in the interests of both countries that it remains so (paragraph