THE LANDFILL TAX CREDIT SCHEME
176. Under the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme, landfill
operators can claim up to 90% tax credit against donations they
make to approved environmental bodies. These environmental bodies
may carry out various activities of general environmental merit
as defined by the regulations. Eligible projects include reclamation
of contaminated land (category A), the pursuit of more sustainable
waste management activities (category C/CC) and the provision
of public amenities (category D).
177. Our Report of 1999 made a number of criticisms
of the Credit scheme including that it could not be demonstrated
that the maximum possible environmental benefit was being gained.
Many of the criticisms we made then were echoed in the evidence
we received on this inquiry. In particular, witnesses complained
that the scheme fails to divert sufficient funds towards sustainable
waste management, and lacks co-ordination to achieve this objective,
as funding decisions are entirely controlled by landfill operators.
To date, £135 million worth of credits has been distributed
but only one-third of this has gone into developing a more sustainable
waste management system whilst more than half have been spent
on the community-based, category D projects.
178. Indeed, there was a strong and almost unbroken
consensus that more of the landfill tax credits should be used
to promote truly sustainable waste management and the aims of
the Waste Strategy 2000.[211]
Waste Watch suggested that the credits should be focused on two
areas: market development initiatives and education and communication
programmes.[212]
WyeCycle suggest that a set, high percentage of the credit funds
go into category C/CC projects. The LGA summed the problem up
rather well when they wrote that:
"Whilst so far the Landfill
Tax Credit Scheme has provided many worthwhile and useful environmental
schemes, few appear to be as essential as the delivery of an adequate
recycling infrastructure..."[213]
179. In January 2000, the Government broadened the
categories of project eligible for funding to encourage more funds
into sustainable waste management. However, Mr Timms, the Minister
of Trade and Industry, acknowledged that this had not taken place,
indeed that "if anything, the proportion of the funds going
on sustainable waste management projects has fallen rather than
risen."[214]
The South West England Environmental Trust told us:
"landfill operators
and/or Environmental Bodies can prioritise according to their
own criteria; for instance, they can prioritise support for category
D projects, refuse to fund category E projects, refuse to consider
projects outside a five (5) mile radius of their own landfill
site, only consider category C education projects, refuse to deal
with other EBs and the like (we have examples of all these limitations)"[215]
Mr Meacher summed the problem up:
"One of the concerns
about the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme, one of the inbuilt flaws,
is that the last thing the landfill operator really wants to do
is to have his money used to promote recycling which he is in
competition with..."[216]
In line with our recommendation of last year,[217]
the Government has announced that it will produce indicative guidelines
for the proportion of funding that they would like to see going
into the different categories of project. However, there is no
mechanism (other than exhortation) to change the proportion of
credits going to the different categories. Although we originally
hoped that guidelines would be sufficient in themselves to shift
credits towards C/CC projects, we are no longer convinced that
this will have a significant effect. It is now difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the landfill firms are operating with too
great a sense of self-interest in the choice of projects they
fund.
180. One of the fundamental problems of the Landfill
Tax Credit Scheme is that it was designed such that the funding
it releases for environmental projects is classified as private
sector expenditure, not public expenditure. It is a direct result
of this feature that it is not possible for Government - or even
the private sector regulator of the Scheme, Entrust - to control
where funds released under the scheme are spent. The Financial
Secretary noted that "we will need to consider whether that
[keeping it as public spending] remains an objective that we will
want to stick with or whether the time has come to make some change
on that front."[218]
The National Audit Office recently concluded that this feature
of the scheme "makes external examination of the value-for-money
achieved by the scheme difficult to assess."[219]
The Landfill Tax Credit Scheme is hamstrung by the need to be
classified as private spending: it is de facto public spending,
which is (or should be) aimed at furthering the aims of the Waste
Strategy 2000. The Community Recycling Network note their
conclusion that "the LTCS should be reformed such that the
money is in publicly accountable hands ... Sooner or later, for
this or another environmental tax or instrument, the bullet of
hypothecation must be properly bitten by the Treasury."[220]
181. The Government announced plans to tinker with
the credit scheme in the Waste Strategy 2000 and listed
possible options for further changes which include reviewing the
types of approved projects to see if they can better reflect the
Government's priority to deliver more sustainable waste management,
increasing the proportion of contributions going to sustainable
waste management activities and using the scheme to help local
authorities raise recycling levels.[221]
Local authorities are currently debarred from receiving any financial
benefit from the credit scheme, chiefly to avoid any conflict
of interest that may arise as a result of local authorities receiving
money from landfill operators who would be competing for waste
management companies from those same local authorities. Many local
authorities that submitted evidence to the inquiry suggested that,
given that local authorities were often having to divert money
away from waste management schemes such as recycling projects
in order to pay Landfill Tax, they should be able to bid for funds
to offset this extra expenditure.[222]
One way round this could be to set aside the credits raised as
a result of increases in the tax to provide a parallel, separate
fund, for which local authorities could make bids.
182. There are other criticisms of the way the scheme
works: one is that there is little or no information published
about where the credits are spent or how to obtain them.[223]
Another is that there has been no cost-effectiveness checking
of the projects funded so far. In our Report on the Landfill Tax,
we recommended that:
"Entrust should
be given the powers to evaluate schemes using a cost benefit analysis.
Moreover a continuous and objective evaluation should be made
of the success of the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme in obtaining
the maximum environmental benefits from the tax credits allowed."[224]
Witnesses to this inquiry echoed our previous conclusion[225]
as did Entrust themselves who stated that:
"there needs to be some
overall cost benefit analysis of the system and we would like
responsibility for running that..."[226]
It is also clear that the credits are not being distributed
equitably across the country: there tends to be a bias towards
those areas where the landfill companies operate.[227]
183. Witnesses suggested radical mechanisms to overcome
the problems of the Credit Scheme. Amongst the ideas put forward
were removing some of the categories of acceptable spending (specifically,
category D, the 'community' projects), taking half of the credits
at source and distributing them separately from the others, bringing
a whole new regulator with powers to channel funding, channelling
some (or all) of the credits to local authorities directly.[228]
We understand that the Government is going to review the scheme
although Mr Timms told us that "I do not think the scheme
as it is currently constructed makes it impossible to achieve
our aims."[229]
This seems to be slightly in conflict with the views of the Environment
Minister, Mr Meacher, who was asked whether it was possible to
change the Landfill Tax sufficiently with its current structure
and replied that he was "doubtful of that."[230]
184. The Landfill Tax Credit Scheme provides a
convoluted and, to date, ineffective method of funding sustainable
waste management. Rather than attempt reform of the existing system
whilst protecting its status as 'private expenditure', we recommend
that this charade be abandoned. The new system should consist
of a fund which takes a given percentage of the revenues from
the Landfill Tax (and the incineration tax which we propose) and
is bid for by those wishing to undertake work. The landfill operators
would no longer control the destination of any of the funding.
Community schemes and general environmental projects (categories
D and E) should be restricted to a smaller portion of the credits
than they receive at present, and we expect all the additional
credits raised by the increased landfill tax and the new incineration
tax to be put directly towards minimising, re-using and recycling
waste. There would be no bar on those wishing to apply for funding
and the eligibility of local authorities should be related to
their ambition and performance in meeting targets for improving
recycling and composting. The fund should be seen, in particular,
as a way of covering the transitional costs, for example, of setting
up a kerbside recycling scheme. The revenue should also be the
source of funds for WRAP to meet its essential task in establishing
markets for recycled products.
Entrust
185. Beyond the credit scheme itself, there has been
much criticism of the operating practices and behaviour of the
regulator of the scheme, Entrust. The Guardian newspaper
made various allegations in April 2000 about abuse of the scheme
and also suggested that Entrust itself was behaving in an improper
fashion. The newspaper submitted a dossier of evidence to this
inquiry. We did not investigate these allegations ourselves but
Entrust and Customs and Excise have examined the allegations about
abuse of the credit scheme and have reported that none constituted
a breach of the regulations of the scheme. Nevertheless, many
witnesses were directly critical of the performance and behaviour
of Entrust. These criticisms echoed our own last year when we
concluded that "The structure, operation and accountability
of Entrust lacks clarity and openness."[231]
186. We explored one aspect of Entrust's work in
particular: its interaction with the landfill tax credit users'
group, the Environmental Bodies Council (Ebco). In the first instance,
we were struck by the contrast between the draft memorandum from
Ebco (which reached us via The Guardian) and the final
memorandum from Ebco. We suspect that the dramatic watering down
which took place between draft and final may have been the result
of falling foul of Ebco's agreed terms of reference with Entrust
which state:
"Where the Ebco is asked
specific questions about its opinion of the Scheme, how things
could be done better, etc., it should be aware of the need to
have discussed already any negative views with ENTRUST and / or
Customs prior to airing those views publicly."[232]
The terms continue:
"to represent the views
of all EBs to ENTRUST and other relevant organisations, which
include, HM Customs & Excise, Government Departments, Select
Committees of the Houses of Parliament, bearing in mind the last
sentence of paragraph 3 above [the quote reproduced above]"
187. We see no reason why Ebco should be hamstrung
in this way which, where Select Committees are concerned, borders
on being discourtesy to Parliament. Other aspects of this agreement
seem to have been barely observed: the numbers of meetings held
between Ebco and Entrust have been limited and, as a result of
a dispute, no minutes have yet appeared from the meeting between
Ebco and Entrust in April 2000. There has been much tension between
Ebco and Entrust over the budget for Ebco, a row which continued
after the appearance of both Entrust and Ebco's former chairman,
Dr Malcolm Aickin.[233]
188. It is clear that the relationship between Ebco
and Entrust has been strained but we were struck by the immature
attitude of Entrust to this problem. Entrust argued that, under
the chairmanship of Dr Malcolm Aickin, Ebco was too focussed on
long-term issues, rather than providing practical feedback and
advice about the way the scheme works for environmental bodies
which Entrust notes is the purpose of the Council.[234]
Entrust concluded that Ebco would be much more effective under
its new chairman.[235]
For Entrust to deal with the apparent conflict with Ebco by burying
their heads in the sand, failing to agree minutes for meetings
and awaiting a new chairman, seems immature and unprofessional.
189. We have previously pursued the subject of the
democratic representation on the board of Ebco. In our Report
on The Operation of the Landfill Tax, we concluded that
"it is essential that this group [Ebco] reflects the diversity
of Environmental Bodies and is accountable to them."[236]
Ebco have tried to fill each of its regional posts by holding
elections at its regional meetings. When quizzed on this matter,
Entrust told us that:
"Ebco, in discussion
with us, have come to the conclusion that a process of nomination
and election is not going to get the representatives. Representation
will have to be managed through a process of appointment..."[237]
This seems weak: an adequate organisation should
be able to attract candidates for such posts relatively easily.
190. If Entrust is to remain as the regulator,
it must work with Ebco to enable the council to form a representative
and effective users group. This will require greater co-operation
and professionalism from both Entrust and Ebco. We expressed disappointment
with the nature and progress of Ebco nearly two years ago: it
is simply unacceptable that Ebco is not established and working
well by now.
191. As suggested by the quotation from Ebco's terms
of reference above, Entrust also displays an entirely inappropriate
- and indeed counterproductive - sensitivity to criticism, even
that designed to assist it in doing its job properly. We understand
that Entrust has now withdrawn its offer to Malcolm Aickin to
chair an "improvement panel", set up by Entrust "to
gather opinions from the many stakeholders with an interest in
the strategic development and the continuation of the Landfill
Tax Credit Scheme". This appears to have been done as a direct
result of Dr Aickin's comments on the evidence Entrust gave us.[238]
This kind of behaviour is unacceptable for any regulatory body.
Entrust, however, is a relatively new body overseeing a unique
scheme. For a body in this position not only to ignore constructive
criticism, but effectively to sack the giver of such criticism
from a job apparently designed expressly for the purpose of offering
it, seems perverse in the extreme. It is now clear why Ebco was
so reluctant to submit its original memorandum to us. If this
is the way Entrust treats those who are in any way critical of
it, it is also understandable that there should have been such
difficulty attracting nominees for election to Ebco.
192. Other criticisms of Entrust have centred on
features like the payment of fees to directors. On the subject
of Entrust's constitution and remuneration from the directors,
Dr Malcolm Aickin agreed that "Entrust have a remarkable
ability to change their constitution and regulations at a whim."[239]
Dr Aickin also noted that "to give them the opportunity to
set their own remuneration without reference to anyone outside
is putting temptation in their way which probably should not be
put in their way."[240]
Indeed, Lord Cranbrook, chairman of Entrust, acknowledged this
to be the case and stated that he would like to see Ministers
involved to deal with such matters.[241]
193. More generally, witnesses argued that a regulator
which was closer to Government would be required to make a success
of the scheme. The South West England Environmental Trust wrote
that Entrust is "a rather expensive operation for such a
limited role" and went on to suggest that:
"Entrust become a government
sponsored regulatory body, with more comprehensive regulatory
powers, to thereby offer greater security to both Environmental
Bodies and landfill operators. We also suggest its role is extended
to include collating and distributing information on projects,
and best value and environmental indices."[242]
Similarly, The Guardian concluded that Entrust
should be replaced "with a regulatory body committed to transparency
and accountability ... We would suggest that a new regulatory
body membership include Government, the voluntary and community
sector, local government, technical experts, and a representative
of the waste industry."[243]
194. Certainly, at a time when waste management should
be undergoing a transformation, the regulator of the Landfill
Tax Credit Scheme should be able to play an active role in guiding
credits into the right projects. The recommendations we have made
for the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme will require a regulator which
has direct Government backing. Although we found no evidence that
Entrust has done anything which can be considered wrong in a strict
sense, the way it is set-up, the limited role it can play and,
to some extent, its behaviour, have left it a tarnished organisation
in need of radical change. To a large extent, this failure must
be considered to be a result of the convoluted and unsatisfactory
system which defines the way the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme is
intended to operate. On reflection, we conclude that the best
interests of the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme will be served by
the replacement of the regulator, Entrust. The new regulator should
be closer to Government and will be required to play an active
role in steering the credits available into the most appropriate
projects.
Ev p160
(HC 36-II) Back
A Way
with Waste: A Draft Waste Strategy for England and Wales,
July 1999, Paragraph 3.19 Back
Ev p23,
p128 (HC 903-II) Back
Ev p149
(HC 903-II) Back
Ev p92 (HC
903-II). Around 25% is made up by the bottom ash, with the remaining
5% from fly ash. Back
Ev p153
(HC 903-II) Back
Reference
to answer to Parliamentary Question on 14 November 2000 [136098-136100]:
"It [the Entec study] concluded that the proposed NOx limit
would prevent 46 deaths being brought forward and prevent or delay
91 respiratory hospital admissions as a result of the formation
of ozone. Entec UK have very recently recognised a mathematical
error ... The correct figures for health effects of NOx are in
fact significantly lower - 0.7 deaths not brought forward and
0.9 respiratory hospital admissions not brought forward as a result
of the formation of ozone." Back
Letter from
Environment Agency to The Guardian, 5 December 2000, (DSW
94(a) (Ev not published)) Back
This point
was put forward by the Capel Action Group (Q149) and accepted
by the Environment Agency (Q896) Back
Draft Exposure
and Human Health Reassessment of 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin
(TCDD) and Related Compounds, US Environmental Protection Agency
Website (www.epa.gov) Back
Q914 Back
Q906 Back
Q106 Back
Memorandum
from Communities Against Toxics (Ev not printed) Back
QQ892-906 Back
Q147 Back
Ev p15,
p43, p150 (HC 903-II) and Ev p201 (HC 36-II) Back
Ev p31 (HC
903-II) Back
Ev p15 (HC
903-II) Back
Ev p15 (HC
903-II) Back
See, for
example, Ev p1, p49, p52, p106 (HC 903-II) and Ev p226 (HC 36-II) Back
Ev p102
(HC 903-II) Back
Q388 Back
Q61 Back
Q11 Back
Q33 Back
Ev p91 (HC
903-II) Back
Q92 Back
Ev p91 (HC
903-II) Back
Ev p73 (HC
903-II) Back
Ev p65 (HC
903-II) Back
Q66 Back
Ev p160
(HC 36-II) Back
Ev p102
(HC 903-II) Back
Ev p55 (HC
903-II) Back
Q428 Back
Q168 Back
Q96 Back
Memorandum
from Communities Against Toxics (Ev not published) Back
Ev p151
(HC 903-II) Back
Q522 Back
Q535 Back
Ev p15 (HC
903-II) Back
Q15 Back
Ev p149
(HC 903-II) Back
Q64 Back
Q15 Back
Q64 Back
Ev p211
(HC 36-II) Back
Q981 Back
Ev p36 (HC
903-II) Back
Ev p36,
p206 (HC 903-II) Back
Q367 Back
Q966 Back
Q1185 Back
Ev p37,
p164 (HC 903-II) Back
Q1029; Ev
p207 (HC 36-II) Back
Q372 Back
Ev p212
(HC 36-II) Back
Q536 Back
Sustainable
Waste Management, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs
Committee, HC 484-I (1997-98), paragraph 122 Back
Q143 Back
Ev p128,
p141 (HC 903-II) Back
Ev p27 (HC
903-II) Back
Ev p15,
p 21, p42, p56, p61, p131, p187 (HC 903-II) Back
Ev p38 (HC
903-II) Back
See, for
example, Q31 Back
Q974 Back
Ev p162
(HC 36-II) Back
Ev p162
(HC 36-II) Back
See, for
example, Ev p27, p42, p46, p187 (HC 903-II); Q567 Back
Q601 Back
Q680, Q296,
Q329; Ev p178 (HC 903-II), Ev p205 (HC 36-II) Back
Ev p300
(HC 903-II) Back
Ev p98 (HC
903-II) Back
Q998 Back
Ev p182
(HC 903-II) Back
Q1241 Back
The Operation
of the Landfill Tax, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs
Committee, HC 150-I (1998-99) Paragraph 48 Back
Q999 Back
National
Audit Press Office, 9 February 2001, Departments of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer: HM Customs and Excise Appropriation Accounts
1999-2000 Back
Ev pp 207-208
(HC 903-II) Back
Waste
Strategy 2000, Part 1, Page 32 Back
Ev p50,
p98, p107, p311 (HC 903-II) Back
Ev p35,
p117 (HC 903-II), Ev p213 (HC 36-II) and memorandum from the
Northumbria Historic Churches Trust (Ev not published) Back
The Operation
of the Landfill Tax, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs
Committee, HC 150-I (1998-99), paragraph 51 Back
Q302 Back
Q875 Back
Q307 and
memorandum from the Northumbria Historic Churches Trust (Ev not
published) Back
See, for
example, Q309 ; Ev p46, p128 (HC 903-II) and letter from Biffa
Waste Services Ltd to Stephen Timms, MP (Ev not published) Back
Q999 Back
Q1234 Back
The Operation
of the Landfill Tax, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs
Committee, HC 150-I (1998-99), paragraph 69 Back
Available
on Ebco's website: http://www.ebco.org.uk Back
Ev p218
(HC 36-II) Back
Q859 Back
QQ860-862 Back
The Operation
of the Landfill Tax, Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs
Committee, HC 150-I (1998-99), paragraph 57 Back
Q846 Back
Ev p218
(HC 36-II) Back
Q783 Back
Q785 Back
Q873 Back
Ev p183
(HC 903-II) Back
Ev p231
(HC 903-II) Back