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Mr. Robert Syms (Poole): What happens to the rest of the Welsh Office structure upon the appointments that we are discussing? It is implicit in the Bill that there will be a Secretary of State. Will there be junior Ministers supporting the Secretary of State, as well as the structure within the assembly?

Mr. Ancram: It is my understanding that, unless they apply for P45s fairly soon, they will find themselves without work once the Bill has passed through Parliament. We are told that the Secretary of State will continue in office. We have not been told that personally; we await the end of what might be called the right hon. Gentleman's coy period, when he will tell us whether he will stand for the assembly or remain with us in the House.

I find it difficult to believe one story I read--that the right hon. Gentleman would try to do both things. That would make nonsense of devolution. The right hon. Gentleman would be bound by the collective responsibility of the Cabinet in Westminster, which he would have to apply to the collective responsibility of the assembly's Cabinet. I think that we would all agree that that would be constitutional nonsense.

I fear that the role of Secretary of State will be severely downgraded by the nature of devolution. We have discussed that previously, and I am sure that the issue will be raised again in another place when these matters are further discussed.

Amendments (a) and (c) to (m) to Government new clause 21, and amendment No. 198 to clause 149, are designed simply to rename the Executive Committee the assembly Cabinet. I believe in calling a duck a duck or a dog a dog. When the Secretary of State makes up his mind--that is, if he does so in the direction that I hope he will--the amendments will make total sense. I therefore hope that he will be prepared to accept them.

Dr. Marek: I shall make a quick intervention or, perhaps, a short speech. I did not intend to do so but earlier I asked my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State about the amendments that I have tabled on the responsibilities and loyalty of the civil service. I would not say that he brushed off my intervention, but he said that I could make my own points. I now propose to do so.

On those matters, I have considerable sympathy with the Opposition Front Bench. It would seem that they have not been thought through very carefully. For me, the problem is deciding where civil servants owe their loyalty. We know that civil servants, including permanent secretaries, meet all the time. They probably meet regularly once a week. The head of the National Assembly of Wales civil service will continue, I am sure, to meet heads of the civil service in the different Departments in Westminster. I am sure also that he or she will continue to do so once a week.

Furthermore, if there are problems within the civil service--I do not know the code in detail but there are procedures whereby problems are raised at a higher and higher level--at the end of the day, the person who carries

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the can is the secretary to the Cabinet, the head of the home civil service. That is the head of the Cabinet here for the Westminster Government, not for the assembly.

I happen to believe that, if a body has servants, those servants should owe loyalty to that body. Under a system of Committee government, that could have worked. The home civil service could have staffed the entire assembly. However, when we move to a Cabinet form of government, surely there must be servants whose primary duty is not to the Executive Committee or to the Westminster Government. There must be servants of the assembly whose loyalty is to non-executive members of that assembly, in much the same way as we have Clerks of Select Committees. We have also Clerks to the House of Commons. Until a few years ago, the Comptroller and Auditor General was a Government employee, but the previous Administration rightly changed the nature of that employment so that the Comptroller and Auditor General is paid for out of House of Commons voted money and owes his or her loyalty--in this instance, his--to the House.

I do not think that we can set up a system where a Back-Bench Member of the assembly will have no servants of that assembly to whom he or she can turn. It is an important issue, and I do not think that the Government have thought it through. There should be officers of the assembly and my amendments--no doubt they are imperfect, and there is no need for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to say that that is the position, if he comments upon those matters before the guillotine comes down at 7.30 pm--Nos. 231 to 233 illustrate the point. I hope that they will be taken up in another place if Members there see that there is merit in them.

Codes of practice are dealt with in new clause 29, which I tabled. It must be right that further consideration is given to codes of practice. Let us suppose that there is a difference of opinion between the national assembly and its Executive, the Executive Committee and the Cabinet in Westminster. How will that issue be resolved if the loyalty and codes of practice of civil servants--Her Majesty's home civil service--rest ultimately with the head of that civil service, who is Secretary to the Cabinet and the senior civil servant here in Westminster, whose loyalty is to the Westminster Government?

5.45 pm

I do not think that the issue has been thought through. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State may try to brush it away or under the carpet. I am not being rude to him, but I ask him to consider the matter. It is an important matter that needs to be clarified. It is important that officers of the national assembly should be servants of the national assembly in just the same way as the Clerks and officers of the House of Commons are servants of Westminster Back-Bench Members.

I do not want to speak for a long time because I appreciate that this will be a short debate. I have said what I wanted to say and I do not intend to amplify my remarks. As I have said, we are discussing an important matter.

Mr. Öpik: Throughout the many days of consideration of the Bill, we have complained that Ministers and the Government generally have not listened to various of our suggestions. Now, it has come as something of a surprise

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and a delight that the Government have made such a substantial effort to try to take on board points made by the Opposition. Slowly but surely, the Secretary of State is beginning to recognise the enormous value of the Liberal Democrats as the constitutional gurus in this place. I applaud that unequivocally.

Mr. Wigley: The hon. Gentleman's modesty knows no bounds.

Mr. Öpik: Indeed. Our constitutional prowess is second only to our humility.

My colleagues and I welcome the general thrust of the block of amendments that is before us. It has been interesting to listen to the concerns that have been raised by other hon. Members, which have been mainly about the confusion between whether it is a Cabinet structure or a Committee structure. As I tried to say earlier in a brief intervention, I do not see that this is a problem.

In modern management systems analysis, it has become clear that some of the best organisations, in ascertaining for themselves how they operate--slightly intuitive, slightly trial and error--come to the conclusion that, if they trust the individuals who are running those systems and consider them to be responsible and bright, they can trust them also to define what would be the best system for them to operate.

In that context, we must make the assumption that the good people of Wales will elect 60 responsible individuals who will be capable of making the right decisions. It is an exciting experiment, not a dangerous one, to allow the Welsh assembly to define its processes to such a degree.

Mr. John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings): As a constitutional guru, how would the hon. Gentleman answer the charge that, despite what he said about talented and bright individuals, the purpose of a constitution is to put in place institutions, conventions and rules that will control the excesses of individuals? A constitutional guru would surely recognise that. Perhaps he will point to a serious organisation, a state or a system of government where the constitution does not put in place such safeguards.

Mr. Öpik: I shall happily ask one of my colleagues to put together a seminar, at no cost, to the official Opposition so that we might discuss those matters at greater depth. However, to answer the hon. Gentleman's question briefly, as I try always to answer direct questions, the purpose of having a constitution is not to regulate every detail of process but to facilitate an outcome or result. We all want the assembly to work, but that does not mean that we must define in minute detail exactly how it will choose to structure itself any more than a company manager would need to define in detail how all staff members choose to operate in order to deliver a result.

Mr. Hayes: I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way twice. He has replied to my first question by referring to businesses. I do not know whether he has a background in business or industry, but I spent a long time in that sector. Companies do not have constitutions, because they are not subject to the pressures

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that I described. Business institutions do not have to have public safeguards in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests. That is a totally inappropriate analogy.


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